Bombers have no effect on the war? (The real one)

[GScholz]

they didnt control the air.  otherwise the il2's wouldnt have had a field day with tanks.


semp

The Il-2s didn't have a field day with German tanks. The Luftwaffe had a field day with Il-2s. Two-thirds of all Il-2s built were destroyed, the highest of all types of Soviet aircraft; they were practically shot down as soon as they came off the production line.

[zack1234]

It was not Hitlers war it was Germany's war 

Lucky they lost again 

Or the radiation levels in Berlin would have a bit higher today

[Oldman731]

Their problem was distributing the fuel; air interdiction by allied fighter-bombers almost completely shut down the German transport and logistics network.

I was surprised to find that the chief cause of damage to the German transportation system was from the heavies - Lancs, 17s and 24s - dropping on railway marshalling yards.  The jabos shut things down closer to the front, but the heavies caused the real logistic nightmare.  Eisenhower was right to overrule Spaatz and Harris and insist that the air forces switch their targets from oil and cities to transportation centers.  Towards the end of the war the Germans weren't able to move coal to their factories in the Ruhr.

- oldman

[GScholz]

That's not what we're discussing; we're discussing the distribution of fuel already in stockpiles to front line units: Tanker trucks. As it had been on the Eastern Front, air interdiction and CAS was the best use of the Allied air forces. The Luftwaffe knew this and after Normandy they prioritized attacking Allied fighter-bombers and medium bombers over the strategic bombers.

[Vinkman]

IT's an interesting Question, and I think that many have posted answers to how the bombing did little to stop war production. But the bombing broke the heart of the German people. City after city were reduced to rubble. In the end it was the bombers the bombed the nazism out of the Germans, in the same way they bombed the imperialism and militarism out of the Japanese. The bombers made the civilian population pay the price for the mistakes of their leaders. This caused a permanent shift in the political and cultural thinking of both countries, and that change was permanent.

In contrast I believe it's why the war's in the middle east have had little effect. Because in those wars we specifically set out to only target Soldiers. While killing soldiers temporarily stops aggression, it does very little to change the political climate and beliefs of the people. So it just reverts back to its old paradigm after it recruits and trains more soldiers.

 

[Oldman731]

That's not what we're discussing; we're discussing the distribution of fuel already in stockpiles to front line units: Tanker trucks.

News to me.  I thought we were discussing your point that "air interdiction by allied fighter-bombers almost completely shut down the German transport and logistics network."  It wasn't the fighter-bombers that shut it down, it was the heavies.  Germany didn't transport fuel from Romania to Normandy in tanker trucks.

I note, while I'm at it, this passage from Williamson Murray's "Luftwaffe," 1985, The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co. of America, Inc., at page 268:

"At the end of June [1944], the Luftwaffe's strategic position, as well as the Reich's, gave the Germans small cause for optimism.  A Luftwaffe intelligence report summed up the situation.  While Allied air operations over Germany had declined due to the invasion, the authors felt that Allied bombers would soon return to Germany.  In France, air attacks had destroyed the transportation system, while bombing attacks in Germany had extensively damaged the fuel industry.  Production of aircraft fuel was off by 70 percent, synthetic fuel production was down by 60 percent, and refinery output (including Rumania) had dropped to 70 percent of total capacity.  The report noted that aerial attacks on transportation and petroleum industries had provided substantial aid to the ground battle in the west.  Particularly worrisome from the German perspective was the possibility that the Allied air forces might do in the Balkans what they had accomplished so successfully in France and Italy; that is, destroy the rail and road system.  In conclusion, the report warned that the great danger was a continuation of attacks on the synthetic fuel industry.  Thus, the German high command needed to provide adequate support for the great fuel plants.  Attacks on transportation were almost as dangerous, but there was little that could be done because one could not protect an entire rail system."  The report reference is to Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, Fuhrungsstab Ic, Nr. 3080/44, 16.7.44, Nryt.:  "Britischnordamerikanische Luftkriegsfuhrung gegen Deutschland, " Imperial War Museum, Speer Collection, Roll #21, FD 3046/49.

As it had been on the Eastern Front, air interdiction and CAS was the best use of the Allied air forces. The Luftwaffe knew this and after Normandy they prioritized attacking Allied fighter-bombers and medium bombers over the strategic bombers.

