Spitfire IX overmodeled??

[Nashwan]

They didn`t lie. The RAF was spanked over London on the 7th of September, by Bf 109s. It appears even those few minutes were enough

If you call Luftwaffe losses of 37+, RAF losses of 27 the RAF being spanked. (The lowest source for the Luftwaffe gives 37, most are higher)

Indeed you are right. The much longer ranged 109s could have spent a lot more time than Spitfires over enemy territory. I always wondered why didn the RAF just copy the 109 and scrap the Spit...  But it`s really not hard to understand. The Bf 109G had a still air range of 615 mils on internal fuel, the Spit IX 434 miles under the same conditions. You don`t have to be a math genius to get that 615 > 434.. I am not sure about the 109E, it was far worser aerodynamically, and the DB 601s had were thirstier than the more advanced DB 605s. The range given for it on internal tank is 460 miles, however I don`t know if it`s the same conditions.

I've asked you repeatedly for a source for your 109 consumption figures, I don't think one has ever been forthcoming, has it?

It could be a problem if you don`t have enough ships for it, and even the "ships" you have are mostly river bargues, unsuited for a stormy channel.

How many ships does it take to support your "1 panzer division"?

The Germans had enough ships to support an invasion, the barges were necessary for landing troops on the beaches. Resupply through a port is much easier, and the Germans were confident they could capture a port.

Interesting. It appears the German High command is on the same opinion as the British High command : Bad weather in the 2nd week of September is restricting air operations.

Isegrim, if you go back you'll notice I was talking about the Luftwaffe sorties dropping in the first week of September.

Tony Wood's site:

http://tonywood.cjb.net/ It's a list of claims from the OKL microfilms.




... and not very surprisingly, the 2000+ claims by the LW don`t turn up anywhere. Thanks Naswan for admitting it.

Try clicking the link, Isegrim.

You refer to Tony Wood, however, NO-WHERE can I see ANYTHING on his site even slightly resambling your statements...

OK, if you really can't see it.

It's halfway down the page, the first file under the heading

O.K.L. Fighter Claims : Chef für Ausz. und Dizsiplin Luftwaffen-Personalamt L.P. (A) V Films & Supplementary Claims from Lists

the file is called

West 1939-41, Issue 1

You have to click on the little Doc or PDF icons to the right of it.

As an example of the detail, the first listed claim on the 1st of sept is Ofw. Erich Rudorffer, 2./JG 2 over Dover at 12:45.

Don't bother reading the introduction, it says it covers claims up to the armistice with France, but it's been updated recently. (You'll notice it has little red dots beside it, which the key on the site says means it's new on the 7th or 24th of January.)

Groehler never claimed such BS (his numbers in the book prove the exact opposite my dear... Of course you haven`t read the book you comment on...), and you have never read anything from him. Regardless of you unfounded opinion, Groehler did so far the most detailed analysis and research on LW strenght

Sorry, I was going by what Les Butler and Don Caldwell have to say on their web page:

"It is clear from his text that Groehler's objectives were: (1) to show that the German-Soviet front was the most significant source of the Luftwaffe losses that ultimately led to Allied air supremacy, and (2) that the Luftwaffe could not afford to weaken its forces in the East, even when pushed hard by the USAAF strategic offensive and the Normandy invasion. Groehler did make these claims, to the undoubted pleasure of his Soviet masters, but his data, when examined carefully, don't back him up. "

http://www.butler98.freeserve.co.uk/thtrlosses.htm

No, they lost around 600 on OPERATIONAL missions,

Source?

Wood and Dempster, The Narrow Margin. Hooton, Eagle in Flames gives similar figures.

plus hundreds of 110s, which the Germans did (laughably) call a fighter.

BS again, they never called it a fighter, they called it a Zestorer, or Destroyer, a multi purpose heavy fighter.

No other answer needed, really.

As for how laughable it was, ask those 55 000 dead corpses buried under the molten aluminium of Lancesters.

Tastless, even for you.

Another of his Bf 110 college, Major Groth, knocked down 13 of the RAF in the BoB alone in his 110.

Of course he did.

According to the Tony doc that you claim doesn't exist, Groth got 2 Spits and a Hurricane on the 30th August, a day when the Jagdwaffe claimed 59 and the RAF lost 25, (including those lost to bomber fire). So, if Groth was typical, he probably got 1 on the 30th of Aug.

He got 4 Spitfires on the 4th Sept, a day when the Jagdwaffe claimed 52 and the RAF actually lost 17. So divide by 3 if you assume NO RAF aircraft were lost to anything other than the Jagdwaffe that day, but more realisticly divide by 4. Another 1 for Groth.

I can't find any other claims by Groth during the BoB, but he did claim another 6 over Poland and France before the BoB. I think Tony Wood says the files are incomplete, so either you've got it wrong, and Groth's 13 victories include Poland or France, or the Jagdwaffe claimed even more than the 2000 figure during the BoB suggested by Tony Wood's docs.

So Groth's 13 kills during the BoB actually become 2.

What was the highest score among Spitfire aces during BoB, again?

Not a clue, but I'm pretty sure it was more than Groth's 2

Incidentally, Groth looks pretty typical for the Jagdwaffe during the BoB. They claimed 2000 single engined fighters, for total RAF single engined fighter losses of less than 1,000, and probably less than 700 lost to the Jagdwaffe. 3 to overclaiming looks about typical for the Jagdwaffe during the BoB.

