BoB deisgn change suggestions

[detch01]

I've flown this event on both sides of the channel now and I think it's missing two things: the goal of the LW to destroy the RAF in the air and on the ground, and a method for balancing the event so that both sides not only have the same chance to win, but the players on both sides feel like they can win all the way through the first three frames. As it is currently designed the RAF cannot win it, the LW CO must lose it to allow an RAF victory.
Two points I want to make here on the current design:
1 - The goals as the event is currently designed are not historical - in the battle the LW bombed RAF fields to do some damage to the RAF logistical facilities but those raids were also aimed at making the RAF launch its fighters so that they could be destroyed. The event as it's currently scored places far too much emphasis on the destruction of ground facilities.
2 - The RAF starts the event with a few fundamental disadvantages that the LW can turn into overwhelming event winning advantages early in frame 1. First of all, the radar-controller, C&C setup is at best awkward - I don't have a solution for that, but in conjunction with the other inherent disadvantages for the RAF in the setup this becomes a much bigger problem than it should. Second, the RAF CO's hands are tied by the limited strength he/she can launch at T+0 and third, being outnumbered in the number of fighters each side can launch each frame. 

The fixes I'm proposing:
The easy one first: helping to balance the event by modifying the scoring system. This can be done fairly easily by including combat attrition in the system and making it the most significant factor in the scoring. Give each ground target a point value, add them up and the RAF starts with these points - every ground target destroyed costs the RAF points and earns the LW points. Then give each aircraft a point value that the opposition can earn, and make sure that the total points available for aircraft kills is at least twice as high as the total points for ground targets. The winner at the end of the event is the one with the highest points. You could even factor in a required kill-ratio for the RAF (and/or the LW) to earn if you wanted to make things complicated.

The second one isn't so easy: The RAF's goal in this design is entirely reactive and its C&C awkward, no real preplanning can be done to mitigate the problems the RAF faces once a frame begins and once the wheels are in the wells C&C has to put as much effort into maintaining it's own effectiveness as it does doing its actual job. Essentially, the RAF commanders go into this event with one hand tied behind their back by being forced to wait and, have a very high probability of being blinded before they can adequately defend themselves.  By allowing the RAF CO to use 1/3 of his squadrons at his discretion at T+0 and, allowing the RAF to tower out at any friendly field I think the event will be a much better balanced event in the future, even with the awkwardness of the C&C.  The first point gives the RAF CO has a few more options for preventing the LW from gaining an overwhelming advantage in the early stages of each frame and, the second point better simulates the ability of the RAF to recover pilots and put them back into the battle.

  These aren't massive changes to the event, but I think both areas of the event design need to be revisited in light of the last four runs of it. If the proposals I've suggested are implemented, both in the scoring method and the freeing up of a few more options for the RAF, it would go a long way towards balancing the event while remaining true to the intentions of the original design. And, of the two major areas for fixing I think fixing the scoring should be first in priority.


Cheers,
asw
 

[DerHund]

HE-111

[Jing0]

I have to agree there is a slight issue with balance, it does seem to be slightly more in favour of the LW than a historical analysis of BOB would suggest to be accurate.

A couple of areas I can see that might be the casue of this are:

1) the berevity of the battles we fight compared to an ongoing attritional fight: The German Acs can destroy spits and hurris faster than the they can be destroyed with their better armament. Historically this was mitigated by the rate at which new aircraft were being built, damaged ones could easily be repaired, as they usually crashed over home soil. This gives a  significant advantage over the germans, where even a small amount of damage would result in a forced landing in or on the wrong side of the channel. In our scenario this I suppose is represented by the fact that the Brits can more easily rescue their pilots, but I dont think the advantage there is big enough to actually show up during the relitivly short frames we play (2 hours as opposed to a month!)
2) We're flying blind!  With plenty of eyes on the ground, even on the few occasions radar was knocked out the fighters could still effectivly be vectored to where they needed to go. In the scenario the LW has a much better idea of what radar is and what it does, which immediatly gives the raf a whole bunch of blindspots! We dont have an Observer Corps covering the whole of of the south of england, we have a handful of hurricanes.
          This results in the RAF flying round in small groups hoping to run into something, and hoping that the rest of the RAF arrives at the same time.  Its no good 5 or 6 planes trying to take on two squadrons of escorts  by themselves whilst trying to get at the 30 bombers behind. Every time I got shot down in the 3 frames I played it was with 4 or more 109s and 110s on me.  I suspect the main advantage the germans had, of being nicely grouped together for mutual support exacerbated the fact that RAF is already outnumbered and almost always flying in small groups in order to be able to cover more ground. The radar should have cancelled this advantage out, allowing fighters to be grouped and sent directly to intercept, its no good sending the raf in easily digested bite size chunks.  However the Radar was easy to destory, impossible to replace (is it down for the full frame?) and there was no ground obs to fill in. This left us relying on reports from pilots.

