Air Asia A320

[WaffenVW]

Earl that is Air France 296 you're describing (the title of the youtube video you linked to is "Air France Flight 296 | Airbus A320 Crash" !!! ), but it did not happen the way you remember. It was incidentally the first crash of an A320. Read the wiki article Zimme83 linked to.

[WaffenVW]

Earl your second example was American Airlines Flight 587, the Airbus A300 that lost its vertstab. It remains the only fatal accident of any Airbus aircraft in North America, and it was an old A300 with NO FLY BY WIRE SYSTEM. Again a case of the human component failing.

[earl1937]

Earl that is Air France 296 you're describing (the title of the youtube video you linked to is "Air France Flight 296 | Airbus A320 Crash" !!! ), but it did not happen the way you remember. It was incidentally the first crash of an A320. Read the wiki article Zimme83 linked to.

All I know about it is what the accident report states! If the crew had over rode the computer and pushed the thrust levels full up, it wouldn't have crashed.
It reminded me of another crash, which had nothing to do with what we are discussing, a DC9 out of Washington National, with the deicing on the EPR probes turned off, in a snow storm, and the crew failed to recognize what was happening and did not push the "thrust levers" full forward, that to would have prevented a crash!
I instructed for many years in a lot of different equipment, and one rule I had everyone implement, where or not it was in the book, if the nose of the aircraft is up, to any degree, in an emergency, push the "Dam+ throttles full forward"! I realize that there were some exceptions to that rule, but the point I wanted to make to the student was just this: "fly the aircraft first, then worry about any damage you might or might not do to the engines!
As for as I know, I never had a student make a "sudden, unscheduled" arrival off field somewhere!
Remember, there are three things in aviation which you need, but can never use and that is this"
Runway behind you
Altitude above you
Fuel left in that red truck by the terminal

[earl1937]

Earl your second example was American Airlines Flight 587, the Airbus A300 that lost its vertstab. It remains the only fatal accident of any Airbus aircraft in North America, and it was an old A300 with NO FLY BY WIRE SYSTEM. Again a case of the human component failing.

Please forgive a 81, soon to be 82 year old mind, sometimes I forget the way things actually happened. That is why I quit flying solo about 5 years ago! My mind is ok I think, but there are a lot of "cob webs" in some corners of it!

[Zoney]

Remember, there are three things in aviation which you need, but can never use and that is this"
Runway behind you
Altitude above you
Fuel left in that red truck by the terminal

The only time you have too much fuel is when your plane is on fire.

[WaffenVW]

All I know about it is what the accident report states! If the crew had over rode the computer and pushed the thrust levels full up, it wouldn't have crashed."

To me that reads: "If the crew had done what they were supposed to do they wouldn't have flown a perfectly fine aircraft into the ground."

One thing that to my knowledge is unique to the A320 family is that it is the only mass produced air liner that hasn't killed anyone. There has been no fatal accidents involving the A320 series where the plane broke in a way that the pilots couldn't have saved it by doing their job properly. This Air Asia accident is a perfect example. All fatal accidents with the A320 have been attributed to pilot error or a deliberate act.

[Busher]

No offense taken or intended. Untill I hear otherwise I am going to assume that Airbus viewed the chance of an incapicitated pilot or mechanical issue causing a jam on one stick as more likely than a failure of CRM and so made the sticks independent of each other. Then to address the obvious chance of conflict they came up with warning lights and signals and a slightly complicated takeover button. It seems counter intuitive but perhaps the thinking is that you are trading away an extremely dangerous single point failure (jamming of pitch and roll control) in exchange for a failure mode that requires multiple failures (not in normal law, breakdown of crm, flight skills for the law and conditions inadequate,) to become dangerous. I don't know but I'd like to understand the reason.

This reminds me of Abraham Wald, a Boffin during WW2 who made the statistical argument that can be described in a simplified way as: Don't add armor to airplanes in the places that returning airplanes have bullet holes add it in the places that don't have bullet holes because thats probably where the bullet holes were in the airplanes that didn't return.

