Spitfire IX overmodeled??

[MiloMorai]

Originally posted by Furball
Spitfire IX must be overmodelled.. I mean, its not American so it must suck.  That Johnnie Johnson killing 38 german fighters in it is just plain fantasy, he was really ben affleck in a P-40.

Well it seems I am not the only one to see this arrogance.


LW claims

See the JaFu II section

http://tonywood.cjb.net/

On June  7 the Allies lost 50 a/c in and around the beachhead, mostly P-51s and P-47s, many by the LuftReich units. That is alot for an AF that had air  superiority.


Fighter losses - USAAF ETO

J - 111, F - 129,  M - 272, A - 358, M - 475, J - 698, J - 469, A - 627, S - 418, O - 517, N - 382, D - 481

So the LW was down and out after Big Week???

[Crumpp]

Gscholz,

The quotes are the same cause we posted them at the same time.

Ignorant is deteriorating into a name calling flamefest simply because you don't have the ability to show your argument.

Here then lets examine the definition of Air Supremacy we both agree on.

In Normandy:

"Air supremacy is defined as the condition when the enemy air force is in-capable of effective interference."

This was definately the case in Normandy.

"Under the condition of air supremacy, the air commander employs all of his aircraft at will."

This was also the case for the Allies.


"Through the complete destruction of the enemy air forces, this condition is the ultimate goal of an air campaign. "

This is arguable but I contend that while the LW still had planes and pilots it did not have a force that could do any damage to the allies in Normandy.  Therefore the LW destruction as an effective fighting force was complete.  

"It may occur however, through the establishment of a diplomatic “no-fly zone”."

The Normandy landings may not have been a Diplomatic "No-Fly" zone but they were unarguably a LW "No-Fly" zone.

Three out of four conditions unarguable and one that you can debate depending on your whether you take a tatical view or strategic.  In my book it meets the definition.

Crumpp

[Guppy35]

Originally posted by MiloMorai
Well it seems I am not the only one to see this arrogance.


LW claims

See the JaFu II section

http://tonywood.cjb.net/

On June  7 the Allies lost 50 a/c in and around the beachhead, mostly P-51s and P-47s, many by the LuftReich units. That is alot for an AF that had air  superiority.


Fighter losses - USAAF ETO

J - 111, F - 129,  M - 272, A - 358, M - 475, J - 698, J - 469, A - 627, S - 418, O - 517, N - 382, D - 481

So the LW was down and out after Big Week???

Milo,

Do you have the number of sorties flown by Allied AC during that time?  How many German a/c were flying in relation to that?

I don't think the argument is that the LW didn't fly, but for the most part the Allies were dictating where the airwar was fought and not fought.

In terms of air support for the ground troops, it just wasn't there for the German troops on the ground.  The Falaise Gap being a prime example of this.

There were an estimated 11,000 Allied sorties flown on D-Day alone.    How many German sorties?  You are stating that 698 USAAF fighters were lost during June of 44.  How many to flak?  And what percentage was this of total USAAF Fighter Sorties flown?  Did it even make a dent?  

Going through Roger Freeman's "Mighty Eighth War Diary" I added up the 8th AF fighter sorties for June 44.  They totalled 23,500+.  That means if we count those 698 LW fighter claims against just the 8th AF fighter sorties, it's a 2.9 percent loss.  

Now add in the 30,863 Fighter sorties flown by the 9th AF during that same time frame(From Kenn Rust's book "9th Air Force in World War II".

You are talking about 698 Fighters lost in over 53,000 sorties. Roughly a 1.3 percent loss. Not much of a loss in the numbers game.

That's the point.  The Allies could afford those kind of losses and fill the gaps with qualified pilots and aircraft.  

No one is saying that the LW quit.  They just didn't have the resources to combat that amount of Allied sorties.  Yes I know aircraft production numbers certainly put the aircraft out there available, but pilots and fuel was also a major and larger consideration.  

Allied pilot training had come a long way from the dark days of the Battle of Britain where those RAF fighter pilots were being thrown into combat with 10 hours on a Spit or a Hurri.

And it had come a long way for the LW in the other direction where the vets had been getting killed because they never got a break.  And this was because they couldn't afford to be given a rest because the replacement pilots just weren't there.

The LW had to at times let the bombers come just so they could martial their resources for one good hit, in hopes of slowing the tide.  They stayed down in any kind of numbers for much of in September and October 44 hoping for a big strike in November which was attempted on the 2nd when the LW got roughly 300 fighters in the air to oppose 1200 8th AF heavies escorted by 900 fighters.  Makes the odds the RAF faced in the Battle of Britain look small doesn't it?