        That doesnt sound bad, but it can be very misleading. If your engaged and trying to vector friendlies to your position its very hard to check your map, get coords and directions, and keep track of the horde of 109s on you! I tried it when I was acting co of 64sqdn in frame 2 and promptly died with the voices of half a dozen sperated and isolated pilots in my ears, resquesting orders and targets! I knew I was somewhere over Dover, but thats not mentioned on the map and most non-brit players wouldnt know where to start looking. (indeed in frame 4, I mentioned on 115 that southampton was the groups rally point and a host of voices demanded to know who southampton was).

         Badboy pointed it out to me as I made this mistake whilst we were heading NE to try and catch the egressing London raid. I was trying to let those planes nearby Id sighted cons to the East, and in front of me, but I did it on the groups radio channel...and the group was spread over several sectors, so to most of them it would have meant nothing, and in some case would have sent them chasing ghosts. Badboy mentioned this as he was some way beind me and couldnt see a thing, whilst I tallied several 109s and bombers. I know full well other pilots made the same mistake, giving information out thats fine for them and the guys immediatly in formation with them but totally meaningless to somone 10k higher, 2 sectors away and going in the opposite direction.

Essentially anyone seeing a contact has to tulips its hight course and a grid ref as best he can and get that info to the controller, instead of trying to second guess the enemy; give the info to the contoller to let him build up a picture of events and let him control it. I dont know how our scouts reacted when they saw a con, but I gather theyd get a rough idea of the enemy course and composition and then dive away to safety. I wander if theres any way we could keep a close watch on the enemy once sighted to make sure we know exactly where they are at all times, perhaps shadowing them from a distance with several aircraft, so we can keep a more accurate idea of course changes etc which will make intercepts a lot easier! Perhpas one pilot stays with them as long as possible, untill hes forced to break off by the escorts, at which point he vectors another scout in to accompany them as long as he can, essentially passing on the baton.

Additionaly there seems to be a lot of emphasis on hitting the LW before they reach their target, something that was never achieved in RL as far as I know, our best bet would be to track them to their target, identify their egress route and then ambush them on the way home, giving us more time to group sufficient strength and gain the neccessary hight.
         
I know thats all a bit long winded but I hope whoever runs BOB next time finds something useful in there!

[Tilt]

First I have to declare an interest as I with banana were the co designers of the original AH BoB  the rule set of which this is very much based upon.

Firstly the objectives.

Primarily the design tried to avoid at all costs any form of points based scoring system.

This means that game play has to be balanced by terrain, arena settings, objectives and resourses.

I can state with a fair degree of certainty that BoB1 2003 and Bob2 2004 were very balanced. Indeed on both these occasions the LW thought it had no chance of victory because it viewed with the same rule set as now that the odds were agin it. Actually on both occassions the RAF won but both times by a very close margin

So what has changed?

The terrain

AH1 Bob terrain was purpose built with special objects.
Radar sites were multiple pyloned affairs with radar huts under them. They were harder than present standard radar towers.
There was puffy AA across the south of England and at standard airfields
Gguns were more lethal than they are set now.
Hanger hardness may have been harder than the standard MA arena setting.

In BoB 1 fuel management was a major, major issue for LW 109 fighters.

