Janes analysis of Hizbullah

[Wolfala]

Group name: Hizbullah. Aliases/Front organisations include Party of God, Revolutionary Justice Organisation, Organisation of the Oppressed, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine. Hizbullah assumed most of the apparatus and remaining personnel from the 1980s umbrella coalition of groups known as Islamic Jihad. The guerrilla wing in Lebanon is Islamic Resistance (IR) and Israeli sources claim there is also a semi-autonomous unit called the Lebanese Platoon.

Level of threat: Hizbullah continues to pose a significant threat to Israel. Hizbullah's relentless guerrilla campaign against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon is widely seen as the driving force behind Israel's May 2000 unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. While Israeli forces withdrew behind the UN approved international boundary, Hizbullah continues to dispute the small Shebaa Farms border region as a pretext for continuing sporadic operations against Israel and, therefore, justifying its retention of a military wing. Iran rearmed Hizbullah with a large number of unguided rockets after the withdrawal. These rockets threaten northern Israel and act as a deterrent against further Israeli operations in Lebanon or US action against Iran's suspicious nuclear programme. Israeli intelligence has also accused Hizbullah of recruiting Palestinian suicide bombing cells in the West Bank.The group is also said to have a formidable international wing which has been blamed for significant terrorist attacks. The leader of Hizbullah-International, Imad Mughniyah, remains one of the world's most wanted men.

# Status: Active.

# Date of founding: 1983.

# Group type: Militant Islamist. Radical Shia Islam.

# Aims and objectives: Hizbullah's initial aim was the establishment of a radical Shia Islamic theocracy in Lebanon and the destruction of the state of Israel. Since the end of the Lebanese civil war, it has evolved into a more pragmatic socio-political movement. It has gained political legitimacy, with a credible holding of seats in Lebanon's parliament and a social service that far outperforms the state's cumbersome bureaucracy. In the wake of the withdrawal of the Syrian military from Lebanon in 2005, the movement has come under increasing pressure to disarm its armed wing. Despite its growing involvement in mainstream politics, the leadership seems extremely reluctant to give up what is now the most powerful military force in Lebanon.
# Leaders: One of the organisation's original founders, Sheikh Abbas Moussawi, led Hizbullah and IR until February 1992 when he was killed by the Israelis. His role as Secretary General was assumed by Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, considered more moderate than his predecessor, but without the level of influence within IR. Imad Mughniyah, who is wanted by the US in connection with the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in 1985 and has been accused of involvement in other terrorist attacks, is said to be the head of Hizbullah-International.

Threat Assessment            TOP

Hizbullah continues to pose a significant threat to Israel. Hizbullah's relentless guerrilla campaign against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon is widely seen as the driving force behind Israel's May 2000 unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. While Israeli forces withdrew behind the UN approved international boundary, Hizbullah continues to dispute the small Shebaa Farms border region as a pretext for continuing sporadic operations against Israel and, therefore, justifying its retention of a military wing.

Already considered the most capable non-state armed group in the Middle East, Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance (IR) military wing was rearmed by Iran with a large number of unguided rockets after the withdrawal. Israeli intelligence believes that members of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps continue to train and operate alongside IR fighters in Lebanon. These rockets threaten much of northern Israel and act as a deterrent against further Israeli operations in Lebanon or US action against Iran's suspicious nuclear programme.

Since the withdrawal of the Syrian military from Lebanon in 2005, Hizbullah has come under growing international and domestic pressure to disarm its military wing. While IR is effectively a civil war era militia that should be disarmed in accordance with UN resolutions, Hizbullah argues that the force is needed to defend Lebanon against future Israeli attacks. With the Lebanese military too weak to tackle IR, disarmament can only be brought about with Hizbullah's approval, which currently seems unlikely.

Israel has also accused Hizbullah of recruiting Palestinian suicide bombing cells in the West Bank. These cells are mainly aligned with the fragmented Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and have accepted Hizbullah financing in return for perpetrating attacks on Israel. In this respect, Hizbullah has established direct influence over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Hizbullah's international operations wing under Imad Mughniyah remains a mysterious entity, but has been blamed for a number of terrorist attacks in the wider region and Argentina. In 1992, a suicide truck bomber attacked the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires to retaliate for the assassination of Hizbullah Secretary General Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi. In 1994, a suicide bomber killed over 80 people when he attacked the Jewish cultural centre in Buenos Aires, possibly in retaliation for Israel's 'Accountability' offensive against Hizbullah a year earlier. While Hizbullah denied responsibility for both attacks, the Argentine authorities have issued an arrest warrant for Mughniyah and some Iranian foreign service officials accused of assisting the bombers. It is feared that Hizbullah retains the ability to launch terrorist attacks in retaliation for an attack on itself or Iran.

