Author Topic: Heavy Aircraft Stall Training  (Read 3040 times)

Offline earl1937

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Heavy Aircraft Stall Training
« on: November 26, 2013, 09:45:51 AM »
 :airplane: The Federal Aviation Agency has come out with a new "proposed" stall warning and recovery procedure, for aircraft operated under FAR part 121, which covers heavy aircraft, jet liners of all descriptions. Anyone operating as a part 121 operator is covered by this regulation. Here is a copy from the FAA on excathly their proposed change!
Pilots of transport-category airplanes should be taught to reduce the angle of attack as their first response to a stall warning, the FAA said on Tuesday. In a new proposed advisory circular, the FAA says it aims to provide "best practices and guidance for training, testing, and checking for pilots to ensure correct and consistent response to unexpected stall warnings, and/or stick pusher activations."

Duh! Is there any "Transport Rated Pilots", or Commercial rated pilots in the world who have not had stall training and recovery? The Buffalo crash a few years back should have pointed out what really needed to be done to correct this problem, "Pilot Training" and related issues. The captain of that aircraft had failed many flight tests while in school and the lady co-pilot was very inexperienced!
If a pilot fails a flight test more than 2 times, on his or her 3rd try, they should be advised to enter a different line of work. Not all people have the coordination and SA, when on instruments to be a safe pilot, when hauling fare paying passengers!
Don't mean to get on my "soap box", but to many people are passed on flight progress tests, just to get more of the almighty dollar!
Which brings me to Aces High landings! Guys, for gosh sakes, slow the aircraft down to no more than 100 IAS over the end of the runway when landing. I still see people trying to land when approaching way to fast, and they either crash or run off the other end of the runway.
Get your favorite ride, climb to 5K or so  and slow the thing down, (maybe 110 IAS), learn to maintain heading and altitude by using the flight controls and power management. Just a few flights of practice will make a big difference in safe landings and scoring your kills or damage points.
Blue Skies and wind at my back and wish that for all!!!

Offline colmbo

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Re: Heavy Aircraft Stall Training
« Reply #1 on: November 26, 2013, 11:02:48 AM »

Pilots of transport-category airplanes should be taught to reduce the angle of attack as their first response to a stall warning,


Well shoot, I too could be an ATP!!

I'm guessing a case of politicians wanting "something done".
Columbo

"When once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the earth with your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you will always long to return."

Fate whispers to the warrior "You cannot withstand the storm" and the warrior whispers back "I AM THE STORM"

Offline Oldman731

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Re: Heavy Aircraft Stall Training
« Reply #2 on: November 26, 2013, 11:06:00 AM »
I'm guessing a case of politicians wanting "something done".


Agreed.

- oldman

Offline earl1937

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Re: Heavy Aircraft Stall Training
« Reply #3 on: November 26, 2013, 11:15:19 AM »
Well shoot, I too could be an ATP!!

I'm guessing a case of politicians wanting "something done".
:airplane: Unless the FAA has changed, its more political than the U.S. congress!
Blue Skies and wind at my back and wish that for all!!!

Offline pembquist

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Re: Heavy Aircraft Stall Training
« Reply #4 on: November 26, 2013, 11:56:17 AM »
You'll have to bear with my poor memory but I thought one of the factors that contributed to the buffalo crash was that the pilot had been flying (maybe had most of his transport time?) in a plane known to be especially subsceptable to tailplane icing and consequent tailplane stall (a Saab?). The notion is that his reaction to the situation was to pull hard to to recover the aircraft he wasn't flying in a situation he wasn't in. If I recall correctly the cockpit was not sterile and they didn't seem to be paying very good attention, when the plane began to stall he didn't know what was going on and fell back on a panicky recollection of what to do about the scariest thing that came to mind. (My memory tailplane stall in the Saab or whatever, is that you don't get a second chance if it departs.) So if my memory is correct I can see why they would write down what is staggeringly obvious, though I don't see how it would make any difference.

I think the strange thing is that it is as if the system thinks flying commuter planes in north east winter weather is somehow less demanding than flying JFK to Paris in a wide body.
Pies not kicks.

