History misconceptions

[Widewing]

I have a substantial library at home, nearly 1,700 books stored on shelves, in closets and stacked in the home office. Many of these are aviation books, mostly hardcovers collected over the past 30+ years.

Within these books I find several consistant errors in history, things repeated over and over by various authors that were incorrect the first time published and still finding their way into new publications. Here's a list of the more common errors of fact.

1) Britain was responsible for the P-51 being designed.

2) More Japanese aircraft were shot down by the P-38 than any other Allied fighter.

3) The P-39 was used by the Soviets as a tank-buster.

4) In air combat, the P-38 could not maneuver with the Bf 109 and Fw 190.

5) At the beginning of the war, Mitsubishi's Zero was faster than any American fighter.

6) P-51s were the first Allied fighters to fly to Berlin and back.

7) Allied bombing severely reduced Germany's factory output of war planes and armor.

8) Grumman's F6F had a maximum speed of 388 mph.

The truth:

1) Britain approached North American Aviation asking that they manufacture the P-40 under license. They even suggested that NAA consider the Curtiss XP-46. NAA bought XP-46 engineering data from Curtiss, but thought the XP-46 to be a poor design. NAA decided to propose a new design rather than build an obsolete aircraft. This was approved, but only if the prototype would be ready within 120 days. It was, but Allison was late delivering the engine. So, the P-51 was designed in spite of what the Brits had originally asked for.

2) P-38s destroyed more Japanese aircraft than any other Allied AIR FORCE fighter. In reality, Grumman's F6F destroyed more than 5,000 Japanese aircraft, almost 2 1/2 times the total of the P-38.

3) On the eastern front, the Soviets employed the P-39 as a battlefield fighter. It's primary purpose was to defeat the Luftwaffe. Ground attack was a secondary purpose. Indeed, the 37mm M2 cannon proved ineffective against tanks. Many of the Soviet Union's top fighter pilots scored all or a portion of their victories flying the P-39. While disliked by the USAAF for its poor performance above 15,000 feet, and its short range, these were not issues on the eastern front. Most combat was below 15,000 feet, usually very near the front line.

4) Early in the production run of the P-38F, the flap system was redesigned to incorporate a "maneuver" setting. The use of flaps enabled the P-38 to turn very tightly, allowing it to out-turn the German fighters at low speeds. At high altitudes, the P-38s suffered from serious compressibility problems and any Luftwaffe pilot finding himself at a disadvantage was able to disengage by diving vertically. This was not satisfactorily resolved until the summer of 1944, when dive recovery flaps began being retro-fitted to P-38Js and the newer P-38J-25-LO and P-38L-1-LO began arriving in numbers. By then, the 8th AF had already began re-equipping P-38 units with P-51s. However, the newer P-38s performed splendedly with the 15th AF flying from Italy and with the 9th Tactical AF from Britain and later from France and Belgium.

5) Althought the Zero offered great range, good climb and remarkable agility, it was not a fast fighter by late 1941 standards. Published data claims a top speed of 332 mph for the A6M2. Actual testing of the aircraft shows speeds no greater than 320 mph. When compared to the P-40 (any model), P-39D or the F4F-3, we see that the Zero was usually at a disadvantage in speed. A simple change in tactics largely neutered the Zero's advantages in maneuverability. During the course of the war, the Zero's performance increased little, while newer and far higher performance fighters coming into Allied service relegated the Zero to little more than a target by mid 1943.

6) On March 3rd, 1944 Col. Harold Rau took the 20th Fighter Group to Berlin. The 20th was flying P-38Js. 101 P-51s finally made it to Berlin on March 6th, but they were accompanied by 88 P-38s.

7) German industrial output actually increased during the height of the bombing. However, the bombing did limit the growth of industrial output. Ultimately, the concentration on destroying Germany's ability to produce fuel (by the Soviets capturing oil fields and the bombing of production facilities) did more harm than the bombing of factories.

