Spitfire IX overmodeled??

[VO101_Isegrim]

If you call Luftwaffe losses of 37+, RAF losses of 27 the RAF being spanked. (The lowest source for the Luftwaffe gives 37, most are higher)  

Facts :

7th September

14 Bf 109s lost and 2 damaged (RAF claims 21 destroyed, + 13 probable, 6 damaged)

27 Spits/Hurris lost (25 of these to 109s), further 10 damaged, 14 pilots killed or missing

So to be more precise, it was the Fighter Command who was spanked by the Jagdwaffe on the 7th September. Possibly one of the reason why the highest rate of alert of invasion was initiated by the British on that day.


I've asked you repeatedly for a source for your 109 consumption figures, I don't think one has ever been forthcoming, has it?

I really can`t remember you asking for such figures, especially not repeatadly. Otherwise the consumption figures of the 109 are well known to you, it was discussed a couple of times. But be more precise in what you are interested in, I don`t feel like typing whole pages.

Until that it remains that the 109 had more range than the Spit, especially if late models are compared, and this is supported by simple reasoning, technical data and intelligence documents vs. some errors in books.


How many ships does it take to support your "1 panzer division"?

You mean a single Pz Div, say some 10 000 men, plus 2-250 tanks can easily conquer the whole UK, defended by some 25-30 divisions...? British land forces weren`t that bad.

The Germans had enough ships to support an invasion, the barges were necessary for landing troops on the beaches.

Uhm, like 168 steamers, 419 tugs, 1600 motorboats and 1910 barges...? A mere 700 000 tons in total ? Protected by two light cruisers, and nine destroyers plus some S-boots? Scharhorst and Gneisenau in repair, Bismarck and Tirpitz not yet finished it` trials?

Somebody in the German general staff summerized the capabilities of the "invasion fleet" nicely: He could send his troops right into a sausage filler machine for the same results.

The only reason British history writing wants us to believe that Seelowe had any real chance to be commenced is because the need to make up for the poor British record in WW2 with a relatively successfull period.


Isegrim, if you go back you'll notice I was talking about the Luftwaffe sorties dropping in the first week of September.

Changing the argument, Naswhwan? OK, fine... still not true. LW sorties were not dropping in the first week of September compared to the previous week, in fact the pressure on the RAF was increasing, 50% sorties were flown in the 1st week of September than in the last week of August.

German daylight sorties according to the RAF`s 1940 reports:

August :

25 : 250
26 : 400
27 : 75
28 : 400
29 : 360
30 : 600
31 : 800
----------
2885 in last week of August


Sept

1 : 450
2 : 850
3 : 600
4 : 650
5 : 450
6 : 720
7 : 700
----------
4420 in 1st week of September

8 : 170
9 : 400
10 : 50
11 : 500
12 : 50
13 : 90
14 : 400
----------
1660 in 2nd week of September


So you better give up that BS about the 1st week of September, for the sake of your own credibility.





OK, if you really can't see it.

It's halfway down the page, the first file under the heading

O.K.L. Fighter Claims : Chef für Ausz. und Dizsiplin Luftwaffen-Personalamt L.P. (A) V Films & Supplementary Claims from Lists
etc...


Still can`t see anywhere Caldwell stating the LW claiming 2000+, 3000+ (etc... your numbers always vary when you talk about LW claims) in BoB. And I am bit lazy to collect it as whole into an excell table, and delete all non-claim lines such as the date, exlude the nightfighter results over the Reich, France etc. Not to mention this is a list of the filed claims by pilots, and NOT the officially accepted list of kills by the Abschusskomission.


