Originally posted by Sable:
The P-51D was faster then the P-38L at all altitudes according to the charts I've seen. 345mph vs. 365mph at sea level, 380mph vs. 400mph at 10,000ft, 420mph vs. 437mph at 25,000ft.
There is one thing that virtually every book and report on the P-38L ignores. Actual WEP horsepower. The Allison V-1710 F-30 powering the L model was rated by Allison at 1,725 hp in WEP. The pilot manuals of the time (with the exception of a few hundred printed in mid 1945) specify max power at 1,600 hp. However, it was the AAF and its inherent conservatism that restricted power to the same rating as the F-17 engines in the P-38H and J. When we look at factory performance data that allows for the max rated output, we see that the P-51D loses its advantage except at low altitudes.
You will notice that the P-38L pushes into the 440 mph region.
Let's look at roll rate while we're at it.
You will notice that the redesigned ailerons of the P-38L improved roll rate at all speeds, with the hydraulic boost giving a significant advantage at speeds from 325 on up.
Here's an intersting statistic from an Air Force loss report:
Loss of Element Leaders and wingmen:
Basis: 100 aircraft lost to Enemy Aircraft
P-47 #1: 45 #2: 55
P-38 #1: 28 #2: 72
P-51 #1: 46 #2: 54
This would seem to indicate that the P-38s were getting bounced a lot, since their wingmen were being shot down at such a high rate, compared with the P-47 and P-51 units).
Does this report define the time window used to compile the statistics? The reason I ask is that when the 55th and 20th FGs deployed, they were responsible for flying all the deep penetrations. This means that two seriously undersize groups were going all the way to the target and were the only escort after crossing the German border. When less than 50 Lightnings must face the entire Luftwaffe fighter force, they find themselves very busy.
Then there was the training issues. Mustang pilots were sent to a Clobber College where they learned how to fly and fight in the P-51. P-38 groups did not have any such system in place, nor was one put in place by the 8th's Fighter Command. Consider that the vast majority of pilots reporting to P-38 groups had never even sat in a P-38 prior to arriving at the unit.
Finally, we must look at the inherent complexity of the P-38. It took many more hours to become proficient in the Lightning than it did in the single-engine Mustang. These issues were brought directly to the 8th Fighter Command's attention by the skipper of the 20th FG in a letter which I posted here before. I'll post here again.
20th Fighter Group Headquarters
APO 637 U.S. Army
(E-2)
3 June 1944
Subject: P-38 Airplane in Combat.
To: Commanding General, VIII Fighter Command, APO 637, U.S. Army.
1. The following observations are being put in writing by the
undersigned at the request of the Commanding General, VII FC. They
are intended purely as constructive criticism and are intended in any
way to "low rate" our present equipment.
2. After flying the P-38 for a little over one hundred hours on
combat missions it is my belief that the airplane, as it stands now, is too
complicated for the 'average' pilot. I want to put strong emphasis on the
word 'average, taking full consideration just how little combat training our
pilots have before going on as operational status.
3. As a typical case to demonstrate my point, let us assume that
we have a pilot fresh out of flying school with about a total of twenty-five
hours in a P-38, starting out on a combat mission. He is on a deep ramrod,
penetration and target support to maximum endurance. He is cruising along
with his power set at maximum economy. He is pulling 31" Hg and 2100 RPM.
He is auto lean and running on external tanks. His gun heater is off to relieve
the load on his generator, which frequently gives out (under sustained heavy
load). His sight is off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch may or
may not be on. Flying along in this condition, he suddenly gets "bounced",
what to do flashes through his mind. He must turn, he must increase power
and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main. So, he reaches down
and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches {valves} to main - turns on his drop
tank switches, presses his release button, puts the mixture to auto rich (two
separate and clumsy operations), increases his RPM, increases his manifold
pressure, turns on his gun heater switch (which he must feel for and cannot
possibly see), turns on his combat switch and he is ready to fight. At this
point, he has probably been shot down or he has done one of several things
wrong. Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before increasing
RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure. Or, he forgets
to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive cylinder head temperature
with subsequent engine failure.