8) Due to a design engineering error, the pitot static port was mis-located. This led to a serious error in air speed indication at high speed. When corrected on a Grumman test aircraft, maximum speed was observed as 412 mph during factory flight tests. This was verified by the Technical Air Intelligence Command (TAIC). Their testing revealed a maximum speed of 409 mph while fitted with independent air speed measuring equipment.

My regards,

Widewing

[Pongo]

Point one is interesting. Evey your clarification still seems like the the british are responsible for the P51 being designed to me.

[zorstorer]

Very interesting Widewing, a few of those I thought I knew and a few I had no idea about.  Thanks for opening this avation buffs eyes.  

[6GunUSMC]

very good read!

[Guppy35]

You sure on the 20th and Harold Rau that were first over Berlin?

I've always understood it was Jack Jenkins in his P38 "Texas Ranger", leading the 55th FG that was first over Berlin on March 3, 1944.

Lots of publicity photos of Jenkins in that 38 because of it.

Still 38s, but a different bunch

Dan/CorkyJr

[Elfie]

1) Britain approached North American Aviation asking that they manufacture the P-40 under license. They even suggested that NAA consider the Curtiss XP-46. NAA bought XP-46 engineering data from Curtiss, but thought the XP-46 to be a poor design. NAA decided to propose a new design rather than build an obsolete aircraft. This was approved, but only if the prototype would be ready within 120 days. It was, but Allison was late delivering the engine. So, the P-51 was designed in spite of what the Brits had originally asked for.

I think this is saying the Brits ARE responsible for the P-51 being designed. Brits didnt do the designing, but if they hadnt approached NAA for P-40's would NAA have designed the Mustang? Guess we'll never know that answer

Good read Widewing

[humble]

Thought this was interesting for 38 buffs....

20th Fighter Group Headquarters
APO 637 U.S. Army
(E-2)

3 June 1944

Subject: P-38 Airplane in Combat.

To: Commanding General, VIII Fighter Command, APO 637, U.S. Army.

1. The following observations are being put in writing by the undersigned at the request of the Commanding General, VII FC. They are intended purely as constructive criticism and are intended in any way to "low rate" our present equipment.

2. After flying the P-38 for a little over one hundred hours on combat missions it is my belief that the airplane, as it stands now, is too complicated for the 'average' pilot. I want to put strong emphasis on the word 'average, taking full consideration just how little combat training our pilots have before going on as operational status.

3. As a typical case to demonstrate my point, let us assume that we have a pilot fresh out of flying school with about a total of twenty-five hours in a P-38, starting out on a combat mission. He is on a deep ramrod, penetration and target support to maximum endurance. He is cruising along with his power set at maximum economy. He is pulling 31" Hg and 2100 RPM. He is auto lean and running on external tanks. His gun heater is off to relieve the load on his generator, which frequently gives out (under sustained heavy load). His sight is off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch may or may not be on. Flying along in this condition, he suddenly gets "bounced", what to do flashes through his mind. He must turn, he must increase power and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main. So, he reaches down and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches {valves} to main - turns on his drop tank switches, presses his release button, puts the mixture to auto rich (two separate and clumsy operations), increases his RPM, increases his manifold pressure, turns on his gun heater switch (which he must feel for and cannot possibly see), turns on his combat switch and he is ready to fight. At this point, he has probably been shot down or he has done one of several things wrong. Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before increasing RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure. Or, he forgets to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive cylinder head temperature with subsequent engine failure.

4. In my limited experience with a P-38 group, we have lost as least four (4) pilots, who when bounced, took no immediate evasive action. The logical assumption is that they were so busy in the cockpit, trying to get organized that they were shot down before they could get going.

5. The question that arises is, what are you going to do about it? It is standard procedure for the group leader to call, five minutes before R/V and tell all the pilots to "prepare for trouble". This is the signal for everyone to get into auto rich, turn drop tank switches on, gun heaters on, combat and sight switches on and to increase RPM and manifold pressure to maximum cruise. This procedure, however, does not help the pilot who is bounced on the way in and who is trying to conserve his gasoline and equipment for the escort job ahead.

