Who defeated Germany?

[Angus]

You are assuming that Germany would have any forces in Africa had Britain surrendered. Again, Germany had too many other immediate problems to dither around in Africa. They only put forces in to prop up the hopeless Italians who were butchered by the Brits.

You have to stay within the "what if" scenario.


My regards,

Widewing

Had Britain surrendered, Germany would have held Gibraltar,- which we today know that they really wanted. So, there would be no getting-into N-Africa from the med.
The Italian Navy was also something to consider. They just were unlucky enough to face Cunningham, probably the best naval commander of WW2...
The French navy in N-Africa must also get into the equation. Same fate though....
Anyway, had Britain surrendered, I would see no reason for the Japs to make war on the USA, nor the Germans, nor the USA on the Axis, since they didn't in the first place in RL. The British colonies being handed on a plate would have solved the embargo, making the USSR a natural enemy for the Japs, and the USSR was uhhmm, a big slice:D
A British surrender would also have handed the Suez canal to the Axis, linking all their naval power.
So, in my opinion, British surrender in 1940=NO WAY for an allied victory.

[Anaxogoras]

That puts things into perspective and makes me wonder what Roosevelt was thinking.  Apparently, when Roosevelt was corresponding with Churchill after the fall of France, and everyone expected the UK to surrender in a few weeks, Churchill asked for help one last time before the showdown.  Roosevelt responded with "Don't let them capture your fleet; let us have it..." or something along those lines.  Of course, I know that the USA was in no mood for global warfare at that point, but it's surprising that the USA had no treaty obligations to come to the UK's defense (never signed up for the League of Nations, though that also failed).

On the topic of why collective security in the League of Nations failed, Stanley Baldwin said:

The real reason, or the main reason, was that we discovered in the process of weeks that there was no country except the aggressor country which was ready for war...

[zuii]

I'm happy to report that my grandfather defeated Germany. This was told to me in great detail when i was 5 or 6 years old and i believe it. I would sit on his stomach (he was a big guy) while he laid on his hammock. He had a beer in one hand and a cigarette in the other and related all the exploits he and his buddies went through. They killed everyone and broke everthing. They were the ones responsible for every defeat Germany suffered. Then he would sing dirty songs he and his buddies made up about women and my grandmother would come out of the house and smack him on the head for exposing me to "such language". So now we know , my grandfather defeated Germany! 


zuii

[Widewing]

Wow, you gents really need to research the British government's contingency planning. Britain would not have surrendered the "Empire". There were plans to govern from Canada should an invasion of Great Britain occur and prove successful. No colonies would have been handed over, nor the Suez, nor Gibraltar, nor the Royal Navy.

Of course, anyone who has researched the plans for Operation Sea Lion will realize that the plan was horribly flawed and virtually doomed to failure. Several major studies were conducted since the war, and every one of them demonstrated that it was a recipe for a major German defeat. Certainly the Wehrmacht was unenthusiastic about the plan and greatly relieved when, in a rare moment of clarity, Hitler called it off. Besides, he had been obsessing over the Soviet Union all along.

Also, the US invasion of Morocco was from the Atlantic, not the Med. It seems you have forgotten about North Africa's Atlantic coast.

As usual, more credit is given to Germany than is truly deserved. Indeed, Germany lacked anything approaching an effective surface navy. As Germany was to discover, the U-boat fleet was vulnerable to hunter-killer tactics and was systematically destroyed. Germany did not have the resources to effectively control more than they occupied by the end of 1941. As we were to see, large numbers of German troops in eastern Europe were tied down defending against partisans. Germany's reach consistently exceeded its grasp, as did Japan's.

Germany's best chance for winning was centered on a negotiated peace with Great Britain. That may have occurred had Lord Halifax become Prime Minister after Chamberlain. However, with Churchill in command, a negotiated peace was completely impossible.

My regards,

Widewing

[FLOTSOM]

I'm happy to report that my grandfather defeated Germany. This was told to me in great detail when i was 5 or 6 years old and i believe it. I would sit on his stomach (he was a big guy) while he laid on his hammock. He had a beer in one hand and a cigarette in the other and related all the exploits he and his buddies went through. They killed everyone and broke everthing. They were the ones responsible for every defeat Germany suffered. Then he would sing dirty songs he and his buddies made up about women and my grandmother would come out of the house and smack him on the head for exposing me to "such language". So now we know , my grandfather defeated Germany! 


zuii

Well <SALUTE> to your Gramps ZUII!!!!!!

we the free world owe him and your family a debt of gratitude that could never be repaid!!

