Spitfire Vb: Did it carry 120 rnds OR 240 rnds of Cannons?

[Crumpp]

11 Group had 352 Spits(6 squadrons)/Hurries(16 squadrons).

Interesting that your numbers remain the same for 11 Group over a three-week period during the battle.   Guess they suffered no losses nor did not benefit from the greater number of single engined fighters the RAF had in service at all.  

So your contention must be that the RAF has the wrong numbers?  That implies incompetence of the highest order if they could not even keep track of the numbers of Fighters they had in service.

Luftwaffe single engine fighters for August according to German sources:

Single-engine fighters      1,011         934          805

RAF numbers for September for according to PRO AIR 20/2307:

Fighter Command Order of Battle--11 August 1940 [35]
                         Establishment  Strength  Serviceability
Hurricanes           723                 721          656
Spitfires               366                 374          334
Total                    1,089              1,095       990

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_5

Although the main battle area took place there, 11 Group was not the only RAF Group to fight in the battle.  That has been proven.  All the RAF Groups were within easy range of the RAF single engined fighters.

Luftflotte III ability to influence the battle was severely impaired due to the lack of range of the 109.  London was 40 miles beyond the normal combat radius of the Bf-109E from the closest Luftwaffe fighter base.

Even then only a small percentage of their combat power could be brought to bear on 11th Group.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/luftflotteIII.html#lehavre

All the best,

Crumpp

[Widewing]

Christopher Shores reports the following strengths of Luftwaffe and RAF fighters on hand.

As of 8/10/40

Bf 109s: 934 on hand, 805 servicable (combat ready)
Bf 110s: 289 on hand, 224 servicable (combat ready)

For the month of August, 1940 average daily availablity of aircraft to Fighter Command.

1,061 - 1,181 on hand, 708 - 764 sevicable (combat ready)
These numbers include Spitfires, Hurricanes, Gladiators and Defiants. My understanding reading Shores is that Fighter Command Blenheim's Mk.I F types were counted as part of the total fighter number.

On 8/8/40 there were 30 operational Hurricane squadrons, 20 operational Spitfire squadrons, 3 operational Defiant squadrons and a single squadron still flying Gladiators. Six squadrons were flying the converted Blenheims.

One reason the RAF fought at a numerical disadvantage was that the Luftwaffe was able to concentrate their numbers, whereas the RAF had to spread their fighters over the whole of southern England.

Note also this notation concerning the fighter levels defined in PRO AIR.
"(36.) The figures for Fighter Command are somewhat higher than those quoted in other sources but have been taken directly from PRO AIR 20/2307. Nevertheless, it is the trend that is important rather than precise strength levels."

In historian lingo this is saying; "these numbers will be disputed by many who have researched fighter strength levels, but exact numbers are not as important as the context of events." Which can be further interpreted as admitting they are not willing to go to battle defending the PRO AIR numbers. This type of notation is common when the author is trying to avoid readers focusing on incidental details that would diminish their primary goal.


My regards,

Widewing

[Crumpp]

PRO AIR 20/2307

Reports 990 servicable single engine RAF fighters in August.

That comes from this document:

Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft: strength, production and wastage

http://www.catalogue.nationalarchives.gov.uk/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=1762649&CATLN=6&Highlight=&FullDetails=True

All the best,

Crumpp

[MiloMorai]

Crumpp, will you do something about that problem of yours.

The 109s did pretty good? Not with 51.5% of the LW casualities being 109s and out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1. (11 Group being the main combat area)

Note is says the Spitfires and Hurricanes of 11 Group. The opposing German force was Luftflotte 2.

Aug 13/16 1940:

Luftflotte 2 had 544 109s.

11 Group had 352 Spits(6 squadrons)/Hurries(16 squadrons).

So a ratio of 1.55:1 in the LW's favor if, and only if, the fighters of 11 Group ignore the LW bombers.

Now you can twist, manipulate data and do what ever else you want to, but the odds were in the German's favor, 11 Group vs Luftflotte 2.


Yes Widewing, Crummp just can't get this though his knoggin.

One reason the RAF fought at a numerical disadvantage was that the Luftwaffe was able to concentrate their numbers, whereas the RAF had to spread their fighters over the whole of southern England.

And it was just not southern England but the whole of Great Britain, even to bases 600mi from London.

[Crumpp]

In historian lingo this is saying; "these numbers will be disputed by many who have researched fighter strength levels, but exact numbers are not as important as the context of events." Which can be further interpreted as admitting they are not willing to go to battle defending the PRO AIR numbers. This type of notation is common when the author is trying to avoid readers focusing on incidental details that would diminish their primary goal.

No that kind of terminology is common when new information is presented that many will find unpalatable.  We are talking about British pride in the concept of the "few" holding off the "many" being eroded.