Targets, tactics and methodology            TOP

One of the primary aims of Hizbullah was to expel the Israeli military from southern Lebanon; to this end it mounted ambushes on Israeli and SLA units in southern Lebanon, and attacked into northern Israel itself using katyusha rockets.

IR relies on a sophisticated intelligence and counter-intelligence capability, assisted by Iranian and Syrian intelligence, which is believed on occasion to have penetrated Israel's own intelligence capabilities, allowing Hizbullah to launch surprise attacks. The group concentrated on undermining the morale of Israeli soldiers posted to southern Lebanon, and civilians living in areas of northern Israel targeted by Hizbullah's katyushas, so that the war in southern Lebanon became politically unpopular.

The group continues to maintain pressure on the Israeli military over the disputed Shebaa Farms border area. IR fighters have used mortars, rockets and anti-tank missiles to carry out sporadic attacks on Israeli forces in the disputed Shebaa Farms sector and elsewhere along the frontier. They have also used anti-aircraft fire against Israeli aircraft entering Lebanese air space.

Hizbullah military activity was at its height during the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon, with the IR mounting attacks with katyusha rockets on northern Israel. Such attacks led to a seven-day Israeli incursion in July 1993 (Operation 'Accountability') and a 16-day air/sea/artillery bombardment in April 1996 (Operation 'Grapes of Wrath'), in which a total of 300 people, mostly Lebanese civilians, were killed, and 500,000 people were twice driven from their homes.
Use of UAV's

On 7 November 2004, the IR flew an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over northern Israel for the first time in what it said was a response to repeated overflights in Lebanese airspace by the Israel Air Force (IAF).

Hizbullah's acquisition of a UAV capability gave the group an immediate psychological edge over Israel and could ultimately provide an intelligence gathering capability and weapon platform.

The UAV, called Mirsad-1 (Observer), flew over several Israeli settlements along the coast of Western Galilee, reaching the town of Nahariya, 8 km south of the border, before returning. Security sources in south Lebanon say the flight lasted 20 minutes. Eye-witnesses in Lebanon stated that the UAV crashed into the Mediterranean Sea just north of Naqoura, the headquarters of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Hizbullah denied that the drone crashed, saying it landed safely.

The IAF air-defence network did not detect the UAV and was notified of its flight by civilian eyewitnesses. "We were not surprised by the use of a UAV by Hizbullah, but we were not ready to intercept it," Lieutenant General Moshe Ya'alon, Israel Defence Force (IDF) Chief of Staff, told the Knesset defence and foreign affairs committee.

The IDF deployed a tight air-defence network of observations and batteries along the Lebanese border after a Palestinian insurgent succeeded in crossing the border using a hang-glider and attacked an IDF base in 1987. "Although we repeatedly warn of the threat of aerial penetrations from Lebanon, our forces failed to prevent this one," an IDF source told JDW. Gen Ya'alon said that lessons were already drawn from the incident, but warned that the success might encourage Hizbullah to arm the UAVs with explosives and use them to attack targets in Israel.

Israeli sources claimed that, now aware of the threat, the IDF's air defences should have no difficulties in countering Hizbullah's UAVs. For several months, Hizbullah sought an alternative means of confronting IAF overflights. Its previous tactic of firing 57 mm anti-aircraft rounds across the border in response to the overflights was effectively neutralised in 2003 when the IAF began bombing Hizbullah's S-60 anti-aircraft batteries.

[Wolfala]

According to the IDF, the Mirsad-1 is an Iranian-made Ababil-T-type UAV that was operated by Hizbullah personnel in the presence of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) instructors. According to IDF sources, the UAV was programmed for route before take-off and was equipped with a camera and a transmitter.

Personnel and recruitment            TOP

Estimates of IR's strength have varied widely. At the higher end of the spectrum, there have been estimates of as many as 5,000 regular forces with perhaps 15,000 reserves. Other estimates suggest a hardcore of about 300 well-trained guerrillas, backed by up to 3,000 reserve fighters. The IR has bases in the Beqaa region and also a support network in Shia towns and villages throughout South Lebanon.

