109's kill ratio (all variants from B to K)

[Nomak]

Hehehe.......good debate fellas.......

[GScholz]

Also the 109 was a demanding aircraft to fly, so was the 190. Late in the war the Luftwaffe couldn't field pilots with enough experience to use the 109 to it's full potential, except for a few experten.

[HoHun]

Hi Nomak,

>"The Mustang, after its conversion to the Merlin engine in 1942, was a fast, long-range, strategic escort fighter with an easy 8-hour endurance. Like the T-bolt it would dive like a banshee, well ahead of the Spit and all German craft."

That's a Carson quote, and it's nonsense.

The Supermarine Spitfire achieved dive speeds well above those of any other WW2 fighter, getting to Mach 0.89 on one occasion.

P-51 and Fw 190 achieved about Mach 0.80, and the Me 109 was dived to Mach 0.79 (source is Radinger/Otto/Schick's "Messerschmitt Me 109", volumes 1 and 2).

The P-47 had the lowest permissible Mach number of these aircraft. Test pilot Eric Brown observed it became uncontrollable at Mach 0.73, and "analysis showed that a dive to M=0.74 would almost certainly be a 'graveyard dive'." (From Eric Brown's "Testing for Combat".) As a result of Brown's tests, the P-47 was fitted with dive recovery flaps that raised the permittable Mach number to ca. Mach 0.75.

Have a look at these threads for a more in-depth discussion of this rather complex topic:

http://www.hitechcreations.com/forums/search.php?s=&action=showresults&searchid=91933&sortby=lastpost&sortorder=descending

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[Virage]

The LW should have pulled their fighters back from the channel. They should have gone after the allied fighters early when they were in p38s and p47cs. The LW tried to go after the bombers and kill enough of them to force the allies to give up. This seemed to be working early but the allies came with more and better fighters.

Not trying to siderail the discussion, but I disagree with the idea that the LW would of prevailed had they focused on the Allied fighters.  The LW could not down as many fighters as the Allies could produce.  Detering the concept of Strategic Bombing by creating unacceptable Bomber losses was the right strategy imo.  The LW learned this lesson in the Battle of Britain.  Not consolidating the defense hurt this strategy.  Even then it is doubtful the LW could of sustained the amount of pressure the Allies could put on them.

[Batz]

Early on the allies didn’t have many fighters. If the major effort would have went after these limited fighters and pilots it would have forced the allies to rush more pilots into the fray. But pulling back deeper into Europe the allied fighters would have face the same situation the LW did in BoB. Even damaged aircraft would have been considered a “kill”.

Going after the bombers did nothing but get the LW killed. The strategic effects that the bombers had on industry were very limited early in the war.

From 1941 to 1943 (according Penguin Atlas of World History) the Allies dropped about 10,000 tons on Germany in 1940, 30,000 tons in 1941, 40,000 tons in 1942 and 120,000 tons in 1943 while in 1944 they drop 650,000 tons and in 1945, about 500,000 tons are dropped in the first four months (at that rate, 1.5 million tons would be dropped over the course of 1945).
 
From late 44 into 45 the war was a fore gone conclusion. Germany had lost.

The real effect on the bombers was in depleting the LW fighter strength in the west. This took place before the p51 in the theater in strength.

There was no reason to go after the bombers. As it was this error was catastrophic in that it allowed the allies fighter-bombers free reign over Western Europe. As a result moving supplies and reinforcements to the front was very difficult. The German Army on the ground could not rely on CAS from LW fighter-bombers nor could defend against the massive numbers of allied fighter-bombers. The LW had large numbers of fighter and pilots tied up with “Defense of the Reich” that it had a real effect on all 3 other theaters.

The strategic bombing campaign never achieved its goal of collapsing the German economy nor did it cause the collapse of German civilian morale.

The LW wasn’t killing bombers faster then they were produced. The Lw could not have killed allied fighters faster then they were built but they could have killed many fighter pilots. They could have maintained enough fighter strength to make the prospect of a Normandy landing with out air dominance very risky.

It would not have won the war. Germany was destined to lose. But it may well have delayed the allied landings.

