Beginnings of a spin, and our current TAA training methods

[Wolfala]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bk8hZ6ug-tI

Was giving a landing clinic the other week. Part of that was steep turns, slow flight, then stalls, and hopefully landings thereafter. This portion was slow flight - and I'm using it as an example of what not to do.

This weekend was an interesting weekend to evaluate what was being taught to very green private pilot candidates. One particular candidate was low time, pre-solo with around 27 hours in a SR-20G3 w/ Perspective. Without going into the gruesome details, there was a tendency for this individual to focus purely inside the cockpit. We started off with the usual incidence of steep turns - this time forcing attention to the outside of the aircraft by covering everything up. Then we got into some slow flight, and I had given the instruments back, but - again, the attention was being narrowly focused inside the cockpit and not what was going on outside. Now normally I wouldn't harp on this as much as I am going to, but I'm going to throw a bunch of guys under the bus for this one.

WHY is anyone who is pre-solo spending time staring at screens and not focusing their attention outside and learning to drive the airplane, and not have it drive them? I say this for a very important reason - because when we got to slow flight, what began as a fairly simple exercise went into a bunch of secondary stalls, the students panic reaction of twisting the stick to counter the drop of the nose and roll (which only made things worse), and us nose down 130* over......same thing with real power off stalls (I'll take some screen caps of this one when I get home). Stuff like this I don't mind b/c it really illustrates to the student where their deficiencies are and what they need to work on...but if you have yr head stuck inside the cockpit and not focusing on what matters in those first formative hours (FLYING THE PLANE) - how is anyone expected to learn what the plane is doing without scaring the hell out of themselves and taking way longer to complete?

INSTRUCTORS - for your primaries pre-solo: TURN THE SCREENS OFF





This is a critical point. The law of primacy says that what we teach these students very early in their flying careers matters, and matters a lot, sometimes to the extent of life and death.

Case in point was the Indianapolis, IN departure stall in IMC where the airplane ended up in a little pond after a very low CAPS pull. The pilot died and the 3 passengers survived.

Here is the full NTSB report http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=CHI06FA245&rpt=fa

The airplane was more than 300 pounds over gross and the CG was (slightly) aft of the aft limit, but even in that condition was capable of a 900 FPM climb. After departure, airspeed was allowed to deteriorate to the extent that the airplane stalled, but, almost unbelievably, it remained in a full stall for 30 seconds. Seemingly there was either no recognition that the airplane was stalled (hard to miss - it was at 70 knots, "wallowing" with the stall horn going off) or the pilot did not know how to recover from the stalled condition. By witness accounts, he was "frozen" in a full aft pull on the yoke, as if he thought that if he just kept pulling hard enough the airplane would stop descending.

It was originally thought that it was a pilot incapacitation accident but it was later determined that he died as a result of the impact.

How could anyone in this situation not recognize and recover from the stall (never mind avoid it)? Some on these Forums have opined that stalls and stall recoveries should not be routinely practiced. To them I say here is your result.  But beyond the recurrent training aspect, there has to be early, limbic system-level training by sight and sound and control feel for stalls and their recoveries.  Playing with the fancy gee-gaws can, and must, wait.

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NTSB Identification: CHI06FA245
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, August 28, 2006 in Indianapolis, IN
Probable Cause Approval Date: 8/15/2008
Aircraft: Cirrus SR22, registration: N91MB
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 3 Serious.

The right seat passenger reported that the takeoff and initial climb were uneventful until the airplane reached about 4,000 feet of altitude. That was when he noticed that the sound of the engine had changed and saw that the pilot was struggling to control the airplane. The airplane went through a series of three quick rolls and the wing dipped down. The airplane entered a counterclockwise spin. The pilot told the right seat passenger to pull the emergency parachute handle, so he pulled the throttle back to idle, and then pulled the parachute handle. The airplane impacted a water retention pond about 4 seconds later. Witnesses observed the airplane descending through the clouds with a partially deployed parachute. The inspection of the engine and airframe revealed no pre-existing anomalies. The engine data obtained from the Multi-Function Display indicated the engine was operating at full power for the entire flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed with variable cloud bases of 400 - 1,100 feet above the ground (agl) and with cloud tops reported at 3,200 feet above mean sea level. The baggage found in the baggage compartment weighed 262 pounds. The weight limit of the baggage compartment was 130 pounds maximum. The calculated takeoff condition weight of the accident airplane was 3,733 pounds. The Maximum Takeoff Weight was limited to 3,400 pounds. The center-of-gravity (CG) position was at fuselage station (FS) 148.7 inches, or 32.8 percent mean aerodynamic chord (MAC). The CG limits at maximum gross weight are from FS 143.8 inches to FS 148.1 inches. The airplane was overloaded and the CG position was aft of the CG limit. An aircraft performance study, which utilized data extracted from accident airplane, indicated that the airplane's airspeed decayed until the stall angle of attack of the wing was exceeded. The airplane was in a stalled condition for about 30 seconds and then entered a spin.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilot's failure to maintain sufficient airspeed, which resulted in a stall and subsequent spin. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's inadequate preflight planning, the overloaded condition of the airplane, and the CG aft of the CG limit.