Educate me.  I've never heard of any such formalized prioritization.  And I question the conclusion that this was the best use of air power in WWII.  Until forward air controlling was well-developed - which didn't really happen until Viet Nam - close air support was a chancy proposition.  I can't think of any battles in WWII, in the west, at least, where close air support was effectively employed during a ground battle.

- oldman

[Vinkman]

News to me.  I thought we were discussing your point that "air interdiction by allied fighter-bombers almost completely shut down the German transport and logistics network."  It wasn't the fighter-bombers that shut it down, it was the heavies.  Germany didn't transport fuel from Romania to Normandy in tanker trucks.

I note, while I'm at it, this passage from Williamson Murray's "Luftwaffe," 1985, The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co. of America, Inc., at page 268:

"At the end of June [1944], the Luftwaffe's strategic position, as well as the Reich's, gave the Germans small cause for optimism.  A Luftwaffe intelligence report summed up the situation.  While Allied air operations over Germany had declined due to the invasion, the authors felt that Allied bombers would soon return to Germany.  In France, air attacks had destroyed the transportation system, while bombing attacks in Germany had extensively damaged the fuel industry.  Production of aircraft fuel was off by 70 percent, synthetic fuel production was down by 60 percent, and refinery output (including Rumania) had dropped to 70 percent of total capacity.  The report noted that aerial attacks on transportation and petroleum industries had provided substantial aid to the ground battle in the west.  Particularly worrisome from the German perspective was the possibility that the Allied air forces might do in the Balkans what they had accomplished so successfully in France and Italy; that is, destroy the rail and road system.  In conclusion, the report warned that the great danger was a continuation of attacks on the synthetic fuel industry.  Thus, the German high command needed to provide adequate support for the great fuel plants.  Attacks on transportation were almost as dangerous, but there was little that could be done because one could not protect an entire rail system."  The report reference is to Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, Fuhrungsstab Ic, Nr. 3080/44, 16.7.44, Nryt.:  "Britischnordamerikanische Luftkriegsfuhrung gegen Deutschland, " Imperial War Museum, Speer Collection, Roll #21, FD 3046/49.


Educate me.  I've never heard of any such formalized prioritization.  And I question the conclusion that this was the best use of air power in WWII.  Until forward air controlling was well-developed - which didn't really happen until Viet Nam - close air support was a chancy proposition.  I can't think of any battles in WWII, in the west, at least, where close air support was effectively employed during a ground battle.

- oldman

This is very informative and points out why the Germans lost the war, and why they were destined to lose the war. The Germans had no strategic offensive capability.
Bombing was the allies greatest contribution because it was a unique capability they had, and developed to great extent during the war. The Germans and Russians, largely ignored developing Strategic weapons. If left to themselves, they would have fought a very long, drawn out, war of fronts and advances and retreats....until the Germans ran out of soldiers and pilots. then the outcome would have happened much the way it did, albeit years later.
I've often felt the US and Britain and France could have sat it out. 

[zack1234]

France did sit it out

Hitlers position in Germany before his success was still not secure.

Once it was clear that the European democracies were incapable the Germans gains were easy.

The German "Myth"

[bozon]

Two-thirds of all Il-2s built were destroyed, the highest of all types of Soviet aircraft; they were practically shot down as soon as they came off the production line.

lol 

[muzik]

In contrast I believe it's why the war's in the middle east have had little effect. Because in those wars we specifically set out to only target Soldiers. While killing soldiers temporarily stops aggression, it does very little to change the political climate and beliefs of the people. So it just reverts back to its old paradigm after it recruits and trains more soldiers.

 

Never thought about it that way.  Maybe we will wise up someday.

[muzik]

Particularly worrisome from the German perspective was the possibility that the Allied air forces might do in the Balkans what they had accomplished so successfully in France and Italy; that is, destroy the rail and road system. 

I believe you just disproved your point. You said they didnt truck their fuel in from Romania. You seem to be reinforcing what I recall, that the allied assaults on rail systems were mostly in France and Italy. Which only forced Germans to start trucking the fuel during the last leg of it's dispersal.

And the heavies were certainly not capable of stopping the flow on country roads. On the other hand, Long range fighters making attacks on rail could and did have the same if not better effect on transportation at less cost.

