From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth

[Wotan]

Back on topic,

The only point Christer is making is the Il2 was not the flying coffin that some think it was.

I will quote the first line again:

One of the most common misconceptions regarding the air war on teh Eastern Front is the notion of the Il-2 as always sustaining an almost unbearable loss rate.

He may have taken some artistic license to demonstrate that (I don’t believe so) but that doesn't detract from the point.

Take it with a grain of salt...

KraziMorai portrays it completely out of context:

http://www.simhq.com/simhq3/sims/boards/bbs/ultimatebb.php?ubb=get_topic;f=98;t=012108

I am sure Christer is torn up due to your "lack of respect".

[Sable]

Well I think this is turning into an argument of semantics.  Certainly the Luftwaffe continued to fly right up until the end of the war.  But if you look at USAAF bomber losses to fighters they drop off to a very low level after the Normandy campaign.  After the mauling that the Luftwaffe took in Normandy an attempt was made to build up a reserve of fighter strength that could be used en masse to inflict heavy casualties on the allied airforces.  After the losses of the summer though, average Luftwaffe pilot quality had sunk low enough that these maximum effort missions did little but offer the chance of a 5 kill mission to allied pilots.  USAAF bomber losses to fighters never rose back to the levels suffered in spring and summer of '44.

So while the Luftwaffe never ceased to exist, they ceased to offer any dangerous (as in dangerous to the entire 8th AF etc.) opposition.  Certainly the skies were still plenty dangerous for individual pilots with the Luftwaffe fighters continuing to score regularly right up until the end.  And the German Flak was a constant threat right up to the end (that is vastly underplayed in AH).

Back to the original post of the Luftwaffe pitting the cream of their force against the Soviets and send the dregs against the US and British.  I think we can all agree the evidence shows that to clearly be false.

[Karnak]

Thanks Sable.  That's what I was trying to say.  Yes, the Luftwaffe did fly to the end, but at greatly reduced capability.  Heck, they were reduced to towing aircraft to the runway to conserve fuel in some cases.

There is a reason the Meteor Mk III's couldn't find anything to shoot down after they started using them in offensives sweeps over German held territory in March, 1945.

[VO101_Isegrim]

Luftwaffe Fighter activity

Western Front, December 1944

11 053 sorties flown by LW fighters
552 victories vs. 527 losses

Eastern Front, January 1945

6816 sorties flown by LW fighters
395 victories vs. 140 losses

Eastern Front, February 1945

12 225 sorties flown by LW fighters
443 victories vs. 260 losses

*See Japo 109K, pg 90





German Tactical Air Sorties over the Ardennes Dec. 16 1944 - Jan. 1, 1944:

Dec 16. - 170
17 - 650*
18 - 849*
19 - 290
20 - 2
21 - 0
22 - 100
23 - 800
24 - 1,088
25 - 600
26 - 404
27 - 415
28 - 15
29 - 340
30 - 150
31 - 613

Jan 1. 1945 - 1,0357

Thats over 7,500 sorties alone for the time period.

*Doesn't include the additional 100 - 250 sorties flown during the nights of Dec. 17 - 18.

*See: Parker Danny S. To Win the Winter Sky. p.515




Luftwaffe Strenght in 1945




On 31 January 1945 the combat units of the Luftwaffe and their associated Erganzungs Einheiten, had the following strength in Bf109 types.
These are on hand totals, they include both 'frontline' and 'other' units.
Included are all aircraft operational and non-operational at the time. (combat/Erganzungs):

Bf109G1/5 (0/1)
Bf109G12 (0/5)
Bf109G6 (71/328)
Bf109G14 and G14U4 (431/190)
Bf109G10, G10/U4 and G14/AS (568/3)
Bf109K4 (314/0)
Bf109G10/R6 (51/0)
---------------------------
Total Bf 109 (1435/527)

Other Jagd types totaled (1058/359)
Schlacht types totaled (680/375)
Nachtschlacht types totaled (422/95)
Zerstorer types totaled (42/0)
Nachtjagd types totaled (1241, no breakdown between the two)
Kampf types totaled (543/158)
Nahaufklarer totaled (407/27)
Fernaufklarer totaled (195/81)
See types totaled (78/17)
Transport types totaled (496/9)
-------------------------------------------
Grand total (6597/1631)


From : RL2III/1158




If those Meteors couldn`t find any enemy to shoot down, they weren`t really looking for a fight. But after all, they weren`t looking for the opportunity in mid-44 either.

[Karnak]

Barbi,

No, they weren't deployed for action outside of the UK until March, 1945.  The only air-to-air action was a Meteor Mk III squadron vs and Fw190 unit that got interupted by some Spitfires that saw the Meteors and assumed they were German.  No kills on either side in that action.