Being a professional military publication, they are not so much concerned with national perceptions or pride.  They are concerned with discovering the facts and fighting future war.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Widewing]

Originally posted by MiloMorai
Yes Widewing, Crummp just can't get this though his knoggin.

One reason the RAF fought at a numerical disadvantage was that the Luftwaffe was able to concentrate their numbers, whereas the RAF had to spread their fighters over the whole of southern England.

And it was just not southern England but the whole of Great Britain, even to bases 600mi from London.

Indeed, Fighter Command had to deploy assets north to counter the threat of Luftflotte 5, based in Norway with nearly 200 combat aircraft.

My regards,

Widewing

[Crumpp]

Indeed, Fighter Command had to deploy assets north to counter the threat of Luftflotte 5,

You should probably read up more on Luftflotte V's participation in the BoB and the amount of warning the RAF had in raids coming out of Norway.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Widewing]

Originally posted by Crumpp
You should probably read up more on Luftflotte V's participation in the BoB and the amount of warning the RAF had in raids coming out of Norway.

All the best,

Crumpp

Why do you resort to personal slights?

Luftflotte5 conducted its first and last raid on August 14. Unfortunately, (as I stated) Fighter Command had resources deployed to counter this. 63 He 111s escorted by 21 Bf 110s were intercepted by Spitfires and Hurris, shooting down 7 of each type. Another He 111 was dispatched by a Blenheim. Later in the afternoon, 50 Ju 88s (without escort) flying from Denmark bombed Driffield airfield, but lost 7 bombers and many more damaged.

Luftflotte 5 was effectively out of the BoB, but Fighter Command still retained units north because the threat remained. After KG26 and KG30 redeployed to Luftflotte 2, Fighter Command shifted some squadrons south. However, the fact remains that for all of August, 15 FC squadrons deployed north.

My regards,

Widewing

[Crumpp]

Luftflotte 5 was effectively out of the BoB,

Correct.

The British had Ultra intercepts to confirm this so they knew a large force chasing phantoms was not needed.

To imply otherwise is just not true.  

Fighter Command still retained units north because the threat remained.

The units maintained in the north were primarily there to rest and refit.  Protection from any threat from Luftflotte V was hardly taxing duty.


All the best,

Crumpp

[Kev367th]

Been watching this thread with interest.
Few bits of info.

In the ealry stages the battle was borne almost exclusively by 11 group.
Was not until the LW started bombing London that 12 group and 10 group was used regularly.
Shortly after this Leigh-Mallory and Baders "Big Wings" (i.e. mass attacks) were utilised, prior to this raids were 'typically' intercepted by relatively small (16-20) numbers of fighters, as Dowding was trying to preserve his forces.

Sidenote - Just caught an snippet from Gunther Rall, in his opinion the LW never recovered from the losses sustained in the BoB.

[edit] Just dug thorugh an old book.
This is what is listed as total (i.e. 10,11,12 and 13 groups) RAF strength as of July 1 1940.
1st figure avail, 2nd fig serviceable.

Hurri - 463, 347
Spit - 286, 160
Defiant - 37, 25
Blenhein - 114, 59

Airfleets 2 and 3 were still redeploying and it would be some weeks before at full strength, but on July 20 could call on
Bf109 - 809, 656
Bf110 - 246, 168
Ju87 - 316, 248
Buffs - 1131, 769

Airfleet 5
Bf109 - 84 (unknown if serviceable or total)
Bf110 - 43, 32
Buffs - 129, 95

So I suppose if you take OVERALL single fighter strength for both sides it is only slightly biased towards the LW, but when you consider that the full might of airfleets 2 and 3 were thrown against mainly 11 group, the 2:1 in favour of the LW looks more likely.

[Crumpp]

but when you consider that the full might of airfleets 2 and 3 were thrown against mainly 11 group, the 2:1 in favour of the LW looks more likely.

Couple of points your missing.

1. The Luftwaffe single engine fighter units never achieved "full strength".  They became even smaller as the battle progressed.

Read the article I posted.  The Luftwaffe did not have a plan in place to fix large numbers of aircraft nor did they manufacture new ones at any increased production rate.

2.  Luftflotte III and Luftflotte II combined their "might" only once.  On 07 Sep 1940, the day Angus has chosen as his typical example.  

The Luftwaffe never did that again.  They lost whole stafflen out of Luftflotte III when they ran out gas and had to ditch.

So I suppose if you take OVERALL single fighter strength for both sides it is only slightly biased towards the LW,

Are you thinking the RAF did not use the aircraft they manufactured?

You have to ask yourself what makes more sense.

Did the Luftwaffe violate a principal of war by not having the necessary numerical superiority in fighters?

Today we know an air force needs a minimum of a 6:1 numerical advantage in air superiority fighters over an opponent to achieve total air superiority in a pure air campaign.

