Spitfire Vb: Did it carry 120 rnds OR 240 rnds of Cannons?

[MiloMorai]

Crumpp has already been told that most of the fighters of Luftflotte 3 were tranferred to Luftflotte 2.

On can plainly see this in the OoBs for August and September.

The first Luftwaffe raid from ErprGr 210 was escorted by 21 Bf-109's and an equal number of Bf-110's. 4 RAF squadrons were sent to intercept and the Luftwaffe took casualties.

ErprGr 210, Denain, Bf 109E/Bf 110C/D, 26 on hand, 17 operational.

So we have 59 LW a/c opposed by up to 36 RAF fighters if all 36 intercepted at once.

[Kev367th]

Crumpp you are incorrect -

Tactics did change from Dowding/Parks initial early battle strategy of using only 16-20 aircraft to turn back raids to using 60-70 in early Sept, then finally "Big Wings" in mid Sept.

Sep 15th was an 'anomly' in terms of relavtive strengths. As it became obvious that a major attack was on the way ALL available fighters from ALL 3 groups were scrambled.

Yes it matters how they enter the battle -
If they come in in small groups they are easier to deal with than if they come in as a large formation.
MA is a great example - the snail trail from one base to another is much easier to deal with than a similar sized mission arriving all at once.

Yup, Dowding/Park both got a raw deal IMO, mostly due to the friction between them and Leigh-Mallory/Bader.

Yup Dowding specifically refused to send up fighters against pure fighter raids, instead concentrating on mixed or purely bomber raids that could cause significant damage.

Sep 7 - was also one occassion were a single sqn of Hurricanes (249 Sqn) was attacked by 60 109s, thats 4 or 5 : 1 odds. Your point being?

LW was successful in hitting the airfields also because of Leigh-Mallorys/Baders insistance on trying to form up their Big Wings, and on more than one occassion went chasing raids instead of covering airfields.

[Crumpp]

ErprGr 210, Denain, Bf 109E/Bf 110C/D, 26 on hand, 17 operational.

Yeah I guess their bombs would not have hindered them in air-to-air combat???

Or the mission unsuccessful if they dumped them???

Geez, quit grasping at straws.

Yes it matters how they enter the battle -

I was not clear; you have misunderstood me, or the concept of the tactics.

The point of small wing tactics was not to attack the enemy piecemeal.  That would be rather stupid and I do not think the "big wing" debate would even be an issue if that was the case.

The tactic involved small units arriving at the same place and time taking the path that works best for them to get there.  The individual formation leaders had control of reaching the rendezvous point.

Most air forces use "small wing" tactics today.  They simply work the best and allow the most tactical flexibility and individual initiative.

Big Wing tactics involved everyone forming up together and flying under one central formation leader.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Angus]

Small wing tactics were largely dependent on the little time. Big wings forming up required more time, and did not become practical before the LW swithced inland.
Although Park preferred 2-3 squadrons to hit at once, that was often not even the case, - even on the 7th, most squadrons fought singly.

[MiloMorai]

Originally posted by Crumpp
Yeah I guess their bombs would not have hindered them in air-to-air combat???

Or the mission unsuccessful if they dumped them???

Geez, quit grasping at straws.  

No grasping at straws Crumpp.

The primary mission of the RAF fighters was to take on the bombers, NOT take on the LW fighters. You find this impossible to grasp. If the RAF fighters forced the LW bombers to jettison their bombs, the mission of the RAF fighters was partialy successful.

Btw, that is a LW advantage of 1.6:1.

The tactic involved small units arriving at the same place and time taking the path that works best for them to get there. The individual formation leaders had control of reaching the rendezvous point.

The RAF fighters did not all arrive at the same place and at the same time.

[Kev367th]

Still unsure why this is a Spit/Hurri v 109 when it comes to the BoB.
In reality it was Spit/Hurri v all aspects of the LW.
Its seems absurd to even discuss it in a fighter v fighter aspect as it clearly wasn't.
"The Few" comes from the FACT that "A Few" (compared to LW strength) managed to halt the vaunted LW in its tracks in the Summer of 1940.

10 fighters v 10 fighters + 80 bombers is still 10 v 90 no matter which way you look at it.

On the few occassions that similar numbers of fighters only engaged each other the losses were about the same.
As has been said the primary target of both the Spit and Hurris were the bombers, not the fighters.

