RAF bomber command overlooked?

[Nath-BDP]

Battle of the Ruhr

March, April, May, June 1943. 1000 Lancasters and Halifaxes lost in 4 months. On some raids up to 90 per night. On one raid more pilots were lost in one night than during the whole BoB.

My question for you is:

Why did the RAF continue with a night bombing campaign when they were (obviously) losing more bombers than their American counterparts during the day? The original hypothetical idea behind night bombing was to keep losses low. So much for that.

I believe that the night war was much more tragic and horrifying than the daylight USAAF offensive, not being able to see your enemy and in danger of being shot from a place where you couldn't defend yourself (keel on Lanc and Halifax.)must have been extremely draining.

When speaking of bombing in WWII or in museums all I see/hear about is the USAAF this USAAF that, B17s and B24s--this is not right, people need to learn about what the RAF did and how they suffered worse than the USAAF.

------------------
Nath_____
9./JG 54 "Grünherz"
 

"It felt as if an angel was pushing..."
-Reponse of Gen. Adolf Galland after flying the fourth prototype Me 262 in May 1943.

[This message has been edited by Nath-BDP (edited 12-25-2000).]

[TheWobble]

Well the RAF and its night bombing had this bad habit of going off course and never hitting targets because they didnt want to fly in the day, so if a musem mentions the RAF bombers thats what yer gonna hear.

[Replicant]

Between 1939-1945 RAF Bomber Command despatched (includes light/heavy):-

297,663 night sorties - 7,449 missing/destroyed (of these 2,278 by fighters, 1,345 by flak, 112 mostly collisions, 2,072 unknowns).

66,851 daytime sorties - 876 missing/destroyed

1943 and 1944 seemed the worst years for losses.  4606 night losses out of 176088 night sorties (283 day losses out of 36888 day sorties).  Note: Most day sorties were light bombers such as Blenheim's, Mosquito's etc.

1945 - 44,074 night sorties (20,664 daytime) saw 507 night losses (90 daytime losses).

I think the main reason for night time raids was that the RAF was low on escort fighters.  In daytime they would require more escorts and heavier armament which had been requested since 1942.  Also 'whilst the USAAF bombed by day, the RAF bombed by night'.  Even with those losses, the effect of a 24 hour alert in Germany must have been tremendous.  The RAF was very stretched with RAF Sqn's in all arena's with Commonwealth support.

Regards

Nexx


[This message has been edited by Replicant (edited 12-25-2000).]

[Tony Williams]

The RAF started off the war believing in daylight bombing, but some nasty early experiences in unescorted raids soon showed that this was not a good idea (RAF bombers at that time had little armour and only a few .303" guns for defence - they got chewed up).

Bomber Command therefore switched to night bombing and concentrated on this thereafter.  At first, the accuracy was terrible because the RAF had never developed accurate blind navigation aids, but as the war went on technology and techniques improved and by the end of 1943 a night bombing raid could be as accurate as a daytime one.  

Day bombing by the USAAF was generally accurate - in good weather - but in bad weather they relied on ground-mapping radar so their accuracy was no better than Bomber Command achieved in bad weather at night.

Ironically, by the end of the war night bombing had become more dangerous than day bombing.  The USAAF's day bombers were not only well-protected and armed, they crucially had excellent escort fighters with them all the way (of course, it was a different story earlier on when the USAAF tried unescorted raids).  At night, the growing skills of the German night-fighter defences meant that the Lancaster bombers lost an average of one plane in twenty, every mission.

The RAF carried on bombing even with heavy losses because it was a way of demonstrating to the Russians that we were still fighting with them.  There was no other way to take the war to Germany until after D-day.

Late in the war, it was really too late for Bomber Command to switch to daylight bombing.  The bombers weren't suitable for it (except at the end, when there were few German fighters about) and the RAF hadn't developed any long range escort fighters (no need for them at night) and anyway, as has been said, there were advantages in being able to maintain 24-hour attacks.  The RAF and USAAF often coordinated their attacks to keep hammering a target.

Tony Williams
New book: Rapid Fire - The Development of Automatic Cannon, Heavy Machine Guns and their Ammunition for Armies, Navies and Air Forces.
Details on my military gun and ammunition website: http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~autogun/
 

[Vermillion]

Nath is that the offensive where they were bombing Berlin (I mean really concentrating on it)?

If I remember correctly, I saw a show on the History channel, that discussed the whole offensive.

Basically it came down to "Bomber" Harris, the British commander in charge of the bomber operations, claiming he could make the Germans capitulate by concentrating the offensive on the population centers, with alot of emphasis on Berlin. Similar to the earlier theory the Germans used in the bombings of London.

Even though losses were extremely heavy as you indicate, it became a political "statement" and Harris had to continue or admitt the failure of his strategy.

Eventually, the RAF bomber command became exhausted and couldn't continue the offensive.

I think this was an episode on "Military Blunders" on the History Channel.

------------------
Vermillion
**MOL**, Men of Leisure

[Wingnut_0]

Verm hit the nail on the head Nath when he said it was politics.  The RAF was riddled with as many political commanders as the German military was during that time.  

The Western Allies were in sometimes bitter disagreement over HOW to conduct the war since day 1 of US official involvment.

I agree with you on the night war.  It was even more dangerous not just fighting but just flat out flying.  The bombers had no screening fire from other friendly's (bombers spread out too much for safe flying) and even the attacking fighters would be bounced by mosquito's, etc. with only maybe a flit of light or a slight outline in the sky before the fatal blow.  

It's a much underated look at aviation and war history imo.

------------------
Wingnut
GeschwaderKommadore
P.T.R. "Black 13"

 

The quality of the box matters little.  Success depends upon the man who sits in it  -  Baron Manfred von Richthofen

[This message has been edited by Wingnut_0 (edited 12-26-2000).]

[Tony Williams]

Bomber Command might be overlooked in the USA but you could fill a library with books about it in the UK  

Tony Williams
New book: Rapid Fire - The Development of Automatic Cannon, Heavy Machine Guns and their Ammunition for Armies, Navies and Air Forces.
Details on my military gun and ammunition website: http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~autogun/