Less than a hundred B-17 had been made by the time of the BoB, and those early B-17 B and C were far from as effective as the later F and G models. The RAF were the first to use the B-17 in combat and they were so unimpressed with the performance that the B-17 was quickly relegated to other duties, mostly coastal defense. They were simply unable to hit their targets and the machine guns froze up, leaving them defenseless. RAF's experience with the Fortress I showed both the RAF and USAAF that the B-17C was not ready for combat, and that improved defenses, larger bomb loads and more accurate bombing methods were required.
At $238,329 per aircraft the production cost of the B-17 also made it completely unacceptable for a BoB-era Luftwaffe. A Ju 88A-5 cost only RM 196,825 ... $46,863 in 1940's currency conversion. The Luftwaffe could get five Ju 88's for the price of one B-17, and the Ju 88 could carry the same bomb load as early B-17's.
Further more the whole of the British Isles were already within the range of Luftwaffe bombers so the B-17's greater range is irrelevant. The Luftwaffe even bombed a number of cities and towns in Ireland. Very few Luftwaffe bombing raids were turned back by the RAF the vast majority of raids reached their targets. The 110 in operation during the BoB did not have better performance than the Spitfire at high altitudes. The 110C in AH is an up-engined version that is not representative of the BoB 110's.
The Luftwaffe was already bombing British infrastructure, but just like the Germans did later in the war the British had decentralized their war industry. The Germans were unable to locate and identify the British war producing "cottage-industry", and the Luftwaffe's strategic efforts were as ineffective in stopping the British war production as the USAAF's later effort against German war production.
As always your comments are nothing but fantasy and wishful thinking. The only thing that could have won the Germans the BoB was to concentrate on the tactical destruction of the RAF and their airfields. The Luftwaffe's switch to strategic bombing and terror bombing lost them the battle ... and probably the war.
Its pretty obvious that you have little understanding of the history of the luftwaffe or the real issues that shaped the BoB.
The seeds for the luftwaffe were planted by Gen Hans Von Seekt in the early 1920's. He selected and nurture the original cadre of officers who would later create the luftwaffe. In 1933 the appointment of Erhard Milch began the transition of the "civil" air industry into the true luftwaffe. The chief advocate and pioneer of what would be considered the modern airforce in europe during the post WW1 era was Giulio Douhet. Hitler, Milch and the "senior brain trust" of the luftwaffe were all proponents of this new "air power". Max Wever was selected as the original Chief of the Air staff and a very forward looking strategic role for the luftwaffe was laid (the Luftkriegfuhrung). The 1st and most pressing need the new mandate required was
A bomber that could fly around Britain from its base in Germany (direct quote from Milch).
General Wever was a strong proponent of a true strategic airforce and immediately began to lay the frame work needed to bring Douhet's vision to life.
The following is a summery of his speech at the 1935 opening of the air war academy taken from an other source...
He stated that "the realms of the air are not restricted to the fronts of the Army; they are above and behind the army, over the coasts and seas, over the whole nation and over the whole of the enemy's territory." Wever went on to advocate the doctrine of attack, stressing the offensive. He asserted that "the bomber is the decisive factor in aerial warfare." He warned that it was not sufficient to establish defense with only defensive weapons, instead the initiative must be taken and this meant that "the enemy bomber formations should be attacked at their most vulnerable moment; when they are on the ground taking on fresh fuel and ammunition and reservicing." In terms of established air policy, emphasis was first on the surprise attack of enemy air forces followed by attacks upon other vital enemy centers of gravity. "An initial assault by the Luftwaffe was to be directed against the enemy air force, including its supporting aircraft and aero-engine factories and ground installations, in order to gain air superiority from the outset."General Wever was killed in a flying accident the following year and the army began to exercise a greater influence over the supposedly independent luftwaffe. From the army's perspective the role of the luftwaffe was
"the role of airpower was simply to allow the maneuvers of the ground forces as much freedom as possible.". This eventually led to a focus on dive bombing vs level bombing and an operational doctrine focused on pinpoint vs area bombing and operational level bombing at lower altitudes. It led to cancelation of the JU-86 and delayed the Ju-88 development significantly and eliminated any true strategic bomber.
So when the JU-881A arrived it had a max speed of 258 mph a range of 550 miles and a 2000 bomb load. When loaded to maximum capacity it had a range of only 250 miles and a top speed of 190 mph....but with a top flight crew it could deliver 50% its bombs in a 50M radius in a dive bombing attack.
Alot of factors from the lack of quality engines to limited and lower octane fuel supplies also played a part, but the real issue here was that the army simply overrode the luftwaffe's goal to develope a true heavy bomber (4 of which were in development in 1936).
This led to operational doctrines and planes tailored to low altitude level bombing and/or dive bombing and operational combat at altitudes that favored the british. This led to very high bomber attrition (so bad that only 1 experienced officer per plane was allowed) and tied german fighters to an ineffective close escort role which maximized there own casualties and minimized there effectiveness vs there british counterparts...
So in 1940 the Germans had the 109/110/He-111/Ju-88...basically the same airforce they finished the war with.
If we look across the ocean to the US...the B-17 was already in production and the XP-38 had set a speed record in 1939. So the US had both the fighter and the bomber that would 1st reach Berlin "on the books" in the 1930's. Whats funny is that the US and germans drew such different conclusions from the spanish civil war where the germans saw validation of there tactics and the americans saw all the shortfalls in both the german bombers and the 109 itself.
So while the german loss of the BoB can be argued as a command failure with a high measure of success the real underlying issue was the failure to implement the Luftkriegfuhrung as originally conceived, which led to obvious shortcomings in equipment not suited to a strategic campaign and relagated the luftwaffe to much more marginalized role then originally hoped for. In the end Germany lost the airwar in 1944 because of choices it made in 1937...