Bottom line is not that the LW lacked the desire or the courage, but they lacked the resources, and ability to combat those kind of odds.

 Dan/Slack

[Guppy35]

A book that might interest people is by John Foreman, called

"1944 Over the Beaches-The Airwar over Europe June 1st -30th"

It contains day to day sorties, claims and losses.

Quoting the author:

"My own impression of the massive Allied air operation in support of Overlord is one of total awe.  It is difficult for the mind to comprehend the scale of the air war over Normandy.  THe German fighters and fighter-bombers tended to be elusive.  When they chose to fight they generally gave a good account of themselves in small air battles usually waged at tree top height.  Except for the few big deep penetration raids by the 8th Air Force, German fighters were only found scudding along 'on the deck'.

Annoying as they were, the German fighter-bombers were but a pin salamander when compared to the other danger to the Allied air forces-Flak.  The vast majority of Allied losses were due to flak.  Yet by skill and courage, the Allied fighter bomber pilots made the whole of Northern France a 'no-go' area to the Germans during the hours of daylight.

When German fighters rose to attack, they were generally roughly handled by the overwhelming number of escort fighters.  This level of Allied air supremacy-for such it was-was only to be equalled by the Isreali Air Force during the Six Day War of 1966 and latterly in the Gulf War of 1992.  In 1944 such Allied air power was to remind the Germans of their own crushing superiority during the campaign in France and during the initial invasion of the Soviet Union.  For the Luftwaffe, the bitter signs of defeat were made clear in the skies over the Normandy battlefield"


Dan/Slack

[GODO]

If we want to put on the table the allied aircraft loses as a measure of he Luftwaffe air strength at Normandy, then we better substract the loses due ground fire.

[GScholz]

No Crumpp, "Air supremacy is defined as the condition when the enemy air force is in-capable of effective interference. Through the complete destruction of the enemy air forces, this condition is the ultimate goal of an air campaign."

"Local air supremacy" is an oxymoron. It's like saying you're master of the universe ... in a very localized area. AIR SUPREMACY IS A GENERAL STRATEGIC SITUATION WHERE YOUR OPPONENT'S AIR FORCE IS FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES DESTROYED. There is a reason why "local air supremacy" isn't listed as a specific term while "local air superiority" is. The US/UK achieved air supremacy in Iraq, but never in Europe during WWII.

Your arguments that the LW was destroyed because it didn't interfere at Normandy in force is laughable. The LW still had more than a thousand operational fighters in Western Europe and even more on the Eastern Front. You are clearly ignorant or arguing for other reasons than finding the truth.

[Guppy35]

From Luftwaffe War Diaries  by Cajus Bekker

"Thus despite the output of machines, which mounted from month to month, the fighter defense of the Reich was finally a mere shadow of it's former self..  By May 24, 1944, it's operational strength had actually declined to the following:

North Germany (1,2, 3 Division) 174 Single engine fighters, 35 twin engine fighters.

South Germany (7 Division) 72 single engine fighters

Total 246 Single engine fighters, 35 Twin engine fighters.

By this date, the Americans, on their side, were in a position to put up 1,000 long range fighters at one time to roam at will over the whole of the Reich.  Nothing could underline more clearly the complete air sovereignty, that the Allies, after so many fierce battles, had achieved."

There are 3 points specifically mentioned at this point as well from the Luftwaffe point of view:

"1-The increasing strength of the enemy was not matched by any increase in defensive operations.

2-The percentaqe loss to the enemy became so minimal that the defense ceased to have any deterrant effect.

3-Losses suffered by the defence in the long run pased the limit of endurance."


Gscholz, I think you are trying to tie in production numbers to actual combat operational aircraft and that doesn't work as the production far outpaced the amount of pilots, fuel etc needed to keep all those aircraft in the air.  

Also from "War Diaries"

"Meanwhile the bulk of the Allied air forces was engaged in preparing for the invasion on June 6, 1944, and afterwards in support of the Allied armies in France.  Against the overwhelming strength that the air forces could now bring to bear, the Luftwaffe could do virtually nothing.  Field Marshall Sperrle and his Luftlotte 3 could put into the air 198 bombers and 125 fighters against the Allied forces of 3,467 bombers and 5,409 fighters."