What's the source for this 1960 claim?

'Fighters' by Deighton, but alternatively you can go through of the Daily reports of the RAF, which lists all causes. Be sure to read what was lost in the hangars, to Stukas and co. British authors seem to "naturally" leave out the Spits that disappeared in a bomb crater, but counting 109s that was lost in a training field in East Germany.

I wouldn't exactly describe a 109 lost in a training accident in Germany as an operational loss, and I don't think any of the historians mentioned would earlier.

RAF wastage might have been close to 2000, but that doesn't mean losses. Old planes being written off for fatigue reasons, fabric winged Hurricanes being sent back for scrapping/upgrading, old aircraft being sent to the maintenance schools for trainee fitters to practice on, all are counted into wastage. And when your factories are churning out a surfeit of planes, wastage is higher than when you haven't got enough planes to go around.

As an example, the Luftwaffe had 1024 109s on strength at the begining of 1940. by the end, they had 829. 1,870 were produced in 1940, which puts wastage at something over 2,050. That doesn't mean 2050 losses, it means a turnover of 2,050 aircraft.

You have no idea about how German air units are built up. That`s why you fail/refuse to understand that in the British system, the reserve planes/pilots were issued to the firstline Squadron,

That's what I said, Isegrim.

whereas in the German system the replacements pilots came to the Jagdgeschwader from different named reserve units, which are of course are not counted in the first line strenght.

Isegrim, where were the German reserves?

These are the figures from the Luftwaffe OOB at http://www.ww2.dk/oob/statistics/gob.htm
which are taken straight from the Luftwaffe records. Click on the Introduction at the top of the page and you will see the references.

The pilot strength of the sigle engined fighter force
Established Available
Dec 39 - 960 - 957
March 40 - 1160 - 1101
June 40 - 1171 - 1126
Sept 40 - 1132 - 917
Dec 40 - 1162 - 915

As you can see, the Jagdwaffe were decidedly under stregth by the end of 1940. You'd think that all these reserves would have been issued, if they existed. What numbers do your sources give for Luftwaffe reserves, Isegrim?

You count British Squadrons, which included the reserves in their structure, but only count the German first line units, that don`t include the reserves in their structure.

You're the only person I've ever seen claiming German reserves still existed by late 1940. Perhaps you can give us some figures, and a source? An explanation of why they remained in the reserves when the Jagdwaffe was so seriously under strength would be nice, too. Especially why reserves weren't sent to squadrons in Sept and Oct, when the Luftwaffe was engaged in combat and had only approx 50% of it's established strength fit for duty.

[Nashwan]

The RAF even had the luxury to let itself spanked all over Norway, the Low Countries, France, Dunkerque, the German Bay, the Channel and it`s own airfields.

Which has what to do with the RAF squadrons based in Northern England in 1940, exactly?

Source? Modern British history book for the elementary school classes ?

The source is Pongo. That's why I said "Pongo summed it up nicely:" and followed it with the quote.

A nice way to put how inflexible the British defense system was. No group was really allowed to interfere with the other group`s actions. Result : the group on the south was decimated, while the others were doing virtually nothing.

Decimated means 10% losses.

The "inflexible" approach worked. 11 Group could call on other groups at any time, and anyway the tactic was to meet the Luftwaffe in small numbers, not with everything in one vainglorious battle.

Plus, of course, squadrons needed to be stationed around the country to defend areas other than the south east, and having squadrons in quieter areas allowed for on the job training and rest and recuperation.

The problem with it for you that it is true. The RAF was throwing untrained rookies into the battle by September. Fact. Live with it.

Sorry, you're claim was that half the British pilots had 5 - 10 hours on type. I note you're not repeating that.

No "untrained" pilot was ever thrown into battle. Pilots with innsuficient conversion training were sometimes sent to squadrons, but in most cases were posted out of the area of battle to gain experience. Also, with each squadron having 20+ pilots, yet usually flying just over half of that, pilots could usually be introduced to operations gradually.

Anyway, the numbers are not in doubt, the RAF lost around 420 Spitfire and Hurricane pilots, and maintainded a positive ratio against the Luftwaffe throught, including Sept and Oct.

Strangely they still managed to win.

Uhm... win ? Surviving perhaps while being bombed every day and night at will by the LW.

Isegrim, haven't you noticed everyone else is debating how close the Luftwaffe came to winning. No-one else is suggesting the Luftwaffe won, or even didn't lose. The Luftwaffe suffered higher casulaties than the RAF, and didn't fulfill it's objectives. The RAF did fulfill theirs.

Then again, you don't even accept the Nazis started the war, so why should I expect you to accept the Luftwaffe lost the BoB?

They didn't. The RAF flew 5000 sorties the last week of August, 4900 the first week of September.

Sept


8 : 215
9 : 466
10 : 224
11 : 678
12 : 247
13 : 209
14 : 806

Total : 2845


Typical Naswhan`s.

Typical Isegrim, more like. READ what I said. The sorties dropped in the FIRST week of September. You have given the figures for the 8th - 14th September. How can that be the first week of September? The first week is the 1st - 7th.

Claim : The LW was breaking. Reason : Their fighter sorties were dropping in the 2nd week of September. (Typical selective thinking, comparing virtually all British - fighter - sorties vs. only a partition of all the German - fighter and bomber - sorties)

Reason: their fighter sorties were down in the first week of September. And it's not a portion of German fighter and bomber sorties, it's the sorties of the Luftwaffe single seat fighter force against Britain, compared with the sorties of RAF Fighter Command in defence of Britain. Naturally it excludes fighter sorties elsewhere in the world, but what do Gladiator sorties in Egypt have to do with what we are talking about?