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Fly safe guys.

[Guppy35]

Why would anyone suggest not practicing stalls and stall recovery?  Seems pretty basic.

I know I had to ask back when I took flying lessons to be shown spins and spin recovery but stalls were always part of the deal, probably every time I went up with an instructor.

Seems like taking the mystery out of stuff would be the way to go.

[Wolfala]

Why would anyone suggest not practicing stalls and stall recovery?  Seems pretty basic.

I know I had to ask back when I took flying lessons to be shown spins and spin recovery but stalls were always part of the deal, probably every time I went up with an instructor.

Seems like taking the mystery out of stuff would be the way to go.

Sadly there exists pilots who are so afraid of stalls they pad 10 to 15 knots on their landing speed. This usually winds with them dead or a porpoise and then prop strike.

[Stoney]

I know for me, when I was completing those first few hours, I was intimidated by the instructor giving me a heading to hold, and altitude to hold, pitch for this speed, etc...All of these things encouraged me to keep my head down looking at instruments.  Unfortunately, I didn't learn how to keep my head up and out of the cockpit.  It took me a bit to break the habit of wanting to concentrate on the gauges.  I don't know what the remedy to that is either.

[Golfer]

Flight simulator pilots make for great instrument students and I recommended to all of mine to get a copy of flight sim as well as the yoke to practice their basic IFR skills.

Flight simulator can pilots make for frustrating primary students because while they have in their mind a functional set of skills and existing knowledge.  They also have habit of staying inside the airplane which without the proper amount of reinforcement (in some cases a towel taped to the instrument panel) in basic stick and rudder skills will continue to stay focused on the panel.

My preferred method was covering everything up with little soap holders, duct tape and a golf towel or simply flying an airplane with nothing more than a basic VFR panel which usually included aerobatic capability.

That said...27 hours and pre solo?  I have a hard time putting the blame on the student for that one.  I don't buy into putting primary students into glass cockpits either.  While yes it's possible and yes it's been done it's no secret that transitioning to glass from steam gauges is easier than transitioning to steam gauges from glass.  That student needs a reboot in a 172, Cherokee or better yet any number of conventional gear airplanes.  I don't even want to know what 27 hours in an SR20G3 costs but I'd say its well over double what I paid for my entire private and instrument training combined. 

[Wolfala]

That said...27 hours and pre solo?  I have a hard time putting the blame on the student for that one.  I don't buy into putting primary students into glass cockpits either.  While yes it's possible and yes it's been done it's no secret that transitioning to glass from steam gauges is easier than transitioning to steam gauges from glass.  That student needs a reboot in a 172, Cherokee or better yet any number of conventional gear airplanes.  I don't even want to know what 27 hours in an SR20G3 costs but I'd say its well over double what I paid for my entire private and instrument training combined.  

Me neither, I think this person got sold a bag of goods. I have conventional steam and no automation to speak of - which might be why I was brought in by their parents. Yea I don't want to think of what a G3 costs to rent let alone get taught in. Just trying to get the poor kid straightened out as best I can - extremely discouraging when i see this happening.

The past few weekends I hosted the first of what will be several Landing Clinics for Cirrus drivers mainly in response to the 8 accidents we've had in the last 6 weeks here on the East Coast. The vast majority of those accidents were landing related, guys coming in 10 or 15 knots over Vref, prop striking, hitting hard, low slow max AoA, and generally dying for the most part.

The first 3 pilots were in mid july 17th and 18th: all 3 pilots were very good sticks - figure on the minimum 250 hours, with the highest of them closer to 1000 TT. Each of them wanted a checkup for different reasons; 1 had a prop strike in his past, another thought his landings were imitating Top Gun a bit too much; another just for a general checkup to make sure they were safe.

