Tail Dragger

[Golfer]

If this situation happened in the future, what, if anything would you do different?

These are the normal debriefing items I'd give to anyone who did what you did.  First, you ended up alive.  Good job.  Now it's time to analyze what you could have done better for the future.

By my measure you had:

1.) A flight control issue that had been resolved. (e.g. No problems at all and a fully functioning aircraft.)
2.) A LAHSO restriction.  This shortened your available landing runway when you accepted the LAHSO clearance as you referenced.
3.) Clear VFR weather in the daytime with good visibility.
4.) Were fast.  Every approach you have a target approach speed and for your airplane I imagine it's the same of changes very little no matter what the weight or conditions are.  Since I know nothing about your airplane for this example lets call it 70 KIAS.  You were probably closer to 90 if you're as fast as you say you were.  This will as you pointed out causes excessive float especially when in ground effect.
5.) Parallel and crossing traffic.

Starting with point number one you had a fully functioning airplane, no emergency and no reason to question its airworthiness.  This is in your favor and its a good thing because you have every reason to expect it will perform for you as it has in the past.  So now you're on an approach in a perfect airplane.

Next is point number 2.  It's clear and a million with excellent visibility and you have all the traffic in sight.  No big deal here, right?  Flying a perfect airplane in perfect conditions, life is good.

Adding in point number 3 you're landing on a shortened runway from 6952' to about 3500 to 3600' with the acceptance of the LAHSO clearance.  I'm sure 3500' is no big deal in your airplane as is the case for many/most piston singles out there but it's shorter than your average GA runway and worthy of extra caution.  When you fly into a 3500' runway normally I'm sure you plan your approach, fly a fairly precise pattern and nail your target airspeed all the way down final so as to minimize float, touch down firmly and do whatever your AFM/POH has you do if that runway is classified as a short field.  This is no big deal, flying a perfect airplane into a runway of suitable length (3500') for it to operate.

Point number 4 we start to get away from flying your perfect airplane into a suitable runway by introducing the fact that we're fast.  Really fast.  Unsafe fast.  Fast enough that now the outcome of the approach and subsequent landing is in doubt.  What do you do in this situation normally?  If you are not stabilized (that's the "S" word) then you go around.  I imagine the Go-Around procedure for your airplane is fairly simple bringing in the power, retracting to a certain flap stage and climbing at either Vx or Vy or other perscribed speed  until you reach a safe altitude.  If you're that far over your airspeed on final you go around.  You're trained to do this and you do it.  So now we get to the first critique item of the day.  In the end, go around if you're not stabilized on approach.

Point 5.  You mentioned the parallel traffic landing 4R and the crossing guy landing 8L.  You seem to feel as though you are boxed in with nowhere to go and nothing could be further from the truth.  You seem to also feel as though you were obligated to land no matter what was going on.  This is not true either.  Neither of these airplanes can or should affect your decision and your obligation to discontinue the approach if it is no longer safe to do so.  If you go around, fly your runway heading, see and avoid the two other airplanes and follow ATCs instructions if they have any to give immediately you won't have an issue.  The guys in the tower are depending on you to make safely your LAHSO restriction because the landing clearance they gave to the 8L traffic is predicated upon that.  If you can't do it the first thing you do is tell ATC "Unable."  "Unable Land and Hold Short 8L."  "Unable LAHSO."  "Unable landing restriction." You do this as soon as possible so the other pilots and the controllers in that tower cab can make the safest decision possible.  This might be ordering you to go-around which as we touched on in point 4 should have been your intial course of action in the first place rather than continuing an unsafe and unnecessary approach without telling anyone.

These situations happen in the real world and there is a reason that come companys in their Ops Specs prohibit the acceptance of a LAHSO clearance.  I've flown for some companies that allow it, others that don't.  One isn't more right or more wrong than the other it's just a decision based on what one operator might deem as safety factor but this also depends on the type of equipment they're operating.  Flying in Part 121 passenger service I was permitted to accept a LAHSO where prior to that flying for a smaller company in light business jets I was prohibited.  In my current business jet and operation I can accept a LAHSO but there are some runway configurations at certain airports I won't.  This is no big deal either if you tell ATC at initial check in "Unable Land and Hold Short."  They simply don't put someone on the crossing runway when you're landing and that's that.