Don't know how many ways it can be said.  I don't care how you want to talk about production numbers.  Operational numbers is the issue.  Pilots, fuel etc.

Imagine that night in the MA when you are flying for a country that has about 20 pilots, getting attacked by about 100.  You've got 5 super aces and 15 average joes against thier 25 aces and 75 average joes.  No matter how you play it, you are going to lose.  You may take some with you, but in the end you'd get overwhelmed.

 And that's what happened, no matter how you crunch the numbers.

And yes the Allies had air superiority.   They could move in daylight, the German Army could not without the risk of those cab ranks of fighter bombers coming down on them.  Talk about demoralizing.

Dan/Slack

[Guppy35]

Originally posted by GODO
If we want to put on the table the allied aircraft loses as a measure of he Luftwaffe air strength at Normandy, then we better substract the loses due ground fire.

Interestingly enough in the Foreman book I mentioned, it lists 104 Allied aircraft lost to all causes on the June 7th date mentioned by Milo where he says 50 fighters went down.

The 104 bombers, fighters and transport aircraft,  number includes technical failures, running out of fuel etc.  The majority were lost to Flak.  There are Four listed as lost to fighters on June 7th, one Mustang, two P47s and a Spitfire.

Dan/Slack
On a day off, surrounded by info

[GScholz]

Defence of the Reich Day Fighters, 3 June 1944 (D-day - 3)

Unit / Types / Location / Strength

JG 1
Stab / 190A-8 / Lippspringe / 2
I / 190A-8 / Lippspringe / 46
II / 190A-8 / Störmede / 39
III / 109G-10 / Paderborn / 37

JG 3
Stab / 109G-10 / Salzwedel / 8
I / 109G-6AS / Burg / 28
II / 109G-6 / Sachau / 50
III / 109G-6 / Ansbach / 67
IV (Sturm) / 190A-8 / Salzwedel / 51

JG 5
I / 109G-10 / Herzogenaurach / 33
II / 109G-10 / Gardelegen / 41

JG 11
Stab / 190, 109G / Rothenburg / 1
I / 190A-8 / Rothenburg / 17
II / 109G-6AS / Hustedt / 36
III / 190A-8 / Rheinsehlen / 23
10. / 190, 109G / Aalborg / 9

JGr.zbV / 109G-14 / Ansbach / 5

JG 27
Stab / 109G-10 / Seyring / 5
I / 109G-6 / Fels am Wagram / 44
III / 109G-6 / Götzendorf / 23
IV /109G-6 / Szombathely / 21

II/JG 53 / 109G-6 / Öttingen / 65

III/JG 54 / 190A-8 / Oldenburg / 21

Einsatz JGr 104 / 109G-5 / Fürt / 4
Einsatz JGr 106 / 109G-5 / Lachen-Speyersdorf / 5
Einsatz JGr 108 / 109G-5 / Voslau /12

JG 2
Stab / 109G-10 / Creil / 3
I / 109G-10 / Cormeilles-en-Vexin / 23

JG 26
Stab / 190A-8 / Lille-Nord / 2
I / 190A-8 / Lille-Vendeville / 31
III / 109G-10 / Nancy-Essay / 37

II/ZG 1 / 110G-2 / Wels / 31

ZG 26
Stab / 410B-2 / Köningsburg-Neumark / 5
I / 410B-2 / Köningsburg-Neumark / 17
II / 410B-2 / Köningsburg-Neumark / 53
7. /110G-2 / Fels am Wagram / 10

Day and Night Fighters

JG 300
Stab / 190A-6 / Bonn-Hangelar / 2
I / 109G-6 /Bonn-Hangelar/ 42
II / 109G-6 / Dortmund / 25
III / 109G-6 / Wiesbaden-Erbenheim / 46

I/JG 301 / 109G-6 / Hölzkirchen / 39

I/JG 302 / 109G-6 / Fels am Wagram / 39


A total of 1097 fighters assigned to the defence of the Reich (against the allied bombing campaign). I don't know how many additional fighters there were that were responsible for local defence.

[Crumpp]

I love to fly LW planes in AH.  I fly for a LW only squad.  

I can see why LW pilots in this community have been labeled Luftwhiners.  Face the facts guys!  The LW was defeated by Jun '44!

Crumpp

[GScholz]

Wrong. The LW was defeated in 1943. Why can't you get anything right?!

[Guppy35]

GScholz,

How many of those were operational?  Where are your numbers from?

Not trying to pick a fight, just wanting to learn where it's from.