Area of operation            TOP

Southern Lebanon, where it is the de facto security apparatus in the absence of any real government security presence in the region. IR has bases in the Bekaa Valley and a support network amongst the Shia villages in the south. The group also maintains a strong political presence in other major cities but particularly in Beirut. It has offices and training facilities in Iran and possibly Sudan.

Hizbullah has training facilities on the Isla de Margarita off the northern coast of Venezuela and is believed to maintain presence in the tri-border area around the towns of Cuidad del Este in Paraguary, Foz de Iguazu in Brazil and Puerto Iguazu in Argentina. Although the strength of the organisation in the area has been in decline since the mid-1990s. Regional intelligence suggests that the perpetrators of the 1992 attack on the Israeli Embassy and the 1994 attack on the Jewish Cultural Centre in Buenos Aires were harboured amongst the large Lebanese community in this region.

Operational preparedness            TOP
Training

Islamic Resistance guerrillas are reckoned to be amongst the most dedicated, motivated and highly trained of their kind. Any Hizbullah member receiving military training is likely to do so at the hands of Iranian Revolutionary Guards, either in southern Lebanon or in camps in Iran. The increasingly sophisticated methods used by IR members indicates that they are trained using Israeli and US military manuals; the emphasis of this training is on the tactics of attrition, mobility, intelligence gathering and night-time manoeuvres.
Weaponry

In recent years, IR fighters operated a number of M113 APCs. Guerrilla squads on operations can be armed with M-16 or AK-47 assault rifles, and an assortment of other weaponry, including Bangalore torpedoes, hand grenades, AT-3 'Sagger' and AT-4 'Spigot' anti-tank missiles, Western-designed TOW anti-tank missiles and rocket-propelled grenades.

The IR has also reportedly taken delivery of a range of air defence weapons, including Strela-2 (SA-7) surface-to-air missiles, as well as ZU-23 Anti-Aircraft (AA) guns, and 57 mm AA guns. IR fighters, who maintain positions along the border with Israel, have been directing anti-aircraft fire at Israeli combat aircraft entering Lebanese air space.

In September 1998 the then IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Shaul Mofaz conceded that Hizbullah's newly acquired AA weapons were a direct threat to Israel's long-unchallenged air superiority in South Lebanon.

According to reports in late 1999, new weapons supplied by Iran to the IR may have included the manportable low-altitude surface-to-air system, the Russian KBM Igla (SA-18 'Grouse'). IR fire-support teams are equipped with 81 and 120 mm mortars, 106 mm recoilless rifles and short- and long-range 122 mm katyusha rockets.

In February 2002, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres accused Iran of supplying 8,000 missiles to Hizbullah over the previous six months. Some of these missiles were reportedly Iranian-manufactured 333 mm Fadjr-5 missiles with a maximum range of 75 km, which would represent a significant boost in IR's ability to attack Israel. Hizbullah proved that it had 240 mm Fadjr-3 rockets capable of reaching far into Israel during the crisis that broke out after Hizbullah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in July 2006.

In the late 1990s the IR was also reported to have obtained two Soviet-made towed 122 mm guns. There were indications in May 2000 that the IR had also seized at least some of the tanks and APCs that were abandoned when the SLA collapsed.

In the period prior to the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000, there were indications that Hizbullah were using increasingly sophisticated roadside bombs - such bombs were among the deadliest weapons deployed against the Israelis and their SLA allies by the IR. It was reported that the IR was using photocell technology to detonate these bombs.

Hizbullah proved that it had an anti-ship capability when it damaged the Israeli missile corvette Hanit and killed four sailors off the southern Lebanese cost in July 2006. The missile was reportedly a Chinese C802 anti-ship missile supplied by Iran. Unaware that Hizbullah had this capability, the Hanit's self-defence system, which is apparently capable of defeating these types of missiles, was deactivated.

External Assistance            TOP

Funding            TOP

Iran is believed to donate funds to Hizbullah; some estimates claim that these are in the region of USD60 million annually (exact figures are unknown). The group also collects donations from individuals and charities, and benefits from legitimate commercial enterprises. There is evidence of Hizbullah receiving funds from narcotics, both cultivation and smuggling in Lebanon and elsewhere. Its presence in the tri-border area between Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil have brought links with known international criminals such as Ali Khalil Merhi, arrested on charges of fraud and music and software piracy. Merhi is also believed to have channelled funds into the cells responsible for terrorist activities against Israeli targets in Argentina in 1992 and 1994. Hizbullah's so-called strategic alliance with FARC in Colombia also raises the likelihood of narcotics funding, and the group was involved in negotiations by the Iranian government to build a refrigeration plant in FARC-held territory in San Vicente del Caguan, Colombia. (This project was abandoned under pressure from Washington.)