 

 

FLOTSOM

[FLOTSOM]

Wow, you gents really need to research the British government's contingency planning. Britain would not have surrendered the "Empire". There were plans to govern from Canada should an invasion of Great Britain occur and prove successful. No colonies would have been handed over, nor the Suez, nor Gibraltar, nor the Royal Navy.

Of course, anyone who has researched the plans for Operation Sea Lion will realize that the plan was horribly flawed and virtually doomed to failure. Several major studies were conducted since the war, and every one of them demonstrated that it was a recipe for a major German defeat. Certainly the Wehrmacht was unenthusiastic about the plan and greatly relieved when, in a rare moment of clarity, Hitler called it off. Besides, he had been obsessing over the Soviet Union all along.

Also, the US invasion of Morocco was from the Atlantic, not the Med. It seems you have forgotten about North Africa's Atlantic coast.

As usual, more credit is given to Germany than is truly deserved. Indeed, Germany lacked anything approaching an effective surface navy. As Germany was to discover, the U-boat fleet was vulnerable to hunter-killer tactics and was systematically destroyed. Germany did not have the resources to effectively control more than they occupied by the end of 1941. As we were to see, large numbers of German troops in eastern Europe were tied down defending against partisans. Germany's reach consistently exceeded its grasp, as did Japan's.

Germany's best chance for winning was centered on a negotiated peace with Great Britain. That may have occurred had Lord Halifax become Prime Minister after Chamberlain. However, with Churchill in command, a negotiated peace was completely impossible.

My regards,

Widewing

from the Atlantic or the Mediterranean is of no real matter. the us could not have sailed an invasion force of the size needed to make a formidable landing in Africa without the ability to stage them from a closer and secured location.

the British government had plans to evacuate, but would it have survived the move as a formidable government? doubtful.

yes some of the studies of today suggest that operation sealion would have ended in failure, but then again they also say that the invasion of Normandy with less than a full day window (approximately an 18 hour window) of anticipated clear weather would be impossible and doomed to failure. but Rommel was at home and no one wanted to wake up Hitler, flukes of timing and circumstance that changed the face of the war.

more credit given to germany than is deserved? reread your history. they accomplished far more than any of the allies would have hoped to accomplish on their own.

i have never read anything that would suggest that the Wehrmacht was anything less than exalted at the thought of invading their snotty nosed neighbors in Britain. I have also read no where that said definitively that operation sea lion was doomed to failure, troubles yes, but inevitable failure no.

the German u-boat threat to England by itself almost defeated the British by starvation. the British could not defend against the wolf packs until after the Americans provided them sonar and destroyers to use as sub hunters. the allies could not even be said to have held a solid victory against the wolf packs until late in 43 early 44, long after England would have starved to death without American intervention.

FLOTSOM

[expat]

 Ships were provided to the RN by the US , however take a look at the list in the link below
   http://www.battleships-cruisers.co.uk/lend_lease_destroyers.htm
These were basically world war one ships , also we had sonar , it was called ASDIC by the RN .
The wolf packs were finally sorted once BOTH  the US and the UK had suitable patrol aircraft  .

[Masherbrum]

Who deserves the most credit for defeating Germany in WWII?

Hitler. 

[expat]

id go along with that the  man started out well but really lost it beeg style

[DMBEAR]

Been fun reading everones take on this.  I don't have an opinion on who deserves the most credit for defeating the Germans. 
 
Undoubtedly, the allies pace would have been slowed w/o the Russians battling the Germans, and vice versa.  However, as soon as B-29's with that Special Delivery started showing up I think the results would have been the same. 

[Angus]

Ships were provided to the RN by the US , however take a look at the list in the link below
   http://www.battleships-cruisers.co.uk/lend_lease_destroyers.htm
These were basically world war one ships , also we had sonar , it was called ASDIC by the RN .
The wolf packs were finally sorted once BOTH  the US and the UK had suitable patrol aircraft  .

The deal was done in 1941, when Britain was out of its worst part.