If those are operational numbers, why were they not able to put up more of a fight?

I'm afraid that they may be assigned on paper numbers, but operational numbers would be a lot different.

Bottom line still remains that they didn't really even make a dent in the Allied airpower.  Was there ever a day where all those 1000 plus LW planes got into the air to attack the bombers?

The Allies were sending over 1000 + raids to Germany on a consistant basis in daylight.  This doesn't include the RAF raids at night with heavy bombers.  It doesn't include the intruder flights of Mossies etc.  It doesn't include the medium bomber raids and the fighter sweeps.

Show me something that tells me the LW ever got that many planes up.  Give me an average of operational LW sorties vs Operational Allied sorties in 1944.  Show me that it's even close to equal.

300 up on November 2, 44 after essentially sitting on the ground for September and October to build up the resources.  This was to oppose 1200 bombers and 900 fighters.  7 to 1 odds?  Kinda tough to win that way.

The Schwienfurt Raid in October 43 was considered the blackest day for the 8th, and on that day it was roughly 300 German fighters vs 270 US bombers.

In the book "Target Berlin" by Jeff Ethell and Alfred Price, they used official German records to total up the sorties flown that day when the 8th hit Berlin on March 6, 44.  It totals roughly 500 sorties, with many of them second sorties.  

This was to oppose 730 heavy bombers escorted by 801 fighters. 3 to 1 odds in favor of the attackers again.  Where were those 1000 LW fighters?  Once again we are talking about 250-300 fighters coming up with some flying second sorties.

I can't find anywhere, where the LW was putting up those 1000 planes.  I can however find many many examples of where the Allies were putting up more then 1000 planes in 1944.

It still comes down to seperating the numbers on paper with those who were actually involved in the combat.

Imagine the numbers if we counted the replacement Allied aircraft waiting in depots etc to fill in the losses.  Imagine the number of pilots waiting in the wings.  They actually were cutting pilot training numbers in the US due to having too many pilots in the pipeline.

It still comes down to operational sorties.

Dan/Slack

[GScholz]

The numbers are from Tony Wood and Bill Gunston's book "Hitler's Luftwaffe". Those are operational unit strengths not sortie numbers. If you look at the locations you will see that they are spread out all over Western Europe defending separate areas, so only a limited number of those 1097 fighters would respond to any one air incursion by the USAAF. Remember that Galland campaigned for a concentration of defence fighters to use more of their total strength against a single incursion, this was not done and as a result only a fraction of the total LW strength could be used at a single incursion. That's why the LW was so outnumbered in their fights. The USAAF could send the majority of its escort fighters against a fraction of the LW's fighter strength.

[Angus]

A thousand fighters total at the 7th of june in 1944, - or so, was not very much of a threat considering the force of the allies.
However, those were not the "last" thousand planes to appear.

Anyway, back to topic. Our Spit IX is a sort of a melting-pot spitty. With the guns of the E wing, speed of the HF, other specs of another one etc. If that is to be changed later on by HTC in AH2, we'll be getting a HF and LF with some slight corrections, and perhaps a wing-clipping option in the hangar.
Hell, maybe there will be an octane algorithm in the program also,  -that used to be there in old Air WArrior, so why not HTC!
Overboosting like that could be perked or not available in the MA, don't really have an opinion about it, but it would surely enchance the CT.
Give it a thought HT

[Guppy35]

Originally posted by GScholz
The numbers are from Tony Wood and Bill Gunston's book "Hitler's Luftwaffe". Those are operational unit strengths not sortie numbers. If you look at the locations you will see that they are spread out all over Western Europe defending separate areas, so only a limited number of those 1097 fighters would respond to any one air incursion by the USAAF. Remember that Galland campaigned for a concentration of defence fighters to use more of their total strength against a single incursion, this was not done and as a result only a fraction of the total LW strength could be used at a single incursion. That's why the LW was so outnumbered in their fights. The USAAF could send the majority of its escort fighters against a fraction of the LW's fighter strength.

The same use of numbers could be used by the Allies then as they had units stationed in other places that were not in the fight, or were taking the fight elsewhere.  We'd better include the 15th AF strength then too as they were hitting Germany from the south.  21 Heavy bomber groups and 7 fighter groups.  What about 12th AF, or the RAF flying in Italy.  Coastal Command?  They were tying up German units too.

The result is the same then.  The Allies were controlling the fight, where, when and who could be involved, which let them controll the odds?


It still speaks to Allied air superiority right?

Dan/Slack