Offline Puma44

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Re: Heavy Aircraft Stall Training
« Reply #5 on: November 26, 2013, 03:17:21 PM »
:airplane: Unless the FAA has changed, its more political than the U.S. congress!
Not to mention the real problem wasn't addressed and corrected.



All gave some, Some gave all

Offline Brooke

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Re: Heavy Aircraft Stall Training
« Reply #6 on: November 27, 2013, 12:10:39 AM »
By the way, any folks who are having problems slowing down from a fast approach:
1.  If you are coming in really fast (300-400 mph, say), chop throttle and do a hard 270 or 360 degree turn to bleed off speed.
2.  If you are lining up and are too fast (but not so fast to need a 360 degree hard turn), stomp full rudder and keep on your approach.  This adds a lot of drag (crossed controls as you keep it on a straight heading).  Gently release rudder once you get to flaps-down speed for your aircraft, and start putting in flaps.

Offline earl1937

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Re: Heavy Aircraft Stall Training
« Reply #7 on: November 27, 2013, 03:09:28 AM »
You'll have to bear with my poor memory but I thought one of the factors that contributed to the buffalo crash was that the pilot had been flying (maybe had most of his transport time?) in a plane known to be especially subsceptable to tailplane icing and consequent tailplane stall (a Saab?). The notion is that his reaction to the situation was to pull hard to to recover the aircraft he wasn't flying in a situation he wasn't in. If I recall correctly the cockpit was not sterile and they didn't seem to be paying very good attention, when the plane began to stall he didn't know what was going on and fell back on a panicky recollection of what to do about the scariest thing that came to mind. (My memory tailplane stall in the Saab or whatever, is that you don't get a second chance if it departs.) So if my memory is correct I can see why they would write down what is staggeringly obvious, though I don't see how it would make any difference.

I think the strange thing is that it is as if the system thinks flying commuter planes in north east winter weather is somehow less demanding than flying JFK to Paris in a wide body.
:airplane:  Copy from NTSB's final report on cause of accident!

Probable Cause
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain's inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover. Contributing to the accident were (1) the flight crew's failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of the lowspeed cue, (2) the flight crew's failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) the captain's failure to effectively manage the flight, and (4) Colgan Air's inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions.

Web site for full report and recommendations:     http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/summary/AAR1001.html
Blue Skies and wind at my back and wish that for all!!!

Offline pembquist

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Re: Heavy Aircraft Stall Training
« Reply #8 on: November 27, 2013, 02:21:32 PM »
From the recommendations that Earl linked to:

Identify which airplanes operated under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K are susceptible to tailplane stalls and then (1) require operators of those airplanes to provide an appropriate airplane-specific tailplane stall recovery procedure in their training manuals and company procedures and (2) direct operators of those airplanes that are not susceptible to tailplane stalls to ensure that training and company guidance for the airplanes explicitly states this lack of susceptibility and contains no references to tailplane stall recovery procedures. (A-10-25)

I get the impression that the captain had never been exposed to the stick shaker which seems like totally inadequate training. My memory about the Saab was correct. Here is a link to a NY Times article on the crash http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/nyregion/19crash.html?_r=0

The predominant impression that's given is of pilot incompetence but the reality is that training and standards were lousy and if there had been a safety culture of any merit at that operator this particular accident would not have occurred.
Pies not kicks.

Offline DaveBB

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Re: Heavy Aircraft Stall Training
« Reply #9 on: November 27, 2013, 04:39:31 PM »
So the horizontal stabilizers are stalling before the wings?
Currently ignoring Vraciu as he is a whoopeeed retard.

Offline colmbo

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Re: Heavy Aircraft Stall Training
« Reply #10 on: November 27, 2013, 08:18:42 PM »
So the horizontal stabilizers are stalling before the wings?

And a fun time was had by all.
Columbo

"When once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the earth with your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you will always long to return."