[Batz]

While its proponents have always made great claims about the effectiveness of strategic bombing, the results have rarely lived up to those claims. As a means of destroying the industrial base of the enemy, strategic bombing during World War II failed. Bombing Germany became devastating only in the final year of the war, at a time when the military outcome of the war was already reasonably predictable. While the bombing campaign certainly had an impact on Luftwaffe deployments and interfered with production to some extent, this cannot be argued to be of decisive importance to the war.

Richard Overy, in his book Why the Allies Won, makes the following statement about the effectiveness of British and American bombing of the Third Reich: "At the end of January 1945 Albert Speer and his ministerial colleagues met in Berlin to sum up what bombing had done to production schedules for 1944. They found that Germany had produced 35 percent fewer tanks than planned, 31 percent fewer aircraft and 42 percent fewer lorries as a result of bombing. The denial of these huge resources to German forces in 1944 fatally weakened their response to bombing and invasion and eased the path of Allied armies."


On the surface, Speer's analysis tells us that the Allied strategic bombing campaign had a decisive impact on the German war effort in 1944. Based on figures found in Paul Kennedy's "Rise and Fall of the Great Powers," the Germans produced in 1944: 17,800 tanks, 39,807 aircraft. So that, on the basis of Speer's statement, they aimed to produce 24,030 tanks and 52,147 aircraft. For comparison, Allied production of tanks and aircraft in 1944 resulted in 51,500 tanks (USSR: 29,000; UK: 5,000; USA: 17,500) and 163,079 aircraft (USSR: 40,300; UK 26,461; USA: 96,318). Therefore, even with the additional production that would have resulted from no bombing at all, the Allies still produce twice as many tanks and more than three times the number of aircraft as the Third Reich.

Such figures do not support Overy's conclusion that bombing Germany had "fatally weakened their response to bombing and invasion and eased the path of Allied armies." In terms of the kind of war of attrition fought in 1944 the additional German production would not have made a decisive difference. Allied production for 1944 is clearly overwhelming. Looking at the military situation on the ground in 1944 is even more telling of how the war is going.

Overy goes on to say: "The indirect effects were more important still, for the bombing offensive forced the German economy to switch very large resources away from equipment for the fighting fronts, using them instead to combat the bombing threat." At least, an ever-increasing number of Luftwaffe units were devoted to the air defense of the Reich as the war progressed. And, new aircraft production shifted towards fighters and away from bombers. The question remains as to whether this impact of the Allied bombing campaign was decisive to the outcome of the war or had just a marginal effect on it.


Furthermore, the converse of Overy's remark was also true. The production of bomber forces represented a significant resource expenditure for the US and especially Great Britain. Was this a worthwhile military expenditure? The results of the campaign are debatable. Certainly the German capitulation did not come about because of the Allied bombing campaign. That honor must go to the land campaigns fought by the allies. So, could the resources devoted to the bomber force been more effectively employed elsewhere?

Perhaps the greatest oversight in an analysis that focuses on the latter part of the war is that the crucial period to consider is from 1941 to 1943. It is in this period that German power is substantial and the possibility of a German military victory exists. How effective was the Allied bomber campaign during this period? According to a table found in the Penguin Atlas of World History, the Allies dropped about 10,000 tons on Germany in 1940, 30,000 tons in 1941, 40,000 tons in 1942 and 120,000 tons in 1943 while in 1944 they drop 650,000 tons and in 1945, about 500,000 tons are dropped in the first four months (at that rate, 1.5 million tons would be dropped over the course of 1945). Considering that Germany dropped about 37,000 tons on the UK in 1940, another 22,000 tons in 1941, with a few thousand tons every year thereafter with marginal results, there is little reason to believe that the scale of Allied bombing between 1940 and 1943 was substantial enough to alter the military balance in 1941 or 1942 either. Yet those are critical years to consider because that was when Soviet survival hung in the balance and British possessions in the Middle East were threatened by conquest.