RAF ground controllers and communication system

Training frames in BOB 1 & 2 were not to help pilots fight in spitfires and hurricanes. They were about setting a full proof method of communications between folk monitoring radar dots, scouts and squadron leaders. So good were they in Bob1 that RAF squadrons being vectored into conflict knew what they were going to meet , its altitude and its number. I noted on occasion where an RAF fighter squadron was vectored around a forward LW fighter sweep they never saw onto incoming bomber streams behind them. This with a 2 minute delay on radar!!

The objectives.

History tells us that the LW objective to shoot the RAF out of the air was flawed. What the KLW never guessed was that Britain was out producing Germany in fighter air craft by a significant margin through out the months of June 1940 thru to early 1944. This tactic was never going to work as Goering discovered after Eagle Tag when the  12 Group big wing met the LW full on over London. Until that point  Goering was convinced that the RAF was near breaking point.

In fact the RAF (11 Group) in particular was very fearfull but not for lack of aircraft. It was concerned about lack of pilots but training records show that the supply of pilots was equal to the LW albeit that training was being cut worryingly in time and quality and actually fell below the attrition rate for August 1940.  Dowding greatest fears were the vulnerability of his radar sites and his air fields.

The LW had already recognised the importance of the radar sites by late august 1940 yet Goering ordered that bombers would not waste time attacking them. They emerged from the battle almost unscathed. ventnor being the only Radar station to be closed for more than a few days and some other being damaged but seviceable after seemingly random attacks.

The airfields of  Southern England had several almost devastating attacks.

Lympne a  small strip off behind the coastal defences recieved over 400 bombs on one raid yet was operational the next day.
Manston was repeatedly attacked and put out of action for several days.
Biggen Hill was hit in  a complex raid of combined NOE and medium altitude bombers thast took it totally by surprise despite the radar network monitoring some of the incoming bombers.

What we learn is that

the LW ignored the single most important asset the RAF had .........radar
the LW could never shoot down aircraft quicker than manufacturing premices in Coventry and Castle Bromwich were turning them out. (indeed even Supermarines Southampton works were only seriously hit once)
had the LW blinded the RAF then its attacks on airfields would have been more successful and only by pushing the RAF back on the ground could it take control of the air over the  channel and the Kentish beach heads.

Hence this is the objective in AH Bob to date. What the AH LW benefit from is the knowledge that Radar is key to the RAF defence.

The other balancing factor is numbers........

As the number of total participants becomes less than the original design number (circa 200) then the smaller the number the greater this favours the LW.

AH BoB has always sufferred from some problems that still remain unresolved. The Ju88 is unrepresentative of the bulk of the LW bomber fleet. It was the elite bomber of its time whilst the LW bomber force would be much better represented by a 70/30 mix of He111's and ju88's (assuming a dornier would be too much to ask for)

[Krusty]

Tilt,

I disagree on several comments you make about the real BOB.

First, the LW couldn't bomb radar towers. They were like power line towers, all frame no structure. Even direct hits from bombs weren't reliable. Especially dive bombing with stukas, it was not an easy target to hit. If it was ever damaged, it was back up within days. The technology was so simple that people pedaled a stationary bicycle to turn the radar one way or the other. Very analog. Very foolproof. They could probably rig one anywhere along the coast with spare parts.

There was no way to take down radar, period. What the LW failed to do was use their own as effectively, or to feint and fake out the radar operators.

Further, while the spitfire and hurricane production was just barely coming into full steam, able to produce enough replacements to keep units staffed, these took time to check and get to the front lines. Pilots were a major problem. I've read more than a few books/autobiographies about RAF squadrons in the BOB. They were losing pilots left and right. Not just shot down but killed. The Eagle Sqns for example had a very bloody loss rate. Much like the late-war LW replacement pilots, RAF replacements were green and much more likely not to survive their first sortie than the folks they were replacing.

Both sides, RAF and the LW, felt that the RAF was about to lose the war. I can't recall if it was Churchill or one of the air marshalls that found out about the accidental bombing of London and said "Thank God," because he knew they'd been saved from having all their airfields wiped out repeatedly.

The real situation was that the LW bombers had high losses, but they got the job done too. More often than not they were shot down on the way home after dropping their load.

All of that is academic, though. I don't think the past 2 BOBs were very representative of the real thing, and part of this is how the hurricane and 110c are modeled in AH and part of it is the FFT high speeds of bombers, and part of it is a mix of other problems.

