RAM, You always do a post good, add a little spice you know
Try to shake that chip off your shoulder before posting
Up until early 44, the LW truly ruiled the skies over western Europe. In January 44 Eisenhower came to England from the Med theater to assume his position as Supreme Commander for the invasion of western Europe. He brought with him air team, which consisted of several commanders with whom the General had worked with and felt comfortable with. Two of them had an important impact on JG26 and the Jagdwaffe. One, Air Vice Marshall Harry Broadhurst, took command of the fighter component of the new Second Tactical Air Force, which contained many squadrons formerly belonging to Fighter Command (RAF). The British Fighters were relieved of much of their escort responsibility as they took up their new task, which was to help soften up the invasion coast. The old warning "achtung spitfeuer!!" once again chilled the German Fighter pilots along the the Channel coast, as the spitfire formations dropped to the deck in search of aerial targets.
Another importanmt member of Eisenhowers air team was Lt. General James Doolittle, who took Generals Eakers job of commander of the 8th AF. He made it plain that Aliied air superiority was a prerequisite for the sucessful invasion of the continent. Since the invasion was scheduled for late spring, the air commanders would have to reorder their priorities, and fast. The allioes could no longer wait for the bomber Generals to fulfil their dream of defeating Germany by strategic bombing alone. In Doolittle, Ike had the perfect airman for the task ahead. Doolittle, a reservist, had no particular loyalties to the theories of Srat Bombing. Always a pragmatist, he was quick to throw out policies that did not contribute to his immediate goal of defeating the LW. American escort doctrine soon changed; the fighters were ordered to patrol fixed zones along the bombers track instead of escorting specific bomber wings. This subtle change in tactics permitted tghe escort formation leaders to concentrate on finding enemy fighters, rather than the "correct" bomber fiormation-- bomber units that missed rendevous were left to fend for themselves.
This was taken from--"JG26--TOP GUNS OF THE LUFTWAFFE" by Donald Caldwell. It doesnt give the specifics but you can see that the change in doctrine and had alot to do with the success of allied pilots, the same type of success that the JG's enjoyed form 1939 on. Early on--the LW had the superior AC in all aspects on both fronts anfd the superior doctrine. They were also ordered by Goering himself to NOT attack RAF or USAAF fighters, but to concentrate on the Bomber raids. The JG's would sortie a lightening attack against the bombers and dive away before the escort had the oppertunity to defend. The 56th FG (Zemkes unit) were using their own tactics which were not the same as Fighter Commands and because of this they enjoyed some early success in early 43 on. They were a "loose" formation anjd used this to bounce the 190's and 109s out ahead of the bomber formation while the The JG's were forming up for the standard High 12 ock attack on the bombers.