Indeed, a look at the effectiveness of strategic bombing during the Second World War suggests that it is only effective against an enemy that has already been defeated militarily. In the case of the air war against the Third Reich, bombing only caused serious economic disruptions in the final year of the war, roughly from June 1944 to May 1945. By this time a German military defeat was pretty much a foregone conclusion. Based on such results, it is impossible to demonstrate that the bombing campaign would have achieved an economic breakdown of Germany since by the time such destruction was being caused; the fronts were already collapsing in both east and west. The Soviet Union, for all intents, had won the land war by the middle of 1944 and the successful Normandy invasion delivered the coup de grace. To make a case for the bombing campaign being decisive the reverse would have to be expected. That is, the fronts would have had to collapse after the industrial damage was done. As it was, strategic bombing merely contributed to the wholesale destruction caused by the general weakness of German resistance in the final year of World War II.

  THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

From Butlers JG 26 Page

Aircraft Losses By theater

[HoHun]

Hi Batz,

>Early on the allies didn’t have many fighters.

Neither did the Luftwaffe - they were largely tied up in the East.

>As it was this error was catastrophic in that it allowed the allies fighter-bombers free reign over Western Europe. As a result moving supplies and reinforcements to the front was very difficult.

If we're talking about the post-invasion time scheme when a front existed, the Luftwaffe suffered heavily exactly because it tried to contest air superiority over the front.

>The strategic bombing campaign never achieved its goal of collapsing the German economy

The attacks on the fuel industry made a big difference. From June 1944 on, the Luftwaffe suffered from fuel shortage as a result of the strategic bombing campaign. In September, they receied only 20% of the fuel tonnage they'd have needed for normal operations. German industry might not have collapsed, but only because the front collapsed quicker.

>They could have maintained enough fighter strength to make the prospect of a Normandy landing with out air dominance very risky.

According to Galland, the Allies had 12837 aircraft available for the invasion, 5409 of them fighters.

At the same time, the Luftwaffe had 3222 aircraft available on all fronts, 1195 of them fighters.

Achieving even limited air superiority over the Normandy never was an option. The Luftwaffe moved a reserve of 600 fighters into Northern France immediately after the invasion, which was 50% of their total fighter force - under the conditions of total Allied air superiority, they were attrited without achieving anything.

The Luftwaffe simply was fighting against impossible odds - there was no winning move for them. If anything, they should NOT have moved their reserves into France but kept them for the defense of the German industry.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[HoHun]

Hi Batz,

Where's the article you're quoting from?

Just look at this:

>The Soviet Union, for all intents, had won the land war by the middle of 1944 and the successful Normandy invasion delivered the coup de grace.

If that's the yard-stick, nothing that happened after the middle of 1944 matters. However, that's not a useful way of measuring the success of the strategic bombing campaign.

Certainly the bomber offensive didn't win the war single-handedly - but I don't remember anyone claiming that anyhow.

The question is, would the decision not to build and employ a strategic air force and do something else with the resources spent on it have made victory easier? I can't see how, and though the article poses the question, it fails to answer it.

Another question the article does NOT ask is whether the strategic air war could have been more effective than it was. This is a regrettable oversight as this question can be easily answered - yes, it could!

The bombing offensive suffered from several mistakes. The attacks against the ball-bearing industry had had a tremendous impact which the US leadership failed to detect the large stocks of production material inevitable with WW2 era logistics initially covered the production gap. Repeated attacks on Schweinfurt would have had the crippling effect the USAAF planners had envisioned - they just gave up too early.

A systematic offensive against electric power plants could have made great impact on the German war industry, too. The British dambuster attacks were quite serious because it reduced the power output available for industrial production in the Ruhr area. Follow-up attacks against power plants could have hurt the German war machine considerably - however, there was no determined campaign against the electric power system.

And then there was the fuel industry. Adolf Galland remarked that after seeing the huge impact the first raids against the refineries had had on the German military, he couldn't understand why the Allies had begun a campaign against the fuel industry earlier. He considered the anti-fuel campaign highly effective, and the German attempts at repairing the damage were completely in vain as the USAAF kept flying regular follow-up attacks to keep production down.

