Here's what Eric Brown has to say on the Condor:
"To assess the Condor's value to Germany as a war machine is not difficult because, in concert with the U-boat, it so nearly brought Britain to her knees in 1940-41"
Unless I missed something, the Reich never was nearly brought to its knees by the Baltimore :-)
(Eric Brown was FAA pilot early in the war, flying a Martlet from the Audacity against the Condor, and later was posted to the RAE at Farnborough as a test pilot.)
Well Ho Hun, given his role in the war I'm not surprised he feels that way. Would It be better if I changed Baltimore to "Lockheed Hudson" or "Short Sunderland" instead
I think my Condor comment was more focused on the durability issue, which I believe prevented it from being used as a conventional bomber. I seem to remember the bellybutton kept falling off the thing if it was landed too hard. Unlike other pre-war German airliners, it was probably actually designed as an airliner
The debate here focuses more on the German heavy bomber campaign than maritime patrol, and the relative need to bring a he-177, Ju-188 or Do-217 into the game, which I support.
The real threat posed by the U-boat menace is another topic for debate. I recently read a rather revisionist treatment "HITLER’S U-BOAT WAR" by the late Clay Blair Jr., where he asserted that the threat was overblown when you add up the numbers, even in the darkest days. I'm not sure I agree, but he does detail practically every U-boat mission as he did with the U.S. fleet boats in "Silent Service". He also covers tonnage under flag, new production, etc. to suggest that it never was as dire as Churchill stated. Actually a bit too dry of a read, but worth it for those so interested.
He also asserts that the U.S. naval defeat during the "happy times" and the U.S. "failure" to follow the British advice were more of a hissy fit that was overblown by the Brits than anything else. He pointed out that US DD assets were needed in the Pacific at the time to help stem the active Japanese advance and were not avail for Atlantic use regardless of what the British would have liked. He also blames Roosevelt's fixation with PC vessels (too small to be effective) as a major source of the shortage of effective escorts on the East Coast. Again, I'm not sure if I know enough about it to comfortably agree, but he does make a compelling argument that the Navy did the best that it could in both theaters (and did not "Snub" the British advice) with what was on hand at the time. He has a reason to be potentially biased, but I know he didn't pull any punches in Silent Service when assigning the blame for the torpedo fiasco.
[Edit: in looking over some of the reviews on Amazon to see some review perspective, I was reminded that the Luftwaffe was a somewhat reluctant partner according to Blair, that coordination was ineffectual early on becasue the aircrews failed to provide accurate reports, and that they had to be dragged kicking and screaming into supporting the U-boat war.]
Charon