Claim : LW`s sorties were dropping, 4000 in last week of August, 3200 in 1st week of Sept, only 1400 in 2nd week of September. (wouldn`t swore on those numbers either).

And The Great Bluff: The magnicent RAF`s number don`t show any similiar.

Facts :

RAF daylight fighter sorties :

last week of August : 5009 sorties
1st week of Sept : 5284
2nd week of Sept : 2845


So much for Naswhan`s "RAF sortie numbers were not dropping in the 2nd week of September."

Isegrim, go back and read what I said.

"The Luftwaffe were pressuring the RAF with a very high sortie rate and attacks on airfields. They began those tactics in the last week of August, when they flew nearly 4000 fighter sorties. But they couldn't sustain it, flying only 3200 sorties in the first week of September, then dropping to only 1400 in the second week of September. "

The crucial part is that they dropped in the first week of Sept, when the campaign agaqinst the airfields was ongoing. The RAF's sorties did not drop then, and only dropped after the Luftwaffe turned on London.

In fact they did. To their half... so, by Naswhan-standards, "the RAF was breaking". (I would merely say that the bad weather in September were preventing sorties, which is acknowledged by both High Commands as could be read above)

From : http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/calendar.html



quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Well, the weather:

7th September 1940 : Fair with some haze.
8th September 1940 : Fair early morning and evening, cloudy for the remainder of the day
9th September 1940 : Scattered showers, thundery in the east. Channel fair.
10th September 1940 : Generally cloudy, some rain.
11th September 1940 : Mainly fine with some local showers. Cloud in the Channel and Thames Estuary.
12th September 1940 : Unsettled, rain in most districts
13th September 1940 : Unsettled.
14th September 1940 : Showers and local thunder. Cloud in the Straits, Channel and Thames Estuary

Again, it's still the second week. I said the Luftwaffe sortie went to nearly 4000 in the last week of Aug, and dropped to 3200 in the first week of Sept, despite the fact the campaign against the airfields was still ongoing.

Trust me, that's good for a British summer. It also only covers the second week of Sept, not the first week, when the sortie rate was already dropping.

German sortie rate was increasing, not dropping.

German sorties according to the RAF`s 1940 reports:

August :

26 : 400
27 : 75
28 : 400
29 : 360
30 : 600
31 : 800

Sept

1 : 450
2 : 850
3 : 600
4 : 650
5 : 450
6 : 720
7 : 700
8 : 170
9 : 400
10 : 50
11 : 500
12 : 50
13 : 90
14 : 400

That's the RAF estimate of total German operations, and is far lower than the actual totals. The RAF explicitly states it's only an estimate.

Hooton gives the figures I posted as German fighter sorties.

It`s more like a simple case that the Automn was coming, and the weather turned bad, making flying impossible.

But not for the RAF, apparently.

RAF daylight fighter sorties :
last week of August : 5009 sorties
1st week of Sept : 5284
2nd week of Sept : 2845

If weather was not the reason as you say, then only German fighters could have been.

Isegrim, I said despite being engaged in the anti airfield campaign, the Luftwwaffe couldn't maintain the sortie rate of the last week of August on into the first week of September. You said it was the weather, and I pointed out the RAF did maintain it's sortie rate in the first week of Sept. Your figures say exactly the same.

Come the second week of September, the Luftwaffe had switched to attacking London, so the whole tactical picture had changed.

The common view is that if the Luftwaffe hadn't switched to London, they could have beaten the RAF. The fighter sorties in the first week of September show the Luftwaffe could not maintain that pressure, they were already dropping, the RAF's were not.

Well then I agree with you that British intelligence was damn near useless regarding the LW`s strenght.

Better to overestimate than underestimate.

The Americans estimated German front line strength at 11,000, with a similar number in reserve, and production at 26,000 in 1940.

The Germans estimated the RAF had just 177 operational fighters left, 300 total including reserves, on the 16th Sept. They estimated monthly production at 250. Actual figures were around 900 fighters including reserves, monthly output at 450.

Without the pilots available, the mechanics had more time to work on getting planes serviceable.

A rather laughable explanation....

Well, they're the Luftwaffe's figures, not mine. Only 735 single engined pilots available for duty on 1st Sept.

not to mention he only counts firstline Jagdwaffe strenght w/o the reserves ("Erganzungseinheiten")?

Where were the reserves, Isegrim? When the fat man was getting annoyed at lack of progress, and demanding the RAf be destroyed, and yet the Jagdwaffe was so understrength, why were they not deployed? Why didn't Galland say he'd like some of the reserve pilots released, for example, if they'd existed?

[Nashwan]

Crumpp, go to http://www.ww2.dk/oob/statistics/gob.htm and look at the Luftwaffe pilot figures.

My figures aren't manipulations they're just the figures.

[MiloMorai]

Laugh all you want Crispy but Barbi will have to have a go a your claim that the LW was a finished force in early '44. If he does not then all his ranting and raving over at Ubi, and other forums, on how uber the LW and its a/c were, was just barnyard manure. It is just not me that visits here. It will not take long for it to get around the net forums that Barbi is full of manure with his uber claims for the excellance of the Nazi soldier and his equipement.