6. What is the answer to these difficulties? During the past several weeks we have been visited at this station time and time again by Lockheed representatives, Allison representatives and high ranking Army personnel connected with these two companies. They all ask about our troubles and then proceed to tell us about the marvelous mechanisms that they have devised to overcome these troubles that the Air Force has turned down as "unnecessary". Chief among these is a unit power control, incorporating an automatic manifold pressure regulator, which will control power, RPM and mixture by use of a single lever. It is obvious that there is a crying need for a device like that in combat.

7. It is easy to understand why test pilots, who have never been in combat, cannot readily appreciate what each split second means when a "bounce" occurs. Every last motion when you get bounced is just another nail in your coffin. Any device which would eliminate any of the enumerated above, are obviously very necessary to make the P-38 a really effective combat airplane.

8. It is also felt that that much could done to simplify the gas switching system in this airplane. The switches {valve selector handles} are all in awkward positions and extremely hard to turn. The toggle switches for outboard tanks are almost impossible to operate with gloves on.

9. My personal feeling about this airplane is that it is a fine piece of equipment, and if properly handled, takes a back seat for nothing that the enemy can produce. But it does need simplifying to bring it within the capabilities of the 'average' pilot. I believe that pilots like Colonel Ben Kelsey and Colonel Cass Huff are among the finest pilots in the world today. But I also believe that it is difficult for men like them to place their thinking and ability on the level of a youngster with a bare 25 hours in the airplane, going into his first combat. That is the sort of thinking that will have to be done, in my opinion, to make the P-38 a first-class all around fighting airplane.

HAROLD J. RAU
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.

[humble]

From what I can find on the net the 55th was 1st over berlin on March 3, 1944. 1st Buffs made it on March 6th....

"Paul Selden, Stan Richardson, and Col. C. Jones (ret.) were three of the approximately 20 members of the 55th Fighter Group who were the first Americans over Berlin in the war. The first USAAF mission over Berlin was scheduled for March 3, 1944, but the mission was scrubbed due to weather. The 55th never got the recall notice, probably due to German jamming, and the group thus earned the distinction of "first over Berlin." Col. Jones was 343rd Squadron XO at the time and gave a vivid description of the instrument conditions the group struggled with on the way to the target. Selden and Richardson gave a far-ranging picture of the lives of combat pilots, including a good-natured debate over the respective merits of the P-38 and P-51. Paul clearly preferred the latter and Stan the former."

http://www.nwha.org/news_3Q2001/news_page8.html

From the little I read it seemed like the 20th went operational slightly later that month...

[humble]

Rau didnt take command of the 20th until after Mark Hubbard was shot down (march 18, 1944). He was functioning as an A3 (staff position) prior to that so he couldnt have led the 20th over Berlin on March 3, 1944....

"After leaving the 20th., at Barksdale, I graduated from Flying School in due time and was assigned to the 1st. Pursuit Group at Selfridge Field, Mich. Field, subsequently to the 9th. Bomb Group at Mitchell Field, and then at Panama. Finally, after coming back from Panama in January, 1943, I was assigned to the New York Air Defense Wing and subsequently to the command of a newly formed fighter group known as the 356th. Fighter Group. I organized the 356th., then took them overseas and got them into combat and after a short period with the 356th. I was transfered up to the 67th. Air Defense Wing as A-3, after serving about four months as A-3 I was given command of the 20th. Group in March of 1944.

  "I took command shortly after Mark Hubbard had been shot down and Johnny Johnson was acting as temporary Group Commander until I arrived. I flew 73 missions, as I recall, with the 20th. Group , about 350 some combat hours between March of '43* and December of '43*. In December I was relieved of active combat and returned to the Zone of Interior. Bob Montgomery then took over command of the outfit and had it, I believe on through most of the rest of the war, which as we all know wound up in the spring of '45."


http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/6940/rau.html

[Zazen13]

Nice info Widewing. So, when are we getting faster F6F's in AH ?!?