The bottom line is, strategic bombing did not have a significant effect on the war by any standards especially when you compare costs to results. And if fighters had not taken control of the sky, the biggest impacts it did have would likely not have occurred.

All you have to do is look at the evolution of precision weapons to see that it was a poor concept that had limited success only because precision strikes by attack aircraft had not been fully developed as a consequence of the same ridiculous belief that rendered the USAAF unprepared at the beginning of the war...  "bombers were the future of warfare."

American high command was a stubborn good ol'boy, political club that looked out for each other instead of the good of the country. They completely ignored the fact that fighters were faster and harder targets to hit, they were ten times more accurate bomb for bomb and could have potentially cleaned the skies of German fighters faster than they could have built them if they had not wasted money and materials on bombers instead of building an overwhelming force of fighter aircraft and fighter bombers.

I believe the greatest contribution heavies made to the war, mentioned by Vinkman, was the effect of piercing through the hard headedness of political beliefs.

...But we didn't HAVE to do that to win the war.

[Shifty]

News to me.  I thought we were discussing your point that "air interdiction by allied fighter-bombers almost completely shut down the German transport and logistics network."  It wasn't the fighter-bombers that shut it down, it was the heavies.  Germany didn't transport fuel from Romania to Normandy in tanker trucks.

I note, while I'm at it, this passage from Williamson Murray's "Luftwaffe," 1985, The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co. of America, Inc., at page 268:

"At the end of June [1944], the Luftwaffe's strategic position, as well as the Reich's, gave the Germans small cause for optimism.  A Luftwaffe intelligence report summed up the situation.  While Allied air operations over Germany had declined due to the invasion, the authors felt that Allied bombers would soon return to Germany.  In France, air attacks had destroyed the transportation system, while bombing attacks in Germany had extensively damaged the fuel industry.  Production of aircraft fuel was off by 70 percent, synthetic fuel production was down by 60 percent, and refinery output (including Rumania) had dropped to 70 percent of total capacity.  The report noted that aerial attacks on transportation and petroleum industries had provided substantial aid to the ground battle in the west.  Particularly worrisome from the German perspective was the possibility that the Allied air forces might do in the Balkans what they had accomplished so successfully in France and Italy; that is, destroy the rail and road system.  In conclusion, the report warned that the great danger was a continuation of attacks on the synthetic fuel industry.  Thus, the German high command needed to provide adequate support for the great fuel plants.  Attacks on transportation were almost as dangerous, but there was little that could be done because one could not protect an entire rail system."  The report reference is to Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, Fuhrungsstab Ic, Nr. 3080/44, 16.7.44, Nryt.:  "Britischnordamerikanische Luftkriegsfuhrung gegen Deutschland, " Imperial War Museum, Speer Collection, Roll #21, FD 3046/49.


Educate me.  I've never heard of any such formalized prioritization.  And I question the conclusion that this was the best use of air power in WWII.  Until forward air controlling was well-developed - which didn't really happen until Viet Nam - close air support was a chancy proposition.  I can't think of any battles in WWII, in the west, at least, where close air support was effectively employed during a ground battle.

- oldman

GO OM GO!  

I believe you just disproved your point. You said they didnt truck their fuel in from Romania. You seem to be reinforcing what I recall, that the allied assaults on rail systems were mostly in France and Italy. Which only forced Germans to start trucking the fuel during the last leg of it's dispersal.

And the heavies were certainly not capable of stopping the flow on country roads. On the other hand, Long range fighters making attacks on rail could and did have the same if not better effect on transportation at less cost.

The bottom line is, strategic bombing did not have a significant effect on the war by any standards especially when you compare costs to results. And if fighters had not taken control of the sky, the biggest impacts it did have would likely not have occurred.

All you have to do is look at the evolution of precision weapons to see that it was a poor concept that had limited success only because precision strikes by attack aircraft had not been fully developed as a consequence of the same ridiculous belief that rendered the USAAF unprepared at the beginning of the war...  "bombers were the future of warfare."

American high command was a stubborn good ol'boy, political club that looked out for each other instead of the good of the country. They completely ignored the fact that fighters were faster and harder targets to hit, they were ten times more accurate bomb for bomb and could have potentially cleaned the skies of German fighters faster than they could have built them if they had not wasted money and materials on bombers instead of building an overwhelming force of fighter aircraft and fighter bombers.