4. In my limited experience with a P-38 group, we have lost as least
four (4) pilots, who when bounced, took no immediate evasive action. The
logical assumption is that they were so busy in the cockpit, trying to get
organized that they were shot down before they could get going.
5. The question that arises is, what are you going to do about it?
It is standard procedure for the group leader to call, five minutes before R/V
and tell all the pilots to "prepare for trouble". This is the signal for
everyone to get into auto rich, turn drop tank switches on, gun heaters on,
combat and sight switches on and to increase RPM and manifold pressure
to maximum cruise. This procedure, however, does not help the pilot who is
bounced on the way in and who is trying to conserve his gasoline and equipment
for the escort job ahead.
6. What is the answer to these difficulties? During the past several
weeks we have been visited at this station time and time again by Lockheed
representatives, Allison representatives and high ranking Army personnel
connected with these two companies. They all ask about our troubles and
then proceed to tell us about the marvelous mechanisms that they have devised
to overcome these troubles that the Air Force has turned down as "unnecessary".
Chief among these is a unit power control, incorporating an automatic manifold
pressure regulator, which will control power, RPM and mixture by use of a single
lever. It is obvious that there is a crying need for a device like that in
combat.
7. It is easy to understand why test pilots, who have never been in
combat, cannot readily appreciate what each split second means when a
"bounce" occurs. Every last motion when you get bounced is just another
nail in your coffin. Any device which would eliminate any of the enumerated
above, are obviously very necessary to make the P-38 a really effective
combat airplane.
8. It is also felt that that much could done to simplify the gas switching
system in this airplane. The switches {valve selector handles} are
all in awkward positions and extremely hard to turn. The toggle switches for
outboard tanks are almost impossible to operate with gloves on.
9. My personal feeling about this airplane is that it is a fine piece of
equipment, and if properly handled, takes a back seat for nothing that the enemy
can produce. But it does need simplifying to bring it within the capabilities of the
'average' pilot. I believe that pilots like Colonel Ben Kelsey and Colonel
Cass Huff are among the finest pilots in the world today. But I also believe
that it is difficult for men like them to place their thinking and ability on
the level of a youngster with a bare 25 hours in the airplane, going into his
first combat. That is the sort of thinking that will have to be done, in my
opinion, to make the P-38 a first-class all around fighting airplane.
HAROLD J. RAU
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.
As you can see, the fighter groups were well aware of the P-38's shortcomings and were tirelessly trying to get them corrected. They were fully corrected with the introduction of the P-38L-1-LO which was a great deal easier to fly and manage.
I haven't touched on the reliability trouble experienced, but rest assured that I have a great deal of material on the causes and the changes made to correct them.
In summary, I'd say that both the P-51 and P-38 were good fighters, and the difference is that the P-51s strenghts were the ones that were more important in RL combat, while the P-38's strengths are more important in the "Arena" combat of online flight sims.
I would would write a different summary. I would state that a properly modeled, well flown P-38L will present the most serious of challenges to ANY World War Two fighter encountered, at any altitude. Granted, the P-38 truly excelled down in the weeds. However, at any height below 20,000 ft. it was the one of the best fighters on the western front, bar none. Above 20k, it was good enough to hold its own with anything that rose up to combat it.
Spend some time talking with pilots who flew both the P-38 and the P-51 in combat, and each and every one of them will say the same thing. If it came down to a knife fight, they would rather be in the P-38.
One point about acceleration: The P-38L accelerated faster than the P-51D by the same margin as the P-51D accelerated faster than the P-39Q. And that's only using the 1,600 hp rating, not the 1,725 hp rating (easily set by the crewchief with a screwdriver and two 7/16" wrenches, according to one pilot).
Perhaps, AH will revisit the P-38L modeling at some point in the future.
My regards,
Widewing