[Crumpp]

Whatever your smokin Milo please don't operate heavy Machinery on it.  For the Machines sake....you could break it.

   What a bunch of baffle em with BS you've posted Nashwan.  Unfortunately your still off on that RAF was never in danger during the BoB tangent.  Only in your world son....  

   You can use the little wheel on the center of your mouse to scroll up.  Nothing you've posted changes ANY conclusions from my previous post.

Crumpp

[GScholz]

Contrary to general belief and official reports, the enemy's bombing attacks by day did extensive damage to five of our forward aerodromes and also to six of our seven sector stations. There was a critical period when the damage to sector stations and our ground organization was having a serious effect on the fighting efficiency of the squadrons, who could not be given the same good technical and administrative service as previously.........The absence of many essential telephone lines, the use of scratch equipment in emergency operation rooms, and the general dislocation of ground organization, was seriously felt for about a week in the handling of squadrons by day to meet the enemy's massed attacks, which were continued without the former occasional break of a day.

Report by Air Vice Marshal Keith Park - 6th September 1940

For most of the phase [24 August - 6 September] the defending squadrons were flying and fighting singly. Only too often the units of combat were a British squadron of twelve aircraft at most and a German formation of twenty to forty bombers and up to 100 fighters. Some British squadron commanders attempted to contain the enemy escort with one flight, and with the other attack the bombers; but time after time there were sufficient German fighters to engage both British flights.

The Air Defence of Great Britain Vol II-The Battle of Britain

I watched as one by one our aircraft returned to base after yet another sortie. Most of the aircraft to our delight had returned unscathed, but then I saw this Hurricane coming in to land. His wings were tipping up, then down, then suddenly he hit the ground rather hard only for him to bounce right up again. Then at the second attempt, he finally kept the aircraft on the ground and taxied a short way and stopped in the centre of the airfield. Casualty procedures were put into action and crash tenders and ambulances rushed towards him only to find that the pilot fast asleep, he did not even have time to switch the engine off

Squadron Leaders remarks at 111 Squadron Croydon September 1940.

Towards the end of the Battle I had just taken about as much as I could bear. My nerves were in ribbons and I was scared stiff that one day I would pull out and avoid combat. That frightened me more than the Germans and I pleaded with my C.O. for a rest. He was sympathetic but quite adamant that until he got replacements I would have to carry on. I am glad now that he was unable to let me go. If I had been allowed to leave the squadron, feeling as I did, I am sure that I would never have flown again.

Sgt. J.H (Ginger) Lacey 501 Squadron Fighter Command

While the Luftwaffe were attacking more and more strategic targets under the cover of darkness, during daytime it was throwing everything it could into an all out effort to destroy the RAF day-fighter bases defending London. On the 30th and 31st August the day battle reached an unprecedented ferocity. The 31st was our blackest day.........
I was one of the casualties on the 31st. As Dornier bombers swept over Croydon, demolishing hangars and technical buildings, I led my squadron off through the smoke and dust against the attackers. Twenty minutes later, after a sharp cut and thrust combat with a swarm of escorting Messerschmitts, my Hurricane was hit. So was I. Once again my parachute saved me. That night in Croydon General Hospital, the surgeon took a 20mm cannon-shell out of my foot, As I passed out under the anesthetic I could faintly hear the sirens wailing. The Luftwaffe were closing in on London.

Group Captain Peter Townsend Duel in the Dark Harrap, London 1986

"I saw his contortions, then I saw him straighten and fly straight into the German aircraft; both crashed and Percy was killed. I was close enough to see his letters, as other pilots must have been and who also confirmed this incident, which in itself caused me to realize my young life and its future, if any, had jumped into another dimension"

Sgt. G.Pallister 249 & 43 Squadrons on P/O P.Burton ramming a German aircraft.

One section attacked Croydon and Biggin Hill. At the former airfield twelve bombers came in at 2,000 feet demolishing a hangar, damaging other buildings and causing casualties. At Biggin Hill, the bombing came from high altitude and to the long suffering occupants of the airfield it seemed that they must be the A1 priority target for the whole Luftwaffe. Further extensive damage was done to hangars and buildings, the married quarters and the officers' mess were bombed and the operations block received a direct hit, extinguishing the lights and filling the rooms with acrid fumes, dust and smoke from the fires which broke out. The temporary telephone lines and power cables put in after the raid on the 30th were destroyed.

Wood and Dempster The Narrow Margin Hutchinson 1961 p315

There was only one way of getting to the bombers without getting mixed up with the fighter escort. "Stand by for head on attack and watch out for those little fellows above," I called. Then I brought the squadron round steadily in a wide turn, moving it into echelon as we leveled out about two miles ahead on a collision course.
Ease the throttle to reduce the closing speed - which anyway allowed only a few seconds' fire. Get a bead on them right away, hold it, and never mind the streams of tracer darting overhead. Just keep on pressing the button until you think your going to collide - then stick hard forward. Under the shock of 'negative G" your stomach jumps into your mouth, dust and muck fly up from the cockpit floor into your eyes and your head cracks on the roof as you break away below.

S/L P.W.Townsend 85 Squadron R.A.F.

