Author Topic: From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth  (Read 2426 times)

Offline Karnak

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From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth
« Reply #15 on: August 23, 2004, 11:16:54 AM »
Quote
Originally posted by ra
I've seen statistics butchered before, but this takes the cake.


I saw that too last night and declined to comment.  The other stats seem interesting and applicable, e.g. loss rate per sortie, but the part Ra quoted is blunt lying with statistics.  It looks like in means something to a casual reader, but in fact doesn't mean anything at all in relation to the claims being made.
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Offline Wotan

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From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth
« Reply #16 on: August 23, 2004, 11:35:38 AM »
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This does not indicate anything about the individual skills of the VVS pilots versus their USAF/RAF counterparts. But it speaks volumes with regards to the overall effectiveness of the respective air forces.


It would indicate that if you totally misunderstand the nature of the combat in the West and the LW's roll in it.

The VVS OTOH as Christer points out in that thread didn’t fly mass formations. They flew mostly tactical sorties spread out along the huge front. As such when they made contact with the LW they were at an altitude disadvantage and normally engaged by an equal or greater number of LW.

The Eastern experten had hundreds of hours of combat experience in that type of combat. This was the "furball" arena much like NA. See JG54 in Kurland.

In the west and over the skies of the Reich the situation was different. The LW was tasked with attacking the bombers and to avoid pitched combat with allied fighters.

Not only were they at a numerical disadvantage for the most part but the freedom of maneuver was restricted to the task at hand, shooting down the bombers.

There have been volumes written on the subject and we gamers aren’t going to come close to fully exploring the issue.

The point of Christer's post is lost of most in this thread. There are 2 myths you here a lot in the west about the Il2.

1. It was a flying tank.
2. The VVS sacrificed large numbers of IL2s to grind down the wehrmacht.

He doesn’t touch the 1st myth but it has been discussed on these forums before. I will add it was not a "flying tank".

Christer's point is that Il2’s were no more sacrificed then the USAAF / RAF bombers were sacrificed in the west.

Of course a LW fighter pilot was far more likely to be shot down in the west. But the 2 theaters are completely different and it’s clearly a case of apples and oranges.

Any comparison between the allied bombing campaign in the west and the LW in BoB is limited at best. These were completely different circumstances as well.
« Last Edit: August 23, 2004, 11:58:51 AM by Wotan »

Offline VooDoo

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From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth
« Reply #17 on: August 23, 2004, 11:42:14 AM »
IL-2 and IL-10 combat losses.

Years 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
Type of loss
Shot down by enemy a/c: 47 169 1090 882 369 2557
Shot down by enemy AAA: 101 203 1468 1859 1048 4679
Destroyed on the airfields: 13 14 40 34 8 109
Unknown cause: 372 1290 917 569 266 3414
Total: 533 1676 3515 3344 1691 10759


Sortie/Kill ratio in different periods of the war.
1st year (till july 42), 2nd year (till june 43), etc...

IL-2 13 26 85 90
Fighters 28 69 127 194
Bombers 14 48 125 133

Its yearly statistic. Sortie/Kill ratio wasnt so good in shorter periods - lets say Kursk battle - only 13 sorties/kill.

Offline Crumpp

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From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth
« Reply #18 on: August 23, 2004, 01:05:57 PM »
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Crump; you make good points; but how different was the task the LW faced against the Allied heavies compared to the RAF's task in 1940?



It was not that different.  The Luftwaffe lost for the same reasons the Allies did not gain Air Superiority over Europe until Early 1944.

Quote
Any comparison between the allied bombing campaign in the west and the LW in BoB is limited at best. These were completely different circumstances as well.


I beg to differ in this one Wotan, bro.


The Luftwaffe lost the BoB because they took away the tactical initiative from their fighters.  They restricted them to visual range escort and did away with the fighter sweeps in front of the bombers.  The tactics of freeing up your fighters to seek and destroy the enemy air force was working in the beginning of the BoB.  By attacking the airfields and other targets with large bomber formations that caused enough damage that the RAF had to respond, and freeing up the fighters to fight ot their strengths, the Luftwaffe was able to inflict casualties at a rate the RAF could not have sustained.  When Goering made the fighters fly their escort missions within visual range of the bombers and no longer gave them the freedom of action they required, the writing was on the wall.