Even the professionals mess up.  On short final, inside a mile to Runway 22 at LaGuardia there was a Delta MD80 variant rolling out on 31.  Watching them on the rollout they were not slowing as quickly as I hoped and I perked up a little more brushing my thumb over the Go-Around button on the thrust levers.  They were slowing, slowing slowing and just when you thought they would make it they called on the radio "DL 1234, We're not going to make the hold short." Before ATC even had a chance to issue an instruction it I had already initiated a go-around and the other pilot and I cleaned the airplane up on schedule.  ATC issued us a go-around by saying "Airliner 5678 Go Around" after we had initiated not even a second before. "5678 Going Around" is the reply and we're once again climbing. There was no harm done, no hurt feelings and no ruffled feathers because everyone was safe.  A visual downwind and rejoining the localizer when ATC had made a spot for us (at LGA this isn't as easy as you think) in the conga line had us back on approach and safely on the ground shortly thereafter.

Charlotte. NC is another airport that has a lot of potential for go-arounds and traffic conflicts partly due to its layout, partly due to it has a large staff of controller trainees and also because of the operations.  General aviation piston, turboprop and jet airplanes mixing with a US Airways hub and other major airline operations has aircraft performance differences as well as pilot experience/comfort differences.  All the more reason to keep your head on a swivel and your eyes and ears open.  In fact in my time flying for a 121 operator in the dozen or so go arounds I made, most were at Charlotte, some at LGA while still others in PHL.  I didn't have a single one at an outstation that I can recall which were typically smaller airports and lower traffic volumes.

In your situation you're in visual weather conditions, have the other airplanes in sight and would have no trouble seeing and avoiding them as you maneuvered on a go-around.  That's the route I'd take in the future instead of trying to make a bad situation worse putting your airplane, your life, your fathers life and the lives on the other airplane at risk doing something you might not be capable of doing.  It sounds like the airplane was barely capable of doing what it did and that is attributed more to luck than to pilot skill because you should have never been in that situation to begin with.  A little thought of what the safest and most prudent action would be while taking this experience with you in the future will do you a good service.

A go-around is always an option until it isn't an option.  That may sound like something weird an old timer might say but there's more truth to it than you know taken a face value.  Good luck.

[RichardDarkwood]

If this situation happened in the future, what, if anything would you do different?

These are the normal debriefing items I'd give to anyone who did what you did.  First, you ended up alive.  Good job.  Now it's time to analyze what you could have done better for the future.

By my measure you had:

1.) A flight control issue that had been resolved. (e.g. No problems at all and a fully functioning aircraft.)
2.) A LAHSO restriction.  This shortened your available landing runway when you accepted the LAHSO clearance as you referenced.
3.) Clear VFR weather in the daytime with good visibility.
4.) Were fast.  Every approach you have a target approach speed and for your airplane I imagine it's the same of changes very little no matter what the weight or conditions are.  Since I know nothing about your airplane for this example lets call it 70 KIAS.  You were probably closer to 90 if you're as fast as you say you were.  This will as you pointed out causes excessive float especially when in ground effect.
5.) Parallel and crossing traffic.

Starting with point number one you had a fully functioning airplane, no emergency and no reason to question its airworthiness.  This is in your favor and its a good thing because you have every reason to expect it will perform for you as it has in the past.  So now you're on an approach in a perfect airplane.

Next is point number 2.  It's clear and a million with excellent visibility and you have all the traffic in sight.  No big deal here, right?  Flying a perfect airplane in perfect conditions, life is good.

Adding in point number 3 you're landing on a shortened runway from 6952' to about 3500 to 3600' with the acceptance of the LAHSO clearance.  I'm sure 3500' is no big deal in your airplane as is the case for many/most piston singles out there but it's shorter than your average GA runway and worthy of extra caution.  When you fly into a 3500' runway normally I'm sure you plan your approach, fly a fairly precise pattern and nail your target airspeed all the way down final so as to minimize float, touch down firmly and do whatever your AFM/POH has you do if that runway is classified as a short field.  This is no big deal, flying a perfect airplane into a runway of suitable length (3500') for it to operate.