The strategic combing campaign made a considerable contribution to the Allied victory, and it could have been even more telling if it had been conducted with better information on the German industry, and with greater determination once targets had been identified as crucial.

The question your article is trying to answer actually is not whether the strategic bombing offensive was successful - it is whether WW2 could have been won primarily from the air. Obviously, this question, interesting as it might be, isn't really that relevant.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[Batz]

From the THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY linked above:

The Attack on Oil

With the reduction of German air power, oil became the priority target in the German economy. The bomber force for several months had been adequate for the task. A preliminary attack was launched on May 12, 1944, followed by another on May 28; the main blow was not struck, however, until after D-day. In the months before D-day and for a shorter period immediately following, all available air power based on England was devoted to insuring the success of the invasion.

Virtually complete records of the German oil industry were taken by the Survey. In addition, major plants that were subject to attack and their records were studied in detail.

The German oil supply was tight throughout the war, and was a controlling factor in military operations. The chief source of supply, and the only source for aviation gasoline, was 13 synthetic plants together with a small production from three additional ones that started operations in 1944. The major sources of products refined from crude oil were the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania and the Hungarian fields which together accounted for about a quarter of the total supply of liquid fuels in 1943. In addition, there was a small but significant Austrian and domestic production. The refineries at Ploesti were attacked, beginning with a daring and costly low-level attack in August 1943. These had only limited effects; deliveries increased until April 1944 when the attacks were resumed. The 1944 attacks, together with mining of the Danube, materially reduced Rumanian deliveries. In August 1944, Russian occupation eliminated this source of supply and dependence on the synthetic plants became even greater than before.

Production from the synthetic plants declined steadily and by July 1944 every major plant had been hit. These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September. Production recovered somewhat in November and December, but for the rest of the war was but a fraction of pre-attack output.

The Germans viewed the attacks as catastrophic. In a series of letters to Hitler, among documents seized by the Survey, the developing crisis is outlined month by month in detail. On June 30, Speer wrote: "The enemy has succeeded in increasing our losses of aviation gasoline up to 90 percent by June 22d. Only through speedy recovery of damaged plants has it been possible to regain partly some of the terrible losses." The tone of the letters that followed was similar.

As in the case of ball-bearings and aircraft, the Germans took the most energetic steps to repair and reconstruct the oil plants. Another czar was appointed, this time Edmund Geilenberg, and again an overriding priority on men and materials was issued. Geilenberg used as many as 350,000 men for the repair, rebuilding, and dispersal of the bombed plants and for new underground construction. The synthetic oil plants were vast complex structures and could not be easily broken up and dispersed. The programs of dispersal and underground construction that were undertaken were incomplete when the war ended.

The synthetic oil plants were brought back into partial production and in remarkably short time. But unlike the ball-bearing plants, as soon as they were brought back they were attacked again. The story of Leuna is illustrative. Leuna was the largest of the synthetic plants and protected by a highly effective smoke screen and the heaviest flak concentration in Europe. Air crews viewed a mission to Leuna as the most dangerous and difficult assignment of the air war. Leuna was hit on May 12 and put out of production. However, investigation of plant records and interrogation of Leuna's officials established that a force of several thousand men had it in partial operation in about 10 days. It was again hit on May 28 but resumed partial production on June 3 and reached 75 percent of capacity in early July. It was hit again on July 7 and again shut down but production started 2 days later and reached 53 percent of capacity on July 19. An attack on July 20 shut the plant down again but only for three days; by July 27 production was back to 35 percent of capacity. Attacks on July 28 and 29 closed the plant and further attacks on August 24, September 11, September 13, September 28 and October 7 kept it closed down. However, Leuna got started again on October 14 and although production was interrupted by a small raid on November 2, it reached 28 percent of capacity by November 20. Although there were 6 more heavy attacks in November and December (largely ineffective because of adverse weather), production was brought up to 15 percent of capacity in January and was maintained at that level until nearly the end of the war. From the first attack to the end, production at Leuna averaged 9 percent of capacity. There were 22 attacks on Leuna, 20 by the Eighth Air Force and 2 by the RAF. Due to the urgency of keeping this plant out of production, many of these missions mere dispatched in difficult bombing weather. Consequently, the order of bombing accuracy on Leuna was not high as compared with other targets. To win the battle with Leuna a total of 6,552 bomber sorties were flown against the plant, 18,328 tons of bombs were dropped and an entire year was required.

