Your first two few opinions contradict themselves. The fact is the IJA NEVER used armor the same way Germany did early in the war. Not EVER.
Who claimed the IJA used similar armored tactics as the Germans did? Japan's armored doctrine was similar to that of the US in that the tank was seen as a tool for directly supporting the infantry and were rarely allowed independent action. Again, this is a typical pattern with you. You can't argue the original points so you create these "artificial" points to argue when they were never brought up to begin with or even part of the original argument.
At the khalkhin-gol incident it was true they were outnumbered in tanks but they still had at least 135 and used them the way they did the entire war. Poorly made tanks, using poorly thought out tactics and . Unfortunately for them they went against a guy namd Zhukov who actually did know what he was doing. How to use combined arms and massed tank formations, a lesson the IJA never did learn in all their years of war.
Again, what evidence or any other data do you have that you can show that the tanks of the Imperial Japanese Army were poorly made? You've been asked previously to cite any sources but you haven't. No one argued that poor tactics, like the withdrawal of air support after local IJAF commanders launched a devastating air raid against the Soviets or poor logistical planning were the two major contributors to the Japanese losing this battle. However, you will not find one credible source that will cite "poorly made tanks" or other equipment as the cause.
This is all so well documented, as is the quality of IJA tanks and the steel used for them, that I just cant argue it with two people who only blubber about books, "as if Im going to bother reading them over this".
The issue with the Japanese tanks wasn't the poor quality of steel to used in their construction, because it wasn't. The problem was one of priority over the use of limited resources like steel. When hostilities commenced in in the Pacific, priority for steel went to the IJN and IJAF for warship and aircraft production and the resources needed by the army were either diverted or curtailed.
Find evidence I can read by clicking a mouse, which you cant.
I've already listed a couple of books that give the information I've cited in my posts in this thread. It is not my fault that you find it very difficult to read a book, that is why I had originally recommending someone that doesn't have this difficulty in reading it to you.
The pacific war wasnt really a tank war,
Never claimed it was, all I did was correct your original misconception about the use of tanks in the Pacific Theater.
oh I know there were some tanks, due to terrain, and tank manufacturing/quality was a low priority for their high command manufactureing decision making. The truth is neither side considered the Pacific terrain as very good for classic tank tactics.
Because tank on tank combat wasn't part of the Imperial Japanese Army's armor doctrine, the IJA saw the tank as a tool for supporting infantry, which was the same doctrine followed by the United States until the end of World War II. It was the Germans and to some lesser extent the Soviets and British, that saw the tank as more than just infantry support. So, yes you are correct that a lot of the island that were fought on weren't ideal for "tank vs. tank" combat but on the islands that did have terrain suitable like Saipan you did see limited tank vs. tank combat in larger than company strength. In Saipan, Vol. Hideki Goto led his 9th Tank Regiment in a night tank counter attack against Col. Jim Riseley's First Battalion, Sixth Marines which later broiled down to a tank on tank engagement when Marine Shermans and LVT(A)-4 amtanks got into the battle. Out of 50 tanks, Goto lost 38 tanks and his regiment was only left with 12 tanks, of which most were in dire need of repair.
Because of this the Allies aimed most of their tank production at Europe and North Africa, The IJA had theirs limited by design and a limited manufactureing base.
No, it wasn't because the terrain wasn't "ideal for classic tank combat" it is because the defeat of Nazi Germany was the main priority for both the United States and England. It was decided at the beginning of the war, the main war effort would be in defeating Hitler, while we held the Japanese in check until war was over in Europe and we could then devote full resources in destroying Japan. That is the sole reason why the ETO and MTO received the majority of tanks that were built. This just wasn't with tanks, it was with everything. It was worse in the CBI, they got the PTO guys' hand me downs.
Japan's limitations in their designs again was based on priority and poor strategic thinking, not due to any "limited manufacturing base" or poor quality of steel.
They had some good tacticians but pretty much nobody listened to them. Even the few occasions they had success didnt translate into much.
In my opinion, that problem is the direct result of the mentality of both the IJA and IJN high command, they were very slow to learn from mistakes and battles and were so caught up in their own mythos that it really did blind them severely in making some critical strategic decisions. Even Yamamoto was guilty of this, which can be evidenced in his strategy to defend the Solomons before his death.
Yaknow theres a reason why "great tank battles" on WW2 history TV channels never show any pacific ones.
It's a shame because the night charge of the 9th Tank Regiment would make a cool episode but I mostly suspect that unlike the majority of tank battles in the ETO/MTO, the tank battles didn't start off as such but rather attacks in support of infantry that developed into tank battles when opposing armor showed up.
ack-ack