On top of this the Luftwaffe never employed a fighter during the battle with the range and performance to fly and fight in all the areas giving the RAF a safe haven.

Lastly the Luftwaffe violated the Principal of Mass.  Rule in warfare is never attack unless you have a minimum of a 4 to 1 numerical advantage over the defender.  Works for Airspace too.  The Luftwaffe had a numerical advantage of almost 2 to 1.  About half the forces they needed to win.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Daylight bombing campaign was inflicting little loss to the Luftwaffe and almost prohibitive casualties to the Allies until two things happened:

1.  The allies got a fighter with both the range to escort the bombers AND the performance to take on Luftwaffe fighters once it arrived in the combat box.

2.  Doolittle freed those fighters up to seek out and destroy the Luftwaffe wherever they could be found.  Before Doolittle, allied fighter escorts had been tied to visual range escort AND could not go below 10,000 feet in pursuit of German fighters giving the Luftwaffe a safe haven.

3.  The Allies built up an enormous numerical advantage over the Luftwaffe.

Crumpp

Offline VO101_Isegrim

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From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth
« Reply #19 on: August 23, 2004, 01:11:29 PM »
I doubt it would come down to tactical reasons. Simple as that, defeating the fighter force of a highly industrialized country was not a possibility during WW2, at that technical level. The Allies committed VASTLY larger forces against Germany, and they didn`t succeed in the same task, the  LW was up there until the last day causing heavy damage, and despite the huge losses suffered, their numbers just kept increasing. No, there was no way to achieve a goal like completely destroying an air force during WW2. Push it back, obtain air superiority or perhaps even air supremacy, yes. But nothing more.

Offline Wotan

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From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth
« Reply #20 on: August 23, 2004, 01:26:26 PM »
Quote
Originally posted by Crumpp
I beg to differ in this one Wotan, bro.


The Luftwaffe lost the BoB because they took away the tactical initiative from their fighters.  They restricted them to visual range escort and did away with the fighter sweeps in front of the bombers.  The tactics of freeing up your fighters to seek and destroy the enemy air force was working in the beginning of the BoB.  By attacking the airfields and other targets with large bomber formations that caused enough damage that the RAF had to respond, and freeing up the fighters to fight ot their strengths, the Luftwaffe was able to inflict casualties at a rate the RAF could not have sustained.  When Goering made the fighters fly their escort missions within visual range of the bombers and no longer gave them the freedom of action they required, the writing was on the wall.

On top of this the Luftwaffe never employed a fighter during the battle with the range and performance to fly and fight in all the areas giving the RAF a safe haven.

Lastly the Luftwaffe violated the Principal of Mass.  Rule in warfare is never attack unless you have a minimum of a 4 to 1 numerical advantage over the defender.  Works for Airspace too.  The Luftwaffe had a numerical advantage of almost 2 to 1.  About half the forces they needed to win.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Daylight bombing campaign was inflicting little loss to the Luftwaffe and almost prohibitive casualties to the Allies until two things happened:

1.  The allies got a fighter with both the range to escort the bombers AND the performance to take on Luftwaffe fighters once it arrived in the combat box.

2.  Doolittle freed those fighters up to seek out and destroy the Luftwaffe wherever they could be found.  Before Doolittle, allied fighter escorts had been tied to visual range escort AND could not go below 10,000 feet in pursuit of German fighters giving the Luftwaffe a safe haven.

3.  The Allies built up an enormous numerical advantage over the Luftwaffe.

Crumpp


umm Seeker said this

Quote
Surely the same lessons apply for the Battle of the Riech as for the Battle of Britain?


My reply was:

Quote
Any comparison between the allied bombing campaign in the west and the LW in BoB is limited at best. These were completely different circumstances as well.