Consumption of oil exceeded production from May 1944 on. Accumulated stocks were rapidly used up, and in six months were practically exhausted. The loss of oil production was sharply felt by the armed forces. In August the final run-in-time for aircraft engines was cut from two hours to one-half hour. For lack of fuel, pilot training, previously cut down, was further curtailed. Through the summer, the movement of German Panzer Divisions in the field was hampered more and more seriously as a result of losses in combat and mounting transportation difficulties, together with the fall in fuel production. By December, according to Speer, the fuel shortage had reached catastrophic proportions. When the Germans launched their counter-offensive on December 16, 1944, their reserves of fuel were insufficient to support the operation. They counted on capturing Allied stocks. Failing in this, many panzer units were lost when they ran out of gasoline. In February and March of 1945 the Germans massed 1,200 tanks on the Baranov bridgehead at the Vistula to check the Russians. They were immobilized for lack of gasoline and overrun.

It wasn't until May '44 that the allies went after the Oil industry. Why they didn’t go earlier? Who knows, but look at the case with Luena included in the quote above. To win the battle with Leuna a total of 6,552 bomber sorties were flown against the plant, 18,328 tons of bombs were dropped and an entire year was required. That was 1 of the 13 synthetic oil-producing facilities. In '43 the allied raids against Ploesti weren’t as effective.

The refineries at Ploesti were attacked, beginning with a daring and costly low-level attack in August 1943. These had only limited effects; deliveries increased until April 1944 when the attacks were resumed. The 1944 attacks, together with mining of the Danube, materially reduced Rumanian deliveries. In August 1944, Russian occupation eliminated this source of supply and dependence on the synthetic plants became even greater than before.

I dont recall where i got that article and i had it on my hardrive for sometime. I was cleaning stuff out a week or so ago when i rediscovered. I kept no notes as to where it came from. I agree that the point of that article is to question whetehr the allies were correct in focussing resource on strategic bombing as opposed to else where but it confirms much of what is outlined in the THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY linked above.

Indeed, a look at the effectiveness of strategic bombing during the Second World War suggests that it is only effective against an enemy that has already been defeated militarily. In the case of the air war against the Third Reich, bombing only caused serious economic disruptions in the final year of the war, roughly from June 1944 to May 1945.

In the case of the the allied attacks on the German Oil production this seems to be the case. Even their success against the ball bearing plants was short lived.

[cont]

[Batz]

The Ball-Bearing Attack

The German anti-friction bearing industry was heavily concentrated. When the attack began, approximately half the output came from plants in the vicinity of Schweinfurt. An adequate supply of bearings was correctly assumed to be indispensable for German war production.

In a series of raids beginning on August 17, 1943, about 12,000 tons of bombs were dropped on this target -- about one-half of one per cent of the total tonnage delivered in the air war. In an attack on August 17 by 200 B-17's on Schweinfurt, the plants were severely damaged. Records of the industry taken by the Survey (and supplemented and checked by interrogation) show that production of bearings at this center was reduced sharply -- September production was 35% of the pre-raid level. In this attack 36 of the 200 attaching planes were lost. In the famous and much-discussed second attack on October 14, 1943, when the plants were again severely damaged, one of the decisive air battles of the war took place. The 228 bombers participating were strongly attacked by German fighters when beyond the range of their fighter escort. Losses to fighters and to flak cost the United States forces 62 planes with another 138 damaged in varying degree, some beyond repair. Repeated losses of this magnitude could not be sustained; deep penetrations without escort, of which this was among the earliest, were suspended and attacks on Schweinfurt were not renewed for four months. The Germans made good use of the breathing spell. A czar was appointed with unlimited priority for requisitioning men and materials. Energetic steps were taken to disperse the industry. Restoration was aided by the circumstance -- which Survey investigations show to have been fairly common to all such raids -- that machines and machine tools were damaged far less severely than factory structures. German equipment was redesigned to substitute other types of bearings wherever possible. And the Germans drew on the substantial stocks that were on hand. Although there were further attacks, production by the autumn of 1944 was back to pre-raid levels. From examination of the records and personalities in the ball-bearing industry, the user industries and the testimony of war production officials, there is no evidence that the attacks on the ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war production.