Widewing, I am aware of the "evac" thoughts of Britain, in case the island fell. But what they'd have left behind was a lot of their power (Industries, population, technology, and the face). A very bad position regarding Gibraltar for instance, since Franco also wanted it. A long distance as well from any strongpoint to hold out the connection to the colonies. An Open atlantic to all Axis shipping, since the UK and the GIUK gate held a certain plug on the Kriegsmarine.
And at last, do not forget, that technically Germany could trade with the USA until 1941, it was just not feasible because of the RN. In 1940 even, German POW's transported to Canada could escape and have their freedom in the USA.
Sorry, I do not see an allied Victory had the UK fallen.

[Anaxogoras]

The deal was done in 1941, when Britain was out of its worst part.

Actually, the early part of 1942 was also a bad time for allied shipping.  And quite a lot of tonnage was sunk in early '43, too, resulting in low fuel supplies in Britain.

[MiloMorai]

Something I picked up off the web a long time ago.

***********
1939:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Sep39 48/178,621
Oct39 33/156,156
Nov39 27/72,721
Dec39 39/101,823
Tot39 147 (36.75/month)/509,321 (127,330.25/month)

British merchant ship construction capacity from 1939-1941 did not exceed 1.2 million GRT per year.
US merchant ship construction in 1939 was 0.242 million GRT.

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Aug39 19/2
Sep39 3/0
Oct39 13/3
Nov39 10/1/1
Dec39 5/1/1
Tot39 50/7/2 (an average of 10 patrols per month and 14% lost)

Thus for 1939, an average of 2.94 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 21 ships sunk (note that throughout these averages will be slightly inflated since they do not include the minor contribution of the Italian submarine fleet.)

1940:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan40 53/163,029
Feb40 50/182,369
Mar40 26/69,826
Apr40 6/30,927
May40 14/61,635
Jun40 66/375,069
Jul40 41/301,975
Aug40 56/288,180
Sep40 60/288,180
Oct40 66/363,267
Nov40 36/181,695
Dec40 46/256,310
Tot40 520 (43.33/month)/2,462,867 (205,238.91/month)
US merchant ship construction for 1940 was about 0.5 million GRT.

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan40 8/2
Feb40 10/3
Mar40 10/2
Apr40 19/3
May40 8/0/2
Jun40 18/3/1
Jul40 4/0
Aug40 16/2/1
Sep40 12/0
Oct40 13/2
Nov40 14/1
Dec40 6/0
Tot40 138/18/3 (an average of 11.5 patrols per month and 13% lost)

Thus for 1940, an average of 3.77 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 28.89 ships sunk.

1941:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan41 23/129,711
Feb41 47/254,118
Mar41 41/236,549
Apr41 41/239,719
May41 63/362,268
Jun41 66/325,817
Jul41 26/112,624
Aug41 27/85,603
Sep41 57/212,237
Oct41 28/170,786
Nov41 15/76,056
Dec41 23/93,226
Tot41 457 (38.08/month)/2,298,714 (191,559.5/month)
US merchant ship construction 1941 0.804 million GRT

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan41 10/0
Feb41 18/3/2
Mar41 15/3/3
Apr41 14/2/2
May41 21/0/2
Jun41 22/2/3
Jul41 24/1/9
Aug41 42/5/9
Sep41 38/0/2
Oct41 37/0/6
Nov 41 27/5/5
Dec41 49/4/6
Tot 41 287/25/49 (an average of 23.9 patrols sailing per month and 8.7% lost)

Thus for 1941, an average of 1.59 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 18.28 ships sunk.

1942:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan42 56/310,224
Feb42 72/429,255
Mar42 93/507,514
Apr42 81/418,161
May42 129/616,835
Jun42 136/636,926
Jul42 96/467,051
Aug42 117/587,245
Sep42 96/461,794
Oct42 89/583,690
Nov42 126/802,160
Dec42 64/337,618
Tot42 1,155 (96.25/month)/6,158,473 (513,206.08/month)
British and Canadian merchant ship construction 1942 1.8 million GRT
US merchant ship construction 1942 5.433 million GRT

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan42 50/2/5
Feb42 29/3/2
Mar42 32/2
Apr42 37/2/2
May42 23/3
Jun42 39/9/5
Jul42 45/7/3
Aug42 58/10/4
Sep42 52/8/8
Oct42 62/6/10
Nov42 54/8/6
Dec42 59/8/7
Tot42 540/68/57 (an average of 45 patrols sailing per month and 12.6% lost)

Thus for 1942, an average of 2.14 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 16.99 ships sunk.