This theory is based off historical experience and draws lessons from all applicable conflicts.

The Luftwaffe was the first air force in history to attempt to achieve total air superiority in a pure air campaign.  No theory or experience existed for them to draw lessons or model.

The Luftwaffe thought they had a 2:1 advantage in single engine fighters and a 3:1 advantage in all planes.  Remember though, their intelligence estimates were wrong.

By using radar ground control, the RAF was able to multiply it's force by having them attack were they could gain advantage.

Even on 7 Sep 40 this occurred.  The first Luftwaffe raid from ErprGr 210 was escorted by 21 Bf-109's and an equal number of Bf-110's.  4 RAF squadrons were sent to intercept and the Luftwaffe took casualties.  The late afternoon raid was the same story again with ErprGr 210 being escorted.

The middle raid was escorted by almost the entire combined strength of Luftflotte II and Luftflotte III single engine fighters.  Only two bombers from KG 30 were lost due to flak on that mission.  JG26 filed six claims against the attacking "spitfires".

The handful of times the Luftwaffe was able to achieve a anything close to a 2:1 numerical advantage they inflicted greater losses than they took.  1.55:1 is about the largest advantage in the air the Luftwaffe was ever able to gain.

However the vast majority of the encounters things were even in single engine fighters or with the Luftwaffe 109's outnumbered due to the insistence that the Bf-110 was an effective escort fighter.

OR You can believe

The Hurricane and the Spitfire were so superior to the Bf-109 that they could fight outnumbered 2:1 and win?

The Bf-109, Spitfire, and Hurricane were design contemporaries.  The assumption is RAF was years ahead of everyone else in aeronautical engineering to have produced two such world beating fighters.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Kev367th]

Think your missing a few points -

I was pointing out that rather than OVERALL numbers you should be looking at 'area' numbers.
As I said the majority of the battle was borne almost exclusively by 11 Group, against them was the 2nd and 3rd LW airfleets.
By combined I meant not neccesarily at the same time, but also raids at different times.

In the early stages Dowding only ever 'typically' comitted a small number (16-20) of aircraft to intercept the raid, the objective being to break up the raid not necessarily shoot anything down.

Once the LW turned to bombing airfields 12 Group started to be used to cover the airfields while 11 Group continued to be used to intercept the raids. 12 Group's performance in this role was less than stellar, mainly due to Leigh-Mallory's and Baders attempt to get their "Big Wings" together.
In fact after the BoB the RAF carried out a wargame in which "Big Wings" were utilised from the outset, the result was a dismal failure.

Once the LW turned their attention to bombing London this now released 12 Group and allowed them to be used also to attack the incoming raids also. In addition parts of 10 group could also be used.

In fact the 1st time the LW was met by the combined forces of 10,11 and 12 group was not until 15 Sep, the famous "How many reserves have we got?" question Churchill asked.
The second raid of 15 Sep was met by approx 170 Spits and Hurris.

Big Wings consisted of at least 3 sqns, the minimum level of fighters required to meet the LW on something approaching equal terms.

So this is how I see it
Early stages - LW big advantage in numbers due to Dowdings use of typically only 16-20 aircraft to intercept a raid.

Mid stages - LW advantage less as 12 Group got used more.

Late stages - LW little or no advantage once the combined use of 10,11 and 12 Groups was possible, and "Big Wings" were utilised.

Of course for the North, the RAF would have a full advantage as no 109's could make the Scandinavia to S. Scotland/N.E. England crossing.

However you look at the numbers the majority of the LW assault was met mainly by only 11 Group up until the very late stages of the BoB.

Not getting into how many were shot down by either side, until the day they drain the English Channel we'll never know for sure.
Suffice to say the LW sustained big enough losses that in became intolerable.

[Angus]

Wonderful Kev; you took almost all words out of my mouth!
One thing missing, - I belive 10th group had some joustles in the first three phases of the fight - as opposing Luftflotte III.
And Crumpp: Again on the 7th of September it probably marks the day that the RAF was first able to intercept with big numbers. The really big day was just as well Sep the 15th, and basically, quoting Galland then the LW threw up as much as they could muster in 38 daylight raids. Cannot remember the date when they put Luftflotte III bombers to night raids, - but they didn't do it with the 109's!!!

As for this:

"Although the main battle area took place there, 11 Group was not the only RAF Group to fight in the battle. That has been proven. All the RAF Groups were within easy range of the RAF single engined fighters.

Luftflotte III ability to influence the battle was severely impaired due to the lack of range of the 109. London was 40 miles beyond the normal combat radius of the Bf-109E from the closest Luftwaffe fighter base.

Even then only a small percentage of their combat power could be brought to bear on 11th Group."