You may prattle on all you like about how the Luftwaffe was just as strong and was everywhere ect, ect, but we both know that it was in a steep decline.  Fuel shortages, pilot shortages, production problems and declining quality.  It is remarkable that they were doing as well as they were, but it is a sham to make it out as though they were everywhere.  Germany was falling apart in 1945 and the Luftwaffe was not immune from those effects.

[VO101_Isegrim]

Well, I just posted some numbers on strenght and the number of sorties flown, never said it was everywhere, that it didn`t big huge problems, that pilot quality was the same - if that`s your read then it`s a reading comprehension problem on your part - but it was there, it was hardly kncoked out, destroyed completely etc. etc., and was still a force to be reckoned with. That was my point, and I underlined it quite well.

As for the Meteors, I have no idea why they were kept back. Guess they just weren`t seen to be fit for combat, having more than a few teething problems. Certainly, they would show nothing new to the Germans they didn`t know already about jets.

[Karnak]

The British were really antsy about deploying new tech over German territory.  They made a lot of stupid decisions not to deploy new technology and lost many lives because of it in my opinion.

In the case of the Meteor, I'd say that the Mk I was not suitable for use against the Germans.  The Mk III was, but it was later in the war.


As to the data you posted, it was late 1944 data.  After the Germans lost the Battle of the Bulge and the Allied armies rapidly advanced things got really ugly.  I'd say that the Germans held everything together really well, all things considered, until Feb. 1945.  After that it is a pretty steep decline.

[leonid]

The reason why life was more dangerous in the west front had to do with the bomber campaign.  Flying into a bomber box was almost suicide with all the defensive fire you'd catch on the way in.  Not only that, you'd have a large number of high-speed fighters close on your tail should you somehow survive the bomber "shower".  So, basically a LW fighter pilot had to time it so that he could get past the wally fighter hordes, make one pass into, through, and out  the bomber box while under heavy fire, then somehow shake the wally fighter hordes enough to fly home.  Not much room for finesse to surviving that situation, just luck (or clouds), speed, and an unpunctured oil radiator.

But, nobody got the 'dregs' of the LW, it was rough all around for the allies.  However, allied skill was basically balanced from west to east, meaning the VVS was no cakewalk for the LW - at least from 1943.  The reason the LW got to operate more effectively in the East had to do with Red Army air doctrine, not general VVS pilot skill.

-leonid

[Angus]

Woopsie, what a thread.
What got me thinking a bit was this:

"Any comparison between the allied bombing campaign in the west and the LW in BoB is limited at best. These were completely different circumstances as well."

True, but not to the point so many here have tried to show.
The BoB was quite special. LW with double to triple strength of the RAF trying to bomb them into submission and/or pave the way for an invasion at a very modest range. They failed.
The Allied bombing campaign is another issue. The range was quadruple as a typical, and until 43/44 mostly not escortable.

Anyway, to get a bit more true to the topic of this thread, as far as I know, the Il-2's were not being butchered so badly, especially considering what their job was.
Other russian planes got the hard end of the stick as well.

And for the bluffers, I have some fuel:
1. From Izzie: "I think one of the reasons for the rather low German/Soviet loss rate over the EF was the HUGE areas involved. Western Europe is relatively small area, fighter and AA cover was relatively dense. On the EF however, I guess literally dozens of missions were flown by both sides without ever encountering a single enemy flight."
You've got it mixed up I guess. LW pilots had lots of target opportunities on the eastern front. I am pretty sure Hartmann saw at least 300 enemy aircraft when he was there.
At the same time, many allied pilots flew as much as a whole tour of duty without seeing a bandit.

2. The LW got mauled into submission in 1944.
I will not go as far as Crumpp by naming it allied supremacy, but superiority will do just fine.
In 1944 on the Western front, the LW was still a problem, but they could not stop anything the allies wanted to harass in German airspace, even in daylight with allies crossing hundreds of miles of German airspace. This is something the Russians hardly tried, which just makes the LW loss difference more spectacular.

3. The LW mostly got mauled by the western Allies, all war through. Any summed up figures?
Anyway, I went through the LW loss records on microfilm at the IWM, and was baffled to find out that the LW losses in huge battles like Stalingrad were on pair or less than those in the Desert war at the same time! I was quite baffled, - had always thought that the eastern airwar was many times bigger in LW terms, but it turnes out not to be,  -when it came to losses.

