BoF

[Angus]

I see no way that the French as well as the British forces would have held. The German plan was sound, and worked, the allied defense didn't. In fact, the only big allied plan that worked was the evacuation at Dunkirk.
The only big risk the Gerries took was their advance through the Ardennas- if they'd been tied up there, things could have started to go bad. But they were fast enough and passed through.
As a point of interest, the Axis advanced on may the 10th. That day also delivered Churchill into office. On that day, there was still fighting going on in Norway. And the British occupied Iceland, something of great enough value to ruin Hitler's day

[Marauding Conan]

Read a fascinating book a few years back called Strange Victory:Hitler's Conquest of France by Ernest R May. Definitely has it's dry spots, but was most revealing. What many don't realize is that the French were well on their way to creating another static front in Belgium before the German's unexpectly erupted from the "impassible" Ardennes after the main French line had moved FORWARD into Belgium.

Bottom line is that the French main body was hampered by two big disadvantages -- its command structure was outrageously, unbelievably inflexible; and the politicians took away the military's best options before the war even started. The Maginot line accomplished its stated goal, and in fact continued to resist for weeks after it had been bypassed and made militarily useless. But the politicians wouldn't allow the military to EITHER build similar defenses along the Belgian border (for fear of offending an ally) OR to advance into Belgian territory when war was declared in order to assure proper defense of France.

So when the Germans started attacking Belgium, the French Army had to wait for political clearance to advance northward and consolidate defensively stronger positions than the pure political boundary allowed. This meant that the first Franco-Nazi battles were closer to meeting engagements than they should have been. Even so, the FRENCH won the armor battles that occurred and stymied German advance. German progress was very slow...UNTIL the forces that got bogged down in the Ardennes broke out from the woods and threatened envelopment. They ALMOST got contained before breaking out, but French dispositions hadn't solidified enough in the area and only a small portion of planned forces were in place. Even after the problem became clear they still had opportunity to "slam the cork into the bottle" and shut things down, but the fossilized command and control systems couldn't cope.

Hitler was not nearly as powerful as later events made him look, and in fact the record shows that many of his generals opposed the war with france. France had more tanks, better tanks, and a larger army than Germany could field. They had the advantages of defense and were fighting on all too familiar ground. Truth be told, even with "blitzkrieg" the French probably SHOULD have been able to stop the Wehrmacht, but the combination of political interference, rigid command structures, and unfortuitous timing in the Ardennes conspired to produce what really was an Unlikely german victory.

In a nutshell, that is the best way to describe the military situation on the ground. Although this topic is not normally discused in France, in some circles the blame is placed in the 3rd Republic, Petain and Comunist Unions (that last part is actually a sore point).

The republic was politically ineffective as it required a change of administration every 6 months and could not unify to create a clear political response. Thus, commiting the army without a clear, unhindered direction. The situation became worst when Petain was named "Head of State". Instead of adapting to the situation, he used the situation to gain total political control (kind of what Hitler did in Germany) and simply forcing the republic to surrender.

There is also the issue of the geriatric high command incapable to adjust its doctrine (read Petain). This change should have happened before the battle. (at worst, it should have happened in 1938).

There is the issue of comunist support for the Nazi party as the Soviet Union and Germany were allied at the time. It has long been suspected that unions controled by the comunists hindered production to the war effort. As things turned out after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it turns out that they did hindered the production of war material under orders from Stalin.

There is the issue of popular support. The republic was not well liked. The horrors of WWI were very fresh in the mind. And the popular opinion was that the "Bosh" would simply impose its political will on the republic and go home... just like any other conflict in Europe of the previous 200 years. I don't think many people understood that the Nazi regime had intensions of establishing an empire in Europe. You almost get the feeling that most people wanted to stay out of WWII. 

So, from the political point of view, I don't think the 3rd Republic had a chance, and I don't think many people at the time mourned its passing either. But, this whole episode of history is a sore point for those who lived through it. And it is difficult to get the elders to speak about it without finding a wall or having the person you ask breakdown in tears.

[Anaxogoras]

Are you asking the cause of the French republic collapse or are you asking if it was the fault of GB that the French republic collapsed?

These points go together in my mind:

• The Luftwaffe attained air supremacy
• The RAF never committed its full strength to the defense of the continent
• The Wehrmacht had long supply lines, like a traffic jam in some places, that were never touched by Allied bombers.