.......I do consider that these latest figures are a means of encouragement, but I feel compelled to look at the long term forecast. In a months time, how many pilots and aircraft will I have at my disposal

Air Chief Marshal Dowding to the War Cabinet

"The Cabinet were distressed to hear from you that you were now running short of pilots for fighters, and they now had become the limiting factor......Lord Beaverbrook has made a surprising improvement in the supply and repair of aeroplanes, and in clearing up the muddle and scandal of the aircraft production branch, I greatly hope that you will, be able to do as much on the personnel side, for it will indeed be lamentable for if we have machines standing idle for want of pilots to fly them"

Winston Churchill to the Secretary of State for Air June 3rd 1940

"I was worried daily from July to September by a chronic shortage of trained fighter pilots and it was not until the battle was nearly lost that Air Staff of the Air Ministry assisted by borrowing pilots from Bomber Command and from the Royal Navy. Incidentally, in December 1940 when I was posted to Flying Training Command, I found that the flying schools were working at only two-thirds capacity and were following peacetime routines being quite unaware of the grave shortage of pilots in Fighter Command........."

Air Vice Marshal Keith Park 11 Group relating to the battle and quoted in Paris 1965

. . . . . . . this day for instance, a lanky, nineteen year old boy called Cocky Dundas* flew with the wing for the first time. Exactly a month earlier Dundas had been with with 616 Squadron at Kenley; they were waiting at readiness for an evening visit from Winston Churchill when they had been scrambled and ran into a flock of 109s over Kent. It was Dundas's first fight and a 109 had "jumped" him, shot his controls to bits and put bullets in his engine and glycol tank. Smoke and glycol fumes filled the cockpit and he could not get his hood open. He spun out of control from 12,000 feet till finally he was able to jettison the hood and baled out at 800 feet, breaking his collar bone at the same time. Now only two of the old pilots were left in the squadron, and Dundas, still shaken, shoulder still weak, was going back for more. . . . .

Paul Brickhill - Reach for the Sky, Collins 1954 p227
* Flying Officer H.S.L.Dundas 616 Squadron RAF.

I drove over to Tangmere in the evening and found the place in utter shambles, with wisps of smoke still rising from the shattered buildings. Little knots of people were  wandering about with dazed looks on their faces, obviously deeply affected by the events of the day. I eventually tracked down the Station Commander standing on the lawn in front of the Officers Mess with a parrot sitting on his shoulder. Jack was covered with grime and the wretched bird was screeching its imitation of a Stuka at the height of the attack! The once immaculate grass was littered with personal belongings which had been blasted from the wing which had received a direct hit. Shirts, towels, socks and a portable gramophone - a little private world for all to see.....Rubble was everywhere and all three hangars had been wrecked.

Squadron Leader "Sandy" Johnstone 602 Squadron

This led to 'a hell of a donny' over Dover, with some 200 aircraft milling about in numerous dogfights. In this area, the Luftwaffe were little more distant from their bases than the RAF squadrons, and for once were prepared to mix it instead of making the one pass and then diving for home, waiting for the red-light blink warning of fuel shortage. No. 615 Squadron lost two pilots, and three of 32 Squadron's pilots, unhurt themselves, made forced landings, while JG26 and JG52 each lost a 109 in the mêlée.

Richard Hough & Denis Richards Battle of Britain  Hodder & Staughton 1989 pp163-4

[GScholz]

....Two further pilots have come to us straight from a Lysander squadron with no experience whatsoever on fighter aircraft. Apparently demand has now outstripped supply and there are no trained pilots available in the Training Units, which means that we will just have to train them ourselves. However, it remains to be seen whether we can spare the hours, as we are already short of aircraft for our own operational needs. It seems a funny way to run a war.......

Squadron Leader A.V.R.(Sandy) Johnstone 602 Squadron Fighter Command RAF *

"Contrary to general belief and official reports, the enemy's bombing attacks by day did extensive damage to five of our forward aerodromes, and also to six of our seven sector stations." Manston and Lympne were unfit for operations 'on several occasions for days' and Biggin Hill was so severely damaged that for over a week it could operate only one squadron. Had the Luftwaffe continued to attack these sectors, 'the fighter defences of London would have been in a parlous state during the last critical phase when heavy attacks have been directed against the capital."
Sector operation rooms suffered both from direct hits and damage to landlines. They all had to use emergency rooms, though these were too small and poorly equipped to cope with the normal control of three squadrons per sector.

Air Vice Marshal Keith Park, C-in-C 11 Group

"It was burning all down the river. It was a horrid sight. But I looked down and said 'Thank God for that', because I knew that the Nazis had switched their attack from the fighter stations thinking that they were knocked out. They weren't, but they were pretty groggy"

Air Vice Marshal Keith Park AOC 11 Group on the switch to attack London.

".....All we could see was row upon row of German raiders, all heading for London. I have never seen so many aircraft in the air all at the same time.... The escorting fighters saw us at once and came down like a ton of bricks, when the squadron split up and the sky became a seething cauldron of aeroplanes, swooping and swerving in and out of the vapour trails and tracer smoke. A Hurricane on fire spun out of control ahead of me while, above to my right, a 110 flashed across my vision and disappeared into the fog of battle before I could draw a bead on it. Everyone was shouting at once and the earphones became filled with a meaningless cacophony of jumbled noises. Everything became a maelstrom of jumbled impression - a Dornier spinning wildly with part of its port mainplane missing; black streaks of tracer ahead, then I instinctively put my arm up to shield my face; taking a breather when the haze absorbed me for a moment ...

SQUADRON LEADER 'SANDY' JOHNSTONE, 602 Squadron, 7 Sept. 1940.