Once and again, Luftflotte III fighters were transferred to escort on the London raids. Once and again, the Luftflotte III original 109 bases are only 140 miles from London. Once and again, that is a vastly shorter distance than the bulk of 10th, 12th and the whole of 13th group. Once and again, 13th group did NOT move south to fight.

Then this cookie:
"Luftflotte III and Luftflotte II combined their "might" only once. On 07 Sep 1940, the day Angus has chosen as his typical example. "

Regarding bombers only, - perhaps, - and relative to daylight bombing.

Look at the numbers from Eagle day, and the 15th as well.....

[Kev367th]

Wasn't missing out 10 Group from the ealry stages. Just that in the main 11 Group bore the brunt of the attacks early/mid stages.

Sept 7 - Saw all 21 sqns around London up to intercept the first bombing raid on London. Against them was almost 1000 (debated here I believe, maybe closer to 700?) aircraft, 1/3 of them bombers. A formation 1.5 miles high, covering 800 sq miles. (Must have been awe inspiring whichever side you were on)

Sep 9-  Airfleet 3 were swapped to night-ops and the start of regular interceptions of raids by 60-70 Spits and hurris.

Sep 15 - All avialable Spit/Hurris from 10,11, and 12 Group (170 total) intercept the 2nd raid of the day.

Sep 18 - First real use of "Big wings" by Dowding. Unescorted formation of Ju-88 attacked by 100+ fighters.

Sep 30 - 2 waves of 200+ aircraft engaged by 12 sqns of 11 Group.

[Crumpp]

I was pointing out that rather than OVERALL numbers you should be looking at 'area' numbers.

Even looking at the "area numbers" the conclusions are the same.  

The Luftwaffe did not have a huge numerical advantage for all but a tiny portion of the battle if you include the Luftwaffe force movements as well.  

Your assumption of RAF tactics changing the numbers of aircraft is wrong.

 

Post-war analysis agrees that Dowding and Park's approach was best for 11 Group.

The "small wing" vs. "big wing" is irrelevant to the strategy.  It makes no difference whether 4-6 squadrons enter the battle as individual units or whether they enter it as a single formation.

There are still 4-6 squadrons in the fight.  Most Air Forces subscribe to the "small wing" theory, giving the small unit leaders the greatest amount of tactical flexibility.

The major obstacle for "small wing" tactics is pilot navigational skill.  This tactic became much easier to do with Radar Ground Control.

Not to enter the "big wing" or "small wing" debate in this thread though.

The issue caused intense friction between Park and Leigh-Mallory, as Leigh-Mallory's 12 Group were tasked with protecting 11 Group's airfields whilst Park's squadrons intercepted incoming raids.

The Luftwaffe was successful in the airfield portion because it forced the RAF to divide their equal forces.  The Germans knew the targets and could concentrate their equal single engine fighter forces over them. Had they stuck to this strategy, they would have won but IMHO it would have been a Pyrrhic victory as they did not have the numerical superiority to deal with the RAF.  

Dowding was a shrewd strategist and IMHO does not receive the recognition he is due.

In spite of this RAF Fighter Command was able to achieve high levels of efficiency, at times achieving interception rates greater than 80%. The R/T problems were solved late in the battle with the adoption of Very High-Frequency (VHF) radio sets which gave clearer voice communications, had longer range and provided multiple channels. For all its faults the RAF had a system of ground control that allowed its fighters to be where they were needed. The Luftwaffe, with no such system, was always at a disadvantage.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain

The shift to London took much of the pressure off the British air force and allowed it to concentrate, all of its efforts against the Luftwaffe. British bases no longer needed fighter protection, and the Royal Air Force was able to concentrate its fighters against the now predictable Luftwaffe.62

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/warden/wrdchp03.htm

The RAF did not attempt to turn back every Luftwaffe formation that penetrated their airspace.  They concentrated their defense against formations they knew they could defeat or inflict casualties.

This can easily be seen in the response to the 07 Sep 1940 Raids.  On the one occasion the Luftwaffe was able to field a 1.55:1 ratio of single engine fighters, the RAF essentially offered token resistance where the Germans were strongest.  They concentrated their forces to attain numerical superiority on the weaker Luftwaffe raids inflicting proportionate casualties to their numerical advantage in single engine fighters.

The Case III air superiority fight can be won if the air commander employs his forces well. If he concentrates, if he accepts some penetrations in order to maul others, and if he develops and uses a good warning and control system, he can beat a larger air force. Conversely, if he tries to defend everywhere, if he commits his forces piecemeal, if he fails to concentrate, he will lose -- and may even lose against a much smaller air force if the attacker outsmarts him.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/warden/wrdchp04.htm

At no point during the campaign was a super Spitfire or Hurricane holding off 2:1 odds of Bf-109's.  The concept is laughable except as a vehicle to increase national pride or push a gaming agenda and has no basis in fact, military history, theory, or strategy.

All the best,

Crumpp