Um, those were the findings of the Accident Investigation, not mine: The lever being the same shape and design of the thrust lever was a matter of confusion, and had resulted in numerous incidents beforehand.
Yes, this was pilot error. He had hit the wrong lever and tried to continue. Perhaps the pressure of the severe flight crew hierarchy gradient had something to do with it. (before the incident , you even get nice little bits like):
CAP: IGS IS VERY IMPORTANT.
THE OTHER DAY, (NAME OF PERSON) FLEW VERY WELL.
F/O: IGS, OH.
CAP: I DIDN'T TAKE OVER ON BOTH CASES, HE LANDED BY HIMSELF.
HE LANDED SO WELL, EVEN CAPTAIN CAN NOT DO BETTER.
F/O: IS THAT SO?
Anyway, so the poor guy throws the wrong lever, puts it in GO. He realizes that's bad, so he moves it back, and tries to continue to land.
The A/P isn't designed that way, and continues the Go Around, applying thrust and elevator.
The FO decided to prosecute. At that point, the fact China Air hadn't implemented a "Recommended" service bulletin from Airbus (not mandatory):
B A300-22-6021 issued by Airbus Industrie dated June 24, 1993 with compliance "Recommended" specified, concerned a modification to the AFS, which disengages the AP when a force in excess of 15kgf is applied to the control wheel in pitch axis during a flight in the GO AROUND mode above radio altitude 400 ft
So the FO applies (at Captain's orders) down elevator and disengages the autothrottle. Without the SB fixes, the A/P doesn't disengage in this mode, and isn't getting the climb it needs, so it trims up, and the AOA climbs. The Captain sees the FO is in trouble and takes over. Finally the A/p is disengaged, and the Captain is flying a slow Airbus with a high nose-up, low throttle and full up elevator trim. The AOA hits the "Alpha Floor", an Airbus limiter on AOA, and as an emergency measure, the Aircraft autonomously selects full power. Full power and full up trim increases the AOA to something like 52 degrees, and the thing hits tailfirst into the runway, killing all but seven of the 271 souls on board.
sources:
Investigation report (analysis section, you can jump to the other parts)
Summary CVRSo no, push the stick forward, and the AP decides to override you. Man and machine depend a lot on each other. Airbus design philosophy is that the machine should "know better" in most cases.
All aircraft have their design quirks and ergonomic niceties. One of the reasons modern A/C need Weight on Wheels to deploy the spoilers (and hence, some additional problems with aquaplaning) is an accident in canada in the late 60s with a DC-8 where the FO accidentally deployed the spoilers at 100 feet AGL. The aircraft hit hard, pranged an engine, and they went around, only to explode.