Author Topic: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII  (Read 19130 times)

Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #90 on: April 05, 2008, 06:50:41 PM »
USSBS

Further Dividends From the Oil Attack

The attack on the synthetic oil plants was also found to have cost Germany its synthetic nitrogen and methanol supply and a considerable part of its rubber supply.

Germany, like other industrial countries, relied on synthesis for its supply of nitrogen and the synthetic oil plants were by far the largest producers. Sixty percent of the nitrogen production and 40 percent of the methanol production came from two synthetic plants. Monthly output of synthetic nitrogen in early 1944, before the synthetic plants were attacked, was about 75,000 tons. It had been reduced by the end of the year to about 20,000 tons.

Nitrogen, besides being indispensable for explosives, is heavily used in German agriculture. Allocation for the 1943-44 crop year was 54 percent of the total supply; allocation for 1944-45 was first planned at 25 percent and later eliminated altogether. Nitrogen for munitions was maintained by reducing the allocation to agriculture, but by the end of 1944 this cushion had been substantially exhausted. The supply of explosives then declined with the reduction in supply of nitrogen. It became necessary to fill shells with a
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mixture of explosives and non-explosive rock salt extender. There was a general shortage of ammunition on all fronts at the end of the war. There was an equally serious shortage of flak ammunition; units manning flak guns were instructed not to fire on planes unless they were attacking the installations which the guns were specifically designated to protect and unless "they were sure of hitting the planes!"

It is of some interest that a few weeks before the close of hostilities the Germans reallocated nitrogen to agriculture at the expense of ammunition. This was the result, according to Production Minister Speer, of an independent decision of his own that the war was lost and the next year's crop should be protected.

Methanol production, necessary among other things for TNT, hexogen and other high explosives, was as severely affected as nitrogen production. Allocations to the principal consumers was heavily cut, and eventually the production of hexogen was abandoned. The loss of methanol coupled with the reduction in nitrogen was followed by a precipitate decline in production of explosives.

The synthetic rubber industry also suffered from the attack on oil. Official German records on raw material supplies show that stockpiles of rubber were small at the beginning of the war -- at the most sufficient for only two or three months' consumption. Imports through the blockade were unimportant. The supply came from four synthetic plants, one of which was a small pilot plant; and two additional plants were under construction during the war. One of the major plants, located at Huels, was attacked as a primary target by the Eighth Air Force in June 1943 and closed for a month; it required three months to get back to 72 percent of capacity and seven months to get back to full production. However, it operated on gas from synthetic oil plants in the Ruhr; when these were knocked out in the summer of 1944, production was again reduced substantially. Production at Schkopau, the largest of the synthetic rubber plants, was lost because it was dependent on hydrogen from Leuna. Investigation of the two remaining plants revealed that production was largely eliminated because of attacks on oil plants of which they were a part. By the end of 1944 over-all statistics for the industry show that production of synthetic rubber had been reduced to 2,000 tons a month or about one-sixth the wartime peak. Had the war continued, Germany's rubber position would have become critical. No indication was found, however, that the rubber shortage had become a limiting factor on German war production or the movement of the German army before the war ended.

Except for oil and associated nitrogen, methanol, and rubber production, no parts of the German chemical industry were a priority target of the Combined Bomber Offensive.

As I have maintained all along at the end of 1944 the Germans were running out of essential supplies, including oil. By that time no miracle of technology or fortune of war could hope to save Germany.
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

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Offline MiloMorai

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #91 on: April 05, 2008, 06:54:22 PM »
So it is only some of the underground refineries that were completed.

The programs of dispersal and underground construction was not completed.

Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #92 on: April 05, 2008, 06:57:51 PM »
No everything was not completed by war's end.



They were at 30% of planned output in October.
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

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Offline MiloMorai

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #93 on: April 05, 2008, 07:04:02 PM »
Actually the underground refineries were operational in October of 1944 and operated until March 1945.
So you gave a false statement that they were all completed when you left out the word 'some'.

Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #94 on: April 05, 2008, 07:10:31 PM »
I never said that they all were operational. I am not responsible for you reading too much into things.
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

-Archangel Gabriel, The P

Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #95 on: April 05, 2008, 07:13:18 PM »
When was the 8th Army Airforce operational in England? Where all its squadrons operational then? Get real Milo.
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

-Archangel Gabriel, The P

Offline spit16nooby

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #96 on: April 05, 2008, 07:21:39 PM »
Wow! This is funny!

OK first of when the Russians took over Rumania in August 1944 it wasn't very crippling.  By that time the Germans had enough synthetic fuel factories and oil in Hungary it had no effect.  Also if the Luftwaffe would have made better choices then they did in the actual BoB they would have easily won air superiority.  Now if they actually invaded is something completely different. I think there are 3 periods in 1940 in which the Gernabs could have one. First of all they had the British nearly beat in late August but to counter the British bombing of Berlin the Germans changed to attacking London.  Second of all they let the British get away at Dunkirk so Hitler could try to negotiate a treary.  Thirdly they started attaking the British radar which was taking its toll. Also German production increasing in 1944 does not mean allied bombing was not working.  It is actually because the Germans switched to a war time economy and were trying to reach their full production capacity.  Also one has to look at the prediction that the allies made of the length of the war.  They predicted the Pacific war to last until 1949 and the European one all the way until 1954.  Also if you look at the Russian attack on Rumania the Germans had close to 700 planes in Rumania.  Only 60 of those are fighters which shows that a lot planes were used to stop allied bombing.  Ultimately I believe if Hitler didn't make so many stupid decisions the axis would have won the war.  