Point number 4 we start to get away from flying your perfect airplane into a suitable runway by introducing the fact that we're fast.  Really fast.  Unsafe fast.  Fast enough that now the outcome of the approach and subsequent landing is in doubt.  What do you do in this situation normally?  If you are not stabilized (that's the "S" word) then you go around.  I imagine the Go-Around procedure for your airplane is fairly simple bringing in the power, retracting to a certain flap stage and climbing at either Vx or Vy or other perscribed speed  until you reach a safe altitude.  If you're that far over your airspeed on final you go around.  You're trained to do this and you do it.  So now we get to the first critique item of the day.  In the end, go around if you're not stabilized on approach.

Point 5.  You mentioned the parallel traffic landing 4R and the crossing guy landing 8L.  You seem to feel as though you are boxed in with nowhere to go and nothing could be further from the truth.  You seem to also feel as though you were obligated to land no matter what was going on.  This is not true either.  Neither of these airplanes can or should affect your decision and your obligation to discontinue the approach if it is no longer safe to do so.  If you go around, fly your runway heading, see and avoid the two other airplanes and follow ATCs instructions if they have any to give immediately you won't have an issue.  The guys in the tower are depending on you to make safely your LAHSO restriction because the landing clearance they gave to the 8L traffic is predicated upon that.  If you can't do it the first thing you do is tell ATC "Unable."  "Unable Land and Hold Short 8L."  "Unable LAHSO."  "Unable landing restriction." You do this as soon as possible so the other pilots and the controllers in that tower cab can make the safest decision possible.  This might be ordering you to go-around which as we touched on in point 4 should have been your intial course of action in the first place rather than continuing an unsafe and unnecessary approach without telling anyone.

These situations happen in the real world and there is a reason that come companys in their Ops Specs prohibit the acceptance of a LAHSO clearance.  I've flown for some companies that allow it, others that don't.  One isn't more right or more wrong than the other it's just a decision based on what one operator might deem as safety factor but this also depends on the type of equipment they're operating.  Flying in Part 121 passenger service I was permitted to accept a LAHSO where prior to that flying for a smaller company in light business jets I was prohibited.  In my current business jet and operation I can accept a LAHSO but there are some runway configurations at certain airports I won't.  This is no big deal either if you tell ATC at initial check in "Unable Land and Hold Short."  They simply don't put someone on the crossing runway when you're landing and that's that.

Even the professionals mess up.  On short final, inside a mile to Runway 22 at LaGuardia there was a Delta MD80 variant rolling out on 31.  Watching them on the rollout they were not slowing as quickly as I hoped and I perked up a little more brushing my thumb over the Go-Around button on the thrust levers.  They were slowing, slowing slowing and just when you thought they would make it they called on the radio "DL 1234, We're not going to make the hold short." Before ATC even had a chance to issue an instruction it I had already initiated a go-around and the other pilot and I cleaned the airplane up on schedule.  ATC issued us a go-around by saying "Airliner 5678 Go Around" after we had initiated not even a second before. "5678 Going Around" is the reply and we're once again climbing. There was no harm done, no hurt feelings and no ruffled feathers because everyone was safe.  A visual downwind and rejoining the localizer when ATC had made a spot for us (at LGA this isn't as easy as you think) in the conga line had us back on approach and safely on the ground shortly thereafter.

Charlotte. NC is another airport that has a lot of potential for go-arounds and traffic conflicts partly due to its layout, partly due to it has a large staff of controller trainees and also because of the operations.  General aviation piston, turboprop and jet airplanes mixing with a US Airways hub and other major airline operations has aircraft performance differences as well as pilot experience/comfort differences.  All the more reason to keep your head on a swivel and your eyes and ears open.  In fact in my time flying for a 121 operator in the dozen or so go arounds I made, most were at Charlotte, some at LGA while still others in PHL.  I didn't have a single one at an outstation that I can recall which were typically smaller airports and lower traffic volumes.

In your situation you're in visual weather conditions, have the other airplanes in sight and would have no trouble seeing and avoiding them as you maneuvered on a go-around.  That's the route I'd take in the future instead of trying to make a bad situation worse putting your airplane, your life, your fathers life and the lives on the other airplane at risk doing something you might not be capable of doing.  It sounds like the airplane was barely capable of doing what it did and that is attributed more to luck than to pilot skill because you should have never been in that situation to begin with.  A little thought of what the safest and most prudent action would be while taking this experience with you in the future will do you a good service.