Sorry, I was going by what Les Butler and Don Caldwell have to say on their web page:

"It is clear from his text that Groehler's objectives were:
(1) to show that the German-Soviet front was the most significant source of the Luftwaffe losses that ultimately led to Allied air supremacy, and
(2) that the Luftwaffe could not afford to weaken its forces in the East, even when pushed hard by the USAAF strategic offensive and the Normandy invasion. Groehler did make these claims, to the undoubted pleasure of his Soviet masters, but his data, when examined carefully, don't back him up. "

http://www.butler98.freeserve.co.uk/thtrlosses.htm

Oh, great. Frankly I agree with that with Butler and Caldwell. The question was, however, not how much valid are Groehler`s conclusions, but wheter his data is valid or not. Not even Butler or Caldwell, or anybody else questions the validity of his data. Groehler is a great source if one just concentrates on the raw numbers and ignores the political BS, that was BTW, absolutely neccesary to be added in any book in socialist era. Besides, I believe he added the propaganda stuff to allow the book pass the censor, and who could read between the lines could find the reality presented in the many-many tables.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No, they lost around 600 on OPERATIONAL missions,

Source?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Wood and Dempster, The Narrow Margin. Hooton, Eagle in Flames gives similar figures.

Give an exact qoute then which supports your claim that 600 "fighters" were "lost" under strictly "operational" missions, they don`t include non-combat related losses, they don`t include accidents etc.


As for how laughable it was, ask those 55 000 dead corpses buried under the molten aluminium of Lancesters.

Tastless, even for you.

Can I take that as an agreement that the Bf 110 wasn`t exactly laughable in it`s own class? In fact, it was a very good machine in the twin engined category. Let`s compare it to the Blenheim, Beufighter...

Incidentally, Groth looks pretty typical for the Jagdwaffe during the BoB. They claimed 2000 single engined fighters, for total RAF single engined fighter losses of less than 1,000, and probably less than 700 lost to the Jagdwaffe. 3 to overclaiming looks about typical for the Jagdwaffe during the BoB.

According to Naswan at least...


RAF wastage might have been close to 2000, but that doesn't mean losses. Old planes being written off for fatigue reasons, fabric winged Hurricanes being sent back for scrapping/upgrading, old aircraft being sent to the maintenance schools for trainee fitters to practice on, all are counted into wastage.

The interesting part of that while you seem to be aware of this fact, you refuse to apply the same standards to LW losses. Double standards.

[VO101_Isegrim]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
whereas in the German system the replacements pilots came to the Jagdgeschwader from different named reserve units, which are of course are not counted in the first line strenght.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Isegrim, where were the German reserves?

Let`s start with the basics. Do you admit that German organisation was different than British one, and reserves were not atteched directly to the Staffeln ? Therefore, German reserves don`t show up in a table that deals only with the 1st line units...?

These are the figures from the Luftwaffe OOB at http://www.ww2.dk/oob/statistics/gob.htm
which are taken straight from the Luftwaffe records. Click on the Introduction at the top of the page and you will see the references.

These show the first line fighter units only.
They don`t show any of 2nd line units.
First line fighter units don`t have reserve planes/pilots attached.
For this reason, no reserves are shown in this table, just the strenght immidiately available to the fighter units.



Note that Olaf Groehler in The History of Air War 1910-1970 also gives the strenght of the LW s-e fighters for April 11 1940. His list includes the reserves as well it seems, and lists 1356 s-e fighters. Naswan`s source gives for a similiar date 1258 fighters.

The fact that Groehler`s table includes the reserve fighters is proven by RL2III/1158 (Nashwan`s favourite ), provided by Richard T. Eger, see below:

On 31 January 1945 the combat units of the Luftwaffe and their associated Erganzungs Einheiten, had the following strength in Bf109 types.
These are on hand totals, they include both 'frontline' and 'other' units. Included are all aircraft operational and non-operational at the time. (combat/Erganzungs):

Bf109G1/5 (0/1)
Bf109G12 (0/5)
Bf109G6 (71/328)
Bf109G14 and G14U4 (431/190)
Bf109G10, G10/U4 and G14/AS (568/3)
Bf109K4 (314/0)
Bf109G10/R6 (51/0)
-----------------------
Total (1435/527)

Other Jagd types totaled (1058/359)

Of those 3379 were single engine fighters, but of those only 2493 were in actual combat units.

Notice the following :

1, There were 314 in LW service of coolest fighter of WW2 .
2, The first number gives the 1st line units, the second gives the reserve units (Erganzungseinheiten means 'Replacement units').
3, Most importantly , note that the total fighters ('Jagd types') avaiable amount 3379 on the 31st January 1945. These include reserve though, the first line units hold only about 2/3 of this, 2493 planes.