As for the map, what map did they use in the first 2? I only remember hearing about it in 2004 with the BOB04 map.

[Fencer51]

As usual there is so much wrong in Krusty's post.  I just don't have the energy to correct it all, so I will go with the one which effects my past associations and trust others to fix the rest of it.

On 19 September 1940, No. 71 was reformed at Church Fenton as the first 'Eagle' Squadron to be manned by American personnel. The Squadron received Hurricanes in November and became operational on defensive duties on 5 February 1941.

But it is completely obvious that 71 Squadron RAF the FIRST Eagle Squadron completely missed the Battle of Britain.

[Krusty]

Never mind, you're just not worth it Fencer. Read a book.

[Delirium]

Both my books and I agree with Fencer.

By the time the 71 came around, even the most novice historian would say the BoB was over.

[Guppy35]

Never mind, you're just not worth it Fencer. Read a book.

Come on Krusty, you blew your credibilty when you threw the Eagle Squadrons in there.  If you are going to make an argument for something, at least keep the most visible aspects accurate.

It looks like you are taking your info from the "Battle of Britain" movie.

I'd suggest to you that Tilt has read a book or sixty about the topic as well.  I'm not seeing anything wrong with what he presented, and his facts are accurate.  

I would suggest however that you should practice what you preach a bit when it comes to research.  

Wanna compare Battle of Britain libraries?

Those 350 foot, visible from France, Radar Towers that Test Group 210 of Erich Rubensdorfer went after in August with their 110s.  And yes the 87s went after them too.  Vettner was down for three weeks.

[Have]

Please don't turn this thread into a "who has the most books of ww2 and know the best" -contest.


In the previous BoB I was flying for Luftwaffe in a Ju88 and now in this one in the opposite side in a Hurricane. Based on these experiences I truly believe that the high speed of the Ju88 is the major factor which tends to spoil the BoB scenario. In Ju88 I flew about two or three frames without basically any enemy contact and couple of times even throttled back intentionally just to get some action by giving the enemy a chance to catch up. Even then the RAF was struggling to catch up. The end result was a series of loong, uneventful and quite boring milk runs.
Now with fresh experiences from the seat of Hurricane I think it was almost the same for RAF, the only "bright" side was that there was something to do by trying to fight off the 109Es. Trying to catch the bombers was hopeless.

Then there is the radar. In my opinion the RAF radar network is way too easy to disable, it was seen pretty obviously in frame 4. By the time the bombers arrive the RAF radar network is mostly or completely down. This does not reflect the historical conditions in any way and while that may not be very important to some, it also generates huge amounts of frustration among the RAF pilots and the radar controllers. I remember the same thing happening also on the previous BoB, where LW had dedicated Me110s flying NOE and disabling the radar stations.

So, what can be done? I would increase the hardness of the radar stations or decrease the time which they regenerate. The latter could also be done by CMs manually reactivating the radars after some variable time limit so that LW could not know precisely when the radar activates again and have planes above them ready to destroy them again. Another option would be to modify the map to contain much more radar stations, so that they could not be taken down so easily.

You should also remember that the control system, which the RAF had was not based just on the radar towers, but also on a large number of visual observation points. The current radar design does not take these into account at all. One easy way to fix this could perhaps be to remove the third country RAF radar operators and just activate the tower radar on all British bases.

[Dantoo]

I guess it will go completely "under the radar" until someone specifically raises it.  Last frame - the Ju88s went in at 198-200mph.  Didn't make a fig of difference.  Just took a bit longer to get to the target.

The tactics that I observed used by the RAF this time could never be effective in my experience.
If they were actually forced into using those tactics, then the strategies formulated by the Axis side worked.  Then credit the Axis CIC and his team, don't whine about the set-up.  If those tactics were pursued by choice, then a different course is clearly required for future success.  It self-suggests.  Whining about the rules and set-up teaches you little that you can take home.  Self critical analysis - what worked, what didn't, why didn't we see that coming, etc etc.?  Only by fully debriefing after each frame have you any chance of improving your result next time.

