The enigma of the Bf-109

[humble]

Originally posted by spitfiremkv
Diablo

The Me109, when it appeared in 1935 I believe, was the best fighter of the world. It remained such until the Spitfire came along, I believe first flight in 1938.
Even so, early Spits, up to MKIX IMO ,were  just equal to their contemporary 109 variants.
Basically, the 109 was updated with better armament and more powerful engines throughout its career, while handling deteriorated as weight increased.
STtill, up to the end of the war it remained better than the P40, P38,P47,Hawker Typhoon and many other fighters of WW2.
In conclusion, I don't agree with your evaluation of the 109 being of average quality.

I'd agree the 109 is outstanding as an early war fighter....average as a midwar fighter...personally I feel it was severely hampered in late44/45 vs the the late war "uber planes"

[DiabloTX]

Originally posted by DiabloTX
HoHun-
My thoughts exactly about the comparison with the Spit.

It was not my intention to downplay the capabilities of the 109 but to illustrate in the literature that I have read that the 109 shouldn't have been as good as it was at the end of its career but it was.  It seems that they write things as "Its airframe was too small for developement" or "Its landing gear strained at the added weight" or things to that effect.  I guess it just amazes me that this little airplane could take on all the modifications and still kick ass.

I don't want this to turn into an endless 109 vs. XXXX thread, technicalities isn't what this is about.  In no way do I think it's an inferior fighter, that's just my point.  It seems like it should be but the 109 obviously was a winner throughout its lifetime.

I also like the 190 better for purely aesthetic resons only.  But that is a completely different subject.

What part of this is where I say it's of "average quality"?

[Angus]

Look at this.
What model 109E is this ?

The Spitfire presented is probably the "Malta" version, - a 4 cannon ship or?
There were faster MK V's around, but not likely to have met Emils, since the 109E was out at that time.

[Angus]

Oh, forgot, graph is from HoHun

[Charge]

109E4/N or E7 1020hp?

edit: By mid-1940 the new Daimler-Benz DB601N had been developed and was beginning to replace the older and less powerful DB601A. Externally, both engines were identical; the only distinguishing mark was the letter N cast into the top of the DB601N engine casing. Unlike its predecessor, which had concave piston heads, the DB601N was developed with flattened heads to increase engine compression. The DB601A produced 1175hp for take-off at 2480rpm with a maximum output of 1020hp at 2400rpm at 14675ft. In comparison, the DB601N provided 1200hp for take-off at 2600rpm with full boost available for 1 minute, plus a maximum emergency output of 1270hp for a similar period at 16400ft. This improved performance necessitated the use of a higher 100-octane fuel as opposed to the 87-octane required by the DB601A.

From: http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/jg26/white4_peter.htm

-C+

[Naudet]

Old myth. The Luftwaffe was centered on strategic warfare and had absolutely neglected tactical warfare.

Maybe in the textbook, but the equipment list surely looks the other way around.
I cannot see were Bf109s, FW190s, HE111, JU87, JU88 & DOx17-Series where ever suited for strategical warfare, they simply lacked range and payload.

The planes that had the range Bf110 and FW200 were poor performers by any means.
Instead of the Bf110 the FW189 would have been the right choice for a long range heavy fighter.
And as a bomber the HE177 should have been properly developed, getting away from the entirely senseless dive bombing capability this huge plane had to possess and switching from the 4-eng-2-prop design to a more conventional 4-eng-4-prop design.

Additionally any air operations by the LW on the eastern front and the mediterenean theatre were of tactical nature.

Or maybe i just have a different view of what i consider to be tactical and what strategical airwar.

[GScholz]

The LW was designed around the principle of combined arms warfare. The LW was meant to follow the army in the field moving from airfield to airfield (whom the LW ground personnel prepared). Close cooperation between the army and LW was a major contributor to the success of the Blitzkrieg doctrine.

During the Battle for Britain the LW was forced to operate as a strategic airforce; something they were never designed for, and ill suited to do.

[HoHun]

Hi Naudet,

>I cannot see were Bf109s, FW190s, HE111, JU87, JU88 & DOx17-Series where ever suited for strategical warfare, they simply lacked range and payload.

Well, Europe isn't that big :-) The bombers had the range to cover all adjacent countries, and the Bf 110 had been specially developed as long-range escort so the Luftwaffe appeared well prepared for strategical warfare.

The payload wasn't limited by tactical requirements but by the state of the technology.

The very long range bombing role was left vacant in the German arsenal due to the high cost. Its 1930's name "Uralbomber" indicates that it was not meant for Western Europe, and probably not considered necessary for Western Europe either.

Considering all twin-engined bombers "tactical" is the 1940s' USAAF language, but not the 1930s' reality.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[HoHun]

Hi GScholz,

>The LW was designed around the principle of combined arms warfare.

