Why Boeing 737 Max production has stopped, and its more than MCAS

[Puma44]

 but what I worry about is pilots saying well it it's a non-issue, instead of saying we train for it, but it should be fixed.

I am not trolling any of you guys, just giving you my thoughts as a passenger. 


semp

It’s doubtful you’ll find a pilot, especially ones with 737 type ratings, saying “it’s a non-issue”.  Modern airliners are high tech machines with double, and sometimes triple, redundant systems.  It’s takes a highly trained and experienced pair of pilots to safely operate them with the ultimate goal on every flight to deliver you safely to your destination. It is not uncommon for an airliner to have a system malfunction, the pilots deal with it IAW the QRH, and continue on safely to your destination without you, as a passenger, aware of it.  The ultimate goal is for you, as a passenger, to have a safe and uneventful flight to your destination.  If you fly anywhere on a third world airline, pay your money and take your chances.

The root cause of this whole discussion about the two third world 737 crashes is “experienced pilots”.  The whole political uproar, Boeing bashing(yes, Boeing deserves a massive bloody nose for hiding the MCAS from operators), and highly misinformed public opinion about this overlooks the root cause of these accidents: inexperienced pilots.

[Vraciu]

You have the answer right there.  It is a complex computerized plane.  It appears that only a percentage of airlines have pilots who are skilled and trained enough to fly it.  It should not be sold to those airlines that do not meet the training requirements.  However, Boeing isn't the saintly company that you all believe it is.  Their job is to make money.  This is why these big goofy engines were added to the 737 in the first place, to compete with Airbus.  All the current trouble stems from them being far forward of previous enginge placement.  Poor aerodynamic design.

I wonder if Boeing knew about the rudder trouble on early 737s before the first crash happened?

You all????

None of these companies are saintly.   Embraer comes the closest, but I still have a tiny bit of suspicion about the Gol midair.   Everyone blamed the crew for doing something that’s physically impossible as posited.   

[Wiley]

yeah, the programmers are idiots and they keep us out of the loop, but it's a non-issue, I'll just train more.  I'll just keep saying nothing is wrong.


semp

As another (infrequent) passenger, what I'm getting out of the guys that are talking about training is, our heads would probably collectively explode if we knew how many of the "innocuous" issues are corrected by flight crews every day.  The point is, what should be an incident that gets reported for a good pilot becomes a crash when it's not.

Stuff shouldn't break, but generally speaking it appears the flight crew should be able to deal with the way things do break, and specifically should be able to deal with the way these planes are breaking for the most part.

I don't see anyone saying "and therefore there's no problem with the plane."  What I hear is "the flight crews should be able to deal with this kind of failure, and they didn't in this case." which is a pretty reasonable thing to say IMO.

Wiley.

[guncrasher]

Puma, I actually have seen pilots saying it's a non issue in here.

semp

[Puma44]

Puma, I actually have seen pilots saying it's a non issue in here.

semp

Point being that if a pair of well trained and experienced pilots handled these jets properly, it would have been an uncomfortable ride vs loss of life for all concerned.

[Vraciu]

Puma, I actually have seen pilots saying it's a non issue in here.

semp

If you don't want to risk getting killed in a plane crash don't fly planes.   

NOBODY said it is a non-isssue.  What we've said, repeatedly, is pilot/maintenance standards/training are woefully inadequate in some countries.   What do you want Boeing to do?   Reposses the airplanes?   I have a better idea, let's stop building them altogether.  Then nobody can get killed with one.

[Busher]

You have the answer right there.  It is a complex computerized plane.  It appears that only a percentage of airlines have pilots who are skilled and trained enough to fly it.  It should not be sold to those airlines that do not meet the training requirements.  However, Boeing isn't the saintly company that you all believe it is.  Their job is to make money.  This is why these big goofy engines were added to the 737 in the first place, to compete with Airbus.  All the current trouble stems from them being far forward of previous enginge placement.  Poor aerodynamic design.

I wonder if Boeing knew about the rudder trouble on early 737s before the first crash happened?

David, I would like to know if you have any aeronautics background or flying time. I mean no disrespect; I wanted to know whether your comment of poor aerodynamic design came from education or opinion.

