More MAX information

[Busher]

I just read the report and having seen too many of these over my career there are a few things that do jump off the pages.

The first is the snag (pilot reported system issues logged when they occur) list on page 20. It sadly does not say if these were all the complaints associated with this airplane. And let me be clear; all airplanes new and old, have snags.
For those who are not in the industry or do not have an aviation background, all of the noted rectifications basically read "system ground tested and no fault found". These four snags are such that an experienced airline pilot would clearly see them to be related. The accident airplane as noted in the report, demonstrated airspeed differences between the Captain's and the First Officer's instruments. One thing I should add... the snag history of an airplane and the associated rectifications, are in the aircraft journey logbook and available to review by each crew when they take over the airplane.
While the rectifications entered in the logbook do return the aircraft state to "serviceable", I can say without doubt that none of the pilots in my peer group would have flown it. Four serious possibly pitot/static issues demanded a far deeper maintenance investigation with test flights performed by management pilots to duplicate the problem.

The second notable item from page 9 is that engine power at 94% N1 (a typical takeoff setting) did not change during the short flight. I could find no explanation as to why power was not reduced but that power setting would have lead to a rapid overspeed. For those without jet experience, 250 knots indicated at 6000 to 10000 feet in level flight requires roughly 65% N1.

The last notable item that I saw from page 11, was the suggestion that the pilots were unable to trim the airplane manually. The 737/727 manual trim wheels require a lot of turning to change the trim loading a small amount. To make changes quickly, a hand crank pops out but as some questioned, it is not more difficult to move the trim wheel when control inputs are applied.. aggressively or not. How the manual trim system could possibly fail, I have no idea and it is not addressed.

All of this it would seem is academic. As I typed this while watching the news, the Chairman of Boeing apologized to the world and fell on his sword.

[Busher]

One more thing to clarify for Pembquist, Airplane manufacturers are very cognisant of their responsibility to train pilots to the standards of their flight manual.
When my airline made a purchase of a new type, before we even brought the first airplane home, a group of instructors would go to the manufacturer's training center (Seattle in the case of a new Boeing) to be trained by Boeing's own instructors. The first group of line pilots to fly the type would then go to Seattle to be trained by our own instructors under the watchful eyes of the Boeing instructors. Only after acceptable training standards are established do the airlines begin training their own pilots.
I will always maintain that its still and will always be an apprenticeship.

[Vraciu]

“Investigators found that pilots on the Ethiopian flight turned the anti-stall system off and back on again to try to regain control of the plane...”

If true well...   There you go.  They f’ed up.  You don’t turn it back on after it runs away.  (You can try testing one side at a time if you’re brave enough and the QRH says to, but that’s airplane-specific.)

[Vraciu]

I just read the report and having seen too many of these over my career there are a few things that do jump off the pages.

The first is the snag (pilot reported system issues logged when they occur) list on page 20. It sadly does not say if these were all the complaints associated with this airplane. And let me be clear; all airplanes new and old, have snags.
For those who are not in the industry or do not have an aviation background, all of the noted rectifications basically read "system ground tested and no fault found". These four snags are such that an experienced airline pilot would clearly see them to be related. The accident airplane as noted in the report, demonstrated airspeed differences between the Captain's and the First Officer's instruments. One thing I should add... the snag history of an airplane and the associated rectifications, are in the aircraft journey logbook and available to review by each crew when they take over the airplane.
While the rectifications entered in the logbook do return the aircraft state to "serviceable", I can say without doubt that none of the pilots in my peer group would have flown it. Four serious possibly pitot/static issues demanded a far deeper maintenance investigation with test flights performed by management pilots to duplicate the problem.

The second notable item from page 9 is that engine power at 94% N1 (a typical takeoff setting) did not change during the short flight. I could find no explanation as to why power was not reduced but that power setting would have lead to a rapid overspeed. For those without jet experience, 250 knots indicated at 6000 to 10000 feet in level flight requires roughly 65% N1.