It would be wrong and simplistic to say it was the UK's fault.  However, the more I learn about what actually happened in this battle, the more it seems we are wrong to heap praise on Dowding.  A more neutral stance would be appropriate.  Like simaril mentioned already, such a rapid German victory was unlikely, so it stands to reason that France and the UK could have stopped the advance if only a few things had gone differently.

[Angus]

How do you come to that conclusion?
After all, Dowding concluded that pumping the RAF dry over France was nothing but a waste, and he pulled what was left back to England quite late.
I cannot see him being wrong at all.
BTW, not everyone knows this, but actually the RAF had problems (from the behalf of the French) in executing their raids, due to French countermeasures, which were made in fear of German countermeasures!
(The French actually prevented RAF takeoffs by blocking runways!!!!)

Anyway, was the German Victory so unlikely? IMHO, since the got away with neglecting the Maginot line, and thereby playing the plan as they wanted, it was not at all unlikely. They had studied well to avoid trench warfare, which the French in return, had planned. Mobility vs non-mobility.

[Rich46yo]

Are you asking the cause of the French republic collapse or are you asking if it was the fault of GB that the French republic collapsed?

Britain's force was an expeditionary force and as such had a dependence on the host country. I suppose it could be argued the Brits got stingy with their airplanes when the writing was on the wall but can you blame them? They had a vast empire to protect, one that was totally Dependant on sea lanes. And they knew the Germans would be coming after them next so they had to keep air superiority over the channel and home Islands.

I know the French took it bad. When the Brits pulled into the ports for evac. But what else could they have done? The Germans had the upper hand.

I'd vote that it was French leadership/political will that was to blame. Overall many French units fought hard an well but they had a far to cumbersome command structure. Their failure to attack the flanks of the German advance , in a meaningful way, was unforgivable. The French made their own bed.

[68Wooley]

Bear in mind, when the BEF withdrew via Dunkirk and the other channel evacuations, it left all its heavy equipment behind leaving next to nothing in the UK other than men and light arms. With the exception of aircraft, the Battle of France left the UK perilously exposed.

Had the Germans found a feasible way of getting across the channel (and despite the myths, that meant more than just gaining air superiority), they would have found there was little there to stop them.

Good book on the RAF involvement in the Battle of France is 'Blue Man Falling'. It is fiction, but mainly historically accurate.

Being in a Fairey Battle squadron must have sucked.

[BaDkaRmA158Th]

What was the population of russia from 1939 to 1945? (How many died, vanished or got captured?)

Kinda wonder how military leaders 5 years before 45 would have reacted to the now known history of the cold war and communism's grip on the planet. Think we would have assisted china in 41, provided russia with thousands of lend lease planes and ammo if we knew how things had turned out?



I am willing to bet, no.

:Edit: The P.82 Defiant, worst "fighter" ever made.

[68Wooley]

:Edit: The P.82 Defiant, worst "fighter" ever made.

Ah yes- the Boulton Paul Defiant - a fighter with no forward firing guns...

[Marauding Conan]

These points go together in my mind:

• The Luftwaffe attained air supremacy
• The RAF never committed its full strength to the defense of the continent
• The Wehrmacht had long supply lines, like a traffic jam in some places, that were never touched by Allied bombers.

It would be wrong and simplistic to say it was the UK's fault.  However, the more I learn about what actually happened in this battle, the more it seems we are wrong to heap praise on Dowding.  A more neutral stance would be appropriate.  Like simaril mentioned already, such a rapid German victory was unlikely, so it stands to reason that France and the UK could have stopped the advance if only a few things had gone differently.

• I don't know if the Germans achieved air supremacy. I think they achieved air superiority
• I would not blame the RAF. It was not ready for wide front operations and in ballance, Dowding took the right decision. I don't know what he was thinking, but I am a believer in fighting only the battles that can be won. And the political leadership of the 3rd Republic was not a position to pull together and win the BoF.
• As to the supply lines of the Germans, again, blame the geriatric leadership of the French army. The French Air Force was not independent, and the individual units were subordined to the ground commander of the area. No way that they would have been allowed to attack units behind the lines at the time, even if it is obious to us that it was the weak point. The whole concept of attacking the weak points is the essence of modern warfare. At the time, both British and French doctrine was based on strong defences spread over a wide area. In that frame of mind, the ground commanders would have wanted the air support to help beligered units on the ground

[Angus]

The French air force actually sported impressive numbers, but their "system" was no good. Dowding illustrated the value of a good system in the BoB, where the LW suddenly started loosing some proper numbers to a smaller force. And not a moment to early did he pull back the fighters from France.
BTW, the RAF's performance immediately improved once they were back at home bases, yet fighting over Dunkirk.