Hizbullah has direct business interests in Lebanon, Iran, Latin America and elsewhere. They are involved in a variety of activities including construction, foodstuffs and clothing manufacture.

The group's welfare and educational programmes are run by charitable foundations which collect money, often quite legitimately, from Shia communities inside and outside Lebanon. The Organisation of the Oppressed acts as a charity and welfare organisation.

Alliances            TOP

Hizbullah is wary of alliances with other guerrilla organisations, being mistrustful of outsiders and believing most Palestinian groups to be riddled with informants.

During 2002 there were reports that Hizbullah was co-ordinating with militant Palestinian groups in the confrontation with Israel. The groups were said to include Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Ahmed Jibril's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).

A eulogy delivered following the death of operative Ghalib Awali in July 2004 acknowledged for the first time the existence of a unit designed for operations in the Palestinian theatre. The statement, by Hasan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of Hizbullah, praised Awali's work within "the unit that devoted itself in the past few years to helping his brethren in occupied Palestine".
Al-Qaeda

Following the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, there were allegations from US and Israeli sources that Hizbullah was allied to Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network - allegations that Hizbullah has strongly denied. The 9/11 Commission Report stated that "Al-Qaeda members received advice and training from Hizbullah" in the past, although states that there is "no evidence that Iran or Hizbullah was aware of the planning for what later became the 9/11 attack." The US Treasury Department also accused operatives loyal to the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of attempting to establish links with Hizbullah "and any other group that would enable them to smuggle mujahideen into Palestine". However, as the insurgency in Iraq has escalated, the Sunni jihadist movement has become increasingly anti-Shia, with Zarqawi's group leading efforts to incite a sectarian war between Iraq's Sunni and Shia Mulsim communities. While Hizbullah may have helped Iran keep tabs on Sunni extremists in the past, an alliance looks increasingly unlikely. Indeed, Sunni jihadists have become extremely critical of Iran and its ally Hizbullah and their attempts to 'hijack' the Palestinian cause.

Sources of weapons            TOP

Small arms are widely available on the Lebanese black market. Iran supplies most of Hizbullah's more sophisticated weaponry, including artillery rockets and anti-tank missiles. A senior Iranian official admitted that Tehran supplied Hizbullah with its UAV capability, the London-based Arabic-language daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat reported on 10 November. The report also outlined that Iran has supplied the group with surface-to-surface missiles that have a 70 km range. Syria has also been implicated in supplying weapons to Hizbullah, either directly, or by allowing Iranian arms shipments to transit its territory.

Some weapons were seized from the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army when it collapsed in May 2000.

[Wolfala]

Foreign bases            TOP

The group has bases in Iran and possibly previously in Sudan. Through a network of charities and businesses it is established in a number of cities in Western Europe and the US. There is also a suspected Hizbullah base in no-man's land along parts of the Argentina-Paraguay border.

Hizbullah has been accused of establishing a significant presence in Iraq since the US-led invasion in 2003. During the 2003 Iraqi Shia uprisings led by Muqtada al-Sadr, there was some speculation that Hizbullah fighters might be training Sadr's supporters. In April 2003, Lebanon's Daily Star newspaper quoted an anonymous US State Department official as saying: "While there are probably members of Hizbullah in Iraq, there is little evidence to suggest that they are actively involved in the violence."

Supply lines            TOP

Hizbullah operates with the blessing of Syria, the power broker in Lebanon, and also with the blessing of the pro-Syrian Lebanese government, which sees IR as a legitimate resistance movement. Iran has flown regular cargoes of arms into Damascus, which were then transferred by Syrian forces to the IR. In 1999 there were reports that Iran was flying war material directly into Beirut Airport for Hizbullah.

US and Israeli officials announced in February 2004 that Syria had resumed weapons shipments to Hizbullah, including a covert shipment of arms from Iran on a Syrian cargo plane that carried humanitarian aid to Iran following the major earthquake in Bam at the end of 2003.

Hizbullah is partly self-funding, having substantial business interests in the region. It is also given major donations by Iran - in 1996 it received at least USD60 million.

