Author Topic: Why British, Soviet and Japanese aircraft are better than U.S. and German in AH.  (Read 2231 times)

Offline csThor

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Well on Kursk. If you read accounts from both sides you will certainly come to the conclusion that it was indeed very close for the Soviets. If I remember correct, the clash at Prokhorovka was something like a desperate attempt to stop the 2nd SS and 3rd Panzerkorps. The 5th Guards Tank Army was rushed out of their readiness position and into this Head-to-Head battle. So tactically the Soviets were in a very disadvantaged position at that time, though strategically they achieved what they wanted. Without the landing in Sicily "Zitadelle" might have gone on and I donīt think anybody wants to think of what had happened in case of german success.

All in all I have to say that Iīm very sorry to see how the american part of the war is overemphasized   .

Offline pzvg

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Nashwan few was in Russian terms (g,d,r)  
And yes I do know they liked the valentine, I said Itanks, you'll note.

Aper, I think you will find the Battle of the Bulge took place long after Stalingrad, Not too shabby an effort for an army that was no longer capable of offensive operations. Try this for an exercise in free thought, run Kursk in your mind, but kick off the German attack a week early.
(We ran this in a wargame, US Army staff college, and boy does it have a significant impact on the whole East front war, The Germans still lost WW2, but in Aug of '46)



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pzvg- "5 years and I still can't shoot"

Offline -aper-

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Well on Kursk. If you read accounts from both sides you will certainly come to the conclusion that it was indeed very close for the Soviets. If I remember correct, the clash at Prokhorovka was something like a desperate attempt to stop the 2nd SS and 3rd Panzerkorps. The 5th Guards Tank Army was rushed out of their readiness position and into this Head-to-Head battle. So tactically the Soviets were in a very disadvantaged position at that time, though strategically they achieved what they wanted.

csThor

Russian Army had the compete reserve front in the battle of Kursk with their best tank armies and other guard forces. Btw these forces  were use in the further offence of Russian Army in Ukraine in summer-autumn of 1943. Even huge Dnepr river didn't help a lot German Army to stop this offence.

 
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Without the landing in Sicily "Zitadelle" might have gone on and I donīt think anybody wants to think of what had happened in case of german success.
All in all I have to say that Iīm very sorry to see how the american part of the war is overemphasized

If you think that Sicily was a main reason of Zitadell's fail you really overemphasize something  

Offline csThor

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Originally posted by -aper-:
If you think that Sicily was a main reason of Zitadell's fail you really overemphasize something    

I have read documents from Bundeswehr University Munich that state that the 5th Guards army was directed towards 2nd SS and 3rd Panzerkorps as the Soviets had nothing else left to stop them. In the original soviet plan the 5th Guards should be the spearhead of the soviet counter offensive after "Zitadelle" was stopped and so this unit had to be protected from suffering unnecessary (Golly-geen, this word makes me crazy   ) losses. In fact the Southern german Group (4th Army, Genobst. Erich von Manstein) was close to break through the defensive lines in spite of heavy losses and a breakthrough would have thrown the soviet plans out of the window.
I do not overemphasize the importance of the landings in Sicily, but you can read in several sources (mine was "Memories of a soldier" by Heinz Wilhelm Guderian, Chief of all german armoured units at that time) that Hitler refused to allow Manstein to continue his attacks because he wanted the 2nd SS Panzerkorps to be shipped to Italy for defense. That means the soviet superiority in numbers (which was there already when "Zitadelle" started) had grown to a much greater extend and so (considering the losses of german tanks, artillery and planes and the capabilities of the soviet war industry) the successfull soviet offensive was not that surprising.

[This message has been edited by csThor (edited 03-26-2001).]

Offline -aper-

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I have read documents from Bundeswehr University Munich that state that the 5th Guards army was directed towards 2nd SS and 3rd Panzerkorps as the Soviets had nothing else left to stop them. In the original soviet plan the 5th Guards should be the spearhead of the soviet counter offensive after "Zitadelle" was stopped and so this unit had to be protected from suffering unnecessary (Golly-geen, this word makes me crazy  ) losses.