1943:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan43 44/307,196
Feb43 67/362,081
Mar43 110/633,731
Apr43 50/287,137
May43 46/237,182
Jun43 17/76,090
Jul43 46/237,777
Aug43 20/92,443
Sep43 16/98,852
Oct43 20/91,295
Nov43 9/30,726
Dec43 8/55,794
Tot43 452 (37.67/month)/2,510,304 (209,192/month)
US merchant ship construction 1943 13.081 million GRT

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan43 61/13/11
Feb43 72/8/9
Mar43 59/16/10
Apr43 95/35/18
May43 55/23/9
Jun43 46/23/9
Jul43 39/27/7 (49 total patrols of all types)
Aug43 33/12/6
Sep43 32/11/10
Oct43 62/23/9
Nov43 36/9/4
Dec43 31/10/2
Tot43 621/210/104 (an average of 51.75 patrols sailing per month and 33.8% lost)

Thus for 1943, an average of 0.73 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 2.15 ships sunk.

So, overall, the most successful year for the U-Boats was 1940, before the expansion of the force allowed for an increase of more than about a dozen patrols sailing per month, and well prior to the entry of the US and its shipbuilding capacity into the war. Worse, the performance of the U-Boat force in 1941 and 1942 never exceeded its performance in the first months of the war. And, after 1943 the U-Boat campaign became ever less relevent to the outcome of the war.

Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Tot44 125/663,308
Tot45 63/284,476

US merchant ship construction for 1944 was 12.257 million GRT
US merchant ship construction for 1945 (through 1 May) was 3.548 million GRT

U-Boat Fleet to 1Sep42
On 19Aug39 there were 57 U-Boats in commission, 20 sea-going U-Boats and 18 ‘ducks’ were fully ready to put to sea
Total number U-Boats deployed to 1Sep42 275
Total number lost 94
Total number retired 10
Total number available 171

U-Boat Fleet 1Sep42 to 1May45
Total number deployed 1Sep42 to 1May45 531
Total number lost 1Sep42 to 1May45 568

British controlled merchant shipping over 1,600 GRT (number/in thousands of gross tons)
3Sep39 2,999/17,784
30Sep40 3,75721,373
30Sep41 3,608/20,552
31Dec41 3,616/20,693

Thus, despite the ‘success’ of the U-Boat force in 1940 (relative to its performance in 1941 and 1942) it had no appreciable effect in reducing the size of the British merchant fleet.

Numbers of ships arriving and losses in North Atlantic convoys inbound to Britain (ships arriving/losses)
1939 700/5 (7.1%)
1940 5,434/133 ((2.5%)
1941 5,923/153 (2.6%)
1942 4,798/80 (1.7%)
1943 5,667/87 (1.5%)
1944 7,410/8 (0.1%)

The operational U-Boat force from 1943-1945 never approached a "steady 400-500 boat." Rather, during 1942 the peak strength of boats assigned to combat flotillas (including those under repair for combat-damage and breakdowns, but excluding those assigned to school flotillas, experimental projects, or otherwise retired from combat) was 202, during November. The low in 1942 was 89 in January. The average monthly strength during 1942 was 143.83. The strength of the force peaked in May 1943 at 237. It had declined to a low of 159 by November. Average monthly strength during 1943 was 197.58. The peak strength during 1944 was 168 in February, the low was 146 in November. Average monthly strength in 1944 was 157.83. The peak strength in 1945 was April with 165, the low was May with 134, prior to the surrender. <http://www.onwar.com/ubb/smile.gif>

At that, these were much better than 1939 (average of 19.5 monthly), 1940 (average of 18.75 monthly) and 1941 (average of 47.5 monthly). OTOH, the 'bang for their buck' was probably highest in 1940, which was also arguably the U-Boats most 'successful' year in terms of ships sunk per patrol and U-Boats lost per ship sunk (see my previous reply).

[FLOTSOM]

Something I picked up off the web a long time ago.

Awsome job!!

good research!!

 

[Angus]

Actually, the early part of 1942 was also a bad time for allied shipping.  And quite a lot of tonnage was sunk in early '43, too, resulting in low fuel supplies in Britain.

I was referring to daylight bombing and the threat of invasion as well.
And 1942 includes the Arctic convoys as well, who started late in '41