Your reply didn't contradict what I said.

Once again:

Quote
These were completely different circumstances as well.


Your reply touched on some of the differences such as the almost endless supply of resources available to the allies. The allies had range and as such the battle area was much larger then just southern England etc... I can go into many others.

However, I have no interest in drifting further from the topic of this thread.

Offline ra

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From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth
« Reply #21 on: August 23, 2004, 01:26:36 PM »
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The Allies committed VASTLY larger forces against Germany, and they didn`t succeed in the same task, the LW was up there until the last day causing heavy damage, and despite the huge losses suffered, their numbers just kept increasing.

The Germans kept pumping more and more resources into fighter production, but the number of fighters they could put into the air on any given day fell continuously during the last year of the war.

Offline Karnak

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From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth
« Reply #22 on: August 23, 2004, 01:33:44 PM »
Quote
Originally posted by VO101_Isegrim
I doubt it would come down to tactical reasons. Simple as that, defeating the fighter force of a highly industrialized country was not a possibility during WW2, at that technical level. The Allies committed VASTLY larger forces against Germany, and they didn`t succeed in the same task, the  LW was up there until the last day causing heavy damage, and despite the huge losses suffered, their numbers just kept increasing. No, there was no way to achieve a goal like completely destroying an air force during WW2. Push it back, obtain air superiority or perhaps even air supremacy, yes. But nothing more.

Yeah, that's why Lancs were doing unescorted daylight missions in 1945.

Face it, by Feb. 1945 the Luftwaffe was done as an effective fighting force.  They could harrass and inflict a few casualties here and there but their ability to actually inflict attrition level casualties was gone.
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Offline VO101_Isegrim

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From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth
« Reply #23 on: August 23, 2004, 01:45:19 PM »
Quote
Yeah, that's why Lancs were doing unescorted daylight missions in 1945.


Maybe do some research on that first. Lancs did the same over the Ardennes, w/o escort, until they bumped into German fighters - the results were ugly.


Quote

Face it, by Feb. 1945 the Luftwaffe was done as an effective fighting force. They could harrass and inflict a few casualties here and there but their ability to actually inflict attrition level casualties was gone.


Well, the USAAF`s statistics disprove this, as well the RAF loss statistics, as well as the LW`s own records . Myths like this can be repeated but can`t be proven. If the LW was not able to stop the Allied onlslaught, that had something to do with the vast numbers of the Allies employed by 1945, not the LW`s inability, which still shot down hundreds and flown thousends of sorties each month even in 1945. If you shoot down 100 out of 1000, that`s attrition. If you shoot down 200 out of 10 000, that`s nothing. Even if your results are twice as good as before.

Offline Karnak

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From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth
« Reply #24 on: August 23, 2004, 01:55:47 PM »
OK Barbi,

Post your loss data.  I haven't got specific numbers, especially here at work.  I'm sure you've got proof that the Germans were about to win the airwar when Germany surrendered.:rolleyes:
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Offline MiloMorai

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From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth
« Reply #25 on: August 23, 2004, 02:08:33 PM »
Karnak, this is the most likely place he is getting his data from, http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot/aafsd/aafsd_list_of_tables_aircraftequipment.html

There is another site, which I have lost which lists themissions from late 43 til wars end. Included is the losses as well as the claims(which I will not take seriously). Will try to find it.

Not the site but http://www.jcs-group.com/military/usaaf/hethel4.html

Wednesday, 14 February 1945
    2 missions are flown.
    Mission 830: 1,377 bombers and 962 fighters are dispatched to hit oil and rail targets in Germany; bombing of most targets is by H2X radar; they claim 11-0-3 Luftwaffe aircraft; 7 bombers and 7 fighters are lost:

       1. 461 B-17s are dispatched to hit the marshalling yard at Dresden (311); targets of opportunity are Prague (62), Brux (25) and Pilsen (12) in Czechoslovakia and other (25); they claim 1-0-0 aircraft; 5 B-17s are lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 54 damaged; 4 airmen are KIA, 15 WIA and 49 MIA. Escorting are 281 of 316 P-51s; 3 are lost (pilots MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair.
       2. 457 B-17s are sent to hit the marshalling yard at Chemnitz (294); targets of opportunity are Eger Airfield (38), Bamberg (33), Sonneberg (23), Tachau (24), Hof marshalling yard (12) and other (17); 1 B-17 is lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 103 damaged; 2 airmen are KIA, 4 WIA and 14 MIA. The escort is 224 of 238 P-51s; 2 are lost (pilots MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair.
       3. 375 B-24s are sent to hit an oil refinery at Magdeburg but are unable to attack due to weather; 340 hit the secondary, the marshalling yard at Magdeburg; targets of opportunity are Emlicheim (1), Meppen (1), Bodenteich (1) and other (1); 1 B-24 is lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 16 damaged; 9 airmen are MIA. 253 of 273 P-51s escort; they claim 10-0-3 aircraft; 2 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).
       4. 84 B-17s are sent to hit the Wesel road bridge (37); 35 hit the secondary, the Dulmen oil depot and 1 hits Ahaus, a target of opportunity; 15 B-17s are damaged. 26 of 30 P-51s escort the bombers.
       5. 44 of 49 P-47s fly a sweep of the Magdeburg area without loss.
       6. 24 P-51s escort photo reconnaissance aircraft over Germany.
       7. 29 of 32 P-51s fly a scouting mission.

    Mission 831: 10 B-24s drop leaflet in the Netherlands and Germany during the night.

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of bombers attacking.
NOTE: Aircraft claimed: 'destroyed'-'probably destroyed'-'possibly destroyed'


Yes, for sure, the LW was swatting USAAF a/c out of the skies like flies.:rolleyes:
« Last Edit: August 23, 2004, 02:18:27 PM by MiloMorai »

Offline Nashwan

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From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth
« Reply #26 on: August 23, 2004, 02:15:55 PM »

Offline Crumpp

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From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth
« Reply #27 on: August 23, 2004, 02:20:08 PM »
Quote
Your reply touched on some of the differences such as the almost endless supply of resources available to the allies. The allies had range and as such the battle area was much larger then just southern England etc... I can go into many others.



Misunderstood you then Wotan!

Crumpp

Offline BUG_EAF322

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From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth
« Reply #28 on: August 23, 2004, 03:02:27 PM »
uhm the allied bombers had to fly miles over enemy territory. flying over many flak areas . Also i bet they flew over better radar controlled territory.

I bet the il's didn't had to withstand hordes off nme fighters . Wich been sent accuratly to their formations.

The ill did frontline attacks CAS and stuff.

The bombers did a whole other thing wich is a deep strike.

Apples and Oranges indeed

It also sound very unlogical why the LW wouldn't send in their elite to protect their own so beloved  country :rolleyes:

Offline VO101_Isegrim

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From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth
« Reply #29 on: August 23, 2004, 03:06:22 PM »
Appearantly, some posters fail to grab the difference between the historical fact that the LW`s strenght was not broken (which is what I say), and the hysterical crap that the LW won over the Allies (which is the usual reaction when someone points out that the German fighter force remained an active and strong adversary until the last days of war.)

Simple as that, mauling a fighter force of an industrialized nation was not possible under the WW2 technical level. They could produce, and train fighters faster than they could be destroyed.


Now, back to the original subject, I think one of the reasons for the rather low German/Soviet loss rate over the EF was the HUGE areas involved. Western Europe is relatively small area, fighter and AA cover was relatively dense. On the EF however, I guess literally dozens of missions were flown by both sides without ever encountering a single enemy flight. On the Soviet side, they encountered even less, as the Germans held only a relatively small number fighter on the EF, abot 1/4 of their total fleet, no more than a few hundred, for a multiple thousend km frontline`s needs.. Radar was at minimal use. Hence the loss rate was low (German loss rate was something like 0.5% !).
« Last Edit: August 23, 2004, 03:12:09 PM by VO101_Isegrim »