After Schweinfurt the allies had to rethink their strategy. Unescorted bombers no matter how good of a formation they fly or how "well armed" they were still did not prevent serious losses.

The attack on the German aircraft industry -- primarily on airframe plants -- was opened in the summer of 1943. The German aircraft industry had been well distributed over the Reich with a view to the possibility of air attack. Isolated raids early in 1941 and 1942 had caused some further shift in production to eastern territory but only limited steps had been taken to disperse individual plant units in order to reduce their vulnerability. The industry was found to have had substantial excess capacity. The efficiency of the industry was low. Unlike other armaments, procurement was not under the direction of the Speer Ministry but under the Luftwaffe.

In '43 the Survey suggests that the allies decided to go after aircraft manufacturing. They were no more effective then against the ball bearings or Fuel. Maybe one could argue that if they stayed with 1 of the three they would have seen success earlier. I agree the allies missed an opportunity in not taking out the power stations. I totally agree the allies made mistakes but I am limiting my speculation to the LW .

But back to my point. It was during these raids on the aircraft manufacturing that the LW in the west was worn down. So even though the aircraft industry wasn’t broken the LW lost many experienced pilots over this period.

By the time of the allied invasion nearly every Gruppe that could have opposed the landings suffered so many losses most were withdrawn to Germany for re-equipment. The LW had no reserves and its my opinion that the LW was wasted being thrown at the allied bombers. When they finally withdrew to the Reich they built up some reserves but foolishly wasted them in Bodenplatte.

 Once the allies had landed there would be no possibility to push them out of Europe. With no aircraft at all to oppose the landings (and with the huge numerical superiority over the the invasion front) the west was lost. As I said above I dont think there was anything the LW or Germany could have done to change the course of the war, they clearly were going to lose.

[Arlo]

My second and third hand sources can kick your second and third hand sources arse.

[Batz]

Originally posted by HoHun
Hi Batz,

>Early on the allies didn’t have many fighters.

Neither did the Luftwaffe - they were largely tied up in the East.

>As it was this error was catastrophic in that it allowed the allies fighter-bombers free reign over Western Europe. As a result moving supplies and reinforcements to the front was very difficult.

If we're talking about the post-invasion time scheme when a front existed, the Luftwaffe suffered heavily exactly because it tried to contest air superiority over the front.

Post invasion is when I suggested that the lw be pulled back to from the channel. I dont think they needed to win (or could) establish air superiority but they could have held back and built up a reserve. The allies werent going to invade until that had worn down the LW. The allies would have been forced to go after them as opposed to the LW getting jumped while forming their large gefetschverbands or getting chewed up while attacking the bombers. Its my opinion that allied losses would have went up and the invasion delayed.

>The strategic bombing campaign never achieved its goal of collapsing the German economy

The attacks on the fuel industry made a big difference. From June 1944 on, the Luftwaffe suffered from fuel shortage as a result of the strategic bombing campaign. In September, they receied only 20% of the fuel tonnage they'd have needed for normal operations. German industry might not have collapsed, but only because the front collapsed quicker.

From June '44 the war was over anyway. Even if the lw had fuel theres nothing they could have done.

>They could have maintained enough fighter strength to make the prospect of a Normandy landing with out air dominance very risky.

According to Galland, the Allies had 12837 aircraft available for the invasion, 5409 of them fighters.

At the same time, the Luftwaffe had 3222 aircraft available on all fronts, 1195 of them fighters.

Achieving even limited air superiority over the Normandy never was an option. The Luftwaffe moved a reserve of 600 fighters into Northern France immediately after the invasion, which was 50% of their total fighter force - under the conditions of total Allied air superiority, they were attrited without achieving anything.