[MiloMorai]

The Luftwaffe on the Eve of Overlord, 31 May 44

Serviceable Aircraft Strengths

Single-engined fighters   1063
Twin-engined fighters   151
Night fighters   572
Fighter-bombers   278
Ground-attack aircraft   352
Night harassment aircraft   305
Twin-engined bombers   840
Four-engined bombers   97
Long-range reconaissance aircraft   153
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft   210
Coastal aircraft   123
Transport aircraft   719
Kampfgeschwader 200 (misc. aircraft   65

Total   4928


Luftwaffe Order of Battle, 10 January 1945

Serviceable Aircraft Strengths

Single-engined fighters   1462
Night fighters   808
Ground-attack aircraft   613
Night harassment aircraft   302
Multi-engined bombers   294
Anti-shipping aircraft   83
Long-range reconaissance aircraft   176
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft   293
Coastal aircraft   60
Transport aircraft   269
Misc. aircraft (KG 200)   206

Total   4566


Luftwaffe Order of Battle, 9 April 1945

Serviceable Aircraft Strengths

Single-engined fighters   1305
Night fighters   485
Ground-attack aircraft   712
Night harassment aircraft   215
Multi-engined bombers   37
Long-range reconaissance aircraft   143
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft   309
Coastal aircraft   45
Transport aircraft   10
Misc. aircraft (KG 200)   70

Total   3331

more detailed info for the above dates and where LW units were http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/2072/LW_OBs.html

example:

Luftflotte 1 (Northern Russia), 31 May 44

Unit   Type   Strength   Svcble
Stab/JG 54   Fw 190A   4   4
I/JG 54   42 (44)   36
II/JG 54   54 (52)   50 (48)
II/NJG 100   Ju 88   29   21 (23)
14 (Eis.)/KG 55   He 111H   1 (11)   1 (8)
Stab/SG 3   1   1
I/SG 3   Ju 87D   27 (33)   24 (30)
II/SG 3   30 (36)   26 (32)
NSGr 1   Go 145   32 (35)   25 (28)
He 46
NSGr 3   Go 145   36 (40)   34 (38)
Ar 66
NSGr 11   He 50   22   19
Fokker C.V
NSGr 12   Ar 66   16   14
1. Osfliegerstaffel   Go 145   9   8
Ar 66

[Sable]

Ok, here's some statistics from a Rand report on aircraft vulnerability in WWII done for the armed forces.  These will show broken down by month the # of heavy bomber sorties, # of heavy bombers lost, # lost to fighters, # damaged by fighters.  I included the number damaged by fighters because there are some months where the number lost to fighters was unknown, so this helps display the trend.  The numbers aren't exact as they are displayed in bar graph form.

Jan 1944 - 4500 sorties - 195 lost - 175 lost to ftrs - 195 dmgd by ftrs
Feb 1944 - 7500 sorties - 250 lost - 175 lost to ftrs - 225 dmgd by ftrs
Mar 1944 - 9000 sorties - 300 lost - 200 lost to ftrs - 225 dmgd by ftrs
Apr 1944 - 9500 sorties - 360 lost - 200 lost to ftrs - 300 dmgd by ftrs
May 1944 - 14,000 sorties - 310 lost - 125 lost to ftrs - 225 dmgd by ftrs
June 1944 - 23,000 sorties - 240 lost - 125 lost to ftrs - 50 dmgd by ftrs
July 1944 - 19,000 sorties - 250 lost - ?? lost to ftrs - 100 dmgd by fighters
Aug 1944 - 19,000 sorties - 240 lost - ?? lost to ftrs - 50 dmgd by ftrs
Sep 1944 - 15,000 sorties - 250 lost - ?? lost to ftrs - 30 dmgd by ftrs
Oct 1944 - 15,000 sorties - 130 lost - ?? lost to ftrs - 30 dmgd by ftrs
Nov 1944 - 15,000 sorties - 130 lost - ?? lost to ftrs - 30 dmgd by ftrs
Dec 1944 - 15,000 sorties - 100 lost - 35 lost to ftrs - 30 dmgd by ftrs
Jan 1945 - 14,500 sorties - 95 lost - 25 lost to ftrs - 25 dmgd by ftrs
Feb 1945 - 20,000 sorties - 100 lost - ?? lost to ftrs - 15 dmgd by ftrs
Mar 1945 - 28,000 sorties - 130 lost - 50 lost to ftrs - 50 dmgd by ftrs

We can see in the numbers here that the Luftwaffe's capability to oppose the allied daylight raids peaks in March and April of 1944 and then declines sharply and levels.  Interestingly, this coincides with the arrival of P-51's and P-38's in greater numbers.  In Feb the 8th AF had 13 FG's available - 2 P-51, 2 P-38, and 9 P-47.  By May they had 15 FG's - 8 P-51, 3 P-38, and 4 P-47.

This total losses stay level through the Normandy and Market-Garden periods (June - Sept) but bombers damaged by fighters can be seen to fall markedly - unfortunately I don't have the data on bombers lost to fighters for most of this period.  In October bomber losses drop dramatically and stay down for the rest of the war.  Keep in mind that Luftwaffe fighter strength (in terms of numbers) actually increased between June of 44 and Jan of 45.  The Luftwaffe also introduced a number of new and better aircraft in this period (Me163, Me262, 190D-9, 109G10 and K4).