Aircraft have not been aerodynamically since the aeronca champ. An airplane is a vehicle being pushed, shoved, pulled through a fluid. When we observe a boat going fast through water we can see the forces acting upon the vessel. Airplanes are no different - the aerodynamic forces are extreme. Over the years of development, the engineers have come up with hundreds of improvements to make airplanes more stable...vortex generators, mach trim compensators, naca wing shaping and many more examples make an aircraft that might otherwise demonstrate mishandling at high speeds, a stable platform. Unlike constantly operating systems that make the airplane a stable platform, MCAS was only designed to intervene when the airplane was mishandled.

As to Boeing's responsibility for pilot training, all airlines when they purchase a new type be it Airbus or Boeing, send their Check/Instructor pilots to the manufacturer for detailed training not only on how to fly the type but how to teach other pilots how to operate the airplane to standard. Airlines are not going to send their entire pilot group to the manufacturer and whether Boeing needs to police the pilot standards maintained by all their customers or whether that authority belongs to the Government Regulator (ie FAA) is for the politicians to decide.

[Zimme83]

The problem with the 737 is that its old as f*ck and all the modifications made have changed the aerodynamics of the original plane significantly. There are not enough room for the bigger engines so they had to be mounted in front of the wing. But this messed up the aerodynamics since they produce a lot of lift at higher AoA. This means that the stick force are decreasing when AoA is increasing. Thus the need for MCAS to comply with the regulations. Unfortunately the design of the MCAS was quite bad thats why Boeing are in this situation. On a fly-by-wire aircraft this would not have been that big of an issue since it could have been dealt with in the control software, but the MAX doesnt have that...

The selling point of the MAX was also that no additional training was needed to transit from the NG, so the MAX pilots wasnt really given a chance to handle a MCAS failure since it couldnt even be tested in the simulator. With proper proficiency training it might have been different, but Boeing didnt want that.

[Busher]

The problem with the 737 is that its old as f*ck and all the modifications made have changed the aerodynamics of the original plane significantly. There are not enough room for the bigger engines so they had to be mounted in front of the wing. But this messed up the aerodynamics since they produce a lot of lift at higher AoA. This means that the stick force are decreasing when AoA is increasing. Thus the need for MCAS to comply with the regulations. Unfortunately the design of the MCAS was quite bad thats why Boeing are in this situation. On a fly-by-wire aircraft this would not have been that big of an issue since it could have been dealt with in the control software, but the MAX doesnt have that...

The selling point of the MAX was also that no additional training was needed to transit from the NG, so the MAX pilots wasnt really given a chance to handle a MCAS failure since it couldnt even be tested in the simulator. With proper proficiency training it might have been different, but Boeing didnt want that.

As Charles Dickens wrote "but most of all, beware this boy...."

[FLS]

You have the answer right there.  It is a complex computerized plane.  It appears that only a percentage of airlines have pilots who are skilled and trained enough to fly it.  It should not be sold to those airlines that do not meet the training requirements.  However, Boeing isn't the saintly company that you all believe it is.  Their job is to make money.  This is why these big goofy engines were added to the 737 in the first place, to compete with Airbus.  All the current trouble stems from them being far forward of previous enginge placement.  Poor aerodynamic design.

I wonder if Boeing knew about the rudder trouble on early 737s before the first crash happened?

You are wrong about almost everything you said. You seem to have read a few things you don't understand.

The sensor that failed is in all commercial aircraft.  Everything else, except the pilots, worked properly.

The pilots that crashed were certified by basically the same people that said it wasn't their fault.

Neither of the accidents were caused by the upgraded engines and the change in the thrust line that the MCAS was added for.

Boeing makes money by building good products. The assumption that profit over-rides safety is an unwarranted slander.

If you want to be clever about motivation think about how Airbus can benefit by pushing stories that Boeing is greedy, because profits are evil, and they don't care about safety.

There are probably still people who think a Toyota could accelerate by pressing the brake pedal.