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abraham_Wald

Control Jams have occurred. I believe it was this accident
http://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/look.php?report_key=102

and the resulting NTSB report that caused the FAA to require all manufacturers of transport category aircraft (FAR Part 25) to have independent flight control systems between the Captain and First Officer that can be split with a simple action.....usually just a pull and turn-to-lock quadrant.
I experienced jammed ailerons in my job about a year before retirement.....system saved my bacon and many more.

[pembquist]

Thanks Busher. So to be sure I understand this correctly, you have 2 sets of controls that each have there own control path to the flight surfaces. In ordinary operation the controls are connected to each other so that they move in unison, in an emergency they can be disconnected from each other so that the non compromised system can be used. Correct?

I am assuming that there is provision for jammed flight surfaces such that a jammed left aileron will not interfere with the operation of the right aileron, is this true?

I remember reading about a jam that I think was in an airliner and was caused by something as pedestrian as an object falling on the floor and blocking the slot one of the controls moved in. I'll try to look it up.

[Busher]

Thanks Busher. So to be sure I understand this correctly, you have 2 sets of controls that each have there own control path to the flight surfaces. In ordinary operation the controls are connected to each other so that they move in unison, in an emergency they can be disconnected from each other so that the non compromised system can be used. Correct?

I am assuming that there is provision for jammed flight surfaces such that a jammed left aileron will not interfere with the operation of the right aileron, is this true?

I remember reading about a jam that I think was in an airliner and was caused by something as pedestrian as an object falling on the floor and blocking the slot one of the controls moved in. I'll try to look it up.

Totally correct Sir!

[WaffenVW]

Please forgive a 81, soon to be 82 year old mind, sometimes I forget the way things actually happened. That is why I quit flying solo about 5 years ago! My mind is ok I think, but there are a lot of "cob webs" in some corners of it!

Nothing to forgive sir. We're just having a friendly discussion after all.

[earl1937]

 

Nothing to forgive sir. We're just having a friendly discussion after all.

That is why I enjoy the forums! I am still learning and I suppose I never will! (at least anytime soon)

[Serenity]

Thanks Busher. So to be sure I understand this correctly, you have 2 sets of controls that each have there own control path to the flight surfaces. In ordinary operation the controls are connected to each other so that they move in unison, in an emergency they can be disconnected from each other so that the non compromised system can be used. Correct?

I am assuming that there is provision for jammed flight surfaces such that a jammed left aileron will not interfere with the operation of the right aileron, is this true?

I remember reading about a jam that I think was in an airliner and was caused by something as pedestrian as an object falling on the floor and blocking the slot one of the controls moved in. I'll try to look it up.

Control Jams have occurred. I believe it was this accident
http://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/look.php?report_key=102

and the resulting NTSB report that caused the FAA to require all manufacturers of transport category aircraft (FAR Part 25) to have independent flight control systems between the Captain and First Officer that can be split with a simple action.....usually just a pull and turn-to-lock quadrant.
I experienced jammed ailerons in my job about a year before retirement.....system saved my bacon and many more.

Okay, THIS makes SO much more sense than the airbus model. I can understand the why in this, it solves the problem, without being incredibly weird in the day-to-day...

[FTJR]

Greetings, I read the report, (thanks for the link) and was horrified at the events. I have to agree with Busher it is a CRM case plus alot of missing training in general airmanship.

But of course that is not the question of why the controls are not linked in Airbus, I cant answer that, the aeroplane was introduced before I joined the airlines in 89, and there was certainly a huge distrust of the machine then.

My personal philosophy is that the company pays me to fly, I fly what they give me. The philosophy between Boeing and Airbus are "different", i've flown the 737(-200,-700/-800), the 767-300, A319/320 and currently the 330. I just passed up the B777 to wait for the A350, so I guess im comfortable with Airbus. Sorry if i cant answer your questions satisfactorily.

[WaffenVW]

A340 engine failure. What a horrible Swiss accent!