These general post-scenario workshops do have a very valuable role in highlighting those things that add to immersion and fun.  At least I think so.  It may not be "fun" to be on the losing side, but winning and losing shouldn't be the focus I believe. It's hard to avoid though.

I don't think there is anything wrong with the basic set-up. It has been run four times I think?  Result is 2-2?  No need for a scoring change.  Quality of implementation of GCI has been suggested as a decisive factor.  Perhaps it is.  I know there was some really good people involved this time.  2006 I have heard was a fiasco and the RAF loss was blamed largely upon that.  I am sure it was better this time.

It is an area that could seriously provide tremendous immersion and great fun for players.  But it is not a simple task and may need to be looked at for an increase in effectiveness.  We had limited DAR in DGS but it still needed a ground element to make it effective.  (Big Picture).  I have made suggestions in the past in respect of bringing those skills to scenarios and FSO.

If you there was common catch-phrase on the Axis side this time round it was "where is the RAF?"  I heard it in every frame.   In the final frame we were flying about north of the Manston area unchallenged, taking out radars right and left.  We were quite observable and our planes weren't expendable.  We unluckily lost a plane to ack and landed back at base after 50 minutes without even a contact.  We then took off as fast as we could for London.  Honestly we thought we wouldn't get there in time to join in the "fun"  We were really, really, wrong (note speed of the bombers again).  We caught the bombers embarrassingly easily.  We took a fairly straight course flashing fields all along the way.  We were about a square out of the target before a lone Hurricane was spotted scouting under the formation.  90 minutes into the frame before we saw a single red icon.  The bombers were in their sights before an attack arrived.  It was driven home, but was too small and lacked the focus needed to interrupt the bombers on their run, they stayed in their sights. 

Now in my opinion, I get the most fun and deepest immersion out of the the 90 minutes of boredom, 30 seconds of terror, but I understand others might not.  No problem. There is plenty of opportunity with the set-up as its written to get things going a bit harder.

Fariz carelessly spoke of volunteering to CO for Allies next BoB.  Make him do it.    I'll help him and if we get thrashed I will be the first posting congratulations to the Axis.  After this post how could I whine? 

[2Slow]

Might I suggest that, in the future, no official frame results be released until after the final frame.  This would help diminish the desertion rates on both sides.  It would also keep both sides in a fog of war.  Especially the LW.

Using this year as an example:  The frame 4 changes would not be announced until frame 4.  One could pretend that German national command authority, in a moment of irritation,  issued new orders at the last minute.  Further more it had been discovered that the current lot of LW bomb munitions had a manufacturing defect.  This defect had the functional results of increasing the target hardness from 150kg to 1819kg.

At frame 4 end it could then be announced that BOB had been won by the Axis in frame 3.  Or explained in the BBS.

As I recall in BOB 1, the LW ignored the dar stations in general.  They would attack a dar station only if it was near a mission objective.  For example, the station south of Southhampton.  At any rate, leaving the dar alone cost the LW BOB 1.  The LW has learned that it is all about the dar.

Might I suggest that there be an actual London to bomb?  High Wycombe (the HQ) was too undersized.  At least one strat city, perhaps 3 of them, two north of the Thames and one south?  If using more than one then they should all be adjacent to each other.  Heck, why not build a London strat city?  One with the palace and House of Commons.

We must maintain the FOG of War for both sides.  It must be really foggy in Berlin.  The RAF, being on the defense over their on territory, will have a better gauge of how the battle is swinging.  The LW should only have a good clue if their AAR's are accurate.

[Fencer51]

The missing element is that there was a network of ground observers.  The Radar was for initial contact and raid notification.  The ground observers tracked the raids once they went feet dry.  So we use the radar for both and therefore loose both functions when the radars are taken down.  Base warning flashes do not fill the requirement of the ground observers. 

You almost need a CM to be on the Luftwaffe side relaying the main raid(s) locations, once feet dry, to the RAF controllers with an estimate on strengths and aircraft type. (Fog of war will vary of course)  They could report "fighters in area of A10" for miscellaneous contacts... etc.

