I used to get paid to research this stuff. I've had the opportunity to look over files, and reports, etc. that most people who actually have lives don't really have the time or inclination to search out.
I don't have a ton of free time right now, so I'm going to start with Yamamoto. If you like what you read and want to see more then let me know and I'll move on to Patton and then Rommel and maybe some others...
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Yamamoto (I can post alot more in a week or so when I have more time):
A big name with the IJN in the history books. But *did you know?*
A few years after the end of WW2, U.S. Naval Intelligence undertook a very ambitious task - they rounded up all surviving (which was alot, due to copies routed up to fleet HQ) IJN surface warfare AARs, and translated them all, and compared them to USN and all available Allied surface warfare AARs.
The result, compiled by Paul S. Dull, is maybe the best book ever written on surface warfare actions in the Pacific during WW2. It is titled 'A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945' (by Paul S. Dull, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 0 87021 097 1).
Anyone interested in the history of surface warfare engagements in the Pacific in WW2 should have a copy of this book. It is one of the rare cases where a single book can be considered a 'bible' for an entire 'realm' of warfare history.
The level of detail is astonishing - charts showing the exact time, direction, and spread of torpedoes fired by individual destroyers in a surface engagement where there was 20+ suface combatants on each side.
The book also goes a long way towards 'debunking' the 'myth' of Yamamoto - as a fleet commander he really wasn't very impressive. He actually made several very crucial mistakes. He had a tendency to divide his forces where there was no reason to do so, and this allowed the Allies to fight the IJN at much better odds in several crucial engagements in 1942 and early 1943.
For a truly amazing example of superb command of surface warfare elements, get this book and read about the surface warfare actions conducted by the IJN during the battle for Guadalcanal.
Did you know that due to superior optics and a large disparity in night engagement exercises/training (in the favor of the IJN in both cases) that IJN 'lookouts' actually outperformed USN radar equipped ships on a fairly regular basis in 1942 and 1943 (i.e. IJN lookouts were spotting USN warships at night *before* USN radar equipped warships were picking up those same IJN warships on radar?).
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Coming soon...
1. There was a very specific reason that German operational commanders held Patton's units in much higher regard than any other U.S. Army units...anyone have an idea about what I am talking about?
1A. U.S. Army units took very heavy casualties in NWE during WW2 when they should not have (according to several DoD studies). The reasons for this don't involve 'Patton attacking too much' (more on this later).
2. Rommel isn't on the 'top 20 list' for German operational/strategic commanders in WW2 according to a very detailed DoD study conducted in the 1950s and 1960s that involved the interviewing of many WW2 German operational/strategic commanders. More on this later.
Mike/wulfie