Well, not really. The Luftwaffe was meant as weapons branch contributing to the victory in coordination with Heer and Marine.

That didn't meant they were focused on close support - in fact, the Luftwaffe doctrine actually considered battlefield interdiction much more effective than direct support in the combat zone.

Large-scale army support (including interdiction) was to be provided only after the enemy air force had been neutralized.

To clarify: The Luftwaffe was not a strategic air force in the sense that it was meant to win wars by the application of air power alone.

The Battle of Britain was a deviation from doctrine as just such an attempt was made. However, pre-war thinking had actually admitted the necessity for such a move if a stalemate on the ground was reached. The requirement for strengthening the Luftwaffe beyond its normal size was realized before the war, but could not be implemented in 1940.

Just as outlined by pre-war doctrine, the Luftwaffe's first action in the Battle of Britain was a serious of all-out strikes against the enemy air force to neutralize the opposition, followed by attacks on strategical targets to break the enemy's will to fight.

The switch from RAF airfields to the city of London was not a sudden change in tactics, but rather an integral element of aerial warfare according to the established Luftwaffe doctrine.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[Angus]

Hey, Scholzie, from you
"The LW was designed around the principle of combined arms warfare. The LW was meant to follow the army in the field moving from airfield to airfield (whom the LW ground personnel prepared). Close cooperation between the army and LW was a major contributor to the success of the Blitzkrieg doctrine.

During the Battle for Britain the LW was forced to operate as a strategic airforce; something they were never designed for, and ill suited to do."

So spot-on! Absolutely the nutshell. In the combined arms warfare, they were whooping. Mind you though that they were not exactly totally unique, - the French airforce was controlled by the army for instance, - but they never went offensive anyway.
However, regarding the BoB, they weren't that ill suited, - the channel is down to 30 km wide you see, and distance to target definately not more than in many places in Europe, say alone in N Africa and the eastern front.
So for that, I slightly disagree. I think the LW could perhaps have won the BoB by not making many of the mistakes they made, - however providing that the Brits would still have made all the mistakes they made.
But so it went. They met a determined opposition and got beaten in their effort of multiple goals, basically 4
1. Subdue English ports
2. Destroy the RAF
3. no. 2 and prep for invasion.
4. Force the British to surrender with intensive bombing.

[spitfiremkv]

 And yet it was still considered obsolete even up to its last days.  

What I am getting at is how did a plane with seemingly so little to offer in it's initial production become such a well respected and highly coveted fighter through it's career in WWII?  Even with all of it's short comings?

 [/B]

I might have missed something in your post

you imply that it was 'always' obsolete.
and that even initial versions 'offered little'
maybe i'm nitpicking here, but from your initial post I inferred that you considered the 109 to not have been a great fighter, from its initial debut up to the end of the war.

[humble]

Originally posted by GScholz
The LW was designed around the principle of combined arms warfare. The LW was meant to follow the army in the field moving from airfield to airfield (whom the LW ground personnel prepared). Close cooperation between the army and LW was a major contributor to the success of the Blitzkrieg doctrine.

During the Battle for Britain the LW was forced to operate as a strategic airforce; something they were never designed for, and ill suited to do.

Show me that in writing will you....

The luftwaffe's primary mission was the destruction of the opposing air capability. It had no inherent combined arms philosophy. It was the only thru "airforce" at that time and had a completely seperate command structure specifically to eliminate any possibility of aviation assets being redirected away from the primary mission. The bombers were perfectly suited to attacks on enemy aviation. Now this is not the current thought of "stratigic bombing" a concept that didnt exist in the mid 30's accept in Doolittles mind. The Luftwaffe's vision of strategic bombing was the elimination of aviation assets and interdiction of supply & troop movement.

All that being said it obviously worked as needed (and was practical) with the german army...but the army had no control over luftwaffe assets.


"Luftwaffe Regulation 16, Luftkriegsführung (Conduct of Aerial War), directed that “the enemy air force is to be fought from the be-ginning of the war . . . . An offensive execution of the battle in the enemy’s territory is indispensable. The aerial battle will gain the initiative over the enemy.”9 Offensive action by bomber units was intended to destroy
enemy air units on the ground, simultaneously disrupting sortie generation and command and control. Fighter units would then hunt down units that were able to get airborne.10 Defense was not emphasized. In order
to avoid diluting the air offensive, defense was left to flak units. This offensive counterair (OCA) effort was concentrated in time to neutralize the opponent’s air force as quickly as possible."
The first Luftwaffe chief of the general staff, Gen Walther Wever, listed the need “to combat the enemy air force” among the Luftwaffe’s priority tasks.6 Prior to the Polish campaign, Gen Hans Jeschonnek, a later chief of staff, wrote that the most proper and essential task is the battle against the enemy air force, and it must be executed vigorously and at all costs. The second task, the support of the army, in the first days of the war cannot claim the same level of importance.
. . . What may be achieved in the first two days by using one’s own air force against an opposing army does not compare with the damage an enemy air force may inflict if it remains battleworthy."