[detch01]

Tilt, you make some good points. Two points in particular that I hadn't considered that did have a major impact on the balance of the event: the hardness of the radar installations and the fuel burn rate.
One thing I'd like point out though, the current terrain was designed for and used in the 2004 running of the event.
As for BoB '03 2006, it was a fiasco, due in a large part to the attitude and lack of interest showed in it by the RAF CO and I think it should as a result be ignored in this discussion.
 I'd like to see a setup and stats comparison between the 2004 event and this last one to see what the real differences between the two events are. Given competent leaders on both sides, no event should be able to be decided half the way through as this one was. 


Cheers,
asw


 

[RDRTrash]

Not sure if this will be interesting for anyone else, but here's my .02...

I've only Side CO'd one event ever, BoB '04.  I'm a history buff, and a strategy and grand strategy gamer in the extreme, lots and lots of historical simulations of all kinds of battles behind my actions.  I was surprised and honored to get selected for the job, and I took it very very seriously.  There were people and information available to help me with the role, but because I didn't know what I didn't know, I did not make good or even proper use of any of those assets.  At the end of the scenario, hindsight, I realized how much more I could have done and how much I really never did.  In hindsight I'd learned that as serious as I'd tried to be, as good an effort as I'd given, and as fun as everyone had told me they'd had, I was beside myself to know how many of my pilots and squadrons I'd not used well or well enough.

Now, I've not been really paying attention to the scenario side of the house, and it might already be available, but is there a Side CO Mentorship system in place?  If there is not, I think it would be an invaluable process to start.  Shall I flesh out what I mean by "Side CO Mentorship"?

Regarding the use of the Ju88s; Given the number of targets that the LW must destroy, and the limited way in which the Ju88's could be used, it was the single most difficult thing to organize and employ, the KG squadrons ( <S> Nonsense and 2Slow and THX for your work in '04 !!! ).  I'd love to see He-111's too, but the fact that the Ju88's are there is not the biggest reason the LW might have won.  It is C&C, IMO.

Regarding the objectives and publicizing the frame by frame results: I'm on the "don't" side of the discussion.  Arguably the LW lost in '04 because I couldn't confirm or disprove destruction of targets.  I tried to C&C a solution that was working, but it was less than perfect.  Ultimately it didn't matter, meaning that all targets but one were eventually destroyed, and it was a C&C decision (my decision, my bad) that sealed the LW's failure with less than 30 min left in the frame, but I think the non-confirmation of target destruction contributed to a better scenario.

Regarding the Radar:  In '04 a downed tower was down for only one frame.  I would not either lengthen or shorten that window.  History proves that they were repaired somewhat easily, and it also proves that they could be destroyed with a genuine effort.  In AH we run only 4 frames for the whole battle, not 30 days of day and night raids; it's still a simulation.  In '04 I had whole squadrons running the coastline wiping out the towers, to excellent effect.  But that effort took away from actual target destruction.  Target hardness has no effect on the discussion, it just changes the way the attack is executed.  It worked well in '04.  If radar wasn't working well in this running, I think that it might be a Coordiantion reason, or the LW focused more resources on it, or had better coordination on it's attacks on the radar. 

Regarding the loss of equipment and pilots: I argued in '04 for an alternate way to manage the loss of man and material during the battle.  Maybe there might be a good way to change it for the better.  But before anyone slams the way it works in this scenario, remember this:  Which AH players would you tell to not show up for the next frame because they don't have a mathematical plane for them to fly, or because pilot losses prevent them from upping?  The scenario experiences success when players get to play, mathematics should facilitate a successful scenario, not hamper the success.  Any discussion should center on maintaining a high participation level at the outset.  I've said all I care to say on it at this point.

Regarding the very first post in this thread, 'it is up to the LW to lose the battle'.  Arguably (meaning I'd argue it's truthfullness), this is a historically accurate statement.  The RAF must spoil the LW's attack.  Bravo to the design of the scenario for achieving success in the truism of this titanic struggle, Bravo!!!

And one last mention for old times sake:
<<S>> 68KO, adversary and friend, rest easy.
<S> 68Falcon, it was a great contest <S>
<S> Jordi and Tilt, you took more flak than the arena's settings allowed.  I appreciate your efforts <<S>>
And <S> to the rest of the CM team that helped me when I didn't even realize it.