As an intersesting aside - Even in 1940 the RAF were replacing its aircraft losses by nearly a 3:1 ratio over the LW. Nearly 500 single engined fighters per month were being produced Jun/July/Aug as opposed to Germanys average of 156.
Getting the pilots to fly them was the problem.

[Crumpp]

The RAF fighters did not all arrive at the same place and at the same time.

Please find where I claim this did not happen?

It was not the intention of small wing tactics.  While some attacks did occur piecemeal, most did not.  

To claim otherwise is simply wrong.

This success is why "small wing" tactics are the standard for modern air forces today.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

Still unsure why this is a Spit/Hurri v 109 when it comes to the BoB.

Because single engine fighters are the type designed to win air supeiority.

You cannot win it with a bomber.

the analysis focuses primarily on the single-seat fighters deployed by the respective air forces. It was in this arena that the Luftwaffe needed to prevail if it were to achieve air superiority over southern England and, in so doing, defeat the Royal Air Force.

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443

Getting the pilots to fly them was the problem.

Germans replaced pilots at a slower rate than the RAF as well.

The Luftwaffe simply did not have the numerical superiority required to win total air superiority in an air only campaign.  Compounding this was their lack of increased production, slow reconstitution program, and slow pilot replacement system.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Kev367th]

Agreed, but the aim of the RAF in the BoB was not to win air superiority, but to survive by inflicting unacceptable losses on the LW as a whole, with the primary targets being bombers, the ones who could damage the RAF the most (aircraft prod, airfields etc).
so to try limitng it to a pure fighter v fighter aspect cant and wont work.

10 Spits/10 hurris v 20 109s/80 bombers still equals 20 v 100 no matter how you slice it.

[Crumpp]

Agreed, but the aim of the RAF in the BoB was not to win air superiority, but to survive by inflicting unacceptable losses on the LW as a whole.

Correct, it was on the defensive with the objective of keeping the Luftwaffe from gaining total air superiority.

Single engine fighters are the most important factor in winning air superiority.

Again, you cannot win air superiority with a bomber.  The 8th AF rediscovered this in late 1943.

10 Spits/10 hurris v 20 109s/80 bombers still equals 20 v 100 no matter how you slice it.

See above.

bombers, the ones who could damage the RAF the most (aircraft prod, airfields etc).

Please find anything to back up this assumption.  Bombers offered little threat to Fighter Command itself.

Both airfields and production facilities were rapidly repaired.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Kev367th]

Again agreed
But when you remeber the LW all but brought the RAF to its knees just by constant bombing of airfields with raid after raid after raid, the pure air superiority aspect gets a little blurred.
It was the change of target to London that allowed the RAF to regroup and rearm, and more importantly get a little rest.

I have little doubt had the LW continued bombing airfields etc the outcome may have been different.

To say bombers offered little threat to FC itself is wierd. If you can't replace downed aircraft that has a DIRECT affect on FC.

Thats like saying it was no worth the allies bombing German Industry as it had no direct affect on the LW.

Anything that has a direct affect on your capabilites is a threat.

[Crumpp]

But when you remeber the LW all but brought the RAF to its knees just by constant bombing of airfields with raid after raid after raid, the pure air superiority aspect gets a little blurred.

Not because of damaging the airfields but the Luftwaffe strategy forced the RAF to divide it's forces.  10 Group protected 11 Group airfields while 11 Group intercepted Luftwaffe formations.  This means an entire Group was removed from the fight unless that particular airfield was under attack.

The RAF Groups were much more operationally flexible than the Luftflotte's.  They constantly worked in each others "areas" and were sent where needed.  The "area" was more a place to land than a boundry they must operate in.

A Luftflotte was viewed as a completely seperate and independant organization.  Think of it as a task force with each having their own fighters, bombers, transports, and general aircraft.  For example, Luftflotte II bore the brunt of the fighting for the Luftwaffe.  Luftflotte III on occasion was assigned daylight targets but for the most part was charged with conducting the "night blitz".  During the Luftwaffe's big push on London, they were assigned daylight targets seperate from Luftflotte II.

Generally you will not find Luftflotte III fighters escorting Luftflotte II bombers or attacking Luftflotte II targets.