Compare with the number Groehler gives as "S-e fighter strenght" on the 1st January 1945 : 3328 fighters. This is very close as given the total (combat/reserve units) fighter strengt of the LW by Richard as 3379. Obviously, given the great similiarity Groehler`s figures include the fighter reserves .

In the same table, Groehler gives the LW s-e fighter strenght on 11 April 1940 as 1356. These also include reserves.

What Nashwan listed for a similiar date is 1258 s-e fighters. Some 100 fighters less. His list only show the first line units, and do not include the reserve planes.


As you can see, the Jagdwaffe were decidedly under stregth by the end of 1940. You'd think that all these reserves would have been issued, if they existed.

It doesn`t work this way. The RAF-FC had an established strenght of some 1400 or so fighters (roughly). Only about 6-700 of these were servicable. Using your logic, the RAF didn`t have any reserves, because if it had, it would surely issue all those reserves to raise the number of operational planes. But things in real life don`t follow your logic.

What numbers do your sources give for Luftwaffe reserves, Isegrim?

I don`t have exact numbers for the full Bf 109. However it`s quite clear from the above, that you only list the first line Bf 109 strenght, and not include the reserves. You do include, however, reserves of the RAF.


You're the only person I've ever seen claiming German reserves still existed by late 1940. Perhaps you can give us some figures, and a source?

You're the only person I've ever seen claiming German reserves didn`t existed by late 1940. Perhaps you can give us some figures, and a source?

An explanation of why they remained in the reserves when the Jagdwaffe was so seriously under strength would be nice, too.

'The JW was seriously understrenght' - this is your claim, unproven, and frankly, BS. I don`t feel o give any explanation to it.

However, it`s interesting to compare the loss rate of pilots (as according to David Baker):

% of fighter Pilot strenght lost:

RAF - LW

August 26% - 15%
September 28% - 21%


Especially why reserves weren't sent to squadrons in Sept and Oct, when the Luftwaffe was engaged in combat and had only approx 50% of it's established strength fit for duty.

Tell us how could there be RAF reserves at all, if the established strenght was supposed to be some 1400 planes, out of which no more than 6-700 were fit for duty during September October? These are facts, and hard to dismiss. It was already proven that the RAF had less servicable fighters than the LW by the date you mentioned (ie. on 28th Sept 712 servicable Bf 109s vs. 604 Spits/Hurris).
Why didn`t they just call up the reserves, if they existed ? You say the RAF didn`t have any reserves left, as they would surely fill up the ranks if they had.

[VO101_Isegrim]

Originally posted by Guppy35
Hmmmm, which June 14th, 1944 we talking about.  The 1st FG History and the 82nd FG history don't mention the 14th at all and the listing for losses in both books show no losses on the 14th.  Whose bellybutton got kicked?  Don't see anything for the 14th FG either and that covers the 38 Groups.

Dan/Slack

I am talking about the 14th FG`s combat vs. the 101st Group Pumas on the June 14th, 1944 over Hungary.

That was 15 P-38s vs. 31 Bf 109 G-6s (US pilots reported some 60-65 109s+190s)

Results :

US side lost 5 P-38s, 2 heavily damaged ones, plus other got light damage. Claimed 13 Bf 109s destroyed, 1 probable, 5 damaged.

Hungarian side lost 1 109 in air combat (pilot KIA), another in emergency landing (pilot alive). 1 109 was damaged in landing, pilot alive. 1 109s RTB due to overheating coolant.
Pilots claim 9 P-38s, only 5 are accepted as valid.

Truth to be told, even though they kicked the 14th`s butt on their first mission, they missed the bombers due to the error of ground control, so effectively a mission failure despite tactical success. On the otehr hand, even if they find the bombers in time, little could they have done against the horde.

[VO101_Isegrim]

300!