The last notable item that I saw from page 11, was the suggestion that the pilots were unable to trim the airplane manually. The 737/727 manual trim wheels require a lot of turning to change the trim loading a small amount. To make changes quickly, a hand crank pops out but as some questioned, it is not more difficult to move the trim wheel when control inputs are applied.. aggressively or not. How the manual trim system could possibly fail, I have no idea and it is not addressed.

All of this it would seem is academic. As I typed this while watching the news, the Chairman of Boeing apologized to the world and fell on his sword.

250 knots below 10,000’ is not universal so are you talking an aerodynamic overspeed?

[Busher]

250 knots below 10,000’ is not universal so are you talking an aerodynamic overspeed?

Yes. I had little care about the 250 knot speed limit in North America. I used 250 and about 65% N1 as an example of speed related to power.
But 94% N1 in a 737 will overspeed the airframe (I suspect Vne is likely 340ish) on one engine let alone both.

[Vraciu]

Yes. I had little care about the 250 knot speed limit in North America. I used 250 and about 65% N1 as an example of speed related to power.
But 94% N1 in a 737 will overspeed the airframe (I suspect Vne is likely 340ish) on one engine let alone both.

Gotcha. 

Thanks.   

(In the Embraer I fly fuel flow most of the time—fuel flow per engine x 2 equals airspeed—but concur with your rough estimate.   When I level off my N1 max -20 gives me 250 and it’s right in that 65% range.   Three-hole Falcons are another story, but still in the 60s I believe, as you noted.)

[pembquist]

Thank you Busher, that is what I thought. I always enjoy reading your posts as they are very informative and straight forward.

Shuffler I understand your point, essential to the point I was trying to make is that big airplanes are not like buses and cars. I sympathize with the idea that the manufacturer shouldn't be held responsible for negligence on the part of the user. The argument for negligence on Boeing's part would be that they did not change their flight manual to include the MCAS system the counter argument is that they did not need to because the existing manual and training would have enabled the pilots to recognize and react appropriately to address a malfunction without knowledge of the MCAS system. I don't think there is a workable parallel to cars and buses here.

I can think of a slightly half baked hypothetical, my boat has a battery switch with a placard put there by the boat maker back in 1977 that says essentially don't touch this switch with the engine running. The reason is you can fry the alternator if you do that. Imagine if it was slightly more dire and touching the switch might cause a fire instead of just ruining the alternator. Now imagine the boat builder hadn't put that placard there nor mentioned the fact that throwing the switch could cause a fire in any of the manuals that came with the boat. Now you could say, "well everybody knows that you don't touch the battery switch when the engine is running," however unless you mean some small fraction of the boat buying public you would be wrong. Imagine further that this boat is peculiar and most boats don't catch fire when you touch their battery switches.  You get the picture, a boat full of tourists captained by a captain that knows that boat electrical systems are a frequent cause of fire but has never heard that touching the battery switch itself could cause one. Boat catches fire everybody drowns. I don't think 100% of people are going to believe that the fault was entirely the captains and are going to ask "Why didn't you just placard the switch boat maker?"

I know this is not directly analogous to the MCAS issue but it is what I could think of spur of the moment to try to illustrate the underlying arguments.

[Toad]

You can go buy a car or a bus with no license. It is not the manufacturer that requires a license.

Is Boeing responsible for licensing pilots or is it the airlines/end user?

Indeed. In the US, the FAA is responsible for licensing pilots. Not the aircraft manufacturer nor the airline. That said, the FAA does designate examiners that do not work for the FAA directly. These DEs represent the FAA when giving flight tests and flight checks. Airlines generally all have FAA Designated Examiners. This is simply because the FAA (read Federal Government) doesn't have enough FAA Examiners to do the job throughout all of aviation. They would have to hire thousands and thousands more FAA Examiner, which they aren't going to do if they can shove the financial burden off on the users.

Similarly, the FAA certifies aircraft as airworthy and approved for US in US airspace. This is done under 14 CFR Part 25 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES.

