My sources on the Corsair are limited in number. Widewing and F4UDOA have much more at their disposal than I. So, I can't say that I'm an export of the F4U by any means. However, I'm somewhat puzzled by some of the posters in this thread minimizing what the Navy considered to be the very troublesome carrier-qualification problems of the Corsair.
Specifically, there is a tendency, by some, to discount the opinions of qualified test pilots with thousands of hours of flight time in a wide variety of high-performance aircraft who have published accounts or testified to the aforementioned negative handling characteristics of the F4U. Indeed, there are some who use a single inconsistency in such testimony as an excuse to dismiss the rest of the account out-of-hand. Those championing a great aircraft should never allow their devotion to make them blind to its weaknesses and idiosyncracies.
The early Corsair's carrier qualification problems were several, and while some were correctable, others proved to be almost insuperable. Poor visibility over the nose during carrier landings proved to be of the latter type, and was never fully resolved, although it could be compensated for somewhat by using a curving path to the approach.
Another problem, torque roll, is aptly describe by Capt. Eric Brown of the Royal Navy. While it is true that the British Royal Navy was able to carrier qualify its Corsairs one year ahead of the U.S. Navy, it did not happen simply because the British worked through the problems. To quote Capt. Brown: "We were a bit desperate at that time with our new carriers being launched faster than we were able to equip them. The Corsairs gave us a bit of a hard time, and we soon understood exactly why the Americans had so much trouble with them. One problem was the bad view over the nose, Also, if one got slow on approach and added full power to go around again, one could induce an uncontrollable torque roll. Because of it's small stabilizing vertical-fin area and high power, the arcraft would then yaw, roll, stall and spin into the water. It also had a most non-resilient landing gear that would bounce the beast over the barrier into the parked aircraft pack on the foredeck."
"It's redeeming factor was its high kill rate - second only to the Hellcat's, but the high accident rate cost a lot of Allied pilots their lives. The Royal Navy had a lot of trash in its Seafire and Sea Hurrican aircraft because neither was designed from the ground up for carrier operations."
A 1952 F4u-5 Pilots' Handbook states clearly on page 29, "At the stall with POWER ON, FLAPS DOWN, a roll off to the left is violent and is accompanied by a 600- to 900-foot loss in altitude." So the torque roll problem still manifested itself even at this late a date in the Corsair's production life. Clearly, no version of the F4U suffered fools gladly.
Early Corsairs had a serious tendency to drop their left wing abruptly during a power-on stall during landing. To correct this, Chance-Voung installed a leading edge strip, or spoiler on the right wing, just out-board of the "crank" or bend section. This caused the right and left wings to stall at approximately the same time, but also increased the stall speed. One Vought pilot is quoted in Francis Dean's AHT as stating, "I found the device had more of a psychological effect for apprehensive pilots than a positive cure for the unsymmetrical stall."
I haven't flown in AH for a while, so I can't comment directly on the Corsair's turning ability with full-flaps, power on. Yet, according to much that I have ready over the years, being low-and-slow in any aircraft the size and weight of the F4U was NOT where a pilot wanted to be when fighting the Japanese, or any light-weight, cut-and-thrust enemy fighter. The speed for maximum deployment of the flaps was 230 mph, and the maneuvering setting on the flaps was 20 degrees. Any five-ton fighter flopping around with full flaps at speeds under 200 mph was begging to get clobbered by any proficient Japanese pilot. The maneuvering setting would allow the Corsair to stay with a Zero at that speed for 1/4 of a turn; an attempt to reef it in and outturn the Zeke to attain a killing shot would put the American in danger of stalling out. Within three turns, the Jap would be punishing the Corsair's pilot for making such a stupid error.
While post-war Navy and Marine pilots tended to be high-time in flight experience, such was not the case during the early part of WW II. The landing problems inherent in the designe were of great concern to the Navy which, in the opinion of many experts, was fully justified in pulling it from carrier duty three times during the war.
Regards, Shuckins
