Tah Gut, you're thinking too much here
Ok,
Define strategic? Hitting railheads, troops concentrations, railways, airfields and such these are not strategic?
Tactical and/or interdiction, not strategic. German bomber forces did the best they could with what they had to work with (equipment and operational disadvantages). Still, they never achieved the level of dominance the allies achieved before D-day in all these areas. Did the allies’ numbers play a role? Of course, but so what? It was a real war and not a Hollywood movie, and the allies delivered victory.
DId they do it enmass as the allies? No they didn't Germany's doctrine was the blitzkrieg, when that stalled and Russia was pushing them back they really had no use for a heavy bomber anymore.
Can't argue here. Germany never had the resources to match the allies in such areas anyway. Tactical operations of lesser and lesser significance, and the ability to apply only local air superiority, were unavoidable outcomes after a quick victory failed in Russia.
Don't make me bring up the numbers as well, how many planes did the germans shoot down? What were the odds again?
I'm not sure I follow this one. Is this a reference to the individual scores of the Top scoring German fighter pilots? If so, I'm frankly surprised the numbers weren't higher. For most of the war they flew in a defensive manner either over the homeland or over the front, where capture wasn't assured in a shoot down; they were not taken out of combat after a handful of combat missions; they had some leeway about pressing an engagement against the odds (fighter sweeps on the Russian front spring to mind); they fought the initial part of the war at an advantage in experience, equipment, tactics (it took the Brits two years to drop the Vic, and the Americans a year to pull our heads out of our rectum with the P-38 and P-47); they could actually find enemy aircraft to shoot at; and they were able to achieve local air superiority on the Eastern front throughout the war, regardless of the overall odds. I do find Lt. Guenther Scheel's 70 missions/71 victories impressive, though I believe the allies had some pilots with similar kill/sortie ratios. Or maybe it was just those Aryan genetics. In any cases I'll trade victory over individual scores any day of the week.
The Ju-88 series was the best twin engine plane in that war period, as a bomber night fighter or recon it excelled in each role.
In an apples to apples comparison I would vote for the Mosquito. Arguments could also be made for the B-25, TU-2 and the A-26 based on different, subjective and technological criteria, IMO. The Ju-88 is certainly in the running and a Ju-188 would be a nice addition. A Do-217 would probably be a more historical choice for addition.
Payload my friend payload. Tu-4 nuclear capable.
And what makes a good strategic bomber, nuclear or otherwise, in 1944-47? Range and advanced performance in speed and altitude (since the typical mission was beyond fighter escort range) while carrying a payload of 10,000 pounds or more. Had the Russians needed a 66,139 lb dive bomber, that went against their philosophy of reliability first, I'm sure they would have produced a copy of the He-177. As it was, they wanted a plane that could win a war.
Not for the role players, each country should be represented is all we are asking.
As a game concession for the CT, sure. I still don't see why for the MA, since your He-177 is just as likely to be shot down by an FW-190 as anything else. If the Stuka is added I would feel no need to push for an A-24 (ALLIES NEED A DIVE BOMBER). Except, of course, for the fact that the Dauntless changed the course of history in that other little skirmish that was going on at the time.
Sachs, I agree with you. The game needs a German bomber with advanced performance and defensive armament. But, I don't buy into the whole Nazi war machine mythology that always seems to overlook the shortcomings.
I give the German field commanders/NCOs, and some general staff officers credit for being on the cutting edge (particularly early in the war). Training and morale were also high at the enlisted level (particularly early in the war). Some German equipment was revolutionary, much was average by comparison to its rivals (the early successes in Russia were using the MKIII, not the Panther or Tiger), and some (including the V programs) were pointless wastes of resources. In the end, Hitler was proven conclusively to be a moron, and Germany's Master Race soldiers raised their hands to surrender like those in every other country (except Japan
) when the only card left to play was death. The mythology ultimately fails for me because the cause was so totally, morally bankrupt. I can respect a Galland for his skill as a combat leader or Hartmann for his skill and precision as a pilot, but I can never admire them for actively helping to propagate such enormous suffering. [edit: I can admire the Me109 for its technological features 1939-1943, but understand why it may have had SOME shortcomings compared to aircraft developed 4-5 years later] I have much more admiration for the allied pilot shot down on his first sortie somewhere far from home in his obsolete P-39.
Charon