Zazen

[Murdr]

Originally posted by humble
5. The question that arises is, what are you going to do about it? It is standard procedure for the group leader to call, five minutes before R/V and tell all the pilots to "prepare for trouble". This is the signal for everyone to get into auto rich, turn drop tank switches on, gun heaters on, combat and sight switches on and to increase RPM and manifold pressure to maximum cruise. This procedure, however, does not help the pilot who is bounced on the way in and who is trying to conserve his gasoline and equipment for the escort job ahead.

Lloyd Wnezel of the 474th FG recalled, "we had solved the problem of predetonation at altitude because of too much cooling in th inter-cooler and did a field-fix, anchoring the nacell fillet to reduce buffet.  We moved the inter-coller switch up to the control yoke and ganged that switch with the gun sight and guns' hot switch so we wouldnt forget to open it.
    The 474th was the only 38 outfit in the ETO at the end of the war - we had petitioned General Pete Quesada {9th Commander} to let us keep the bird when other groups were changing to P-51s and P-47s"

[StarOfAfrica2]

Originally posted by Pongo
Point one is interesting. Evey your clarification still seems like the the british are responsible for the P51 being designed to me.

You can make the statement, but its not the whole truth.  The USAAF had far more to do with it being built than the Brits, who really just wanted SOMETHING.  They had nothing to do with pushing anyone to make something different.  This is an excerpt I posted previously in another thread.

From the book WARBIRDS:  American Legends of WWII

During the first months of the war the British and French renewed their efforts to purchase US-built aircraft, settling on the P-40. Lt. Benjamin S. Kelsey, head of the Army Air Corps Pursuit Projects Office at Wright Field, and his boss, Col. Oliver P. Echols regretted this since it would push a new Curtiss Fighter, the XP-46, off the assembly lines. Air Corps commander Gen. H.H."Hap" Arnold decided he could not spare the four-month lag in production to change from the P-40 to the P-46 - if America were drawn into the war, quantity would be drastically needed.

In January 1940, recalled Kelsey, "Echols made a suggestion to the Anglo-French Purchasing Commission to find a manufacturer who wasn't already bogged down with high-priority stuff. Curtiss-Wright and the Air Corps would make available all the data we had on the XP-46 in place of the P-40, to find some way of getting around the problem."

Scouting for other companies to build the P-40, the commission was drawn to North American Aviation, which had done a sterling job in providing Harvard trainers. The company made it clear they had no desire to build another firm's fighter; they wanted to design one themselves.

Donovan Berlin had spent the better part of the last two years developing the XP-46. With his go-ahead, NAA Vice President Leland Atwood bought the data, along with the results of how the aborted belly radiator scoop worked on the original XP-40 for $56,000. On 4 May, NAA signed a Foreign Release Agreement with the Air Corps permitting sale of the Model NA-73 overseas, providing that two examples were supplied to the Army. Kelsey and Echols had maneuvered hard to get their new fighter built at a time when the Air Corps had no procurement money.

................Wing designer Larry Waite incorporated, at the insistence of Edward Horkey (aerodynamicist), the NACA (National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics) laminar-flow wing section, which had not been in the original design concept. Kelsey had pushed behind the scenes ........ to get the new wing design into the project.............."All this happened," recalled Kelsey, "without anyone at Wright Field having the foggiest notion of what was going on. We had to stay out of it because it was a British procurement." The NAA team's genus resulted in the best design possible around the radical NACA laminar-flow wing section.

Though the Curtiss data was shipped by crate to California, Atwood later said not much of it was used in the final design. Others in the industry, particularly Berlin and those at Curtiss said otherwise from the time the Mustang became famous.

Whether you believe North American used the XP-46 data or not, and alot of people DONT believe it, they did buy the data on it.  The USAAF wanted another fighter, but didnt have the money to develop one in the pre-war environment.  The original contract allowed the USAAF to keep two of the planes built for "evaluation purposes", built on the Brit's dollar.

[palef]

Thank you Widewing and Humble!

[Scherf]

Might want to adjust 6) to "first allied day fighters"

[gofaster]

Widewing, do you write for "Flight"?