The position was grim in the extreme as from August 24th to September 6th. 295 fighters had been totally destroyed and 171 badly damaged, against a total output of 269 new and repaired Spitfires and Hurricanes. Worst of all, during the fortnight 103 pilots were killed or missing and 128 were wounded, which represented a total wastage of 120 pilots per week out of a fighting strength of just under 1,000.
Experienced pilots were like gold dust, and each one lost had to be replaced by an untried man who for some time would be vulnerable, until he acquired battle know-how. Fresh squadrons, moved in to replace tired units, very often lost more aircraft and pilots than the formations they replaced. For instance, 616 Squadron lost twelve aircraft and five pilots between August 25th and September 2nd and had to be retired to Coltishall in No.12 Group.

No. 603 Squadron, newly arrived in 11 Group on August 28th, had by September 6th lost sixteen aircraft and twelve pilots, while 253 Squadron at Kenley lost thirteen Hurricanes and nine pilots in the seven days they were in battle, from August 30th.

Wood and Dempster The Narrow Margin McGraw Hill 1961 p332-3

By 1630hrs, all twenty one squadrons around London were in the air or taking off. The sight that they encountered east of Sheppy astounded them: a formation one and a half miles high, covering 800 square miles of sky.

Len Deighton - Battle of Britain  Jonathon Cape 1980 p169

.....Ray looked eastward downstream towards the estuary. Never had he seen such a terrifying sight; the sky was dotted with a mass of specks which seemed quite motionless. Then he realized they were approaching, he recognized them as Heinkels and Dorniers, flanked by escorts of Messerschmitt 109s and 110s. The boys could not imagine there could be so many at once. In fact the Luftwaffe had amassed nearly four hundred bombers and more than six hundred fighters - over a thousand aircraft - for this all out attack.

Peter Townsend - Duel in the Dark  Harrap 1986

A black day for Fighter Command was September 11 with combat losses exceeding those of the Luftwaffe. Two major co-ordinated attacks by the Luftwaffe were launched, both in the afternoon. The first, comprising He 111s of KG 1 and KG 26 headed up the Thames Estuary towards London, with a fighter escort 200 strong. The defending squadrons made little impression on the escorts at first and lost heavily; some of them had been scrambled too late and were caught on the climb. As on the 7th, the 110s formed a holding pattern in the Croydon area, while the single-seaters ran themselves low on fuel. As a result, the Heinkels were quickly left without an escort and suffered in consequence, losing 10, plus four more which force landed in France, while a further 120 were damaged.
Meanwhile Luftflotte 3 mounted a raid on Portsmouth and Southampton, causing little damage. Luftwaffe combat losses for the day totaled 21, and another six force landed. Of these, only four were Bf 109s, although a fifth crashed as a result of a midair collision over France. Collisions were not that unusual; four Ju 87s were lost to this cause on a training mission also. Six Spitfires and nineteen Hurricanes were lost and a further six fighters crash landed. Twelve pilots were killed and four severely injured. This was an exchange rate that Fighter Command could not afford.

Mike Spick Battle of Britain Salamander 1990 p134

... and finally the incontestable truth about the Battle of Britain:

In Park’s mind, 7 September was always the turning point. Three years later, he flew to London from Malta and gave his first press interview on the Battle of Britain. He explained how close the Germans came to victory and how they threw it away by switching their main attack to London.

Vincent Orange Sir Keith Park Methuen 1985 pp107-108

Now Nashwan please ... continue!

[Crumpp]

Ding, Ding!!

It's Gscholz by a knockout!

Did you see that left hook?

Crumpp:lol

[Guppy35]

Originally posted by VO101_Isegrim
Uhm, the 1944 June 14th P-38 defensive circle was actually vs. our 109s, not the Rumanian ones, and we kicked the lightnings really in the bellybutton on that day. (one of the very-very rare circumstances we had numerical superiority).

PS: I have the details of it, there was some really wild claiming on the US side.

Hmmmm, which June 14th, 1944 we talking about.  The 1st FG History and the 82nd FG history don't mention the 14th at all and the listing for losses in both books show no losses on the 14th.  Whose bellybutton got kicked?  Don't see anything for the 14th FG either and that covers the 38 Groups.

Dan/Slack

[gripen]

Guppy35,
According to Ethell it was 14th FG and date was june 14th, but this comes from a pilots memories so date might be wrong.

GScholz,
There is not much sense to selectively pick up quotes which happen to support your view. Similar quotes can be collected from other side too to support what ever one wants to argue.

Otherwise so far I have not seen any statistics which supports the argument that the LW was actually winning BoB. Both sides suffered heavy losses and it appears that the RAF was more worried about their losses than LW; Dowding wanted to save fighters for possible invasion. Still to establish somekind of air superiority the LW would have needed far better than 1:1 ratio on fighters and none of the above statistics support that.

gripen

[Crumpp]

Yeah Gripen and the allies never had Air Supremacy over Normandy either....Geez.  

Gripen shifts along the perch in his elegant, golden cage.

"Rooooaaaaack,  Polly want a cracker...."

HOW many times do the same stats have to be posted and refuted?


Crumpp

[MiloMorai]

Originally posted by Crumpp
Yeah Gripen and the allies never had Air Supremacy over Normandy either....Geez.  

Gripen shifts along the perch in his elegant, golden cage.