[VO101_Isegrim]

Pilots

The critical problem faced by the Fighter Command was the loss of trained fighter pilots. In phase one of the campaign, (8 to 18 August), the RAF lost 154 pilots (killed, seriously wounded, missing). Only 63 new fighter pilots were available from the training schools for the same period. During phase two, 24 August to 1 September, the figures were even worse as losses reached 231 pilots, or about 20 percent of the total combat strenght of the command! Combat strenght in the month of August decreased by almost one third, from 1434 to 1023. The Squadron avarage fell from 26 to 16 operational pilots. Naturally, combat experience was similiarly reduced.

In July and August, roughly one-fourth of the Squadron Leaders and one-third of the Flight Leaders had been killed or removed from flying due to injuries. Experienced pilots numbered no more than 500 - less than one half of the Fighter Command`s strenght - with the remainder often having less than 20 hours flying time on fighters. Daily sortie rates were high and it was not uncommon for pilots to fly three of four sorties a day. Stress was also high. "One Squadron, No 85, based at Croydon, had fourteen of it`s eighteen pilots shot down in two weeks, two of them twice.".

From "The Battle of Britain - A German Perspective" by Lt. Col. Earle Lund, USAF, Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course, Campaign Analysis Study. Page 25


" For Dowding, it was the pilot supply that was causing a headache. The week following Adlertag, he lost almost 80 % of his Flight- and Squadron Leaders (KIA, MIA, or denied from flying). Flights that met the enemy were often led by officers with no experience whatsoever. There was one Squadron Leader who was put in charge without ever being in a Hurricane; he had three takeoffs and landings before leading his unit into combat.

But it wasn`t only the commanders lacking experience, the subordinate pilots often had a mere 10 hours in single seat fighters. It took extreme courage for such flyers to land in high-speed fighters, not to mention air combat. Moreover, on the 10th August Dowding agreed to reduce pilot training even more. It took a mere two weeks between training the pilot and his first combat engagement.  Until July, the course was six months long."

page 195

...

"Johnny Kent, who was a professional officier and test pilot in the RAF, managed to transfer himself to a combat unit in the spring of 1940. He wasn`t keeping his mouth shut about the short combat course he took. He had to fire at ground targets near the river Dee with the eight machineguns of his Hurricane. After a half second burst, the guns become silenced. Cursing his jammed guns after landing, he was told that he merely used up the amount of ammunition issued for the practice. Kent stated that "many of the new boys went into his frist combat without ever firing his guns". Few of Kent`s instructors ever flew in combat, but there were also some who was not serving with a flying squadron for years."

page 115

"The Fighter Command had sustained heavy losses, and morale was incredibly low. After arriving to the airfield, the new assigned commander of the 92nd Squadron, sit among his pilots in the canteen without uncovering his identity. His first impressions were unfavourable. "Their whole behaviour and rudeness showed the lack of self-discipline." He stated that they were "a disorderly, undisciplined, and demoralized group made of first-class material".
This Squadron sustained almost twice as many losses as the 303rd, from where the new commander was transferred from. In a short period, it lost 4 of it`s commanders, 3 of them in the previous month (August). One of them was alive for only 2 days.
Combat effectiveness of the squadron was refelcting it`s demoralized state. One one occasion, during combat air patrol in their Hurricanes, a small group of Bf 109s made diving attacks agaisnt them. Johhny Kent, the new commander, met them head to head with his unit. The Germans however turned away every time from direct engagement. After several such occasions, Kent noticed that many Hurricanes were turning back and attempting to return to base. Kent called this phenomenon the "109 disease". "These pilots no longer believed that they could stand fast against the German fighters." "When we returned to our base, I called the pilots together, and told them that if I see just once again that any of them flees, and thus endangers himself and the whole unit, I won`t wait until the Germans get him, I will shoot him down myself."

Page 236


Len Deighton, Fighters (pages as in Hungarian edition)

[Nashwan]

So to be more precise, it was the Fighter Command who was spanked by the Jagdwaffe on the 7th September. Possibly one of the reason why the highest rate of alert of invasion was initiated by the British on that day.

The Jagdwaffe were supposed to be escorting the bombers. The RAF were supposed to be targeting the Bobers. Total RAF losses were lower than Luftwaffe losses.

How many ships does it take to support your "1 panzer division"?