                                just my 2 cents

Offline RRAM

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #97 on: April 05, 2008, 07:28:41 PM »
From my perspective the Americans, Japanese, Russians and even Italians totally dominated the germans in "2nd generation" airframes.

Not really in agreement here. Fw190D9, Me262 and Ta152 prototypes flew during 1942. The Me262 was not ready for service until 1944 because the engines simply could not be developed much earlier than that, but the Dora and Ta series were ready for a "go ahead" since early 1943. That they were not given a green light had more to do with german fixation into turbocharged engines and the particular dislike of Tank of the Ju213 powerplant for the 190 evolutions.
Germans spent all late '42 and all 1943 looking for a turbocharged 190 and fighting to make the me209 and me309 worthy fighters, yet the D9 and Ta could've been flying since mid-43 at the latest. I'd say both were excellent airframes.

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The 109 was saddled with all its major shortcomings thruout the war. While the 190 was clearly a better plane in many ways it never really was a dominant air to air weapon with most expertain favoring the 109 by a wide margin.

This is a higly subjective question. Most of the former 109 experten who flew the 190 preferred the latter. Some (a small number) liked the 109 over the 190. Depends on who you ask, and the context the pilots where flying at. If I were a german pilot flying Reich Defence during 1944, I'd rather like the 109 much more because of the altitudes the fights were being fought at were well over the ones the 190A was effective, but where the 109s still performed well.

If you ask the pilots in the 1942-43 channel air battles, or those in the russian front who flew both the 109 and the 190 there's almost general consensus (there are some notable exceptions but most jagdflieger loved it) the 190 was a better fighter than the 109.

It's hardly accurate to say that "most experten" favored the 109 over the 190 when probably the most respected of them all, Adolf Galland, who did 90% of his air to air kills aboard Bf109s, asked for all the Bf109 production to be brought to a halt, and for the Fw190 to be the standard propeller engined fighter of the Luftwaffe.

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The 262 certainly was the true 3rd generation airframe and was well ahead of its counterparts...at the same time the lack of better plane was a serious issue by the end of 1942. The gravity of the problem is clearly illustrated by the luftwaffe's attempts to "force" the G.55 into german production (which I feel would have significantly altered the course of the airwar and more then likely significantly impacted US daylight bombing)...

I honestly don't see where the G.55 could've played such a decisive role. It was a good fighter, I agree, but the place where the LW was being slowly but steadily attrited were the air to air fights against the bomber raids on the Reich. At 25-30000 feet I can't see how the G.55 would do a better job than the Bf109s then in place. In fact I think neither the germans or the italians had a plane with better enough performance over the Bf109 to justify the latter's replacement.

The main problem the germans had since 1943 had more to do with where the battles were being fought, than with the planes themselves. At the eastern front the fights were almost always under 6000m. Over the Reich the fights happened between 7 and 9km of altitude. In the East the Luftwaffe had to fight at low altitudes. In the West they had to give battle at very high altitudes.
The germans had to make do with two different fighters which could fight at any altitude from down low up to 10km of altitudes, and that was something really difficult to achieve, even more if we take in account than in the East they were fighting hordes of planes specialized at low altitude fighting, while in the west they had to stop the tide of a high-altitude specialized fighter force. Building fighters able to fight in both scenarios was something the germans were forced to do...but the fighters themselfs couldn't excell at every altitude they had to fight at.
When the Ta152H entered service the LW finally had a high altitude  dedicated fighter which was still able to provide sterling service at low altitudes aswell . But that was already way too late. Had the Ta152H entered service by mid-late 1943 (and there was no real reason why this could not happen other than Tank's dislike of the engine, and the RLM insistence on turbos over mechanical superchargers) things could've ,this time yes, been very different from what they were, for it was a much better fighter for the altitudes we're talking about than the standard 190s, the Bf109s and the G.55s you mentioned. The 190D9 could've given the Fw190 family a better shot at the altitudes usual in the west (even though it was not an specialized high altitude fighter). It could also have been built by mid 1943 but it didn't enter service until late'44. The reasons?...ask the RLM...wrong decissions.