After flying with all of them, there emerged a few common threads which wove them all together:  Speed and Energy Management and a stabilized approach profile

Depending on who I was flying with, some patterns were 130 knots on the downwind with a power reduction to grease it on at Vref, some were 110 knots and 85 over the numbers - there was a lot of variability. Each student would demonstrate an arrival at the pattern coming from cruise and give me a landing, then a typical pattern and landing after a touch and go - we'd make corrections from there.

For all 3 individuals, once their energy management issues were identified, each one demonstrated a DRAMATIC improvement in the consistency of their landings. Another thing which helped was getting each individual closer to the runway before making a power reduction to the flare and touchdown.

With each person now having a stabilized approach profile more or less dialed in, we went from 300 foot wide NATO plates to the normal normal every day 150 ft x 5000 ft variety, and then drilled down to 3000 feet with obstacles, to 2500 ft with no obstacles, and then finally 2100 feet with trees on both ends - the latter only having been possible with yr speed and approach angle under control.

Two individual started off uncomfortable landing on runways shorter then 3000 feet and no obstacles - both managed to get into 2100 ft with obstacles without issue once they were comfortable with the aircraft.

Each pilot had around 4 hours of external HD video recorded - which was transferred to them after the session. I went through the tapes later in the day and issued an AAR for areas worth paying attention to. Its a long day for these guys, so to be able to digest everything which occurred and review it at their leisure, and see mistakes made and what could've been done differently is of tremendous value.

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Some issues which cropped up on 2 out of the 3 pilots; both engaged the auto pilot at 300 feet after takeoff. That bothers me. Its impossible to know what an aircraft feels like when under high power, high AoA, when the computer is driving it. The auto pilot is great as a workload reduction device - but not at the erosion of yr hand flying skills. It is also completely useless when it comes time to land and kicks off anyway.

Pilots are not bringing the aircraft close enough to the runway before reducing power for the flare - this results in an excessive sink rate and hard landing. Gotta get guys over the numbers, under 5 feet, bring the power back and gradually increase the pitch attitude for a good 1 foot per second sink to the concrete.

At least 1 pilot transitioning from the factory was not instructed how to conduct a Hot Start. Its a good thing we have a thread for that:  http://www.cirruspilots.org/forums/t/118470.aspx

In general, especially for the guys buying new - they are NOT receiving enough training on how the actual aircraft flies in various configurations. I see far too much emphasis on the displays and systems, and not enough if any on the actual aircraft itself. Maybe its the instructors that were given the CSIP designation for some of these folks not having any experience in other types (i.e. the SR is the only thing they know - and its hard to draw useful comparisons to show students for why something can be done in this plane vs others). I see a lot of value in having a broad experience in aircraft types for this reason specifically.

[Wolfala]

I guess what bothers me more then anything else is the Bonanza syndrome (to abuse the term - b/c it affects all high performance types). You got low time, type A's who are used to bulldozing their way through life thinking they can do it in an aircraft. And what they don't realize about the Cirrus 20/22 is its a really difficult aircraft to master - especially when it comes to the edge of the envelope. The difference between success and failure of a landing at Vref is +- 5 knots, with the plus side being the bounce and porpoise / prop strike risk, and the minus side maxing out the A0A - and when u dump the power hitting hard with the prop strike and all the bad stuff that goes along with it.

Ah well...good to vent.

[Stoney]

I think all that emphasis on tech really has a tremendous impact on stick and rudder skills.  I think there may be an impulse to concentrate on running all that electronic stuff in those hours they get in the plane, versus solid stick and rudder.  Unfortunately, none of that stuff is a replacement for the basic VFR skills common to everything from a Cub to the Cirrus, et al.  The amount of stick time required for full proficiency includes almost twice that for a basic VFR aircraft because the systems skills and proficiency is over-laid on the basic VFR stuff.  Heck, even Flying magazine seems to stress the system stuff over basic VFR skills.

I think the basic proficiency level of the average GA pilot in general is too low.  They don't get enough hours.  Having spent time in military squadrons, its interesting to see how they approach training and proficiency.  Perhaps there should be some sort of proficiency standards set by your community that can be encouraged (like 10 manual touch and gos every month or something).  Obviously the FAA mins aren't getting it done.  How many of these guys are flying hard-core IFR anyway?