I disagree. Had the Japanese Navy not taken out our battleship fleet, they would have ended up killing the entire fleet, including CVs (which, per American naval doctrine, would have been used only in a support roll to BB's). This was American naval strategy prior to Dec 7th.(of course, this had changed by sunrise, Dec 8th.) Battleships were the spearhead, supported by carrier aircraft as recon tools. The USN would have ridden its' big guns into destruction, versus a navy that utilized carrier tactics in an offensive way.
Were that to happen, the United States would have been hard pressed to mount anything less than a continental shelf, west coast defense for 3 years or so. During that time, Japan would have had the ability to consolidate its' gains in the Pacific and build its' industrial complex, something it never had the time to do in the real war. With the raw materials and oil it had annexed in the Far East and South Pacific..... we would have had absolutely zero options, save to sue for peace. We had no allies left in the Pacific.... Australia had no means to do anything but hold on.
Our industry wasn't retooled for war production, fully, until the spring of 1943. The destruction of the Battleships in Pearl was probably the reason we won the war. It forced our strategy to shift.
I disagree. While I do agree with your discription of US naval doctrine at the time of Pearl harbor is correct. The Pearl harbor raid was just that a raid. It was not planned or designed for an extended contested battle. There was no plan to implement a carrier battle at sea. It was a hit and run raid from it's conception, no battle plan in place other than a sneak attack. Admiral Nagumo failed to make a third strike because he did not know the location of the US Carriers since they were not at anchor in Pearl Harbor. The third strike may well have been more decisive than the previous two had they targeted the submarine facilities and the tank farm. Nagumo was too worried about losing his fleet to fight a decisive battle. Which would involve hanging around long enough to mount an effective search for the American fleet and taking a chance on his own task force being located and coming under attack. So he kept to the plan, do as much damage as possible with a little risk to his task force as possible and get the hell out of Dodge.
The Japanese although the masters of carrier warfare at this time were still victims of the big gun club in their Navy. Even Yamamotto's Midway battle plan called for the Main Body of battleships to move in and deliver the killing blow against the American Fleet at Midway once the carriers had softend the enemy up. Another thing to remember about the influence of the gun club on the IJN. The Japanese were committed to building more big battleships. The Yamato had just recently joined the fleet at the time of Midway. Her sisters the Musashi and Shinano were under construction as well. The Shinano was converted to a carrier only after the carrier losses suffered by the IJN at Midway. There were also plans for a fourth Yamoto class super battleship. These monsters were a huge waste of resources that could have gone into fleet carriers. Even though the Shinano was converted to a carrier, by the time this was done her construction was too far along to be a proper fleet carrier. Having limited hanger facilities and repair shops. She was finished out to be more of shuttle carrier allowing planes to transfer from land bases to her deck then off again to other carriers. The whole Yamato class episode shows an attitude of the Battleship first.
Japan fared very well in the early days of the war. She enjoyed a numbers advantage in warships including both Carriers and Battleships. Japan could not keep up with American production period. Just because Japan lost the Battle of Midway in the summer of 1942 and Guadalcanal in the fall of 1942. This did nothing to take back her gains of natural resources in Southeast Asia, so were was all this production you speak of? Japan could have never kept pace with American production and the advantage America had of not only production facilities but natural resources in country.
America of the 1940s wasn't like the America of today. There was no mass media telling people everyday America was bad and everything was hopeless. There was no hard to identify insurgent force hiding behind civilians. There was a foreign military power that had attacked America's territories, friends, and killed American military members, and civilians. People then were tougher physically and mentally. They were not the type of people to sit fearfully on their sorry a**es blaming their leadership, their own country, and hoping if they make nice with the enemy it wouldn't happen again. They filled recruiting stations and factories, then went after the threat to ensure it didn't happen again.
As far as the USS Ward's attack on the mini sub not causing the fleet to sail and the launching of hundreds of aircraft to look for a threat... Nobody in the USN expected a carrier raid or attack of any kind on Hawaii. A submarine off the mouth of Pearl Harbor was probably expected and probably not considered a huge threat to a fleet in anchor in the harbor. Plus remember Command and Control in a peacetime 1940s era military was nothing like what you have today. If you really want to wonder why one side allowed itself to get slapped so hard in the opening stages of conflict, look at how the USSR ignored the German buildup just before Operation Barbarosa.
