Is it your opinion then that Germany never stood a chance, no matter what tactics they would have employed?
On the contrary, it is fairly easy to contrive a set of circumstances where it might have been successful. Based of course on the fact that it is easy to be wise with hindsight. However, given the ability to see the history and the mistakes that were made, correcting them could have changed the outcome.
For example:
- The importance of the British Radar was underestimated and its function misunderstood. Leaving the coastal radar stations intact was a serious mistake, that with the wisdom of hindsight should have been taken out at all cost. It was also a mistake to bomb the open framed structures, that proved very difficult to destroy. It would have been far more effective to use commando raids or paratroopers to take out the radar, destroy the sites completely and kill or capture the operators for interrogation. By doing that the Luftwaffe would have gained the element of surprise, vital in all military operations. Everything else they did from that point would have been more successful and resulted in lighter casualties. With out their eyes, the RAF would have lost the ability to scramble fighters to intercept specific raids, the RAF would have needed to mount patrols, something that was totally unsustainable. By the time raids were spotted it would have been too late to intercept them on the way in, if at all. The RAF Squadrons would have ended up widely scattered trying to find raids based on information from ground spotters, very often chasing distant friendly aircraft up and down the coast and been very much less effective. Achieving that advantage alone, could easily have turned the course of the Battle in 1940.
- The importance of closing airfields was also misunderstood by both sides, the ability to relocate the aircraft with such ease made the effort almost futile, but trying to do it with air attacks alone was and still is only a temporary measure because filling up holes in the ground rarely presents any real difficulty. If you want to permanently deny the enemy the use of an airfield you need to have troops and tanks on the ground. Airborne assault again comes to mind, something that the Germans were very good at and honed to a fine art later in the war. That both sides misunderstood this back in 1940 is clear, in the German case because of they way the attacks were carried out out, and in the British case because of the unfortunate comment made by Dowding when the Germans switched their attacks to London he said it "... could be the German's biggest blunder." a comment that has given the German attacks on British airfields far more merit in the eyes of some post war writers than it really deserved
- Not getting troops on the ground as early as possible was the next mistake. Establishing a beachhead, even if it was initially done by airborne assault was vital, then the focus of the Luftwaffe could have been directed to ground support, local air superiority, and attacks on Navy ships to keep them out of the channel, all things that the Luftwaffe was better equipped for, and were much better at doing. As I mentioned earlier, England was ill prepared to repel invaders for some time after Dunkirk, and once a beachhead had been established it is doubtful that it could have been prevented from breaking out and pushing inland, because the Germans could then be more easily reinforced and because that type of offensive, using the Luftwaffe for close air support was formidable.
- The importance of gaining total air superiority was misunderstood, it simply wasn't necessary. The Germans only needed to secure local air superiority for the initial landing and break out. Destroying the RAF in the air was not essential for an invasion, it was only essential for Goring's ego. The RAF would have been easier to destroy by overrunning their airfields, as they did in Poland, France and later in Russia. By attempting to destroy the RAF in the air the Luftwaffe allowed sufficient time to pass so that the invasion was doomed due to bad weather
- Using tactical aircraft in a strategic role was another mistake that resulted in heavy losses. Facing a well trained, experienced fighter force highly motivated to defend their home territory, the Ju-87 Stukas and Bf-110s could not defend themselves effectively and the Bf-109’s short range was a problem.
The last point is an important one because during the Battle of Britain, the Germans attempted a strategic offensive with a Luftwaffe better equipped for a tactical offensive. The inadequate bombing power was a significant factor contributing to their failure.
However, few people may realise how close Germany came to having the worlds first strategic bomber fleet, equipped with four engined bombers that may have turned the tide at the Battle of Britain because not only would many of the German fighter escort problems have been solved, but the increase in the effectiveness of the bombers may well have been enough to tip the scales between victory and defeat.
For America, England and Germany alike, the development of a strategic bomber fleet rested with men of genius! For America, there was General William "Billy" E. Mitchell, who holds first place among men of exceptional practical foresight and military intuition! Despite his clear-sighted, and farsighted prophetic vision, Mitchell's ideas were not readily accepted by orthodox military thinkers in the USA, but despite many hardships and the odd court-martial he proved that he was right. In England, both Winston Churchill and "Bomber" Harris shared a vision of the efficacy of true strategic air power!
That vision was also shared by one man whose foresight might have changed the fortunes of the Luftwaffe. Major-General Wever had plans to produce four engined bombers as early as 1935 capable of carrying large bomb loads from German bases as far as the north of Scotland. The Dornier 19 had four 650hp radial engines and a top speed of 200mph and a range of almost 1000 miles. The Junkers 89 had four 960hp engines and a top speed of 245mph and similar range. However, Wever was killed in a flying accident in 1936 before his plans became concrete. In 1937 Kesselring was forced to sign the order to cancel the Do19 and Ju89 by Goring who knew that they could produce three twin engined bombers for the same time and cost as two four-engined bombers. He was quoted as saying "The Fuhrer will ask not how big the bombers are, but how many there are!" such was the fate of Germany's strategic bomber fleet.
Germany had lost the only man with the vision and ability to change their fortunes, and handed it over to Goring, a man who can (and that is being kind) only be described as incompetent! What would have happened if Wever had not perished in a plane crash, if Mitchell had not persevered, or if Harris had not had Churchill's support? It is almost certain that our history books would be very different than they are today, and perhaps they would not even be written in the same language.
Badboy