All in all I don't think the germans had a problem with airframes, nor engines. The airframes were there. The powerplants, too (The Jumo213E was already around by early 1943. The DB603 series ,too, tho this had problems with low production and the Reich's completely misguided police of using them in bombers before using them on day fighters). What was lacking was a good guidance from the higher levels where decisions were made, a guidance which took all the incorrect decisions possible in the 1941-1944 time frame.
« Last Edit: April 05, 2008, 07:40:00 PM by RRAM »

Offline humble

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #98 on: April 05, 2008, 09:20:51 PM »
The G.55 was considered comparable by the germans to the frontline 109 at the time of the test in Feb 1943. This was with a bigger more robust airframe and the 3 x 20mm configuration. So the G.55 had the equivelent punch to a 109 with gondolas but with none of the performance loss. The germans also noted that the G.55 could easily accomodate the DB-603 engine as is, which the 109 could not. So the G.55 would have immediatley provided a 3x20mm plane with performance comparable to 109 and the ability to field a 5 x 20mm option with performance that would exceed the late war DB-605 109K's. So you would have had a DB-603 engined fighter (which was never actually produced outside of the last 152's & D0-335's) with tremendoud potential to damage the buffs but none of the drag from the gondolas that effected ability to function in the true fighter role.

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Offline RRAM

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #99 on: April 05, 2008, 09:39:25 PM »
Yes, humble. The problem was that not many G.55s would've received the DB603 (turning it into a G.56), because of the same reason why tank had to push until 1945 to get RLM clearance for a production TA152 with that engine. Productions run were too low and until mid-late '44 they were mostly used in bombers and night fighters...

I don't think the RLM would've allowed the use of that engine on an italian design if they didn't allow Tank to put it into the 190s he was developing.

Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #100 on: April 05, 2008, 09:59:02 PM »
The G.55 was considered comparable by the germans to the frontline 109 at the time of the test in Feb 1943. This was with a bigger more robust airframe and the 3 x 20mm configuration. So the G.55 had the equivelent punch to a 109 with gondolas but with none of the performance loss. The germans also noted that the G.55 could easily accomodate the DB-603 engine as is, which the 109 could not. So the G.55 would have immediatley provided a 3x20mm plane with performance comparable to 109 and the ability to field a 5 x 20mm option with performance that would exceed the late war DB-605 109K's. So you would have had a DB-603 engined fighter (which was never actually produced outside of the last 152's & D0-335's) with tremendoud potential to damage the buffs but none of the drag from the gondolas that effected ability to function in the true fighter role.

Humble, the G.55 wasn't quite the superplane you make it out to be.

http://kurfurst.allaboutwarfare.com/Tactical_trials/109G-4_Guidonia/109G-4_vergl_Estelle-Guidonia_de.html

The test of the G.55 concludes:

Torque forces are high. The rudder effectiveness could have been better. Roll rate is somewhat poorer than 109G. Turns very good. Unstable gun platform. It could not be determined if the plane tended to stall to a particular side. Stall characteristics similar to Spitfire. Good visibility to the sides and rear. Not suited to carry external ordnance due to position of radiator and undercarriage.


Combat test 109G-4 vs. Fiat G55:

Under 2000m the G.55 climbed slightly better on climb-power, the 109G-4 then overtook the G.55. Above 5000m the G.55 was again slightly better in climb on climb-power. 109G-4 is somewhat faster in level flight. G.55 turns somewhat better than 109G-4. Both planes were considered equally fast in a dive.


Now... note that this was an early G.55 with only one cannon and four machineguns. And it performed like a 109G with gondola waffen. I'm sure it would have performed better with the bigger DB 603 engine, but in the end the G.55 did not merit the added cost in production and the disruption of the 109 production line.
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

-Archangel Gabriel, The P

Offline MiloMorai

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #101 on: April 05, 2008, 10:19:57 PM »
See Rules #4, #5
« Last Edit: April 07, 2008, 12:55:27 PM by Skuzzy »

Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #102 on: April 05, 2008, 10:22:23 PM »
No I don't suppose you understand Milo. Believe what you will, but I will not be provoked into a flame war with you, so just give up.
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

-Archangel Gabriel, The P

Offline Iron_Cross

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #103 on: April 06, 2008, 12:03:29 AM »
It's from a 1947 135 page report made by the British Ministry of Fuel and Power detailing German oil production in WWII. It's complete with maps of all the production sites. I can even tell you how deep they drilled.

I see where your problem is Lumpy.  You are thinking that what is produced at the fields is what gets sent out.  This is wrong.  What comes out of the ground is CRUDE OIL, a mixture of all the various components that get SEPARATED at a REFINERY.  I could have enough wells to produce 50,000mT of crude, but if I don't have the refineries to crack it down into avgas, fuel oil, motor oil, ect... ect... it doesn't mean squat.  The refineries were the choke point for the German oil industry, not the production fields.  The refineries never ran out of product to crack(according to that report), they just never could produce enough finished products because they were being bombed to oblivion.
Strategic air, put a crimp in the fuel hose of the German war machine.  Your blanket statement, that it was indecisive at best and a waste of resources at worst, doesn't hold up.

I'm sorry that I blew your house of cards down...Wait...no I'm not. :D

Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #104 on: April 06, 2008, 12:42:39 AM »
If you actually read the documentation I've posted you will notice it says finished products. Nice try though.  ;)
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

-Archangel Gabriel, The P