You mean a single Pz Div, say some 10 000 men, plus 2-250 tanks can easily conquer the whole UK, defended by some 25-30 divisions...? British land forces weren`t that bad.

Of course not, I was repeating your claim. Hence the quotes.

The Germans had enough ships to support an invasion, the barges were necessary for landing troops on the beaches.

Uhm, like 168 steamers, 419 tugs, 1600 motorboats and 1910 barges...?

It's only a 20 mile crossing. Hell, the Italians had enough to support several panzer divisions and tens of thousands o their own troops in North Africa, over much larger distances. I'm sure the Germans could manage o rustle up enough shipping in Europe.

Protected by two light cruisers, and nine destroyers plus some S-boots? Scharhorst and Gneisenau in repair, Bismarck and Tirpitz not yet finished it` trials?

Of course not. The Kriegsmarine couldn't hope to stand up to the RN. That was the Luftwaffe's job. The Germans felt the Luftwaffe would be able to protect the invasion fleet, although I very much doubt they could have, even if they' been able to defeat the RAF.

Isegrim, if you go back you'll notice I was talking about the Luftwaffe sorties dropping in the first week of September.

Changing the argument, Naswhwan?

No, repeating the argument. That's what I've been saying all along, even though you have consistently tried to change it to the second week of September.

German daylight sorties according to the RAF`s 1940 reports:

Isegrim,I'm talking figures taken from Hooton, who got them from the Luftwaffe archives. You areusing figures that the RAF puts every time as "estimates"

Given a disparity between Luftwaffe records o sorties and RAFestimates of Luftwaffe sorties, I'd choose the original Luftwaffe figures every time.

But, as you think the RAF figures of Luftwaffe activity aremore accurate than Luftwaffe figures, then we'd better use them. From the same page you trust above Luftwaffe figures, Jagdwaffe losses 7th Sept: 43 109s and 110s destroyed, 18 probable, 12 damaged. As you can see, the RAF spanked the Jagdwaffe over London on the 7th Sept.

In total, the Luftwaffe lost 2,500 aircraft during the battle, the RAF less thn 1,000. Or don't you want to use RAF figures in preference to the Luftwaffe's own figures anymore?

So you better give up that BS about the 1st week of September, for the sake of your own credibility.

Isegrim, for the sake of your own credibility, you need to decide wether you trust RAF estimates over Luftwaffe records. I am using a consistent line, Luftwaffe records for the Luftwaffe, RAF records for the RAF.

O.K.L. Fighter Claims : Chef für Ausz. und Dizsiplin Luftwaffen-Personalamt L.P. (A) V Films & Supplementary Claims from Lists
etc...


Still can`t see anywhere Caldwell stating the LW claiming 2000+, 3000+ (etc... your numbers always vary when you talk about LW claims) in BoB.

Caldwell? It's Tony Wood's site, I didn't mention Caldwell in connection with it. My mention of Caldwell was in relation to Caldwell's site, and his opinions of Groehler.

The claims are all listed. Nobody "mentions" 2000, thats just the number of claims made. You can count them if you don't trust me. I used a spreadsheet, which does the work in seconds.

And I am bit lazy to collect it as whole into an excell table, and delete all non-claim lines such as the date, exlude the nightfighter results over the Reich, France etc. Not to mention this is a list of the filed claims by pilots, and NOT the officially accepted list of kills by the Abschusskomission.

It's easy to do with a spreadsheet. Strangely, their seem remarkably few claims of Spitfires etc over the Reich during the BoB

As to the officialy listed claims, we can try a few comparisons.

We already know Groth has 13 claims listed, and you say he is acknowledged to have 13 kills by the end of the BoB.

Helmut Wick is supposed to have got 42 victories during the BoB. I can find 42 claims by Wick from July to the end of December 1940. This actually goes outside the British timeframe, but I'll assume those 42 are in the German timeframe for the battle.  

Adolf Galland. Because of the problem with the dates, eg is July counted as BoB by the Luftwaffe? Is December? Is January? I looked at Galland in detail. He is supposed to have had 50 kills when he took command of JG26 on 1st Nov 1940. Tony Wood's doc lists his 50th kill as being on the 30th Oct, and his 51st as the 1st of Nov with JG26. Again, an exact match.