Actually the Russian reserv (Stepnoi front) had 580000 infantry, 9000 artillery , 1640 tanks - very significant forces (several armies including 5th Guards tank army and 5th Guards infantry army).
Only these two 5th Guards armies were taken from  reserv and sent to cover the positions of the Voronezh's front (on the 6th of July). It was the most dangerous part of the Russian lines where German army despite of heavy losses managed to drive a wedge up to 30-35 km into Russian defence positions. The German panzerkorps hardly tryed to find the way to Oboyan', but the 1th and 6th Russian armies of Voronezh's front stayed well and the only way for panzerkorps was 8-9 km field on the west of Prokchorovka. The first groups of panzers were spoted there in the evening on the 11th of Julay. The 5th Guards armies got the order to counterattack the German tank forces and in the morning on the 12th of July the great tanks battle began...

BTW simultaneously on the 12th of July Russian armies of Brjansky and Zapadny fronts started the offence operation on the opposite flank and on the 15th of July it was supported also by the armies of  Centralny front. So the German army got a big problem (because of the very limited reservs) and was needed to stop the offence on Voronezh's front and start to think something about defence. (So it happend without Sicily operation).

Offline csThor

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I think you should not confuse "..nothing left..." with the general lack of reserves. In fact the main part of the Reserve Front stationed behind the ops area was placed far north as the STAWKA had thought of the northern sector to be center of attack (which was not correct). So no forces were close enough except the 5th Guards, as the majority of the tank units stationed in the southern sector had suffered high losses from german tanks and planes. I cannot completely recall when and which units but I know that some of the reserves had to be included into the defensive units because of the losses.

Offline leonid

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Regarding the battle of Kursk, it wasn't that the Soviet's Steppe Front were running dry - far from it.  It was that the Stavka had to get reinforcements to the main attack axis in a timely manner.  It was difficult at times to insure that this was done, which is why Steppe Front assets were used: they happened to be the closest armor assets at the crucial moment.

The Soviet plan was to put continuous pressure on the German flanks while blunting the head of the attack.  By doing this German reserves would be redirected to the flanks, and the actual push would be very narrow, ripe for possible encirlement.  Operationally, as aper states, there were a series of diversionary attacks, both north and south of the Kursk salient, and these were done to use up German operational reserves.

So basically, while the SS Panzer Corps was making steady headway, it was being done at a terrible price in men and equipment (there were not many German Pz Vs and VIs losses in the attack, but their support was taking a very heavy beating).  Couple this with the fact that almost all German reserves had been committed, and you can understand why the attack was called off.

Glantz has compared German archival records with Soviet archival records, and wrt Kursk OKH had no idea just how many Soviets were deployed in and around the salient, nor did they realize how fortified the area had become.  This became more and more common as the war progessed.  While the Red Army may not have been as skilled in tactical combat as the Germans, they were second to none when it came to operational intelligence and deception.

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Offline leonid

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Originally posted by Widewing:
See Professor Richard Overy's book, Russia's War. Published in 1998, Overy was granted access to much of the Russian's WWII records.
Did you know that more than 90% of all railroad stock, locomotives and rails used by the USSR were made in the USA? You may also wish to read Overy's Why the Allies Won.

My regards,

Widewing


I find it interesting that Overy also theorizes that no other type of government could have withstood such a German attack, and that it may be possible that only a leader such as Stalin could have held it all together during that time.

Btw, how much Glantz have you read?

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leonid, Kompol
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"Our cause is just.  The enemy will be crushed.  Victory will be ours."

[This message has been edited by leonid (edited 03-26-2001).]
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Offline Widewing

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Originally posted by leonid:
 I find it interesting that Overy also theorizes that no other type of government could have withstood such a German attack, and that it may be possible that only a leader such as Stalin could have held it all together during that time.

Btw, how much Glantz have you read?


I've read some of Glantz's magazine articles and I just picked up a copy of his book on Operation Mars.

I'm curious as to how Glantz has been received in Russia. How reliable do you see him?

My regards,

Widewing

My regards,

Widewing

YGBSM. Retired Member of Aces High Trainer Corps, Past President of the DFC, retired from flying as Tredlite.

Offline leonid

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Originally posted by Widewing:
I've read some of Glantz's magazine articles and I just picked up a copy of his book on Operation Mars.

I'm curious as to how Glantz has been received in Russia. How reliable do you see him?