"Rooooaaaaack,  Polly want a cracker...."

HOW many times do the same stats have to be posted and refuted?


Crumpp

LOL and this Crispy claims to be a professional dirt eater. Some of that dirt he ate while crawlimg around on his belly like a snake was full of pollutants for it has effected what is suppose to be between his ears.

This is the mature(????? ) person you have defending the USofA, Americans?

[Nashwan]

GScholz, did you read what I posted to Crumpp?

I'm saying most popular histories of the RAF use mainly British sources, which isn't suprising given the state of Luftwaffe archives.

From a British perspective, the RAF was losing in the last week of August and first week of September. What wasn't realised at the time is that the Germans were losing more. Their strength was falling faster than the RAF's, and their fighter force was shrinking faster than the RAF's.

You've posted a very long list that does exactly that. It speaks only of the RAF, and their view of the battle. Nobody is denying the RAF were under intolerable pressure in late August/ early September.

But you can't judge a battle of atrition by looking only at one side

The RAF was weeks away from breaking, only if the Luftwaffe could keep up the same amount of pressure. Yet their fighter sorties fell from 4000 to 3200 in the first week of Sept, their serviceability fell, and their diminishing number of pilots had to fly more sorties per man, and longer sorties, than the RAF.

Where in your long list of quotes are the ones that tell of the Luftwaffe?

Contrary to general belief and official reports, the enemy's bombing attacks by day did extensive damage to five of our forward aerodromes and also to six of our seven sector stations. There was a critical period when the damage to sector stations and our ground organization was having a serious effect on the fighting efficiency of the squadrons, who could not be given the same good technical and administrative service as previously.........The absence of many essential telephone lines, the use of scratch equipment in emergency operation rooms, and the general dislocation of ground organization, was seriously felt for about a week in the handling of squadrons by day to meet the enemy's massed attacks, which were continued without the former occasional break of a day.

Report by Air Vice Marshal Keith Park - 6th September 1940

Don't you think it would have been more honest if you'd included the next line as well when you copied and pasted?

When asked later about the general situation, Park simply stated "...we are holding our own...just".

Or perhaps you copied and pasted it from the second page it appears on, where it is followed by a different line:

On the German side, even though no was prepared to admit it, the state of affairs was in reality even worse.

Either way, you should have been honest enough to put the following line in.

Look at the date. The Luftwaffe turned on London on the 7th. The whole tone of this is that the critical period was already over by the 6th. Which fits in exactly with what I'm saying, the Luftwaffe launched an all out attack on the airfields in late August, but could not sustain the same level into September.

"Contrary to general belief and official reports, the enemy's bombing attacks by day did extensive damage to five of our forward aerodromes, and also to six of our seven sector stations." Manston and Lympne were unfit for operations 'on several occasions for days' and Biggin Hill was so severely damaged that for over a week it could operate only one squadron. Had the Luftwaffe continued to attack these sectors, 'the fighter defences of London would have been in a parlous state during the last critical phase when heavy attacks have been directed against the capital."
Sector operation rooms suffered both from direct hits and damage to landlines. They all had to use emergency rooms, though these were too small and poorly equipped to cope with the normal control of three squadrons per sector.

Air Vice Marshal Keith Park, C-in-C 11 Group

Dowding, in his despatch, responded by pointing out that 11 Group had survived 40 attacks on 13 airfields, and had briely lost only 3.

The position was grim in the extreme as from August 24th to September 6th. 295 fighters had been totally destroyed and 171 badly damaged, against a total output of 269 new and repaired Spitfires and Hurricanes. Worst of all, during the fortnight 103 pilots were killed or missing and 128 were wounded, which represented a total wastage of 120 pilots per week out of a fighting strength of just under 1,000.
Experienced pilots were like gold dust, and each one lost had to be replaced by an untried man who for some time would be vulnerable, until he acquired battle know-how. Fresh squadrons, moved in to replace tired units, very often lost more aircraft and pilots than the formations they replaced. For instance, 616 Squadron lost twelve aircraft and five pilots between August 25th and September 2nd and had to be retired to Coltishall in No.12 Group.

No. 603 Squadron, newly arrived in 11 Group on August 28th, had by September 6th lost sixteen aircraft and twelve pilots, while 253 Squadron at Kenley lost thirteen Hurricanes and nine pilots in the seven days they were in battle, from August 30th.

Wood and Dempster The Narrow Margin McGraw Hill 1961 p332-3

Again, it looks only at the sustainability of RAF losses, as if the Luftwaffe was a constant force. Total Luftwaffe losses in the same period were around 370, and the RAF were producing more than twice as many replacements as the Luftwaffe, and the RAF had large reserves.

RAF Spitfire and urricane strength, including reserves, on th 23rd August was 1225. By the 6th Sept that had declined to 1040. A reduction of 185. But at that rate it would take 6 weeks just to deplete the reserves, without cuting into frontline strength. And thats only if the Luftwaffe could keep up the same rate, and if the weather had turned worse by mid October.

While the Luftwaffe were attacking more and more strategic targets under the cover of darkness, during daytime it was throwing everything it could into an all out effort to destroy the RAF day-fighter bases defending London. On the 30th and 31st August the day battle reached an unprecedented ferocity. The 31st was our blackest day.........
I was one of the casualties on the 31st. As Dornier bombers swept over Croydon, demolishing hangars and technical buildings, I led my squadron off through the smoke and dust against the attackers. Twenty minutes later, after a sharp cut and thrust combat with a swarm of escorting Messerschmitts, my Hurricane was hit. So was I. Once again my parachute saved me. That night in Croydon General Hospital, the surgeon took a 20mm cannon-shell out of my foot, As I passed out under the anesthetic I could faintly hear the sirens wailing. The Luftwaffe were closing in on London.

