Thanks, Nuke (great handle for this thread). The following from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists sheds more light (it's too long for this board; couldn't find way to link it, so here's how it begins ... it's worth a Google to finish it):
(QUOTE)
Nuclear policy: France stands alone
Leaner and meaner? France is trying to do more with less--and that includes its smaller, but more flexible, nuclear arsenal.
By Bruno Tertrais
July/August 2004 pp. 48-55 (vol. 60, no. 04) © 2004 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
In the fall of 2003, the French media reported that a major shift in the country's nuclear policy was under way. On October 27, the headline of the daily Libération screamed, "Chirac's Small Bombshell: France Will Soon Revise its Deterrence Strategy in Order to Be Able to Strike 'Rogue States,' Even Preventively." The newspaper reported that France would announce a new nuclear doctrine that would take into account "rogue states" with weapons of mass destruction, and that new weapons were being considered to deal with such threats. A few days later, Jean Guisnel suggested in the weekly Le Point that several major adjustments to the doctrine had been secretly decided in 2001 (October 31, 2003). But President Jacques Chirac and his government denied that there had been any change in French nuclear doctrine and maintained that no change was forthcoming. [1]
The confusion was understandable. Nuclear policy in France is shrouded in secrecy--even more so than in other Western nuclear weapon states--and transparency has long been anathema in Paris. Few public pronouncements or official documents are available for analysts and media to comment on, so journalists are frequently tempted to exaggerate the importance of tidbits of information and may easily misinterpret senior officials' off-the-record comments.
The episode revealed a tension in French nuclear policy that has existed since the end of the Cold War. On one hand, France still clings to the concepts of nuclear sufficiency and deterrence--deterring major powers is still the first mission of French nuclear forces. On the other hand, since Chirac's election in 1995, French authorities have insisted on the diversity of conceivable deterrence scenarios and on the need for greater nuclear "flexibility"--including options to reduce collateral damage.
(LONG MIDDLE PART DELETED HERE)
French leaders have suggested that the country's nuclear deterrent already plays an implicit role in the protection of Europe. In 1995, Paris and London declared that they "could not imagine a situation in which the vital interests of either of our two nations, France and the United Kingdom, could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened," and decided to increase nuclear cooperation between the two countries. [15] In his June 8, 2001 speech, Chirac stated that any decision by France to use nuclear weapons "would naturally take into account the growing solidarity of European Union countries." But despite some occasional hints, France has fallen short of declaring that its nuclear deterrent explicitly covers its EU partners. [16] The way France interprets the mutual security guarantee that member states have agreed to include in the EU Constitution will be an interesting test of French nuclear policy.
(16 FOOTNOTES)
Bruno Tertrais is a senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique in Paris, France.
(UNQUOTE)