Fate whispers to the warrior "You cannot withstand the storm" and the warrior whispers back "I AM THE STORM"

Offline pembquist

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Re: Heavy Aircraft Stall Training
« Reply #11 on: November 27, 2013, 09:06:14 PM »
So the horizontal stabilizers are stalling before the wings?

Yes, because of icing. See the videohttp://youtu.be/_ifKduc1hE8
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Offline earl1937

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Re: Heavy Aircraft Stall Training
« Reply #12 on: November 28, 2013, 02:29:41 PM »
From the recommendations that Earl linked to:

Identify which airplanes operated under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K are susceptible to tailplane stalls and then (1) require operators of those airplanes to provide an appropriate airplane-specific tailplane stall recovery procedure in their training manuals and company procedures and (2) direct operators of those airplanes that are not susceptible to tailplane stalls to ensure that training and company guidance for the airplanes explicitly states this lack of susceptibility and contains no references to tailplane stall recovery procedures. (A-10-25)

I get the impression that the captain had never been exposed to the stick shaker which seems like totally inadequate training. My memory about the Saab was correct. Here is a link to a NY Times article on the crash http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/nyregion/19crash.html?_r=0

The predominant impression that's given is of pilot incompetence but the reality is that training and standards were lousy and if there had been a safety culture of any merit at that operator this particular accident would not have occurred.
:furious This one of many accidents caused by what I said before, "lack of training" by operators who cut corners to save money!
Blue Skies and wind at my back and wish that for all!!!

Offline Valkyrie

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Re: Heavy Aircraft Stall Training
« Reply #13 on: November 29, 2013, 07:09:35 PM »
I am working on a commercial rating now 243 hours and an aerospace space engineering degree. I feel the failure is in the PTS, and the design of the stalling regime.

Stalls going into spins are not well understood by todays ATP commercial or CFI, and the regulation in the PTS standards are to blame. They call for a recovery with minimal altitude loss and its that second part is the problem. When training in trainers for ratings the full power stall procedure is to cut the power, nose up to bleed speed, then full power nose up into the stall. ALL effort is focused on stopping the stall before it develops, not allowing the stall to occur, then recovering, but recovering only from an incipient stall. Much would be gained by requiring a full stall demonstration allowing the stall to develop and not worrying about busting the alt on the recovery, many testing failures have resulted from accelerated stalls on the recovery trying not to drop alt in the stall. This may come from a misread altitude loss requirement, but the way it is enforced is a nearly a failure to allow the stall happen. The ultimate lesson that needs to be learned is that you MUST FIRST break the stall, then initiate recovery. I would care if every applicant lost 300 feet so long as they knew that they had to get the AOA under critical first. I think it is very likely that the Colgan Air Capt. never saw more than 4 intentional stalls in his life. Today pilots are taught that stalls are impossible to recover from (Cirus pull the chute), and are taught cookbook style stalls that will likely never happen in real life.

This started with the FAA getting away from spin training years ago and has moved to the point where while training even a stall is to be avoided at all costs because they turn into spins which are now only taught once during CFI training and not even done on that check ride. Combine this with an overreliance on automation (see 777 SFO, Colgan Buffalo, UPS Birmingham) and its a very real issue of basic piloting skills being totally lost. Extremely low time CFI's who don't know much of anything and its a case of the blind leading the blind. I'll be a CFI before long and I won't ever have been in ice before making it to a transport aircraft. I would much rather have gone to a cargo carrier and flown nights in the right seat than get my 1250 hours instructing, and it would have been far safer, than the current Rube Goldberg style regulations.

I would much rather have the FAA allow very low time 500 hour CPL pilots in cargo aircraft than the current 1500 atp requirements that wouldn't have stopped the buffalo crash.
« Last Edit: November 29, 2013, 07:13:17 PM by Valkyrie »

Offline earl1937

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Re: Heavy Aircraft Stall Training
« Reply #14 on: November 30, 2013, 12:01:53 PM »
I am working on a commercial rating now 243 hours and an aerospace space engineering degree. I feel the failure is in the PTS, and the design of the stalling regime.