[FLS]

The problem with the 737 is that its old as f*ck and all the modifications made have changed the aerodynamics of the original plane significantly. There are not enough room for the bigger engines so they had to be mounted in front of the wing. But this messed up the aerodynamics since they produce a lot of lift at higher AoA. This means that the stick force are decreasing when AoA is increasing. Thus the need for MCAS to comply with the regulations. Unfortunately the design of the MCAS was quite bad thats why Boeing are in this situation. On a fly-by-wire aircraft this would not have been that big of an issue since it could have been dealt with in the control software, but the MAX doesnt have that...

The selling point of the MAX was also that no additional training was needed to transit from the NG, so the MAX pilots wasnt really given a chance to handle a MCAS failure since it couldnt even be tested in the simulator. With proper proficiency training it might have been different, but Boeing didnt want that.

There was no MCAS failure.  It was a local training and certification issue.

[Vraciu]

The problem with the 737 is that its old as f*ck and all the modifications made have changed the aerodynamics of the original plane significantly. There are not enough room for the bigger engines so they had to be mounted in front of the wing. But this messed up the aerodynamics since they produce a lot of lift at higher AoA.

Engines do not produce lift.   They produce thrust.

Underslung engines tend to cause the nose to pitch up when power is added, and vice versa.   It's a known dynamic.   Your alternative is to ride the train.

Yes, the airplane is old, but so what?  That doesn't make it flawed.   It makes it outdated perhaps, but if the customers want it that way that's what they get.  Southwest's tail has wagged the dog for years on the 737.   It is what it is, but that doesn't make it a bad airplane.

This means that the stick force are decreasing when AoA is increasing. Thus the need for MCAS to comply with the regulations.

This is no different than the STS that's been on the 737 for decades.

Unfortunately the design of the MCAS was quite bad thats why Boeing are in this situation. On a fly-by-wire aircraft this would not have been that big of an issue since it could have been dealt with in the control software, but the MAX doesnt have that...

Air France 447.   Fully-automated computer fly-by-wire flight control system.   Fly-by-wire.   *cough*  *cough*  228 deaths.   

The problem with the 737 is too much software, not too little.   That aside, the steps for solving the problem remain the same.   Disconnect the system if it malfunctions.  This crew re-engaged it--after remaining at takeoff thrust to well beyond the certified Vmo speed.  Fly-by-wire won't save you there.

The selling point of the MAX was also that no additional training was needed to transit from the NG, so the MAX pilots wasnt really given a chance to handle a MCAS failure since it couldnt even be tested in the simulator. With proper proficiency training it might have been different, but Boeing didnt want that.

We do it all the time in the 737 NG with the STS.  Almost the exact same system.  Exact same results.   The response to the problem is exactly the same with MCAS as it is with STS.

[Oldman731]

And still there's this (Sullenberger commenting on Langewiesche):

In “What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 MAX?” William Langewiesche draws the conclusion that the pilots are primarily to blame for the fatal crashes of Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian 302. In resurrecting this age-old aviation canard, Langewiesche minimizes the fatal design flaws and certification failures that precipitated those tragedies, and still pose a threat to the flying public. I have long stated, as he does note, that pilots must be capable of absolute mastery of the aircraft and the situation at all times, a concept pilots call airmanship. Inadequate pilot training and insufficient pilot experience are problems worldwide, but they do not excuse the fatally flawed design of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that was a death trap. As one of the few pilots who have lived to tell about being in the left seat of an airliner when things went horribly wrong, with seconds to react, I know a thing or two about overcoming an unimagined crisis. I am also one of the few who have flown a Boeing 737 MAX Level D full motion simulator, replicating both accident flights multiple times. I know firsthand the challenges the pilots on the doomed accident flights faced, and how wrong it is to blame them for not being able to compensate for such a pernicious and deadly design. These emergencies did not present as a classic runaway stabilizer problem, but initially as ambiguous unreliable airspeed and altitude situations, masking MCAS. The MCAS design should never have been approved, not by Boeing, and not by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The National Transportation Safety Board has found that Boeing made faulty assumptions both about the capability of the aircraft design to withstand damage or failure, and the level of human performance possible once the failures began to cascade. Where Boeing failed, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should have stepped in to regulate but it failed to do so. Lessons from accidents are bought in blood and we must seek all the answers to prevent the next one. We need to fix all the flaws in the current system — corporate governance, regulatory oversight, aircraft maintenance, and yes, pilot training and experience. Only then can we ensure the safety of everyone who flies.

http://www.sullysullenberger.com/my-letter-to-the-editor-of-new-york-times-magazine/

Apparently what he was talking about was this:

Sullenberger reported that the recreations of the crashes showed that a failed AoA sensor simultaneously generated a false “stick-shaker” (too slow) and “clacker” (too fast) warnings. “Even knowing what was going to happen, I could see how crews could have run out of time and altitude before they could have solved the problems,” he testified.

https://www.eetimes.com/sullenberger-mcas-exposed-a-failed-system/

FWIW.