The Luftwaffe simply was fighting against impossible odds - there was no winning move for them. If anything, they should NOT have moved their reserves into France but kept them for the defense of the German industry.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

By pulling back and not sacrificing themselves against the bomber streams the allied air losses would have went up. I dont think the allies would have landed until they had destroyed the lw in the west.

[HoHun]

Hi Batz,

>Post invasion is when I suggested that the lw be pulled back to from the channel. I dont think they needed to win (or could) establish air superiority but they could have held back and built up a reserve. The allies werent going to invade until that had worn down the LW.

I can't figure out what you're trying to say! Prior to the invasion, the Luftwaffe WAS held back and a reserve WAS built. The Allies DID invade in spite of the reserve, and they wore down the Luftwaffe in the course of the invasion.

>From June '44 the war was over anyway. Even if the lw had fuel theres nothing they could have done.

The war wasn't over in June 1944, there was still a lot of fighting to be done - some of the worst fighting of the entire war, actually. The end result might have been obvious, but the price each side had to pay wasn't. The Luftwaffe could raise the price the Allies had to pay, and the strategic bombing offensive could - and did - lower it.

Von Clausewitz never saw an aircraft in his entire life, but he'd sure have understood that :-)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[Batz]

Post invasion

That was a typo, it should have read pre-invasion.

From Caldwell’s 1991 interview with Galland

Galland: ,,,,,,,

The Big Blow was the replacement for the 262. I finally won Goering's assent and convinced him not to throw every possible fighter against the enemy every day, which was the rule up to the time of the invasion. Every time, we sent this full force up to fight; there was no reserve, no time to recover, no training, and finally I got permission to build up this fighter reserve, which came up to 2000 prop fighters. These forces were not trained to fight on a battlefront, like in France; but they were sent there on order of Hitler immediately, and as you know, they didn't arrive, they missed the airfields, the airfields had been taken over by the enemy. Terrible disorganization; hundreds and hundreds of aircraft were lost every day by accident.

Planes weren’t the problem. Trained pilots like the ones lost while engaging the bombers were irreplaceable. The "reserves" that were finally built up and sent forward were not very effective.

My hypothesis in that after Dieppe the lw should of pulled back, concentrated its forces, conserved its pilots, built up an additional quality reserve and forced the allies to hunt them down over their territory where the lw could choose its engagements more carefully. Instead of forming up in large wings to go hit the bombers. This never would have happened because Hitler was incapable of restraint.

The object of defense is preservation; and since it is easier to hold ground than to take it, defense is easier than attack.  "But defense has a passive purpose: preservation; and attack a positive one: conquest. . . .  If defense is the stronger form of war, yet has a negative object, if follows that it should be used only so long as weakness compels, and be abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positive object.

....Von Clausewitz

[HoHun]

Hi Batz,

>My hypothesis in that after Dieppe the lw should of pulled back, concentrated its forces, conserved its pilots, built up an additional quality reserve and forced the allies to hunt them down over their territory where the lw could choose its engagements more carefully.

In fact, that's what they did. The channel front was defended only by one or two Geschwadern, and they seldom if ever flew over England.

>Instead of forming up in large wings to go hit the bombers.

Well, the bombers had to be hit, the problem is just how they were hit - with small numbers of fighters on every raid. Clausewitz demands a concentration of forces, and Galland agreed - he'd rather have had two or three raids unopposed to hit the forth decisively with a concentrated attack.

"The object of defense is preservation [...]" ....Von Clausewitz

Attacking bombers was defense :-)

Von Clausewitz on strategic bombing:

"The second way is to direct our enterprise with preference on such objects that increase the enemy damage. Nothing is easier than imagining two different directions of our forces, of which one is the far better choice if it comes to throw over enemy forces, though the other when throwing over is not the purpose can be much more profitable. By convention, one would consider the first to be the more military, the other more to be political. When one takes a higher vantage point however, is one as military as the other, and each one only useful, when it matches the given conditions."

Appliee to WW2, the bombing offensive was a profitable enterprise, and obviously the Luftwaffe had to try and raise the price for the USAAF so it became less profitable or even a loss.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)