Walter Oesau. The info I found says he got his first victory on the 13th May, his 20th on the 18th Aug. Again, Tony Wood's doc gives exactly the same figures. It then says he got his 40th on the 5th Feb 41, and again Tony Wood's doc gives his 40th on 5th Feb.

So, either this doc contains the confirmed kills, or kills were confirmed as a matter of course.

Oh, great. Frankly I agree with that with Butler and Caldwell. The question was, however, not how much valid are Groehler`s conclusions, but wheter his data is valid or not. Not even Butler or Caldwell, or anybody else questions the validity of his data. Groehler is a great source if one just concentrates on the raw numbers and ignores the political BS, that was BTW, absolutely neccesary to be added in any book in socialist era. Besides, I believe he added the propaganda stuff to allow the book pass the censor, and who could read between the lines could find the reality presented in the many-many tables.

His data is quite obviously wrong if he saidwhat you claimed. Tony Wood has posted each individual claim, and hey check ou with what the pilots are supposed to have scored. They amount to 2000 claims for single engined fighters.

Give an exact qoute then which supports your claim that 600 "fighters" were "lost" under strictly "operational" missions, they don`t include non-combat related losses, they don`t include accidents etc.

They do include accidents, they include accidents on operational missions, for both sides. They do not include accidents on non operational mission, eg a checkout flight after engine troubles, a ferry flight from manufacturer to airfield etc.

According to Naswan at least..

According to the Luftwaffe archive documents published on Tony Wood's site.

[Nashwan]

The interesting part of that while you seem to be aware of this fact, you refuse to apply the same standards to LW losses. Double standards.

No Isegrim, I am applying exactly the same standards.

Lets look at the Luftwaffe OOB again:

29th June 1107 109s on srength
28th Sept 920 on strength

Production of 109s

220 July, 173 August, 218 Sept, 611 total

611 produced, on strength number went down 187, total 798 less 109s by the end of Sept, and the Bob went on for another month, and some 109s would have been repaired.

Wastage is always higher than losses.

And I'd be willing to bet, in late 44 when the Luftwaffe had lots of aircraft, but operations were curtailed for other reasons, wastage would be much higher as a percentage of overall losses.

Let`s start with the basics. Do you admit that German organisation was different than British one, and reserves were not atteched directly to the Staffeln ? Therefore, German reserves don`t show up in a table that deals only with the 1st line units...?

Yes

These show the first line fighter units only.
They don`t show any of 2nd line units.
First line fighter units don`t have reserve planes/pilots attached.
For this reason, no reserves are shown in this table, just the strenght immidiately available to the fighter units.

Where were the reserves? What source have you got that tells you there were reserves at all?

In the same table, Groehler gives the LW s-e fighter strenght on 11 April 1940 as 1356. These also include reserves.

What Nashwan listed for a similiar date is 1258 s-e fighters. Some 100 fighters less. His list only show the first line units, and do not include the reserve planes.

Then what figures does Groehler give for the period of the battle? You're skirting around the issue, Isegrim. You haven't shown they had any reserves during the battle.

Hell, they only had a 100 aircraft reserve before the battle of France. That would have been gone before the BoB started. You still haven't shown anything that says they had reserve pilots, ever.

As you can see, the Jagdwaffe were decidedly under stregth by the end of 1940. You'd think that all these reserves would have been issued, if they existed.

It doesn`t work this way. The RAF-FC had an established strenght of some 1400 or so fighters (roughly).

Possibly, if you include all the other types, but I doubt it was that high. Spit and Hurri establishment was around 900.

Using your logic, the RAF didn`t have any reserves, because if it had, it would surely issue all those reserves to raise the number of operational planes. But things in real life don`t follow your logic.

Squadrons were supposed to have 18 odd fighters. The RAF purposely oversupplied the squadrons knowing that some planes would always be undergoing repair, overhaul etc.

In effect, the RAF had two levels of reserve, some with the squadron, others in storage depots.