A go-around is always an option until it isn't an option.  That may sound like something weird an old timer might say but there's more truth to it than you know taken a face value.  Good luck.

That is called being SERVED



Dammmmm Golfer is keeping it real!





Todd

[Golfer]

No it's not.  Please don't interpret it as such because that's a disservice to what it really is.

It's a critique of a pilots performance based on an evaluation (or in this case an evaluation of Serenity's telling of the story) which are continuous and ongoing in ones flying career whether it be professional or recreational.

It's the same critique I'd give a private pilot and a professional alike and it's told objectively, without intent to demean, belittle or discourage the person receiving the critique.  It's the same critique I'd expect to receive had I made the same decisions.  A critical element to learning is making mistakes as well as learning from the mistakes of others.  This early in his career he hasn't had the exposure to make that many and will continually find himself in new situations (this is true for every pilot out there regardless of logbook hours) that will call upon their experience and judgement to see them through.  This experience of Serenity's is a golden opportunity to not only learn what happens when you have a slightly out of control feeling, which is uncomfortable and good for learning in and of itself, but also to learn that it's up to you to prevent yourself from letting a future situation develop into that feeling ever again.

It's not an ooh-rah, backslap, high five moment to come through what Serenity did.  It was being smiled upon by fate on that day and I'm confident that he had the attention of the controller in the Tower Cab with his thumb on the mic switch, the pilots in the other airplane landing on 8L who were primed for a go-around and the airplane landing on his parallel runway watching the situation unfold.  He wasn't alone.

It's not a beat down by any means.  It's illuminating the mistakes you made so you can learn from them and be safer in the future.

[mechanic]

Excelent write up golfer, but I think you're missing his motives in sharing the story! Just for a fraction of time our young pilot friend had loss of control and death flash before his mind's eye. Sure it turned out ok and to be something almost comical, with hindsight. All the debrief material in the world has little impact compared to the rush of thought that he has experienced in that fleeting few seconds. Considering he is young it is likely that he wants to share this experience with others as much as possible, because quite simply put and quite understandably, it scared the living soup out of him and left a permanent mark.  

[Golfer]

There is nothing funny or comical about what happened on that approach and it should leave a mark.

I also haven't missed any points.  Age is irrelevant.  He has the certificate in his pocket, the airplane doesn't care how old you are, the ground doesn't care how old you are and gravity doesn't care how old you are.  All that matters are the decisions you make based on the experience you have.  I had more than 2000 hours in transport category jets before I could even rent a car.  Did my date of birth play a part in successfully handling various emergencies in numerous types of airplanes or did the experience I'd gathered on my own and with the help of others better prepare me to handle those events?

As a pilot you are never committed to do something someone on the ground says to if it's not what you want to do.  That's the final authority of the Pilot in Command to use their Emergency authority.  This doesn't have to be officially declaring an emergency especially if there is no time.  (There is also no stigma to declaring an emergency.  I've never filled out an "FAA Emergency Report Form" because they don't exist.  The most I've ever done is a company incident report and the firefighters/rescue persons asking for some basic info.) Do what you need to do to remedy the situation, keep the airplane right side up and going where you want and then if there is time let people know what it is you're doing.  Aviate, Navigate and then Communicate.  Very little that happens in airplanes require fast hands and quick thinking.  Solving a flight control malfunction such as this is one of the very few and it gets your attention RIGHT NOW!

He did exactly right by remaining calm, assessing the situation and solving the problem.  The problem was then gone.  The situation was over.  The airplane is in perfect flying condition, working as advertised and he's now 20 or more knots fast trying to land on a short runway.  We're back to basic airmanship and aeronautical decision making.  That's all.

Like I said, it's a critique.  It's a "good job for living, now lets see what we can do better for next time" learning experience.  It's not meant as anything less.

In the future if there's something you're not comfortable with Serenity use the word "Unable."  Unable LAHSO today.  Unable Runway 4L due to winds, request Runway 8L.  Unable heading due to weather, mountain, party balloons, sharks with laser beams, etc.   Don't let someone force you into something you're not comfortable with.  You absolutely have the final authority when you're the PIC.  Good luck.

[mechanic]

 

[Serenity]

You seem to also feel as though you were obligated to land no matter what was going on.

