For those Brewster fans...

[Widewing]

Aircraft in Action, The Brewster Buffalo in PDF format....

http://www.mediafire.com/?uwxsh03yvg58kr8

[Brooke]

Great find! <S>

[Ack-Ack]

The section on the B-239 is very good, though I don't think it's going to dispell any myths some have about the plane.

ack-ack

[Wmaker]

 

Yep, I have that one.

Another fairly nice book for english speakers about the subject is a bi-lingual (english/polish) Brewster F2A Buffalo published by Kagero.

[Megalodon]

Yep, I have that one.

Another fairly nice book for english speakers about the subject is a bi-lingual (english/polish) Brewster F2A Buffalo published by Kagero.

Kagero Brewster F2A Buffalo  58.62 mb .........click regular download

http://d01.megashares.com/dl/Hg1rgx8/Kagero_Monografie_02_Brewster_F2a_Buffalo.pdf

 

[Rich46yo]

 I love how on page 4 it relates how USN doctrine in the late '30s was for carriers and air power to be supplemental forces and scouts to "soften up the enemy for the big guns of the BBs". Little did anyone know that within a few years BBs wouldn't be worth the price of their steel for offensive operations and instead became primarily land attack gun platforms and bullet catchers for the very CVs that were first deemed to be under them.

Then came Taranto. Then Bismark. Then Pearl. Then Prince of Wales and Repulse. Naval operations changed forever in the space of a few months.

This PDF has some great pictures and diagrams of what is one of my favorite AH airplanes. They alone are worth opening the PDF.

This is a terrific document.

[bustr]

On pdf page 30, the gunsight drawing in the Aussi section is being called a MkIII. It's the Australian J178 modification of the MkII with two lights bulbs in the base and a fixed range reticle produced in Australia by the J.W. Handley Pty Ltd. If you have a copy of the Aussi Boomerang pilots manual you can see a picture and read about the reticle structure.

[Krusty]

Rich, quite the opposite in fact... Battleships became so valuable and so important they were afraid to put them in harm's way. This is true of most of the navies that had such ships, including the UK as well. Such a mystique was built up about these super weapons, so much emphasis was made on producing them, limiting them (treaties limiting tonnage, etc), and overall preventing others from making them, that in the end they were too valuable to even use.

Naturally all this changed over time, but for the most part I think it holds true throughout the war.

Yes, carrier power proved to be much more important, but only because they had no fear of losing them (and losing control over the seas in the process). Imagine what role the carrier would have played if the battleships were there everywhere taking the fight to the enemy every time? Without the power vacuum created by holding back the BBs, would CVs really have shone as brightly?

[Ack-Ack]

Rich, quite the opposite in fact... Battleships became so valuable and so important they were afraid to put them in harm's way. This is true of most of the navies that had such ships, including the UK as well. Such a mystique was built up about these super weapons, so much emphasis was made on producing them, limiting them (treaties limiting tonnage, etc), and overall preventing others from making them, that in the end they were too valuable to even use.

Naturally all this changed over time, but for the most part I think it holds true throughout the war.

Yes, carrier power proved to be much more important, but only because they had no fear of losing them (and losing control over the seas in the process). Imagine what role the carrier would have played if the battleships were there everywhere taking the fight to the enemy every time? Without the power vacuum created by holding back the BBs, would CVs really have shone as brightly?

Please, tell us in which cases the battleships were held back?  I hate to burst your bubble but out of the two of you, Rich is not the one is incorrect. 

The prominent thought amongst the navies pre-war was the battleship was the premiere ships in their navies, the pride of their fleets.  Even when Billy Mitchell showed the USN back in the '30s how vulnerable ships were to air power, it was ignored and led to his courtmartial.  Even with the earlier success with naval air power (the British strike at Taranto and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor), it wasn't really until the Battle of the Coral Sea that the shift from a battleship centric fleet to a CV centric fleet started to take place.

ack-ack

[Karnak]

I have on my bookshelf "Principles of Warship Construction and Damage Control" by Manning and Schumacher, on the base of the spine it says "United States Naval Institute Annapolis Maryland 1935" and inside it says "Copyright 1924, 1928, 1930, 1935 by U. S. Naval Institute.  Reprinted 1939 with corrections"

It is most certainly a battleship centric book, and while it mentions aircraft carriers as the newest kind of warship it only spends time on battleship damage control and a lesser section on submarine damage control.

[Krusty]

Battleships were held back as early as WW1, with the Battle of Jutland (which only made the fear of losing battleships in combat all that much stronger). There was always a reluctance to commit them to combat. The mentality held through WW2 as well. Faster, CHEAPER, more plentiful battlecruisers were being pushed out as much as possible, but in a number of cases it has been commented that the admiralty or the decision-makers (aka the higher-ups, fleet commander, what-have-you) were afraid of losing their battleships more than they were on using them. This doesn't seem to hold true with the Japanese, though.

I'm not saying they were never used. However, they didn't always have to be used either. Even just being present in a theater of operation without DOING anything meant a stand-off ensued with the opposing side. Just look at all the effort the Royal Navy made to be "ready" to engage the fjord-bound German battlecruisers -- and they weren't even full battleships!

P.S. And please note I *AM* saying it was a very battleship-centric world (this should have been clear), but that much like supercarriers NOW, back THEN there was a fear of losing this status symbol. The Battleships were the status symbol of a super power at the time. To lose one in combat was a public blow on the national scale.

[nrshida]

Ventral window? That's a nice feature. Does the AH Buffalo have that?

[Wmaker]

Ventral window? That's a nice feature. Does the AH Buffalo have that?

It is there in AH Brewster when looking from inside out but covered when looking from the outside view. It's was conscious modelling decision by Superfly to do it like that (having both functionality of the window and correct outward appearance).

In real life they were covered up quite quickly (painted over/replaced by dural sheeting).

[nrshida]

I suppose it was to mostly help with carrier landings?

[Rich46yo]

Rich, quite the opposite in fact... Battleships became so valuable and so important they were afraid to put them in harm's way. This is true of most of the navies that had such ships, including the UK as well. Such a mystique was built up about these super weapons, so much emphasis was made on producing them, limiting them (treaties limiting tonnage, etc), and overall preventing others from making them, that in the end they were too valuable to even use.

Naturally all this changed over time, but for the most part I think it holds true throughout the war.

Yes, carrier power proved to be much more important, but only because they had no fear of losing them (and losing control over the seas in the process). Imagine what role the carrier would have played if the battleships were there everywhere taking the fight to the enemy every time? Without the power vacuum created by holding back the BBs, would CVs really have shone as brightly?

Krusty not to turn this into a non-Brewster slugging match but your post really doesnt make sense.

They were super weapons until air craft carriers began sinking them. BBs really didnt accomplish all that much in WW2.

This just befuddles me.

Yes, carrier power proved to be much more important, but only because they had no fear of losing them (and losing control over the seas in the process). Imagine what role the carrier would have played if the battleships were there everywhere taking the fight to the enemy every time? Without the power vacuum created by holding back the BBs, would CVs really have shone as brightly?