Group Captain Peter Townsend Duel in the Dark Harrap, London 1986

Again, it supports exactly what I am saying. The Luftwaffe effort had already begun to trail off in early September.

.......I do consider that these latest figures are a means of encouragement, but I feel compelled to look at the long term forecast. In a months time, how many pilots and aircraft will I have at my disposal

Air Chief Marshal Dowding to the War Cabinet

Again, like all your accounts, it's looking at the strength of the RAF, not the balance of forces. Only the balance matters. If the RAF lost 30% of it's strength, it wouldn't matter if the Luftwaffe lost 50%. In fact, it wouldn't matter if the Luftwaffe lost 30%, because Fighter Command by late August was much larger than the Jagdwaffe.

. . . . . . . this day for instance, a lanky, nineteen year old boy called Cocky Dundas* flew with the wing for the first time. Exactly a month earlier Dundas had been with with 616 Squadron at Kenley; they were waiting at readiness for an evening visit from Winston Churchill when they had been scrambled and ran into a flock of 109s over Kent. It was Dundas's first fight and a 109 had "jumped" him, shot his controls to bits and put bullets in his engine and glycol tank. Smoke and glycol fumes filled the cockpit and he could not get his hood open. He spun out of control from 12,000 feet till finally he was able to jettison the hood and baled out at 800 feet, breaking his collar bone at the same time. Now only two of the old pilots were left in the squadron, and Dundas, still shaken, shoulder still weak, was going back for more. . . . .

Paul Brickhill - Reach for the Sky, Collins 1954 p227
* Flying Officer H.S.L.Dundas 616 Squadron RAF.

Which implies 616 lost all but two pilots. In fact, 616 lost 5 pilots throughout the battle. 616 was based away from the fighting for most of the battle, and was one of those squadrons that took inexperienced pilots, trained them, then sent them on to new squadrons.

In Park’s mind, 7 September was always the turning point. Three years later, he flew to London from Malta and gave his first press interview on the Battle of Britain. He explained how close the Germans came to victory and how they threw it away by switching their main attack to London.

Vincent Orange Sir Keith Park Methuen 1985 pp107-108

And Park was under the impression the Luftwaffe was twice as strong as it actually was, and had twicee the replacement rate. Park thought the Luftwaffe could do what it did in the last week of August on into September and October, but it couldn't.

GScholz, I said most history books present only the British viw of the battle, and make judgements without looking at the condition of the Luftwaffe. You have responded with a very long list of mainly pilot accounts, that look only at the British side of the battle. How do you judge a battle of atrition by looking at only one side?

Edited to clean up quote brackets

[Nashwan]

Now, from the same site you copied and pasted all the quotes from:



"Although the above graph shows that German losses during this month were very high, they appear even worse when we take the total German strength and convert the above figures into percentages. The single engined Bf109 figures represent 24% of the total fighter strength while the bombers represent a total of 19% of the bomber strength. Concern to the Luftwaffe was the high casualty rate of pilots and crew, which had to have an impact on morale of aircrew of the German Air Force.  
The month previous, when the Luftwaffe was content on attempting to draw the Royal Air Force into combat over the English Channel, figures were far fewer than those shown above for the month of August 1940 when more serious attempts were being made on targets over Britain itself. "

"But things were not to get any better. In a later document, when looking at the total damages and losses of the Luftwaffe, we shall see that as the Battle of Britain wears on, things do not improve for the Luftwaffe, and it was not just the German fighter strength that suffered. "

Casualties for August

RAF 130 Spitfire and Hurricane pilots killed and captured

Luftwaffe 145 109 pilots killed and captured. (And the Luftwaffe were training less pilots, and had a smaller number of single engined pilots)

It's much worse when you look at total fighter pilot casualties, inluding the twins.

Luftwaffe, 335 killed and missing

RAF 146 killed and missing

Even if you count in the wounded, and assume that none returned to combat, the RAF are still well ahead.

[Crumpp]

OK,

After some extensive research this argument is unwinnable for both sides.  It is the current "rage" among WWII scholars.  The real ones who get paid to teach in Universities.

There is a debate as to whether or not the Luftwaffe could have sustained the level of casualties it was taking.  The RAF was producing more planes than the RLM.  Counter - RLM didn't put Germany on a Wartime production plane til much later in the war.  German workers still worked 8 hours /day 5 days/week.

I personally think the "planes" scholars are wrong as the amount of airframes was never an issue.  Pilot replacement is and the LW was under some strain.

I also personnally feel that with that said they never had to "dig" for pilots nor did they change their replacement policy like the RAF.  The LW didn't lower it's training standards to fill cockpits the RAF did AND robbed other services for trained pilots. Counter - RAF could have withdrawn to the Northern Airfields.  IMO this would have resulted in a defacto LW victory.



So in the academic world two schools of thought:

1.  The Luftwaffe was capable of winning the BoB and almost did as the British Leadership feared in Sept '40.

2.  The LW was incapable of winning the BoB from the begining

As such there is plenty of material out there to support both sides of the argument.  No one will solve it here.

Crumpp