Stalls going into spins are not well understood by today's ATP commercial or CFI, and the regulation in the PTS standards are to blame. They call for a recovery with minimal altitude loss and its that second part is the problem. When training in trainers for ratings the full power stall procedure is to cut the power, nose up to bleed speed, then full power nose up into the stall. ALL effort is focused on stopping the stall before it develops, not allowing the stall to occur, then recovering, but recovering only from an incipient stall. Much would be gained by requiring a full stall demonstration allowing the stall to develop and not worrying about busting the alt on the recovery, many testing failures have resulted from accelerated stalls on the recovery trying not to drop alt in the stall. This may come from a misread altitude loss requirement, but the way it is enforced is a nearly a failure to allow the stall happen. The ultimate lesson that needs to be learned is that you MUST FIRST break the stall, then initiate recovery. I would care if every applicant lost 300 feet so long as they knew that they had to get the AOA under critical first. I think it is very likely that the Colgan Air Capt. never saw more than 4 intentional stalls in his life. Today pilots are taught that stalls are impossible to recover from (Cirrus pull the chute), and are taught cookbook style stalls that will likely never happen in real life.


This started with the FAA getting away from spin training years ago and has moved to the point where while training even a stall is to be avoided at all costs because they turn into spins which are now only taught once during CFI training and not even done on that check ride. Combine this with an overreliance on automation (see 777 SFO, Colgan Buffalo, UPS Birmingham) and its a very real issue of basic piloting skills being totally lost. Extremely low time CFi who don't know much of anything and its a case of the blind leading the blind. I'll be a CFI before long and I won't ever have been in ice before making it to a transport aircraft. I would much rather have gone to a cargo carrier and flown nights in the right seat than get my 1250 hours instructing, and it would have been far safer, than the current Rube Goldberg style regulations.

I would much rather have the FAA allow very low time 500 hour CPL pilots in cargo aircraft than the current 1500 ATP requirements that wouldn't have stopped the buffalo crash.
:airplane: You make some valid points and as a one time FAA designated pilot examiner for Private, Commercial and Instrument ratings and Multi-engine rating, we were required to strictly stick to the current FAA flight standards. As far as stall requirements, the recognize of an impending stall was the most important thing, but like you, I think that falls short of finding out if the applicator was truly, "the master of that aircraft". After the usual check maneuvers, I always had the applicant demonstrate a 45 and 60 degree banked turn, VFR, with a plus or minus 100 foot altitude loss or gain. (I wonder how many pilots in AH could do that in the game). Most could not do it in a satisfactorily manner, so usually retraining was required before I would pass the applicant's check ride. Very few flight instructors had completed the demonstrated spin recovery technique which I think was very important pilot training. Slow flight was another pet peeve of mine, as most couldn't maintain altitude and airspeed at the same time.
The pilot of the Buffalo crash had failed instrument flight tests 2 or 3 times in his career, but he was allowed to cont flying as PIC of transport aircraft. While that aircraft model had a history
of zonal icing problems, I think the pilots incompetence in IFR conditions had more to do with that accident than anything. The fact that the crew was engaged in idle "chit chat" was also a factor in this accident.
At any rate, if a PIC doesn't stay "ahead" of his aircraft at all times, its just a matter of time before he is involved in an accident! Instrument flight on partial panel is another thing I always insisted on. If a pilot cannot fly on "needle, ball, airspeed and altimeter, then he or she shouldn't flying on instruments. All the new bells and whistles are well and good for safe flight, but what happens when you have complete electrical failure? Fortunately most good airlines insist on "raw" date instruments in the event of Elect failure, but then comes the question, can the PIC fly on raw data alone.
As a chief flight instructor for largest flight school in Atlanta, I flew with every potential new instructor and only hired about 5 out 10 because of the lack of understanding and training for the things which I have mentioned in this reply.
On your Ice comment, just remember, if it is freezing rain, climb, because there is warm air above you. If you have clear or rime ice, use your deice boots, if you have them on that aircraft, manually, not on automatic.
Blue Skies and wind at my back and wish that for all!!!