What counts?

[Murdr]

Yes you can have knowledge without SA, or SA without Knowledge. However, only one of those 2 make a certain situation difficult, and that is the lack of knowledge.

On the same basis (current and accepted scientific analysis), pilot knowledge is considered a primary component of SA.

[Zazen13]

That is incorrect according to currnet analysis of human factors in aviation.  The choice is the output of SA, not a component of it.

That would be like saying food creates poop, but poop can exist without being the direct result of eating food, which is of course impossible. Poop is just the excreted unused remnants of food, or for the purpose of our discussion, processed information resulting in a decision, or a turd, as the case may be.

[Murdr]

That would be like saying food creates poop, but poop can exist without being the direct result of eating food, which is of course impossible. Poop is just the excreted unused remnants of food, or for the purpose of our discussion, processed information resulting in a decision, or a turd, as the case may be.

Ok, as silly as it seems I'll play along with your analogy... 
Food=environmental factors 
SA=digestive track
Poop=decision
Pooping=performance of action.

[Zazen13]

On the same basis (current and accepted scientific analysis), pilot knowledge is considered a primary component of SA.

 Knowledge could mean almost anything, that kind of general statement is pure fluff, it means nothing.

Knowledge of what? Your plane, their plane, physics, aerodynamics, BFMs, ACMs, the immediate vicinity, the larger strategic area, the price of tea in China, the going rate for a BJ, the relative E states and likely intentions of 20 friendly and enemy cons, etc?

The fact remains that decisions can be made based on observations alone, if knowledge of that information is what you're talking about well...duh?!? no chit?!? But, if by knowledge you mean of ACM's than that is a load of bull pucks. With almost no ACM knowledge very good decisions can be made based on SA alone such as whether to engage, disengage, switch targets, commit E to a con, preserve E and regain altitude etc. None of that requires any specific knowledge of ACMs necessarily, although it certainly couldn't hurt.

[Zazen13]

Poop=decision
Pooping=performance of action.

Good job, that's where we are at with this logic flow now. The poop, the decision itself, is purely a mental construct, it is unmanifested intention based upon the assimilation of raw external information. Depending on the situation, the course of action may or may not require additional skillsets or "knowledge" beyond just SA itself. Making decisions and acting upon them, assuming the action does not require specialized "knowledge", can be actualized without any further consideration other than SA itself by practically anyone, even a 2 week noob who doesn't even know what ACM means, but is endowed with some common sense and powers of observation.

Examples of this would be whether to engage, disengage, switch targets, commit E to a con, preserve E and regain altitude etc. None of that requires any specific knowledge of ACMs or any other "knowledge" necessarily other than the SA itself to make the decisions. The reason I know this is I was the noob 18 years ago who wouldn't know an immelman turn if it bit my wiener off, but I could still negotiate complex engagements successfully based entirely upon pervasive situational awareness and some common sense.

This is a big reason I really like sub-dividing Tactical Awareness and Strategic Awareness conceptually.  Tactical Awareness definitely does require specialized knowledge in every respect that I can conceive of. Strategic Awareness does not necessarily require anything more than the power of observation and common sense.

[Murdr]

Knowledge could mean almost anything, that kind of general statement is pure fluff, it means nothing.

"Pilot knownledge" is pretty self explanitory.  I'm not going to waste my time spelling out the depth of a knowledge base needed to help evaluate environmental information.

But, if by knowledge you mean of ACM's than that is a load of bull pucks.

Sure, one can make an effective decision without that knowledge, but the perspective pool of choices to pick from will be much more limited.

With almost no ACM knowledge very good decisions can be made based on SA alone such as whether to engage, disengage, switch targets,

I see, and what will the quality of possible choices be without a systems knowledge of your own aircraft, a basic knowledge of opposing aircrafts performance in relation to your own?

commit E to a con, preserve E and regain altitude etc.

That's going to be difficult to manage without a grasp of energy theory.

[Zazen13]

Sure, one can make an effective decision without that knowledge, but the perspective pool of choices to pick from will be much more limited.I see, and what will the quality of possible choices be without a systems knowledge of your own aircraft, a basic knowledge of opposing aircrafts performance in relation to your own? That's going to be difficult to manage without a grasp of energy theory.

I think we're understanding each other now. There's definitely decisions, especially at the purely tactical level, that all but require some specialized "knowledge" (ACM's). There's also a few decisions that I can think of on the strategic level that would not likely be considered without some additional skills and knowledge (eg: wingman coordination tactics, energy fighting techniques, evasive maneuvering techniques) beyond just SA and some common sense. So, I agree that "knowledge" can definitely enhance potentially both the efficacy and plurality of decisions you can make available to yourself to act upon with the same observational information. In WWII this became painfully obvious to Air Forces that by necessity skimped on training and solo flight times. But, just being aware of your surroundings alone combined with basic common sense and intelligence can provide the basis for many decisions that can translate into successful encounters.

When new pilots were taken up for the first time the first thing that was beaten into them had nothing to do with ACM's or combat specifically, it was always how to scan in "head on a swivel" fashion for bandits above them, check their 6 with a partial roll and wing dip to look for low bandits while staying in formation. Even very well trained pilots were often dead in a week because they're attention was on holding formation not keeping their SA up which alone would have saved them.

[Murdr]

Ah cool, just came across somthing that saves some typing.... Situation Awareness Analysis and Measurement book preview.  Page 5, SA definition.  Page 8, reasoning of the decision being a product of his model.  I didn't expect to find Endsley's book in an e-format.