My regards,

Widewing


Glantz has been at this for quite some time, not as long as Erickson, but since the 80's at least.  He is very respected within the historian community, including the Russian one.  Glantz' work on the Russian front is usually done by getting as much material from both sides, then trying to find the answer through the biases.  He tends to focus more from the Soviet side, mostly because it has not really been represented since war's end, in the western world.  However, that doesn't mean he necessarily favors the Soviets' side as his work on Operation Mars illustrates.  That book incidently pissed off quite a few Russians.  Personally, I have great respect for his work, as well as Erickson's.  The reason is that they both have taken great strides to getting sufficient data from both sides before making any assessments. A lot of Glantz' earlier works can be found at Frank Cass Pubs.

And regarding Soviet military archival material, it is probably one of the most detailed, and accurate, library of documents you'll find in the world.  The reason is that this was the collection of reports and assessments created by military circles for military circles in the Red Army.  Accountability was demanded to determine the methods and the cost for victory.  Anything less then truthful reports could have very dire consequences.  In reality, accuracy wasn't too hard to come by, since the Soviets were really fighting for their existence as a people, rather than just a political entity.

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leonid, Kompol
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Offline Buzzbait

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S! Leonid

You asked me to post material regarding which airforce was the most responsible for the destruction of the Luftwaffe.  I did so in my post:  "Who destroyed the Luftwaffe?".  But I don't see a comment from you.

By the way, I am not biased against the Soviets.  Neither am I an American trying to show how wonderful they were.  I'm a Canadian and I grew up admiring Spitfire and Typhoon pilots.  But the facts say the US Strat bombing campaign was the largest factor in destroying the Luftwaffe's ability to control the air over its troops and Germany.

In regards to the discussion ongoing regarding the contribution of the Soviets on the ground:

The Soviets did more damage to the Werhmacht than any other nation.  Without a doubt the Lend Lease which was provided to them by the U.S. and Britain was very helpful, perhaps crucial in a logistical sense.  But the vast majority of the material which the Soviets used to fight the German Army was Soviet produced.  Their tanks were superior to any the Allies sent them.  In fact many experts believe the Soviet Tanks were superior to the German.  Their guns usually had equal armour penetrative ability, but additionally they usually were a larger caliber, which made them more effective versus Infantry.  They were usually faster, and had as good armour protection.  Their treads were larger, which gave them better cross country ability.  The IS-122 was more than a match for the Panther, Tiger I and Tiger II.  The only area where the Germans had significant advantages was in Optics.  The better lenses on the Panzers allowed them to engage successfully at much longer ranges.  The Soviets compensated for this by extensive use of smoke to obscure the view of the attacking tanks.

The German Army never had less than 55% of its troops committed to the Eastern Front.  During the crucial years '41-'43, the number was closer to 70%.  While the British were fighting 4 or 5 German Divisions at El Alamein, the Soviets were facing 100's.  And beating them.  The fact is, the Soviet Armies would have driven to Berlin whether or not the Allies had invaded at Normandy.  Beginning in 1943, the Soviets launched offensives twice a year, in Summer and Winter.  These always cracked the German Fronts within a few days.  The subsequent advances only ended when supply distances to depots became too great for trucks (yes U.S. Supplied often) to supply the attacking columns, or the heavy artillery to keep up.  (Normally supply came from railheads, and the Russian rail gauge was a different width from the standard European and German, and since the Germans had converted all the rail to standard, the Soviets had to regauge it as they advanced. This took some time.)
Once the advance ended, the Soviets would simply begin preparations for another offensive.  They would bring up and emplace their artillery, restock their divisions, create new supply depots and when everything was ready, would simply break the front again.  There was nothing the Germans were able to do to stop them.

Matching up the Soviet Armies versus the Western Allies in 1945 shows to the Allies disadvantage.  The Allies only had advantages in the area of artillery fire control and in the air.  The Soviets greatly outnumbered them, and their equipment was generally superior.  It is likely that with the start of hostilities, the Allies would have been driven back to the Rhine.  But Strategically, the Soviets would undoubtably have lost in the end, ever without considering the Atomic bomb.

The fact was, the Soviets were actually exhausted by '45.  They had suffered 27 million dead, (mostly civilians killed during the incredible barbarism of the German occupation, their military losses were in the 8 million range)  They were actually beginning to run out of manpower to replenish their divisions.  They needed to rebuild their infrastructure, the Germans had destroyed everything of value as they retreated.  The Soviets needed to put people back to work rebuilding their country, not keep them under arms.

