Thought it was time to start another thread on this since the other one started by Airscrew was getting a little long. My main purpose is to share some observations on WW2 radar to help clarify a little on WW2 radar realism and to gently challenge some assumptions by those who claim to want more "realism" for radar usage in AH.
First, An Observation / OpinionLet me diverge a little first. I think HTC have their reasons for implementing the current bar radar and dot radar as it is. I don't claim to know what those reasons are. My observations on the consesquences of the current radar are as I've stated in the other thread:
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- It helps people find where fights are and lets them get into the action quicker.
- It forces strikes, missions, field captures etc to be well planned and executed.
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Whether intentional or not, I think HTC has struck a good balance for those wanting to get into the action without wasting too much time and those who really want well planned missions. My OPINION is that HTC's implementation of the dar is mainly to reward certain types of behavior vs. trying to simulate ultimate radar realism. Okay, enough on that tangent.
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON RADAR IN WW2 AIR COMBAT
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Radar usage in WW2 air combat was quite extensive and was readily available for various combatants early in WW2. Not only that but directing WW2 air battles was quite sophisticated.Students of the Battle of Britain know that a very crucial element of the British integrated air defense system that gave it the ability to fight against superior LW numbers were the Chain Home (CH) and Chain Home Low (CHL) radars. CHL stations were set up to detect aircraft below 3000 ft.[1] CH & CHL stations began showing up sometime in 1935-36. The Brits had several years to perfect their usage in directing the air battle and this proved to be true by 1940.
Information provided by the radar was pretty detailed. “CH stations could detect aircraft up to 100 miles away, and could give the bearing and an approximate indication of the height and number [of aircraft] of an approaching formation.”[1]
Knowing enemy formation information wasn’t enough to achieve accuracy in control. “To achieve accuracy in control had been a problem, but during 1939 ‘Pipsqueak’ had provided the answer. One fighter in each section of three switched his R/T on to this device, which produced periodic signals picked up by D/F (direction-finding) ground stations. Crossbearings from these fixed the fighters’ position, which could be continuously plotted. Armed with this information, and with knowledge of the enemy’s course derived from the radar and observer plots, a controller on the ground could give his pilots over the R/T a ‘vector’, or compass bearing which would…bring them to within sight of the enemy. This ‘controlled interception’…was to be the basis of Fighter Command’s operations in the forthcoming Battle.” [1]
The point is CH & CHL usage along with ‘Pipsqueak’ was pretty sophisticated by 1940 and played a vital role in the direction of the air battle during BoB.
The result was incredibly effective. “The tall radar towers, long since correctly identified, were clearly proving more effective than the German High Command had reckoned…The last month’s fighting had disquietingly revealed how, time after time, the weight and directions of Luftwaffe attacks had been anticipated so early by the RAF that the fighter squadrons were there, awaiting them like tipped-off gangland rivals.” [1]
Radar usage for directing air defense was not the solely a Brits only technology. The Luftwaffe also established the effective use of radar in directing air battles early on in the war specifically to counter RAF Bomber Command’s night bombing campaign. “German defenses were transformed by the addition of radar in the autumn of that year [1940]. The large Wurzburg radar units were set up, one in each of a series of grid ‘boxes’ drawn on a map, roughly 20 miles across. Within each box a night-fighter could be directed to intercept any bomber picked up on the screen. A central control room kept each fighter within its sector, circling round, waiting for its prey.” [2]
By 1943 The German air defense was quite formidable. It was this same command and control system that caused so much grief for the 8th Air Force with the lack of long range escorts.
IFF technology was available early in WW2.Both the Brit and LW examples of usage of radar depended on being able to identify friendly craft- e.g. the Brits “Pipsqueak”. “Indentfication friend or foe (IFF) was a proven technology. The British had developed IFF and used it effectively in the Battle of Britain. RAF aircraft carried a transponder that was activated by British radar signals and sent back a pulse that showed up in radar stations as a green light. All other radar returns triggered red lights.”[3] These series of lights helped plotters with plotting friendly and enemy aircraft.
Interestingly enough the Brits had offered the technology to the US as early as August 1940 “but the Signal Corps was too proud to take the gifts from the foreigners”[3]. The Signal Corps’ SCR-270 mobile radar systems that it was so proud of was useless without IFF as evidenced by SCR-270 located at Opana Point, Hawaii on December 7th, 1941 that picked up the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor that was surmised to be B17’s returning.[3]
Electronic Warfare Was Definitely a Part of WW2 Air Combat.What may be somewhat surprising of folks is some of the Electronic Warfare activity during WW2 in air combat.
There are examples of ECM that the US had but it was fairly crude at the time.[3] The RAF came up with a way and device to jam the German night-fighter airborne radar known as the Lichtenstein with a device called the SN2 with some success.[2]
Some other examples of Brit ECM is quite intereseting. “On some nights British radio jammers succeeded in talking over the German controllers and directing fighters to the wrong town; on some occassions they played recordings of the Fuhrer’s speeches to apoplectic pilots who were forced to circle around in an aerial no-man’s-land. But such a ruse was very hit-and-miss.”[2]
Chaff on the other hand was used quite extensively by the Brits and USAAF in 1943. “To supplement it [ECM], there was “window” or “chaff”. This consisted of strips of aluminum foil, like Christmas tree tinsel. Bomber crews were given bales of the stuff and told to throw out a few strips at a time to create an electronic blizzard on enemy radar screens. Not suprisingly, window got thrown out in handfuls, or by the armload. During intense flak, entire bales would hurtle through bomber formations, glittering and sparkling as they came apart.”[3]
I’ve written a novel and will quit now.
References:
[1] The Battle of Britain, Richard Hough / Denis Richards
[2] Why the Allies Won, Richard Overy
[3] Winged Victory, Geoffrey Perret
[ 07-26-2001: Message edited by: dtango ]
