Let's add some real life persepctive on the 38. This doesn't answer any epcific question on the AH P-38 but it just makes for thought. I high lighted on section in particular for the realism Nazi's
-Westy
A letter written by Col. Harold Rau,
Commanding Officer of the 20th Fighter Group.
20th Fighter Group Headquarters
APO 637 U.S. Army
(E-2)
3 June 1944
Subject: P-38 Airplane in Combat.
To: Commanding General, VIII Fighter Command, APO 637, U.S. Army.
1. The following observations are being put in writing by
the undersigned at the request of the Commanding General, VII FC.
They are intended purely as constructive criticism and are intended
in any way to "low rate" our present equipment.
2. After flying the P-38 for a little over one hundred hours
on combat missions it is my belief that the airplane, as it stands
now, is too complicated for the 'average' pilot. I want to put strong
emphasis on the word 'average, taking full consideration just how
little combat training our pilots have before going on as operational
status.
3. As a typical case to demonstrate my point, let us assume
that we have a pilot fresh out of flying school with about a total of
twenty-five hours in a P-38, starting out on a combat mission. He is
on a deep ramrod, penetration and target support to maximum endurance.
He is cruising along with his power set at maximum economy. He is
pulling 31" Hg and 2100 RPM. He is auto lean and running on external
tanks. His gun heater is off to relieve the load on his generator,
which frequently gives out (under sustained heavy load). His sight is
off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch may or may not be
on. Flying along in this condition, he suddenly gets "bounced", what
to do flashes through his mind. He must turn, he must increase power
and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main. So, he
reaches down and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches {valves} to
main - turns on his drop tank switches, presses his release button,
puts the mixture to auto rich (two separate and clumsy operations),
increases his RPM, increases his manifold pressure, turns on his gun
heater switch (which he must feel for and cannot possibly see), turns
on his combat switch and he is ready to fight. At this point, he has
probably been shot down or he has done one of several things wrong.
Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before
increasing RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure.
Or, he forgets to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive
cylinder head temperature with subsequent engine failure. 4. In my limited experience with a P-38 group, we have lost
as least four (4) pilots, who when bounced, took no immediate evasive
action. The logical assumption is that they were so busy in the
cockpit, trying to get organized that they were shot down before
they could get going.
5. The question that arises is, what are you going to do
about it? It is standard procedure for the group leader to call, five
minutes before R/V and tell all the pilots to "prepare for trouble".
This is the signal for everyone to get into auto rich, turn drop tank
switches on, gun heaters on, combat and sight switches on and to
increase RPM and manifold pressure to maximum cruise. This procedure,
however, does not help the pilot who is bounced on the way in and who
is trying to conserve his gasoline and equipment for the escort job
ahead.
6. What is the answer to these difficulties? During the past
several weeks we have been visited at this station time and time again
by Lockheed representatives, Allison representatives and high ranking
Army personnel connected with these two companies. They all ask about
our troubles and then proceed to tell us about the marvelous
mechanisms that they have devised to overcome these troubles that the
Air Force has turned down as "unnecessary". Chief among these is a
unit power control, incorporating an automatic manifold pressure
regulator, which will control power, RPM and mixture by use of a
single lever. It is obvious that there is a crying need for a device
like that in combat.
7. It is easy to understand why test pilots, who have never
been in combat, cannot readily appreciate what each split second means
when a "bounce" occurs. Every last motion when you get bounced is just
another nail in your coffin. Any device which would eliminate any of
the enumerated above, are obviously very necessary to make the P-38 a
really effective combat airplane.
8. It is also felt that that much could done to simplify the
gas switching system in this airplane. The switches {valve selector
handles} are all in awkward positions and extremely hard to turn. The
toggle switches for outboard tanks are almost impossible to operate
with gloves on.
9. My personal feeling about this airplane is that it is a
fine piece of equipment, and if properly handled, takes a back seat
for nothing that the enemy can produce. But it does need simplifying
to bring it within the capabilities of the 'average' pilot. I believe
that pilots like Colonel Ben Kelsey and Colonel Cass Huff are among
the finest pilots in the world today. But I also believe that it is
difficult for men like them to place their thinking and ability on
the level of a youngster with a bare 25 hours in the airplane, going
into his first combat. That is the sort of thinking that will have to
be done, in my opinion, to make the P-38 a first-class all around
fighting airplane.
HAROLD J. RAU
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.
[** It is worth noting that most of Rau's suggestions were addressed
in the P-38L-5-LO, including automatic powerplant controls]
