Bushido? Mukato? Hehe, all part of one big, juicy rationalization for a leadership who led their nation into a fiery hell, and didnt have the good graces or human decency to admit they screwed the pooch.
And what
you miss is that 'good graces' and 'human decency' are
Western value and moral judgements, not Japanese ones. You are condemning them for failure to adhere to codes of conduct alien to their culture.
They "altered" religion to create a different conciousness among their people; one that acculturated them to war. They indoctrinated their society to have them believe that suicide was glorious, and life intolerable if they chose to live and let live; this was a concious act on the part of the Japanese military leadership.
They didn't 'alter' any religion; they took their existing cultural traditions and cultivated the belief that the soldier was the modern-day samurai -- and thereby wrapped the military in all of the traditions and values from the 'golden age' of Japanese history. And for most military personnel, it was a step
up; the vast majority of the military came from the merchant, peasant, and worker classes, and telling them that they were modern samurai was a vast social promotion -- in the past, lower-class families would be eager to marry their daughters to samurai family, so their children could be samura, but now you could become samurai yourself just by joining the military. It was a powerful social incentive; one that played heavily on the traditions that the Japanese had been raised on.
A leadership that chose to ignore the rules of the geneva convention
Japan was not signatory to the Hague Treaty regarding the treatment of POWs. The only violation of the Geneva
Protocol that the Japanese committed during WWII was the use of biological and chemical weapons. The Third Geneva Convention, which laid out the standards for the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians during wartime, was held in
1949, four years
after the end of WWII.
Consider that the French used some 49,000 German POWs to clear mines throughout Europe and Russia from 1945-1946, forcing the prisoners to walk through the area they'd cleared to prove that the area was safe. Between 8% and 17.5% of the POWs forced into mine-clearing were killed as a result of these actions. From 1935-1936, Italian forces sprayed mustard gas from aircraft against Ethiopian troops. Violations of the Geneva Protocol and inhumane treatment of prisoners was not confined to Japan.
And the Japanese treatment of prisoners was no better or worse than what the Japanese expected for themselves
as prisoners, or than they treated Japanese prisoners. The Japanese tradition was that being captured -- to become
toriko, 'prisoner' -- was a disgrace not only to themselves, but to their family. Japanese POW guards were mystified at Allied POW's interest in contacting their families to let them know they were captured but alive -- to
want to communicate the shame of their capture to their families was alien to them. Similarly, Allied POW guards found it difficult to accept how easily Japanese POWs would profess their willingness to work for their captors, and would work faithfully; because they considered themselves dead to their family, and had a need to feel that they were useful.
yet, wanted at the same time to become players on the world stage and develop spheres of influence throughout the pacific. Why? For resources they didnt have.
And which the US had threatened to cut off, in an ultimatum which gave no way for the Japanese to back out of their actions in a manner which would let them save face.
Some American policy-makers had long disliked Japan partly because of racism, partly because of economic rivalry. Like today, some were disturbed by the presence of Japanese products on American shelves. And although the U.S.-Japanese trade was much larger than the U.S.-Chinese trade, many people thought that someday China would provide a huge market for American manufacturers, if Japan didn't get there first. Thus, when Japan began hostilities against China in the 1930s, there was concern.
As early as 1938, Roosevelt quietly explored with the British the possibility of war with Japan. Japanese overtures, including an offer in 1940 to leave China and the Axis Pact, were rebuffed. In July 1940, Roosevelt began his program of economic warfare by embargoing strategic goods. In September, he prohibited exports of iron and scrap steel to Japan. In June 1941, he restricted oil shipments. About a month later, Roosevelt froze Japan's funds in the United States. This was followed by a warning that a continuation of Japan's expansionist policies would compel the U.S. to protect its security. Roosevelt also refused to meet with Japanese Prime Minister Konoye. Soon afterwards, the Japanese government fell and General Tojo became prime minister.
During negotiations with Japan, Secretary of State Cordell Hull demanded that Japan withdraw from China and Indochina, leave other countries alone (including the sacrosanct colonies which the U.S., Britain, and Holland had bagged though their previous imperialistic campaigns), and scrap the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity sphere. Japan offered concessions, but the American response suggested to the Japanese that the U.S. wanted no agreement. Caught in an economic vise, the Japanese began to speak of war if no settlement were reached by November. The American officials were aware of this, thanks to the breaking of the Japanese codes and the interception of diplomatic messages.
On November 20, Japan made an offer that included restoration of peace between it and China and withdrawal of troops from Indochina in return for commercial normalization. (Meanwhile, Japanese forces were moving toward American, British, and Dutch colonies, just in case the offer was refused.) Hull called the offer "utterly unacceptable." Although the U.S. military wanted additional time to prepare, and Roosevelt initially wanted a six-month delay, Hull issued an ultimatum on November 26 demanding total Japanese withdrawal from China and Indochina. Recognizing that compliance would humiliate the Japanese, Hull knew that the ultimatum would not be accepted. And Hull was right — the Japanese government refused to accept the ultimatum. The next day Hull told Secretary of War Stimson, "It is now in the hands of you and [Naval Secretary] Knox — the Army and Navy."