[Zazen13]

Ah cool, just came across somthing that saves some typing.... Situation Awareness Analysis and Measurement book preview.  Page 5, SA definition.  Page 8, reasoning of the decision being a product of his model.  I didn't expect to find Endsley's book in an e-format.

Yea, I've read that before. He uncouples decision making from SA for the arbitrary reason of later being able to retrospectively evaluate the decision itself and the outcome of that decision more objectively. If the decision isn't evaluated independently in this way, from a military standpoint, it's much more difficult to determine what caused the positive or negative outcome, the good or bad decision itself, possibly flawed SA precipitating the decision or the influence of another mitigating factor (ie: mechanical failure, deception, personality factors). In real combat, good decisions can lead to failure and bad decisions can lead to success, so it's important to evaluate those situations in the interest of preserving life and resources in the future.

He admits that often the mental process of SA and the decisions from it are in actuality the same mental process, seamlessly coupled. Uncoupling them is just a theoretical convenience for the purpose of establishing after the fact cause and effect relationships for evaluation purposes.

In AH we have a very versatile filming tool and massive volumes of non-lethal sheer repetition of cartoon air combat experiences to use to exhaustively evaluate those cause and effect relationships. So, theoretically isolating the two inextricably interwined mental processes is not necessary. We have far more efficient methods available to reconstruct and evaluate the relative efficacy of our decisions and the factors that precipitated them.

[Murdr]

This is a big reason I really like sub-dividing Tactical Awareness and Strategic Awareness conceptually.  Tactical Awareness definitely does require specialized knowledge in every respect that I can conceive of. Strategic Awareness does not necessarily require anything more than the power of observation and common sense.

Not only has SA been previously broken down by categories, grouping them in a number of different ways.  But "Tactical Awareness", as I've been saying for pages, is already defined- "This knowledge domain stores facts about the identity and capabilities of all other units in the vicinity (and, if military, that will include their combat intention as well)". (Endsley).  But it is still a sub-category of SA and not a separate entity.

[Zazen13]

Not only has SA been previously broken down by categories, grouping them in a number of different ways.  But "Tactical Awareness", as I've been saying for pages, is already defined- "This knowledge domain stores facts about the identity and capabilities of all other units in the vicinity (and, if military, that will include their combat intention as well)". (Endsley).  But it is still a subcategory of SA and not a separate entity.

Yes, we've agreed that Tactical Awareness is a subset of Situational Awareness. But, that statement you quoted used my term Strategic Awareness. Which relates per my little equation I made earlier...

Strategic Awareness + Tactical Awareness = Situational Awareness

The term vicinity he uses as it evidentally relates to ground forces would be equivalent to considering bandits you are actually actively engaged with in close proximity in air combat or will be imminently.

Strategic Awareness on the other hand can be maintained, as he said in his description of SA on page 5, even without direct involvement in the engagement. You see people do this at furballs all the time, they come in with some altitude and spend some time aloof from any engagement, while gathering information, getting a feel for the ebb and flow of the battle, checking for high(er) bandits, before using that information to decide upon a time and place to apply himself actively in the engagement itself.

[Murdr]

The term vicinity he uses as it evidentally relates to ground forces would be equivalent to considering bandits you are actually actively engaged with in close proximity in air combat or will be imminently.

Well there's progress.  How many pages have I been saying that TA is assessing ALL immediate threats?

[Murdr]

Strategic Awareness on the other hand can be maintained, as he said in his description of SA on page 5, even without direct involvement in the engagement.

This is also not a new term. The thing I disagreed with your comments on StrA is that instead of being limited to visual cues, it is scoped well beyond visual range.

[SD67]

So, from what I can gather SA is the art of knowing when not to poop your pants.

[Murdr]

Yea, I've read that before. He uncouples decision making from SA for the arbitrary reason of later being able to retrospectively evaluate the decision itself and the outcome of that decision. If the decision isn't evaluated independently this way, from a military standpoint, it's much more difficult to determine what caused the positive or negative outcome, the good or bad decision itself, possibly flawed SA precipitating the decision or the influence of another mitigating factor (ie: mechanical failure, deception, personality factors). In real combat, good decisions can lead to failure and bad decisions can lead to success, so it's important to evaluate those situations in the interest of preserving life and resources in the future.

He admits that often the mental process of SA and the decisions from it are in actuality the same mental process, seamlessly coupled. Uncoupling them is just a theoretical convenience for the purpose of establishing after the fact cause and effect relationships for evaluation purposes.

In AH we have a versatile filming tool and massive volumes of non-lethal sheer repetition of cartoon air combat to use to evaluate those cause and effect relationships. So, theoretically isolating the two inextricably interwined mental processes is not necessary. We have far more efficient methods available to reconstruct and evaluate the relative efficacy of our decisions and what factors precipitated them.

It is not just from a "military standpoint".  This goes across the board into commercial and private aviation.  The same analysis that evaluates poor decisions and accidents in real life results in forming training simulation scenarios.  Repetition of training simulations with unpredictable problems posed to the trainee is then evaluated again as a learning tool.  The AH situation is not unique or set apart from that. 

I evaluate films for players often enough.  Observing a breakdown in SA is clear.  Observing a bad decision is clear.  It's often not too hard to spot when a bad decision resulted from poor SA, though it helps when there is feedback from the player.  A breakdown in SA does not always lead to a bad decision.  A bad decision cannot be assumed to have resulted from poor SA.  This is exactly why they can be separated for the sake of discussion.  I see no practial purpose in coupling them back together.