A squadron was expected to be able to fly 12 aircraft at a time. They had more, but they allowed for some always being unserviceable. Only if less than 12 planes were serviceable would the squadron be below strength.

If you look at the RAF reports, you will see they maintained 600 or so serviceable Spits and Hurricanes.

But for the Jagdwaffe, it's not even serviceable planes. Look at the figures for end Sept. 1132 establishment, only 920 on hand. Forget serviceable aircraft, the Jagdwaffe had 212 less aircraft in total than they should have.  That's nearly 20% below strength, yet still none of the reserves you claim existed were issued.

In fact, if you look at the figures you've posted from Groehler, even before the bale of France, the reserves wereonly 100, so if the reserves had never been touched they would still make up less than half the shortfall

I don`t have exact numbers for the full Bf 109. However it`s quite clear from the above, that you only list the first line Bf 109 strenght, and not include the reserves. You do include, however, reserves of the RAF.

So to sum up, the Luftwaffe had 100 fighters in reservebefore the battle of France. They then fought two major air campaigns, fighter strength fell to more than 200 below establishment, no one has given figures claiming they still had reserves. Isegrim, you are the only person who thinks they did.

'The JW was seriously understrenght' - this is your claim, unproven, and frankly, BS. I don`t feel o give any explanation to it.

It's from the Luftwaffe's own figures. Established strength en Sept 1940 1132, actual strength 920. They were short 212 fighters.

However, it`s interesting to compare the loss rate of pilots (as according to David Baker):

% of fighter Pilot strenght lost:

RAF - LW

August 26% - 15%
September 28% - 21%

54% in two months? So at 60% over the whole battle. Problem is, Fighter Command lost 1 in 6 pilots killed, and another 1 in 6 pilots wounded. 3000 took part, approx 500 each killed and wounded. That's a total casualty rate, for the whole battle, including wounded, of 33%.

Especially why reserves weren't sent to squadrons in Sept and Oct, when the Luftwaffe was engaged in combat and had only approx 50% of it's established strength fit for duty.

Tell us how could there be RAF reserves at all, if the established strenght was supposed to be some 1400 planes, out of which no more than 6-700 were fit for duty during September October?

Firstly, 1400 is a made up figure
Because the squadrons were up to strength with 600 or more sericeable Spits and Hurricanes. And RAF established srength never fell, planes were issued from storage at times.

What you want us to believe is that strength of the Luftwaffe single engined fighter force fell almost 20% below establishment, and the reserves existed but weren't issued.

[Angus]

Oh dear, oh dear, Isengrim again
Get one thing straight about the basics bud, the Germans LOST the Battle of Britain. And just a year later, the "pathetic Brits" were launching much bigger air-raids at the German Reich then the Germans ever managed to put together, - 1000 two and four engined bombers in a raid is far more than the Germans ever put together. Bear in mind also, that in the final stages of the BoB, the German escorts were up to 4 for each bomber. This was in daylight and the RAF had practically no cannon armed fighters, and the bombers were only 30-60 minutes away from friendly territory!
Yet again to remember, for the Brits on the offensive, that included cruising over enemy territory for hundreds of miles.
Cruising to Berlin meant that the British aircraft were over German airspace for at least 3-4 hours, - London - Berlin is about 1100 miles with return, while London-Paris is close to 400.
Aces like Schnaufer had a nice opportunity for targets, - if one would get into the stream of bombers, kills would rack up quickly.
Actually, the Brits were already ahead in NF technology, with some pilots racking up many kills over German occupied territory, many of te victims being German night fighters!
I also find it quite funny to look at your figures about the nice range of the 109 compared to the Spitfire, while the Spitfires of the RAF were already streatching much further into the Luftwaffe's reagion in the low countries in 1941 or so, than ever the 109 into Britain. You may calculate at will, but this was actually the case. The RAF's (Spitfire) operational radius seems to have been reaching much further than the operational radius of the 109. So eat yer numbers!
Better still, I'll give you mine. From Calais to central London, the airline is only 85 miles, while from Central London to Rotterdam we have 192 miles.  

[gripen]

Originally posted by Crumpp
Yeah Gripen and the allies never had Air Supremacy over Normandy either....Geez.  