In July 2004 Hizbullah denied allegations by the deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Sierra Leone that it was involved in siphoning profits from West Africa's multi-million dollar 'conflict diamond' trade. Hizbullah said the accusations were part of a campaign aimed more at "threatening and restricting the businesses of Lebanese traders rather than targeting Hizbullah."

Group Structure and Logistics            TOP

Organisation            TOP

Hizbullah is more than a guerrilla organisation, it is a political, social, welfare, commercial and educational network. The ruling body of the organisation is the Higher Consultative Council, and there are three regional councils based in Bekaa, Beirut and South Lebanon.

IR is a small, highly effective guerrilla organisation trained and directed by Iranian Revolutionary Guards. IR commanders do not necessarily inform Hizbullah's Higher Consultative Council of strategy. Hizbullah's overseas network is even more secretively run; known loosely as Hizbullah-International, it is directed by Imad Mughniyah.

Political/Religious representation            TOP

Hizbullah operates as a legitimate political party in Lebanon, participates in elections and hold seats in the National Parliament.

Information campaigns            TOP

Hizbullah's command, control and communications are amongst the most sophisticated of any guerrilla group. They have also used the internet as well as their social and welfare programmes to promote their message. The organisation's web site is frequently the target of cyber attack by Israel.

In December 2004 a French court ordered an end to satellite television broadcasts to Europe by Hizbullah's television channel, Al-Manar on grounds they are clearly anti-Semitic and a potential threat to public order.

Background Information            TOP

Overview of campaign            TOP

Hizbullah's military wing demonstrated its effectiveness in the relentless and highly sophisticated guerrilla war that was waged against the Israeli presence in South Lebanon. The war of attrition waged by well-trained, well-armed, highly motivated and highly disciplined IR fighters was the primary factor behind the Israeli withdrawal of May 2000. By end of the 1990s, Hizbullah was regarded as one of the most formidable enemies ever encountered by Israeli forces.

Israeli sources believe that Hizbullah has applied lessons from Israeli and US military training manuals. Equipped with advanced night vision and communications equipment, Hizbullah guerrillas have, for instance, been able to adopt tactics to defeat powerful Israeli infra-red sensors.

Following the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, the Lebanese government refrained from deploying its forces along the Blue Line, the frontier with Israel. This left the way open for the Hizbullah's military wing, IR, to install a well co-ordinated military structure along the border. Hizbullah fighters have carried out sporadic attacks against Israeli forces in the disputed Shebaa Farms sector along Lebanon's southeast border with the Golan Heights. Hizbullah air defence units have also fired on Israeli aircraft carrying out reconnaissance patrols over Lebanon.

Tension along the border has heightened following the commencement of the Al-Aqsa intifada in October 2000. Prior to this latest phase of the conflict, there were signs that Hizbullah was lessening its presence on the border. In May 2002 the movement unexpectedly scaled down its visible military presence along the Blue Line, while maintaining an intelligence presence along the border, as well as defensive anti-aircraft positions. There was speculation that the withdrawal of fighters from the frontier was the result of US pressure on Syria.

This scaling down came to an end in 2003, as tensions rose in the area following the war in Iraq, the new US hardline approach to Syria and Israel's airstrike against the Ain Sahab camp north of Damascus, which it alleged was a terrorist training facility. It was widely thought that Hizbullah might renew hostilities across the border.

Fears of instability and threats of further Israeli retaliation came after Hizbullah launched cross-border artillery fire from southern Lebanon for the first time in two months on 27 October 2003, drawing airstrikes and fire in return. Given the hardware seized after the defeat of the SLA and support from Iran, Hizbullah was better prepared to fight Israel than at any time in its 21-year history. Hizbullah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem said that the party had been preparing for the next round of conflict since Israeli troops withdrew from an occupied strip of southern Lebanon in May 2000.

[Nilsen]

hehe im sure a link would have dont just fine but thx anyway ripsnort

[Wolfala]

Link wouldn't work - need to have a subscription which usually runs around $700 a pop per publication. i.e. Janes Defense Weekly, Janes Intelligence Digest, etc.

[LePaul]

So you, like, stole this from a subscription site?

You little terrorist!

[Scrap]

Wow! Thanks for the post.

[Nilsen]

Originally posted by Wolfala
Link wouldn't work - need to have a subscription which usually runs around $700 a pop per publication. i.e. Janes Defense Weekly, Janes Intelligence Digest, etc.

Id love to have a subscription there. My father used to buy every edition of Janes Fighting Ships when I was younger...damn those bricks were expencive.