The Founders made the intent of the 2nd Amendment undeniably clear.
Of course,
nothing is undeniably clear when lawyers get involved.
This stuff is basically clipped from:
http://www.guncite.com/gc2ndsup.html There have been 5 main Supreme Court cases that dealt with the 2nd Amendment. They are: U.S. v. Cruikshank (1876), Presser v. Illinois (1886), Miller v. Texas (1894), U.S. v. Miller (1939), and Lewis v. U.S. (1980). One the Supreme Court refused to hear, Burton v. Sills (1968), and one concerning the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and "the people", U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990), are also discussed.
U.S. v. Cruikshank involved members of the Ku Klux Klan depriving black victims of their basic rights such as freedom of assembly and to bear arms. The court decided that neither the First nor Second Amendments applied to the states, but were limitations on Congress.
Thus the federal government had no power to correct these violations, rather the citizens had to rely on the police power of the states for their protection from private individuals.This case is often misunderstood or quoted out of context by claiming Cruikshank held the Second Amendment does not grant a right to keep and bear arms. However, the court also said this about the First Amendment.
The court explained that these rights weren't granted or created by the Constitution, they existed prior to the Constitution. Presser v. Illinois ruled that the states had the right to strictly regulate private military groups and associations. It also reaffirmed the Cruikshank decision that the Second Amendment acts as a limitation upon the federal government and not the states. However Presser also stated that setting the Second Amendment aside,
the states could not prohibit the "people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security..."Miller v. Texas (1894) Franklin Miller, convicted of murder, on appeal, claimed his Second and Fourth Amendment rights had been violated under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court upholding the conviction, reaffirmed Cruikshank v. U.S. and stated: "And if the fourteenth amendment limited the power of the states as to such rights, as pertaining to citizens of the United States, we think it was fatal to this claim that it was not set up in the trial court."
In other words the court wouldn't even consider whether Miller's rights had been violated under the Fourteenth Amendment because he had not filed such a claim in his original trial.This Next one is truly illuminating FOR BOTH SIDES OF THE QUESTION:U.S. v. Miller (1939) Frank Layton and Jack Miller were charged with violating the 1934 National Firearms Act, which regulated and taxed the transfer of certain types of firearms, and required the registration of such arms. The Miller court decided the following:
1) The National Firearms Act was not an unconstitutional usurpation of police power reserved to the states.
2) "In the absence of evidence tending to show that possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel of less than 18 inches in length,' which is the subject of regulation and taxation by the National Firearms Act of June 26, 1934, has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia, it cannot be said the the Second Amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument, or that the statute violates such constitutional provision."
3) "It is not within judicial notice that a shotgun having a barrel of less than 18 inches in length is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense."
4)
"The Second Amendment must be interpreted and applied with a view to its purpose of rendering effective the Militia." As noted in the Summary section, Miller has often been mis-cited. Note that in the entire text of Miller, neither the words "state militia" nor "National Guard" are to be found.
Regarding item 4) above, the Miller court defined the Militia as the following:
The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators.
These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case back to the district court, giving the defendants a chance to provide evidence that a short-barrelled shotgun could contribute to "the efficiency of a well-regulated militia." Note Miller only required evidence that the weapon contribute to the efficiency of a well-regulated militia. The court never said the defendants had to belong to a well-regulated militia.
In other words the Miller case interpreted the Second Amendment to mean one has the right to own militia type weapons. The defendants had not appeared for their Supreme Court hearing and they had no legal representation as well! In its brief the U.S. government argued the "collective rights" theory. (See GunCite's rebuttal to the U.S. government's brief.)
Lewis v. U.S. (1980) Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 forbids the possession of firearms by a convicted felon. Lewis, the petitioner, was convicted of a felony in a 1961 state court "for breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor". In 1977, in Virginia, Lewis was charged with receiving and possessing a firearm in violation of the above act. Lewis, claimed his latest conviction violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because he had no counsel present during his 1961 trial.
The court upheld Lewis' conviction, holding:
(a)...the fact that there are remedies available to a convicted felon - removal of the firearm disability by a qualifying pardon or the Secretary of the Treasury's consent, as specified in the Act, or a challenge to the prior conviction in an appropriate court proceeding - suggests that Congress intended that the defendant clear his status before obtaining a firearm, thereby fulfilling Congress' purpose to keep firearms away from persons classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous.The court also commented it was customary to deny convicted felons the right to vote, hold union office, or practice medicine.
Burton v. Sills (1985) (the Supreme Court refused to hear t his case for a reason or reasons known only to them)
From Stephen Halbrook's "That Every Man be Armed: The Evolution of a Constitutional Right":
A...striking erosion of the right to possess arms was exemplified in the New Jersey case of Burton v. Sills (1968). It originated when members of sportsman clubs and gun dealers brought an action to declare unconstitutional the state's gun-control law, which imposed restrictive requirements. Conjuring up an image of "political assassinations, killings of enforcement officers, and snipings during riots," the court expressed exaggerated fears of a revolution. The New Jersey Supreme Court restricted the definition of militia to "the active, organized militias of the states," that is, the National Guard. The court's very use of these adjectives to modify the word "militia" ignores the constitutional militia comprised of all persons capable of bearing arms. The Burton opinion simply fails to provide scholarly, historical, and analytical treatment of the subject, as indeed primarily only the antebellum state opinions do provide.
U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990) This case dealt with whether nonresident aliens, located in a foreign country, were entitled to Fourth Amendment rights. The Court ruled they were not. In discussing the meaning of "the people" in the Fourth Amendment, the Court commented:
" '[T]he people' seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution. The Preamble declares that the Constitution is ordained and established by 'the people of the United States.' The Second Amendment protects 'the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,' and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments provide that certain rights and powers are retained by and reserved to 'the people.
While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that 'the people' protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community. "
Therefore the Court viewed "the people" in the Second Amendment to have the same meaning as in the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth amendments..
However, the Court didn't discuss whether the militia clause is a limiting factor, and how it might restrict the people's right to keep and bear arms. Moreover, in U.S. v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992), the Eighth Circuit stated:
"Citing dicta from United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 ... Hale argues that the Second Amendment protections apply to individuals and not to states or collective entities like militias. This argument is inapplicable to this case. The purpose of the Second Amendment is to restrain the federal government from regulating the possession of arms where such regulation would interfere with the preservation or efficiency of the militia ...
Whether the 'right to bear arms' for militia purposes is [Page 24] 'individual' or 'collective' in nature is irrelevant where, as here, the individual's possession of arms is not related to the preservation or efficiency of a militia. Id. at 1020." On a concluding side-note:
"Interestingly, the majority opinion's analysis of 'the people' protected by the Bill of Rights was an elaboration of a point made by the dissenting opinion from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, when the majority had held that Mr. Verdugo was entitled to Fourth Amendment protections. When the Verdugo case went to the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General's office quoted from Ninth Circuit's dissent, but used ellipses to remove the dissent's reference to the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court majority, of course, put the Second Amendment back in."
--- The Supreme Court's Thirty-five Other Gun Cases. By David B. Kopel
Some may find this boring but I find it an interesting example of how our system works. The Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial....intended checks and balances one upon the other.
Those Founders were pretty sharp.