The aircraft manufacturer must build their aircraft to meet these standards and the aircraft undergo certification tests.

Similarly the aircraft manufacturer must supply an Airplane Flight Manual that the FAA must also approve. It's the 'how to' for the aircraft's operation.

So before you offer the Boeing engineers/managers a last cigarette and a blindfold before you line them all up to be shot at sunrise, don't forget the FAA approved the MAX as it is today and approved the AFM as well.

[MiloMorai]

Boeing (CEO) has publicly accepted blame and apologizes for the 2 MAX accidents and loss of life.

Video with taped statement by the CEO: https://www.yahoo.com/news/preliminary-report-says-pilots-ethiopian-093005543.html

The chairman of Boeing acknowledged Thursday for the first time that a new maneuvering system was responsible for two plane crashes that killed almost 350 people, and he apologized to the families and friends of the victims.

"We at Boeing are sorry for the lives lost in the recent 737 accidents and are relentlessly focused on safety to ensure tragedies like this never happen again," CEO Dennis Muilenburg said in a videotaped statement posted on Twitter.

[ACE]

You hate to see it.

[Vraciu]

Boeing (CEO) has publicly accepted blame and apologizes for the 2 MAX accidents and loss of life.

Video with taped statement by the CEO: https://www.yahoo.com/news/preliminary-report-says-pilots-ethiopian-093005543.html

The chairman of Boeing acknowledged Thursday for the first time that a new maneuvering system was responsible for two plane crashes that killed almost 350 people, and he apologized to the families and friends of the victims.

"We at Boeing are sorry for the lives lost in the recent 737 accidents and are relentlessly focused on safety to ensure tragedies like this never happen again," CEO Dennis Muilenburg said in a videotaped statement posted on Twitter.

They got cornered. 


That said, I find it almost impossible to believe MCAS wasn’t mentioned in a manual somewhere.   (See my screenshot of the MCAS page of the 737-7/8 Differences Manual.)

United seemed to be aware of it.   So...

I am an EMBRAER guy not a Boeing guy.   Every manufacturer has its quirks (and I’m typed in Cessna, Dassault, IAI, Gulfstream, Embraer, etc.) so I can only explain what I see from that viewpoint.    Boeing has a lot of stupid, ridiculous, primitive sh— in their planes, but that is driven more by antiquated regs (common type rating) than anything else, IMHO.     They’ve also worked well for a long time. 

[JOACH1M]

You hate to see it.

You really do, chat.

[MiloMorai]

Preliminary report, http://www.ecaa.gov.et/documents/20435/0/Preliminary+Report+B737-800MAX+%2C(ET-AVJ).pdf?fbclid=IwAR3NUwxrSFR-3L2afsb1EQS914Wm-ECeoSDCJVmaSKHUCOxUHDZHikoIF8s

[Toad]

I wonder if now all the data from the Voice Recorder and Data Recorder will be turned over to the NTSB. This because the FAA is implicated due to their Part 25 certification of the MAX.

I think the Boeing CEO did what his paid crisis management advisors told him to do.

I haven't had time to read the entire prelim but I intend to do so. Busher points out a few head scratchers in that report. I'm wondering if the FDR records engagement/disengagement of Stab Trim Cutouts.

Still a lot of questions.

[deSelys]

Meanwhile.  These two had 159 hours COMBINED on the 737.   That's a Green-On-Green that is generally prohibited by USA carriers.

The report states 1417 + 207 hours on 737, 103 + 56 on the MAX 8. As the 737 type rating is valid across all series (and as the MAX 8 didn't require extra training from the NG), is it correct to add all hours by type rating to give an idea of the crew experience or is it more realistic to differentiate by series (Classic, NG and MAX)? 

Side question: how can crews gain enough experience when a new plane model rolls out?

Another question: Vraciu's image from a manual explaining MCAS comes from the Boeing 737 -7/-8 systems differences manual vol. 1: is it a manual aimed at pilots or technicians? (http://www.b737.org.uk/images/mcas-mtm.jpg)

Thanks