Iraqization

[Hangtime]

Originally posted by Charon
I think we could have won a military victory in Vietnam as in Iraq. But without providing the conquered people of the North a better alternative than the corrupt S. Vietnamese puppet government, you would not have seen any peace from it IMO. Just more VC, more outposts, control of the urban areas and the daylight and the continual, incremental KIAs among US occupation forces. There was a strong and willing support of the communist regime (even if we would consider it misguided) so the people would not have felt liberated. And regardless of the press releases calling S. Vietnam a democracy, it was obviously a corrupt puppet dictatorship to those in both the North and the South. So to actually win the hearts and minds, get the locals invested in the system and come home easily, you have to prove to the masses that they control their destinies in a system that is superior to what some opposing charismatic leader can sell to the masses. While the opposition among Iraqi’s seems less firm, there does appear to be a dangerous level of mistrust and uncertainty of us and our motivations that has to be quickly overcome, IMO.

The problem is -- you set up a true democratic process in Vietnam or Iraq, and they don't have to listen to Uncle Sam at some point. Maybe they vote into power communism or radical Islam, or they nationalize industries or develop unacceptable trade relations, etc. We were pretty mild on the true colonial empire, but our version of colonialism based on puppet dictatorships throughout the world has had no more ultimate success than the European version. The locals can see through the BS too easily.

Charon

Yah Nailed it Charon. Thanks.

And, yah also clarified in my mind what's wrong now in Iraq.. and what the likely results will be.

It ain't good, is it. Damn.. damn.. damn..     how the hell did we manage to get ourselves into this.. and how do we get out?

[oboe]

To add a little more color to the picture, the free but struggling Iraqi democracy will probably be forced to curtail individual liberties to fight the continuing insurgency, and the democratic majority of the population might well be in favor of closer ties to the hardline conservative theocratic pseudo-democracy in Iran.

If the US sees this happening, odds are it will not want to pull troops out and give up control in such a strategically important oil rich country.    The presence of US troops will continue to foment the insurrection.

Or maybe the whole country will have a meltdown into 3-way civil war right in front of us anyway, with our troops caught in the middle.   That's what Bush Sr was concerned would happen and one of the reasons he chose NOT to go into Baghdad and depose Saddam in the first Gulf War.

Unless we start pumping and selling their oil ourselves, I don't think it will have been worth it economically.

[Charon]

It ain't good, is it. Damn.. damn.. damn.. how the hell did we manage to get ourselves into this.. and how do we get out?

That's a good question. So much of what is required is time intensive. I believe Hackworth once commented that it takes at least a decade to build a professional, truly effective military force from scratch. How long does it take to build a stable democracy? Hackworth also called for more boots on the ground, which Bush dismissed as recently as last night -- aparently as much for political reasons as anything elses (can't have the Iraqi's think we're beefing up the occupation force- can's rock the boat at home) and probably some physical limits now at current force levels. Bush did say "They're not asking for more..." but Hack addressed that too in January:

We can still win

By David H. Hackworth

The invasion of Iraq was sledgehammer-simple: Slug in some "shock and awe" and kiss Saddam Hussein goodbye.

But while our troops and generals deserve a big "bravo" for their brilliance and bravery during the initial war-fighting phase, the occupation – which went wrong right from the get-go and has bled along for almost two more terrible years – is going down as one of the biggest snafus in U.S. military history.

If the generals had any kind of plan to stabilize Iraq, it had to have been drawn up and approved by serving officers seriously stoned on LSD. But as there's zip evidence of any high-level pre-invasion planning effort, I suspect that Gen. Tommy Franks bought into all the Pentagon hype about how once the statue of Saddam fell it would be wine, roses and ecstatic dancing in the streets – and then the majority of our soldiers would leave 40,000 peacekeepers behind to assist the appropriately grateful Iraqis in building a booming, oil-rich democracy and return home to confetti and victory parades.      

Our troops were truly magnificent in the early days of the fumbled occupation. Their skill, sacrifice and flexibility gave new meaning to "take charge and move out, field expediency and staying loose," and prevented even worse disasters in the chaos that ensued after our forces took down Saddam.        

