More MAX information

[Puma44]

Busher

You were right.

I was wrong. There are WAY more people out there that reason like a 12 year old than I ever imagined.

And far too many of them hold political office and are experts on all things, just ask them.

[bustr]

At least no Hollywood actors who played Boeing test pilots have testified in hearings before Congress about this issue.

[Oldman731]

At least no Hollywood actors who played Boeing test pilots have testified in hearings before Congress about this issue.

The day is young.

- oldman

[DaveBB]

I just learned today in the Ethiopian crash that the flight crew had to switch the MCAS system back on multiple times in order for the electric trim to work.  When it was off, they couldn't trim the stabilizer for some reason.  They followed procedure and shut it off, but for some reason they couldn't get the horizontal stabilizer to trim.

[FLS]

I just learned today in the Ethiopian crash that the flight crew had to switch the MCAS system back on multiple times in order for the electric trim to work.  When it was off, they couldn't trim the stabilizer for some reason.  They followed procedure and shut it off, but for some reason they couldn't get the horizontal stabilizer to trim.

Today you can learn about manual trim and going too fast because you left the throttle setting too high.

[Puma44]

I just learned today in the Ethiopian crash that the flight crew had to switch the MCAS system back on multiple times in order for the electric trim to work.  When it was off, they couldn't trim the stabilizer for some reason.  They followed procedure and shut it off, but for some reason they couldn't get the horizontal stabilizer to trim.

That again brings up the question, did they deploy the center console manual trim handles (knee knockers) and actually try.

[Vraciu]

I just learned today in the Ethiopian crash that the flight crew had to switch the MCAS system back on multiple times in order for the electric trim to work.  When it was off, they couldn't trim the stabilizer for some reason.  They followed procedure and shut it off, but for some reason they couldn't get the horizontal stabilizer to trim.

Their direct violation of the NNC exacerbated their problem, along with the aforementioned failure to reduce thrust. 


If  you turn a runaway trim system on after disabling it guess what happens. 

[Puma44]

Today you can learn about manual trim and going too fast because you left the throttle setting too high.

Pretty much Private Pilot 101 stuff. 

[Mister Fork]

Pretty much Private Pilot 101 stuff. 

...and both forgot the #1 pilot rule when crap goes downhill...

FLY THE PLANE

[Busher]

...and both forgot the #1 pilot rule when crap goes downhill...

FLY THE PLANE

You're so right but sadly I'll repeat myself again; the powers that be have successfully maligned what I believe to be another fine airplane.

[bustr]

Here is an unintended consequence of the MAX incidents which is probably why all the MAX were grounded to try and curtail this kind of witch hunt to hurt Boeing. Since the two Boeing crashes are still fresh in the public's memory, this article by the NY Times is a perfect hair on fire horror story bashing Boeing, and so far no 787 has ever crashed. It's also a bait and switch attack on Boeing's choice of North Carolina for a production site specifically due to it being a right to work state. Boeing wanted to reduce production costs for the 787 by not paying union wages. The story details "alleged" whistle blower safety complaints and interviews with retired and fired employees. It never specifically says, if the NC production site was union, there would be a higher quality of production and less of the issues outlined in the story. But, half way through the article they finally get to the fact NC has the lowest union participation in the country and Boeing wouldn't allow union employees from Washington to be sent there to help production. And admit an Air Force contract was shut down for awhile over similar issues at a Boeing union staffed plant in Washington.

In the end I suspect only pilots care about pilots and what really happened, while civilians only care about the latest horror story that says the sky might fall on them if they fly on some company's airplane this month. 

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/20/business/boeing-dreamliner-production-problems.html?utm_source=pocket-newtab

[deSelys]

Interesting article:

https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/how-the-boeing-737-max-disaster-looks-to-a-software-developer

[FLS]

Stupid article. He thinks the mandatory MCAS update information was hidden from the pilots to increase sales. He ignores the pilots actual actions and concludes it was a software failure. Poor writing with no actual analysis.

[deSelys]

Dunno...

-Isn't it true that the 737 type rating covers all the models from the -300 to the MAX? What about the differences trainings? Is there an exam evaluated by an independent examiner at the end?

-2 other interesting points IMO:

• software is usually written by people with much less of an aeronautical 'culture' than e.g. mechanical engineers
• software certification would not be on the same level as certification of 'nuts, bolts and wires' components

[FLS]

Dunno...

That's correct. That's why everything seems plausible.