[MiloMorai]

There are those out there that lay the blame for the defeat on the Brits.

Supplied by an American of French heritage at http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/fall-france-1940-a-10428.html

The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 - Julian Jackson
Of all the works concerning 1940 that i've read, I think this one is the most fair. Very well written, not only examines the military but also the political and societal consequences of 1940. Not solely a 20/20 hindsight lesson, but I feel Jackson really tries to understand the "boot on the ground", so to speak, of why people acted/reacted the way they did. Definately the most studious and serious work I've seen on the subject yet. I highly recommend it. J. Jackson is critical of all where it is deserved and gives praises where it is due.

Sixty Days that Shook the West - Jacques Benoist-Mechin
A day by day account of the battle, both military and political on a per day basis, thus making it simple to understand. Overall it is good, with some generalization here and there, as well as some specifics. I like it because there is a good bunch of early accounts of the High-Commands inter-squabbling as well as national leaders. A sense of panic sets in as you go along.

Basically he (Arsenal VG-33) is saying the Brits turned tail and ran leaving the French 'high and dry'.

[Angus]

After a lot of reading, I think they did the sensible thing.
And the EVAC was about the only thing ever successful from the allied side in the BoF.
The French, being sore about the deal claimed that if France fell, the British would have their heads twisted off by the neck just like chicken.
After the BoB, the British response was "Some neck. Some Chicken".....
By the way, AFAIK the defence plan put much of the BEF under French command. And there was basically no plan for anything happening except the Germans attacking the Maginot line head-on. Which (silly them!) they didn't
As a sidenote, French forces actually moved into Germany as soon as 1939 (Saarland), and left again. IMHO, an allied offensive while Germany was at war in Poland could perhaps have tipped the scale and put the trench war into German soil. But there was not the will for such a plan.
I have been on these grounds. There were great battles there before, when German forces crushed the French late in the 19th century. And there are still some fine pillboxes there from Hitler's time. Slowly sinking into the forests...

[Masherbrum]

:Edit: The P.82 Defiant, worst "fighter" ever made.

Ah yes- the Boulton Paul Defiant - a fighter with no forward firing guns...

It met Air Ministry Specification F.9/35.  Which had specified a "turret fighter with a powered turret as the sole armament."

[Anaxogoras]

As to the supply lines of the Germans, again, blame the geriatric leadership of the French army. The French Air Force was not independent, and the individual units were subordined to the ground commander of the area. No way that they would have been allowed to attack units behind the lines at the time, even if it is obious to us that it was the weak point. The whole concept of attacking the weak points is the essence of modern warfare. At the time, both British and French doctrine was based on strong defences spread over a wide area. In that frame of mind, the ground commanders would have wanted the air support to help beligered units on the ground

It was not a matter of whether the air force was independent or a branch of the army, and to offer that as an explanation for why they didn't attack jammed supply lines implies the most ridiculous stupidity.  They didn't attack them because they couldn't; the Luftwaffe had command of the air almost as soon as the battle begun.  Hence, my question as to whether the Luftwaffe's air superiority over France could have been prevented, maybe even mitigated to air parity, had the RAF deployed in full strength in France before May 1940.

Again, to me, that the RAF wasn't deployed in full strength in France is symptomatic of more general lukewarm effort to defend allied nations, with France being equally culpable.  The Poles were abandoned to their fate, the Finns fought the Russians alone, they made a desultory attempt to help the Norwegians, and then, when it came down to the two strongest powers that hadn't really bothered to defend their weakest allies, they displayed the same flaccidity toward each other.

Lastly, the US was ready to watch the UK surrender to Germany.  This is a fact.  It's a disheartening chapter in the history of the west.

[Angus]

Not all know this, but the LEND-LEASE deal only passed through congress with marginal majority. And that was...in 1941.
Anyway, I don't quite go with the BEF being half-hearted in France, nor the RAF. They were simply beaten, and as Dowding coldly put it, the RAF would have stopped existing as a fighting force in a couple of weeks or so for the loss rates they were suffering. The whole defence of France was a disaster once the Germans had managed to flank the French and British and their speedy armour and close ground support owned the fields.
BTW, if I recall right, the French airforce actually sported impressive numbers ...