There is no doubt both that our warriors won the battle and that our generals blew the occupation and have been playing catch-up – badly – ever since. And nearly two years later, too many of our senior military geniuses still don't understand that we're fighting insurgents and that they need to get the necessary additional combat power on the ground quicksmart.

Again, the three mistakes that have continued to haunt our forces in Iraq since April '03 are: (1) No initial occupation plan; (2) no acknowledgment at the top that we're fighting an insurgency war; and (3) not enough combat troops to put down the insurgents, who daily become smarter, stronger and better-organized.            

Our grunts have been letting me know since the early days of the invasion that there has never been enough people power on deck to do the job. "We're stretched too thin" has been a constant complaint. "Battalions are doing the work of brigades and brigades divisions," snorts an infantry skipper now in the Mosul area of operations.

So far, not one general has had the guts to stand tall and demand more troops from either Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard Myers – who was selected for the job because he's a technical whiz, not a warfighter – or his boss, SecDef Donald Rumsfeld. And late last year, when a reporter tore into Rummy on CNN about how our forces were knee-deep in an insurgency war that wasn't going well, Rummy remained in undaunted denial, defending the one-note, high-tech 21st-century force he keeps pushing – in spite of the overwhelming evidence that this war is now all about insurgency.

Meanwhile, our brass hats appear to be suffering from the Shinseki disease they caught bearing witness to then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki's being treated as a leper for standing up to Rummy over the number of troops needed for the occupation. The lesson learned from this telling example: Don't cross Rummy. So even though Shinseki was dead-right, the brass went along – to get along – with a shamefully inadequate troop strength.

In my judgment, the war in Iraq against the insurgents is still winnable: if Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran are told to stop supporting the insurgents or else; if we get enough boots on the ground ASAP to saturate and dominate the badlands; and if the brass allow the small-unit leaders to do their thing without the obsessive micromanagement that infects our Army.          

The troops should be left alone to build up a solid network of Iraqis who want the war to end. Then together they can put down the spoilers and spread the good life that the majority of the people in Iraq are now starting to enjoy.    

Fighting insurgents is relatively simple. You don't need to be the top guy in the class to win the game. But you do need common sense and commanders who aren't afraid to stand up to bum-kissing top brass and dumb policy.

Nobody listened to old Hack the first time around in Vietnam when he was saying as much, and he was certainly Persona non grata this time around. I did see a clear acknowledgement of point no. 2 last night, though Cheny was still spouting the "dead ender - end in sight" spin a couple of weeks ago.

Charon

[Gunslinger]

Originally posted by oboe
what Bush Sr was concerned would happen and one of the reasons he chose NOT to go into Baghdad and depose Saddam in the first Gulf War.

Incorrect.  Going to Baghdad was never part of the MISSION.  One thing they did correctly in the first gulf war was to lay out a set of clearly defined goals.  Going to baghdad was NEVER one of them.

[Torque]

charon, one of the few treasures the bbs has to offer ( next to hang's tongue and cheek hiliarious posts)

a beacon of common sense shining in the fog of patriotic bias and blinded rhetoric.

[Pongo]

It will be interesting to see how this turns out.

[lazs2]

charon... you are correct in that their democracy will most likely not be like ours.   I seriously doubt that given free elections, we will see them elect a dictator for life or a commie tho.

They may elect someone who then seizes power and takes away the elections... that is something that we would need to intervene in.

lazs

[Sandman]

Originally posted by Gunslinger
Incorrect.  Going to Baghdad was never part of the MISSION.  One thing they did correctly in the first gulf war was to lay out a set of clearly defined goals.  Going to baghdad was NEVER one of them.

True enough, but Bush could have. I think he was right not to.


There's a passage in his book where he talks about how difficult it would be to occupy Iraq.

[oboe]

Gunslinger -

I know it wasn't part of the mission, but he still considered it and ultimately decided against it.   I remember Powell defending the decision not to go into Baghdad.   But that action (and its likely consequences) was definitely being considered at the time, whether it was part of the mission or not.   Being offmission was used as the main justification of the decision NOT to go in.