German and Japanese

[Duedel]

Does anybody know what's the background behind this:
The germans had only 2 prop fighter (single seat, one engine) production lines (109, 190) with many differences between each version of the planes (109E, 109G...).
The japanese had many different prop fighter produktion lines (J2M, Zeke, Shoki, N1K, KI61...) with marginal differences between the versions of one production line.
Why? Which strategic decisions lie behind it?

[HoHun]

Hi Duedel,

>The germans had only 2 prop fighter (single seat, one engine) production lines (109, 190) with many differences between each version of the planes (109E, 109G...).
>The japanese had many different prop fighter produktion lines (J2M, Zeke, Shoki, N1K, KI61...) with marginal differences between the versions of one production line.
Why? Which strategic decisions lie behind it?

The Germans were aware of their economical restrictions and the necessity for mass production. They decided for one heavy escort fighter and one light interceptor to equip the Luftwaffe for the war - Me 110 and Me 109 -, and later additionally adopted the Fw 190 to make use of the potential of radial engines.

The Japanese weren't really prepared for a war of attrition, and they lacked the determination to use their resources in a similar efficient way. Development was driven by two independend service branches, Army and Navy, who didn't cooperate as closely as required to achieve economy of scale by adopting one common fighter. That fact alone doubled the number of types developed and produced by the Japanese.

The main production types of the Navy were:

- A5M: obsolete pre-WW2 fighter
- A6M: 1st generation standard fighter
- J2M: 2nd generation interceptor with disappointing performance
- N1K: 2nd generation seaplane fighter used as landplane to fill the interceptor gap

The main production types of the Army were:

- Ki-27: obsolete pre-WW2 fighter
- Ki-43: 1st generation standard fighter
- Ki-61: 2nd generation inline-engined fighter
- Ki-44: 2nd generation fighter
- Ki-84: 3rd generation fighter
- Ki-100: stopgap radial-engine fighter

A serious strategic disadvantage the Japanese found on way to compensate for was the narrow industrial base Japan had to rely on. Though the designers came up with excellent airframes, engine technology was lacking badly. As a result, Japanese fighters of the 2nd and 3rd generation never really matched the performance of their Allied opponents (or their German counterparts).

The search for the best performance from the available powerplants in turn led to experimentation with different fighter types, increasing the number of airframe designs. When a new engine was ready for production, it couldn't be turned out in the numbers necessary for the entire fighter force, so the old fighter designs relying on the old engine designs had to be kept in production in parallel to the new designs.

In general, the Japanese lost a lot of production efficiency to redundant developments, small-scale production runs, and also to designs poorly suited for mass production.

To highlight the difference: The A6M was an excellent design, but it probably wouldn't have been accepted without major changes to ease production if the decision would have been made by the Reichsluftfahrtministerium and not by the Japanese Navy.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[-=Silo=-]

Also to add to what Ho-Hun has already said, Japanese brass were convinced that slow nimble turnfighters were the only way to go.

The Navy mainstay was the A6M, and the army used the Ki-43. While the Army was wise enough to at least get their planes updated, they still produced the obsolite Ki-43 till the end of the war!!! Interestingly enough, the J2M and Ki44 (both tremendous E-fighters) was developed simultainiously with the A6M and Ki-43 respectively. Had the Japanese not been as stubborn and reliant on outdated concepts of aerial warfare, they may have pushed these (or similar types of designs) up and made them priority.

The Ki-44 came off the assembly line the same time as the Ki-43s, yet the ceased Ki-44 production and kept on producing ki-43s even while the Ki-84 was in production! Madness!
Now... those slow planes had their advantages. Range being one. In the vast expanses of the Pacific, it would make good sense to have the great range of the Ki-43 and A6M.
The Japanese were basically fighting a defensive war after early 1943, so producing more of those types (J2M, Ki44) might have been a very good idea.

The Japanese had some extremely talented aircraft designers who were basically hamstrung by beaurocracy, and stubborn leaders.


P.S. I wouldn't say the J2M was a failure. It was a solid design IMO. Good gunpacakge, climb, speed and high alt performance and even turn (compared to US birds   )As I understood it, the did quite well vs. P-51s in 1945 (factoring odds, and piss poor pilot training). Some 15 year Japanese pilot with 8 hours of flight time may have sucked in it... but if it were in Aces High, it would be like putting a 190's guns on a 109. It would probably be THE bomber intercepter of choice if it's introduced.
<S>

[ 12-15-2001: Message edited by: -=Silo=- ]

[oboe]

I second Silo's thoughts on the J2M.   It had some development troubles, and was therefore operationally delayed, but I've read more than one account that praised its handling and effectiveness.   History seems to have painted it as an "also-ran", however I think this is unfair.

Also, while the Japanese have to concede a speed advantage to Allied planes, and therefore the ability to dictate the fight, there were still some matchups between late war planes that favored the Japanese - for example the N1K2-J vs F6F-5.

[Karnak]

The Japanese, like nearly eveybody else, order the replacement of an aircraft as it entered service.

Thus when the A6M was entering service, the Navy placed the design order for the A7M.  However, Jiro Horikoshi kept being pulled off of the work he was doing on the A7M in order to do an update to his A6M.  Furthermore the Navy decided to standardize on the Nakajima Homare 21 and ordered Mitsubishi to use that engine even though Horikoshi protested that it was not adequate.  Under these orders Horikoshi produced the A7M1 which the Navy tested in May, 1944 and was unhappy with due to a lack of power.  The Navy then gave Mitsubishi the go ahead for Horikoshi to redesign the A7M with the Mitsubishi Ha-43.11 engine that he had wanted to use originally.  Horikoshi then produced the A7M2 which the Navy was very happy with and order into production immediately.

At this time an earthquake badly damaged several Mitsubishi plants and they were unable to begin production until July, 1945.

Had the Navy allowed Horikoshi to use the engine of his choice the A7M could have been in combat by September or October of 1944.  Had Mitsubishi also allowed Horikoshi to focus on the A7M and passed upgrading of the A6M to junior engineers it is possible that the A7M could have been enting service in late 1943 or early 1944.

The A7M1's flight handling is described as "it possesed excellent stability and controlability, but was decidedly underpowered".

The A7M2, with the 2,200hp Mitsubishi Ha-43.11, modified that "it was immediately obvious that manuverability, rate of climb, and maximum speed were noticably improved, while it retained its excellent stability and controll features."


There is an example of beaucracy hampering the efforts of a skilled aircraft engineer.