I believe the greatest contribution heavies made to the war, mentioned by Vinkman, was the effect of piercing through the hard headedness of political beliefs.

...But we didn't HAVE to do that to win the war.

The USAAF did build an overwhelming force of fighters and fighter bombers along with the heavies. That's why there was barely a Luftwaffe at the end of the war and why the German Army could only launch an offensive like they in in December of 44 depending on bad weather to keep Allied Tactical Air Forces grounded. Yes Germany was still producing a large numbers of fighters late in the war but they didnt have the experianced pilots of the past thanks to Allied fighters, and they didnt have fuel to persecute the war offensively anymore thanks to the bombing of their oil and rail networks. Ask Japan about about the ability of strategic bombing to win a war. The ability to do precision strikes by any aircraft wasn't achieved until Vietnam and even then it was in its infancy. It really wasn't realized until the Gulf War.

[Oldman731]

I believe you just disproved your point. You said they didnt truck their fuel in from Romania. You seem to be reinforcing what I recall, that the allied assaults on rail systems were mostly in France and Italy. Which only forced Germans to start trucking the fuel during the last leg of it's dispersal.

And the heavies were certainly not capable of stopping the flow on country roads. On the other hand, Long range fighters making attacks on rail could and did have the same if not better effect on transportation at less cost.

In order to get to the last leg of fuel dispersal, the fuel had to go through all the preceding legs.  Those legs were by rail.  When Eisenhower ordered the RAF and 8th AF to switch from "strategic" targets to transportation targets, those targets were marshalling yards in France, Germany and elsewhere.  The strategic bombing survey has a chart that shows the enormous amount of ordnance which was dropped by the heavies on those targets, crippling the rail transportation system.  The fuel wasn't making it to the tank trucks because it was stuck in transit further back in the system.  Had we been able to hit the transportation systems in the Balkans, closer to the oil production facilities, the effect would have been even more pronounced.

The bottom line is, strategic bombing did not have a significant effect on the war by any standards especially when you compare costs to results.

I don't know how to respond to this, in light of the sources people have already cited in this thread.

American high command was a stubborn good ol'boy, political club that looked out for each other instead of the good of the country. They completely ignored the fact that fighters were faster and harder targets to hit, they were ten times more accurate bomb for bomb and could have potentially cleaned the skies of German fighters faster than they could have built them if they had not wasted money and materials on bombers instead of building an overwhelming force of fighter aircraft and fighter bombers.

In the late 1930s and early 1940s, when the strategic doctrine was fashioned and the planes to implement that doctrine were developed, this simply was not true.  Waves of P-35s, P-36s, P-39s and P-40s would not have accomplished what the B-17s and B-24s did.  If nothing else, they couldn't carry bombs and had comparatively pathetic range.  The ability of fighters to carry heavy ordnance loads, and to deliver them with any accuracy at a reasonable distance from their bases, didn't occur until the middle of the war (if not later) and, so far as I can tell, was not anticipated before then (hence the continued development of dive bombers such as the SB2C).

Oddly enough, the notion that strategic bombing in WWII was unsuccessful didn't come up until the Viet Nam war.  You can read all of the sources, by all of the participants, written during the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s and you won't find any of them that say "hey, strategic bombing was a failure!"  It was only when Rolling Thunder was producing questionable results, and the anti-war movement was gaining strength, that you first started to see people proclaiming that strategic bombing had never worked - as justification for why it should have been discontinued in the 1960s.

- oldman

[Shifty]

Oddly enough, the notion that strategic bombing in WWII was unsuccessful didn't come up until the Viet Nam war.  You can read all of the sources, by all of the participants, written during the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s and you won't find any of them that say "hey, strategic bombing was a failure!"  It was only when Rolling Thunder was producing questionable results, and the anti-war movement was gaining strength, that you first started to see people proclaiming that strategic bombing had never worked - as justification for why it should have been discontinued in the 1960s.

- oldman

Linebacker II was the last great strategic bombing offensive during Vietnam and it seemed to get everyone's attention.

[Oldman731]

Linebacker II was the last great strategic bombing offensive during Vietnam and it seemed to get everyone's attention.

True.  But I remember reading plenty of predictions at the time that WWII had proven it couldn't work.

Surprise, surprise, surprise.

- oldman