Gripen shifts along the perch in his elegant, golden cage.

"Rooooaaaaack,  Polly want a cracker...."

HOW many times do the same stats have to be posted and refuted?

Thank you for your kind words. It's not my problem if your statements are not supported by your own definitions or sources. Neither it's not my problem if your statements actually contradict the sources you have selected to use.

gripen

[Crumpp]

The Statements are supported and what  is more are the popular Historical view.  Simply because you don't want to admit to being wrong doesn't mean I am going to repost them EVERY time you lamely attempt to refute the facts.

Crumpp

[Angus]

Supremacy, Superiority, local or not local, it's all down to penny haggling lads. No need to be childish Crumpp

[GScholz]

This is all quite entertaining! Please continue!

[VO101_Isegrim]

Originally posted by Angus
And just a year later, the "pathetic Brits" were launching much bigger air-raids at the German Reich then the Germans ever managed to put together, - 1000 two and four engined bombers in a raid is far more than the Germans ever put together.

I do not wish to waste time on the rest of your patriotic nonsense, just this one. The "1000 bomber raid", Operation Millennium, was the great hype of the Bomber Command serving for propaganda purposes. Let`s get it straight : the "pathetic Brits" (your words) could not not summon 1000 bombers together for the operation, not to mention they didn`t have 4 engined ones in any meaningful numbers. Let me enlighten you, my dear. There were no 1000 British bombers, there were only little more than 1000 bomber sorties on that day, which was possible only because the British bombers flew two sorties at that night (they didn`t have more than 600 or so operational bombers IIRC). The bombing itself was rather unimpressive, the LW was mounting such sortie rates on a daily basis during BoB (mind you, the LW could mass as much of 1300 bombers vs. England in 1940, and in fact they had around 1500-1700 in total).


Actually, the Brits were already ahead in NF technology, with some pilots racking up many kills over German occupied territory, many of te victims being German night fighters!

So? How many German nightfighters were lost? 100? 200? How many British bombers? 10 000+ . The LW gladly accepted this exchange rate.

I also find it quite funny to look at your figures about the nice range of the 109 compared to the Spitfire, while the Spitfires of the RAF were already streatching much further into the Luftwaffe's reagion in the low countries in 1941 or so, than ever the 109 into Britain.

So ? What`s so miraculus about that the Spit in 1941 WITH droptanks could reach further than the 109 in 1940 WITHOUT droptanks? It doesn`t change anything about the 109 having more range and endurance than the Spit.

[Guppy35]

Pssst!  I hate to break it to ya, but the Allies won.  It was in all the papers you know

Dan/Slack

[Angus]

Hehe, tsk tsk tsk, Isengrim is back, gladly, was worried about this thread becoming too boring:D

Beginning "I do not wish to waste time on the rest of your patriotic nonsense,"

Isengrim, Isengrim, I am NOT British, nor even American

Secondly:" The "1000 bomber raid", Operation Millennium, was the great hype of the Bomber Command serving for propaganda purposes."
I'll look it up better, for I do not trust your statements.

Thirdly: "So? How many German nightfighters were lost? 100? 200? How many British bombers? 10 000+ . The LW gladly accepted this exchange rate. "
You silly clot! The exchange was a whole lot of bombers for the  955 THOUSAND TONS OF BOMBS. Haggle at will, the German Reich was bombed relentlessly for many years. It was not just the LW who bled, but the whole nation and the whole war machine.
To top this up a bit, the US 8th dropped 693.000 tonnes.

And fourthly:"What`s so miraculus about that the Spit in 1941 WITH droptanks could reach further than the 109 in 1940 WITHOUT droptanks?"
I'll look deeper into it, but the first of the so-called rhubarb sorties were flown in Mk II's without drop tanks, then later on in MK V's. I know that the MK V had them in 1942, which allowed the to fly straight from Gibraltar to Algiers, but that's another story.
Anyway, everything I have read so far apart from your stuff, gives the Spitfire a very similar range band to the 109, with the RAF seemingly stretching further with it.

Best regards.

Angus the non-Brit