Other sources give slightly different figures, but most agree that the Luftwaffe deployed an effective strength of slightly more than 900 Bf 109 fighters out of some 1,000 aircraft. This comprised the bulk of their single-seat fighter force. Approximately 150 aircraft remained in other theatres, including Germany, to defend against possible Bomber Command attacks. [34] By comparison, Fighter Command could field 52 squadrons of Hurricanes and Spitfires, nearly 1,100 aircraft (Table 3).Thus, in terms of single-seat fighters, the opposing air forces were fairly evenly matched, albeit Fighter Command was outnumbered more than 3:1 overall.

Of course, these figures only provide an opening balance. Not unexpectedly, the strength of the respective air forces changed over the course of the summer and autumn as attrition took its toll. However, when looking at the overall picture, Figure 3, it is evident that Fighter Command steadily fielded more single-seat fighters as the battle progressed. In fact, as the Royal Air Force grew stronger, the Luftwaffe grew weaker. [36]

What makes this all the more surprising is that Fighter Command's operational losses were significantly higher than those suffered by the Luftwaffe's fighter force (Figure 4). This was equally true for the Battle of France as it was for the Battle of Britain. Thus, for 4 months, July-October 1940, Fighter Command lost more than 900 Hurricanes and Spitfires [37] compared to 600 Bf 109s recorded by the Luftwaffe quartermaster returns. [38]

Of course, operational losses do not tell the whole picture since they exclude accidents and other wastage.

At the height of the battle, Fighter Command's total wastage in Hurricanes and Spitfires was more than 180 percent of its operational losses, compared to 140 percent for the Luftwaffe's Bf 109s.

It could be argued that a better test of relative strength is serviceability.

All in all, it seems safe to conclude that serviceability remained fairly constant in Fighter Command throughout the battle, somewhere between 80 and 90 percent. [43]

The Luftwaffe figures, drawn from quartermaster returns, indicate that the serviceability of the single-engine fighter force fell from slightly more than 80 percent at the start of the battle to close to 70 percent by autumn. These are also somewhat higher than other sources might indicate. Indeed, Richard Overy suggested that the number of serviceable Bf 109s could have fallen to as low as 40 percent of the total strength in October l940. [44] If, as discussed previously, operational wastage was actually higher than recorded, then availability may well have fallen to these levels. What is not in doubt is that Fighter Command, unlike the Luftwaffe, was largely able to sustain the serviceability of its fighter force.

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_3

All the best,

Crumpp

[Kev367th]

Which all fits with one of my original posts were I said the RAF probably came close to achieving a 1:1 ratio (fighters) by end Sep. By which time the BoB was all but over, yes there still nuisance raids through Oct, but never again at the levels of early Sep.

12 Group were usually tasked to protect 11 Groups airfields. Most of the time 12 Group either arrived late, or failed to show as they were off chasing raids instead.
In fact 12 Group couldn't be fully utilised until the target switch to London, partly range issues.

To say that bombers couldn't threaten FC directly is absurd.

There is no point shooting down the enemy at say 2:1 if the enemy is turning out replacement aircraft at 3:1..in the long run, you lose.

If Britain was turning out replacement aircraft at approx average of 5000:166 July/Aug/sept with bombing, imagine how it would have been without bombing.
The BoB might of finished earlier.

Serviceability - Problem wasn't serviceable aircraft, but finding pilots to fly them. No point having 100 serviceable aircraft and 10 pilots.

[Crumpp]

To say that bombers couldn't threaten FC directly is absurd.

Did unescorted bombers directly threaten the Luftwaffe in 1943 or win air superiority over Europe?

Which all fits with one of my original posts were I said the RAF probably came close to achieving a 1:1 ratio (fighters) by end Sep. By which time the BoB was all but over, yes there still nuisance raids through Oct, but never again at the levels of early Sep.

Yes but the RAF started the battle with pretty much a numerical parity in single engine fighters.

They took higher losses IMHO due to squadron level tactics of using "Vics" and the fact their pilot quality was generally lower at this time in the war than the Luftwaffe.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Kev367th]

Look at the deployment of the alleged equal number of single engined fighters.
You seem to think everyone of them was flying out of 11 groups airfields.

I suppose we could quibble over the word directly - In my opinion if bombing results in fewer aircaft replacements,  destroyed airfields, destroyed maintenance areas, thus hindering my ability to put a larger fighter force in the air, that directly affects me. IMO.

If I bomb your only aircraft fuel refinery, although not a direct attack on your aircraft, it directly affects you.