One last comment:   Someone above mentioned he thought that the Soviets needed a leader like Stalin in order to win the war.   I strongly disagree.  Stalin was the primary reason the Soviets had so many problems initially in surviving the German onslaught.  It was his purges in the '30's which eliminated the experienced Officer corps, and it was his idiotic commands during the summer of '41 which saw 1/2 the Soviet army destroyed.  It was only when he surrendered tactical command to Zhukov and allowed him to prepare the Moscow Counter-Offensive in November of 1941, that the Soviets began the long road back.  Even then he didn't learn his lesson.  In the Spring of 1942, Stalin insisted on the ill-considered Kharkov Offensive, which lost the Soviets close to 500,000 troops which they could ill-afford.  They should have been held back to meet the Summer '42 German Offensive.  After that he let his generals run things until 1944, by which time the situation was very much under control.  Stalin was a parasite on his people.  Only the ordinary Russian soldier's incredible heroism and stamina saved the Soviet Union.

Nath-BDP

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The lend-lease equipment did not reach the Soviets in time to aid the the decisive battles of '41 and mid '42, however, by late '42 and '43 onwards the lend-lease equipment played a very important role in the Soviet's ability to advance and keep their army in check. The most important objects supplied to the Soviets were most likely the trucks used for transportation of troops and supplies, iirc during one of the advances towards Berlin by the soviets in late '44 14,000 of the 18,000 trucks used in this advance were of Western origin.

Also, I disagree about how the Soviet advance across the Don towards the Donets and into Belgogrod and Kharkov was a mistake. This front in the northern sector above the caucuses was important to prevent a German counter attack from this sector to the south and indanger the Soviet southern front. Also, I belive Stalin knew that Hitler would order his forces to hold Kharkov to the last man, similar to his mistake in Stalingrad, however, this time the German command in Kharkov went against the Fuehrer directive and evacuated the city on Feb 15th 1943 and retreated back only to retake the Kharkov front from the Soviets in early March--which caught them totally by surprise.

It most also be remembered that the Soviet's waited to see if the British 8th Army advance in N. Africa was successfull before launching their Nov 19th winter offensive towards Stalingrad and to the South along the Volga and into the Caucases.

Offline leonid

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Buzzbait,
Sorry, but I really never questioned who hit the Luftwaffe the hardest.  My posts were directed at the effect lend lease had on the Red Army.  In fact, I agree with you.  The USAAF daylight strategic bombing was the major cause of the destruction of the jagdfliegeren, and in hindsight was arguably of greater importance than the actual bombing campaign itself.  And the P-51 was the icing on the cake.

Nath,
From an operational point of view the reckless Soviet advance towards Kharkov in the winter of '43 was a clear case of self-deception.  The STAVKA and operational commands were so firm in their belief that the German line would collapse that they continually ignored their subordinate commanders' warnings of a German buildup until it was much too late.  Fortunately, the recklessness of this costly operation was not lost on the Red Army.  From that point on, the Soviets never took anything for granted.

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leonid, Kompol
5 GvIAP VVS-KA, Knights

"Our cause is just.  The enemy will be crushed.  Victory will be ours."
ingame: Raz

jato757

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well, i dont think many of us are ww2 pilots, so we dont know how the planes flew. in most cases the guys flyin, for which ever side in real life had a few hours in the plane, or at least to where the could feal what the plane was going to do, not may people get to that point on aces high. they just get pised off and start callen people hacker   thats my opionin, btw i still fly the G-10

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[This message has been edited by jato757 (edited 03-27-2001).]

Offline Buzzbait

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S! Nath

I wasn't referring to the Spring '43 advance towards Kharkov and the Dneiper.  That was part of Zhukov's plan for the advance after Stalingrad.  And it was certainly worth the attempt, although the Soviet Tank Corps overstretched themselves in the attempt to cut off and trap the Germans in the Rostov area.

I was referring to the Spring '42 Offensive, the first attempt to retake Kharkov.  This followed the Soviet Counter-Offensive at Moscow.  After that successful attack, Stalin thought the Soviets had worn down the Germans enough to resume a strategic offensive posture.  In fact the Germans actually outnumbered the Soviets at that point in the war, and the best tactic would have been a defensive mode.  As it was, the attack was a complete failure, and made the German Army Group South Offensive in towards the Caucasus and the oilfields much easier.  Fortunately for the Soviets and the rest of the world, Hitler got fixated on Stalingrad, instead of bypassing it, and the rest is history.