"

[GScholz]

Germany's airwar visionary during this period was Walther Wever, head of the Luftwaffe until his death in 1936. Wever studied Douhet's teachings but believed that a broadly based air strategy was superior to "strategic" bombing, [18] and he argued that the air force should complement the army and navy.[19] his death left the Luftwaffe with less capable men in charge. Nonetheless, the doctrine governing Luftwaffe air power was formulated by Wever before he died. Fundamentally, the three military services were to co-operate in order to achieve the foremost goal of any war, that of destroying the enemy armed forces. "It is the task of the air force in leading the war in the air within the wider framework of the whole war to serve this goal." [20] More specifically, Luftwaffendienstvorschrift 16: Luftkriegsführung (Luftwaffe Service Regulation l6: Conduct of the Air War) laid down three points: (l) subjugation of the enemy air force in order to achieve and maintain air superiority; (2) support of the army and navy; (3) attack against the enemy industry.[21]

These three points implied that the Luftwaffe should destroy the enemy air force over its own territory, if possible when it was still on the ground. For good measure aircraft factories ground installations, and air fields were also to be bombed. Secondly, support of the army was critical. Bombers were to clear the way for tanks and infantry by destroying depots, harassing enemy troops, and disrupting communications. Already, Luftwaffendienstvorschrift 16 hinted at the future subordination of the Luftwaffe to the Army. Once these two primary tasks had been accomplished, airplanes were to bomb production centers, food supplies, railroads, ports, traffic centers, military recruiting centers, and Government administrative centers.[22]

http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v07/v07p133_Oppenheimer.html#ftnref19

[GScholz]

Continued...

The Polish Campaign (1 September - 27 September 1939)
In many ways, the Polish campaign justified the principles which had been enumerated and developed in Spain. The first of these principles was the concentration of all available effort on one task at a time. The second principle was the elimination of any obstacle that might hamper the movement of the ground forces.[102] The German Air Staff planned the military operations against Poland, Fall Weiß (Case White), largely according to these principles, and was rewarded with a spectacular success.

The strategy and tactics applied in Poland to implement the two principles elucidated above were taken from Condor Legion experience in Spain. Basically, the Luftwaffe supported infantry, and mechanized armor units, clearing the path of obstacles and seeking to achieve air superiority. The Polish Campaign demonstrated the efficacy of the lessons learned in Spain: close ground support tactics, air transport, and dive bombing. The Polish Campaign also provided the first opportunity to combine the full might of the Army and the Luftwaffe. Blitzkrieg (lightning war), as this new type of warfare was termed, was the close cooperation between tactical air and mechanized ground formations to penetrate deeply and rapidly into enemy territory.[103] The basic elements of Blitzkrieg had been developed in Spain. In Poland, they were fully implemented for the first time.

[humble]

I]The first Luftwaffe chief of the general staff, Gen Walther Wever, listed the need “to combat the enemy air force” among the Luftwaffe’s priority tasks.6 Prior to the Polish campaign, Gen Hans Jeschonnek, a later chief of staff, wrote that the most proper and essential task is the battle against the enemy air force, and it must be executed vigorously and at all costs. The second task, the support of the army, in the first days of the war cannot claim the same level of importance.[/I]


The support of the Army was NOT a luftwaffe priority at the beginning of the attack on poland. In fact the luftwaffe only had a single ground support plane (the JU-87) during the course of the entire war.

The first of these principles was the concentration of all available effort on one task at a time. The second principle was the elimination of any obstacle that might hamper the movement of the ground forces

This is a false statement, the luftwaffe was never focused on ground support as its primary focus during the initial stages of the war.


1 The Luftwaffe was organized, equipped, and successfully employed to gain air superiority in short-offensive campaigns. This impressive offensive air strategy featured all-out independent operations against opposing air forces as the means to achieve air superiority

To the German airmen, it was widely accepted that defeat of the enemy air force was the best means to attain this all-important goal of air superiority.

From the opening minutes of a campaign, German air units focused the bulk of their efforts on the destruction of the enemy air force

This offensive counterair (OCA) effort was concentrated in time to neutralize the opponent’s air force as quickly as possible.

More significantly, the Luftflotten were commanded by airmen, free from the army chain of command. This independence enabled the Luftwaffe to minimize diversions in support of secondary

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/andrews.pdf


This is pretty typical of modern thinking by military historians on this topic...