Actually, you hit the nail on the head here. Working with instructors around this particular airport for years, I was brought up to feel that any slip-up at this particular tower, and I could expect to lose my license and be fined out of existence. I will say, I did feel a particular NEED to land on the first go.

Before continuing, I want to state that when I read your debrief, I saw it as instruction offered, not as an attack or anything, so please do not read this as argument, or rebuttal.

The idea of a go-around actually entered into my mind just as I leveled out and regained control. Three things jumped into my head: Despite having had good results from removing the glasses, I wasn't positive that was the cause of the loss of control; The landing wouldn't be as perfect as I would have liked, I knew with a little finesse, I could make it; and third, I was shaken up. The safest thing for me to do was get on the ground while I was still thinking clearly.

Even after landing, I wasn't convinced the glasses were the sole root of the problem, I'm still not. The way the controls seized just didn't seem right for interference with the stick, so I just wanted to hit the dirt, ASAP. In retrospect, that is not good motivation to go to ground. That would imply I would land even if I would miss the LAHSO. That's not the case, but I won't lie, my ADM wasn't perfect, and I was shaken.

There were two key factors to deciding to try to stick the landing. Firstly, I was fast, but low. As I saw it, my extra speed at that point in my approach was compensated for by my lack of altitude at that point in the approach. Secondly, I felt I would be able to determine several more seconds into the approach whether I could absolutely make it, or not. And with my power-to-weight ratio and climb rate, so even if I touched down, and just could not apply brakes fast enough, I knew I could throttle up and get back above pattern altitude in MUCH less time than it would take to continue slowing down.

Long story short, shaken and unsure, the one thing I knew was that I was confident I could make the landing, and that if it ever got too close for comfort, I could get back into the air without violating the LAHSO.

Perhaps it was the wrong decision. As a third party observer, I know I would be questioning my own decision right now. Had the altitude or speed been even the slightest bit different, I may have made a different decision. And I was CERTAINLY wrong to have felt constrained to land. But that was my thought process.

Both your post and mine however, go a LONG way to emphasizing the need for instruction BEFORE climbing into ANY cockpit!

[mechanic]

Both your post and mine however, go a LONG way to emphasizing the need for instruction BEFORE climbing into ANY cockpit!

Just as my flippant remark about flying the crazy plane in the OP is backed up by limited yet comprehensive and succesfull flying instruction in my past, the subject of the OP had also had previous flying instruction, so why are all the licenced pilots making this point so vehemently? It sounds a little bit like the licences pilots here are feeling like 'I had to work really hard to earn the right to fly, so why should he be able to fly for free damnit'

 

[Serenity]

Just as my flippant remark about flying the crazy plane in the OP is backed up by limited yet comprehensive and succesfull flying instruction in my past, the subject of the OP had also had previous flying instruction, so why are all the licenced pilots making this point so vehemently? It sounds a little bit like the licences pilots here are feeling like 'I had to work really hard to earn the right to fly, so why should he be able to fly for free damnit'

 

As I understood it, he had no formal instruction. Learning to fly a plane and jump out of one are very different things! (Although I must say, I do hope to jump out of one soon, although I'm not old enough yet )

[mechanic]

He told me that his uncle who owns a Cessna prop aircraft and has his own strip has taken him up on several flights. So he does have some experience.

And I am not gonna tell a two time winner of the purple heart that he shouldn't do anything. I think he has earned the right.




Todd

 

[Serenity]

 

ROFL. If that counts for training, I should be IFR multi engine rated!

(P-3 Simulator with a Navy instructor )

[Cougar68]

It sounds a little bit like the licences pilots here are feeling like 'I had to work really hard to earn the right to fly, so why should he be able to fly for free damnit'

 

Or maybe it's that the licensed pilots in here know exactly what the guy is in for and don't want to see him kill himself and put another black mark on our hobby?

[Penguin]

And who said the guy wasn't going to inspect it?


From talking with him he seems to have learned from his first mistake and plans to be much safer in the future.




Todd

In war, and in flight, the first casualty is always the plan.

-Penguin

[Yossarian]

I hate to say it, but this guy is so screwed.

[Penguin]

Darwin Award FTW!  Wait, FTW stands for For The Win, but this would be a fail, which would defy logic.  However, a fail could be a win if it was funn- Wait!  What am I saying?  This man could kill himself, or others, are you mad, man?  Get him of that contraption this very instant!

-Penguin