Keep in mind that in the fall of '44 Galland wanted to inflict 400-500 bomber losses in a DAY with his 'grosse schlag' to try and pause the allied bomber raids and buy time to bring the Me-262 into greater use.  The Luftwaffe pilots just didn't have the capability to do this vs. the growing strength of the Allies.  

This is why I say that the Luftwaffe no longer posed a threat to the Allied air forces.  The allied air commanders could do whatever they wanted, knowing that the Luftwaffe couldn't hurt them badly enough to stop them.  But obviously on a personal level the Luftwaffe was still very dangerous - at least for 50-100 bomber crews every month.

[Crumpp]

Milo,


Using Servicable Aircraft Strengths is not going to prove anything except what the USAAF concluded after WWII.  

Heavy bombing produced little to no effect on complicated industrial output that is dispersed properly.  

It could however effect simple industrial output like oil.

The Luftwaffe did not run out planes.  It ran out of qualified men to fly them.

Good reads on the Subject:

  http://www.schifferbooks.com/newschiffer/book_template.php?isbn=0887403484

 

Interestingly, this coincides with the arrival of P-51's and P-38's in greater numbers.

That is exactly right.  When the USAAF started ranging ahead of the bomber Stream and bouncing the Luftwaffe as they climbed to hit the bombers, it was over.  

Before the USAAF fighters were tied to visual range escort which meant the Luftwaffe could climb at leisure and attack when they were ready.  Since the USAAF could not purse below 10,000 feet if a LW fighter got in trouble he could simply dive out and flew home.

Another thing Milo's statistics do not show.  98 Percent of the post-1943 Luftwaffe trained pilots died before the completion of their 6th mission.  If they survived to their sixth, their chances of survival went up astronomically.  The pre-1943 trained pilots took casualties, sure,  but a surprising few fell compared to the multitude of "cannon fodder" post-43 trainees.

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

Milo,


Using Servicable Aircraft Strengths is not going to prove anything except what the USAAF concluded after WWII.  

Heavy bombing produced little to no effect on complicated industrial output that is dispersed properly.  

It could however effect simple industrial output like oil.

The Luftwaffe did not run out planes.  It ran out of qualified men to fly them.

Good reads on the Subject:

  http://www.schifferbooks.com/newschiffer/book_template.php?isbn=0887403484

 

Interestingly, this coincides with the arrival of P-51's and P-38's in greater numbers.

That is exactly right.  When the USAAF started ranging ahead of the bomber Stream and bouncing the Luftwaffe as they climbed to hit the bombers, it was over.  

Before the USAAF fighters were tied to visual range escort which meant the Luftwaffe could climb at leisure and attack when they were ready.  Since the USAAF could not purse below 10,000 feet if a LW fighter got in trouble he could simply dive out and flew home.

Another thing Milo's statistics do not show.  98 Percent of the post-1943 Luftwaffe trained pilots died before the completion of their 6th mission.  If they survived to their sixth, their chances of survival went up astronomically.  The pre-1943 trained pilots took casualties, sure,  but a surprising few fell compared to the multitude of "cannon fodder" post-43 trainees.

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

We can see in the numbers here that the Luftwaffe's capability to oppose the allied daylight raids peaks in March and April of 1944 and then declines sharply and levels. Interestingly, this coincides with the arrival of P-51's and P-38's in greater numbers.

It also coincides with a major daylight-bombing offensive that started in Jan. 44 with Berlin and culminated in Operation Argument "Big Week" in March.  


Look at the number of Allied Sorties and how they rise thru March.  After March the preparation of the Beachhead begins and targeting of supply lines, railheads etc..

Now look at the loss rate.  The Luftwaffe became militarily ineffective.  Individually they could and did score successes.

Crumpp

[MiloMorai]

Originally posted by Crumpp
Milo,


Using Servicable Aircraft Strengths is not going to prove anything except what the USAAF concluded after WWII.  

Heavy bombing produced little to no effect on complicated industrial output that is dispersed properly.  

It could however effect simple industrial output like oil.

The Luftwaffe did not run out planes.  It ran out of qualified men to fly them.


Crumpp

Crumpp, I got your message with one post. You can delete the duplicate using the edit function.

What my post shows is that the LW was in a steady decline, dispite the increase in a/c production. Servicable means the a/c was flight/combat capable wether there was a pilot or not for it.

Thought the link would be of interest for you as it list Fw190 units. Here is another, 190 specific, http://fw190.hobbyvista.com/oob.htm

What heavy bombing did do was keep manpower away from production (re-building, repairing) and from combat, and deflecting production away from more important weapons of war (instead of producing 88 flak, they could have been building more 88 AT weapons).