- oldman

[Vraciu]

And still there's this (Sullenberger commenting on Langewiesche):

In “What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 MAX?” William Langewiesche draws the conclusion that the pilots are primarily to blame for the fatal crashes of Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian 302. In resurrecting this age-old aviation canard, Langewiesche minimizes the fatal design flaws and certification failures that precipitated those tragedies, and still pose a threat to the flying public. I have long stated, as he does note, that pilots must be capable of absolute mastery of the aircraft and the situation at all times, a concept pilots call airmanship. Inadequate pilot training and insufficient pilot experience are problems worldwide, but they do not excuse the fatally flawed design of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that was a death trap. As one of the few pilots who have lived to tell about being in the left seat of an airliner when things went horribly wrong, with seconds to react, I know a thing or two about overcoming an unimagined crisis. I am also one of the few who have flown a Boeing 737 MAX Level D full motion simulator, replicating both accident flights multiple times. I know firsthand the challenges the pilots on the doomed accident flights faced, and how wrong it is to blame them for not being able to compensate for such a pernicious and deadly design. These emergencies did not present as a classic runaway stabilizer problem, but initially as ambiguous unreliable airspeed and altitude situations, masking MCAS. The MCAS design should never have been approved, not by Boeing, and not by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The National Transportation Safety Board has found that Boeing made faulty assumptions both about the capability of the aircraft design to withstand damage or failure, and the level of human performance possible once the failures began to cascade. Where Boeing failed, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should have stepped in to regulate but it failed to do so. Lessons from accidents are bought in blood and we must seek all the answers to prevent the next one. We need to fix all the flaws in the current system — corporate governance, regulatory oversight, aircraft maintenance, and yes, pilot training and experience. Only then can we ensure the safety of everyone who flies.

http://www.sullysullenberger.com/my-letter-to-the-editor-of-new-york-times-magazine/

Apparently what he was talking about was this:

Sullenberger reported that the recreations of the crashes showed that a failed AoA sensor simultaneously generated a false “stick-shaker” (too slow) and “clacker” (too fast) warnings. “Even knowing what was going to happen, I could see how crews could have run out of time and altitude before they could have solved the problems,” he testified.

https://www.eetimes.com/sullenberger-mcas-exposed-a-failed-system/

FWIW.

- oldman

We're all pretty sick of Sullenberger.   And that Southwest chick Tammy Jo.   Like enough already, people.

Sully is just being contrarian so he can sound smart.  He's not.

"Look at me. I'm awesome.  Blah blah blah blah."

The only thing that saved him was the Hudson River.   I had that identical scenario in a Citation III simulator back in the day, long before he did it.  I did the exact same thing.  Had it happened somewhere else I might have wound up in a building.

You can't mask the MCAS with that trim wheel.  It makes one hell of a racket and when it trims the way you don't want it to you turn it off.

[FLS]

I'm guessing Sullenberger recovered each time in the simulator since he fails to mention that.

Nobody is against an improved MCAS, the point is that the MCAS did what it was designed to do and the FAA had signed off on it.

The loss of reliable airspeed and altitude information is not the biggest problem in VFR conditions when you've left the throttles at takeoff thrust.

The issue I have with Sullenberger here is the notion that Langewiesche promotes an "age old aviation canard" that the pilots are mostly to blame. He must know that most aircraft accidents are caused by pilot error. So it's not a canard, a false statement, it's the usual reason. He even agrees with it right after calling it false to deplatform Langewiesche.

He's correct that the accidents revealed issues with the MCAS, but that's not the main reason for both crashes. The pilots weren't ready to fly the plane when the automation failed.