S! Skernsk
Here is an excerpt from the official British report on the battle done after the fact. Turns out that the Fortresses mentioned were involved in Dieppe, but not in direct support. They did make an attack on enemy Fighter airfields during the day.
It would seem there were 50 Squadrons of Fighters, 6 Squadrons of close support Fighters, (carrying some ordanance) 2 Squadrons of dedicated `Hurribombers`, and just 2 Squadrons of day bombers. (Bostons) One of the criticisms of the plan which Mountbatten drew up for Dieppe was that there wasn`t enough Ground support aircraft. The original plans created by the Canadian Divisional Commander Roberts, called for something like 20 Squadrons of daybombers, but Mountbatten bowed to political pressure from the British Strat. bombing Chiefs and reduced the numbers. Most analysts point to that, as well as not enough Naval bombardment, as a major reason for the failure of the assault.
Here is the report: (I may have more later)
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"The Air Battle
35. AIR FORCES
In the preceding pages, little reference has been made to the part played by the R.A.F., mainly because, in the natitre of things, our aircraft, though very active, were not often seen from the ground. It should be clearly understood, however, that the air battle was not a separate phase but went on continuously from the first landings until dark, reaching its greatest intensity during the main withdrawal from the beaches.
The air battle was directed by the Air Force Force-Commander, Air Vice-Marshal T. Leigh-Mallory, from H.Q. of 11 Group of Fighter Command at Uxbridge,2 and the immediate operations of fighters were directed by the fighter controller in the Calpe. The Air Forces detailed to take part in the operation were 56 squadrons of day fighters (50 to provide cover and six for close support), two squadrons of Hurricane bombers, two squadrons of day bombers, four squadrons of Army Co-operation forces, and three squadrons of "Smoke forces," in all 67 squadrons. In addition, Coastal Command provided search patrols during the passage of the expedition throughout the dark hours. Bostons carried out bombing attacks on the east headland battery at 0510, after which a smoke screen was laid over both headlands. The two batteries behind the town were also bombed by Bostons, but owing to the haze and the bad light these attacks on the batteries were considered, in the words of C.C.O., " quite ineffective."3 " Intruder" aircraft engaged batteries, the attack by cannon-firing fighters on" Hess" battery being particularly helpful, as has already been mentioned (Sections 20 and 21). Cannon-fighters supported the landing of the troops on Red and White beaches at Dieppe, and further smoke screens was laid as requested by the Naval and Military Force Commanders. Subsequent bombing attacks were made on the east headland when it was seen that the Blue beach landing at Puits was held up. Unfortunately the bombs, like the destroyers' shells, had little effect on the enemy's defences. Nor can it be said that the bombing was very intensive, for the total of bombs dropped amounted only to some 220 bombs of 500 lb and about 90 of 250 lb, a total of 60 tons (see Appendix E). When it was seen that the situation on white beach was deteriorating, attacks were made at about 0930 on the west headland by "Hurribombers" and cannon-fighters.
1 For fuller details, see B.R. 1887, p. 144 et seq.
2 With him throughout the operation were the Chief of Combined Operations and the G.O.C. 1st Canadian Corps. They had before them, on the naval, military and air plots which were constantly kept up to date as signals came in over the very complete W/T and land line system of communications, a complete picture of the action. Except for a number of discussions on various points with the Royal Air Force Commander, the Chief of Combined Operations and the G.O.C. 1st Canadian Corps refrained from interfering with the course of the operation, which the Force Commanders clearly had in hand.
3 BR., p.32.
40
41
36. ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION
At the commencement of the operation there was practically no enemy air opposition, the Luftwaffe having evidently been taken by surprise, but as time passed enemy sorties of 20 to 30 fighters appeared, and subsequently the strength of the sorties increased to between 50 and 100 aircraft. Fighter bombers also arrived and some abortive attacks were carried out on our ships, but it was not until about 1000 that heavy bombers appeared escorted by fighters. The heavies were energetically attacked by our fighters and sustained severe losses. The bombers made no attempt to attack our troops ashore and confined their attentions to the ships, but, except for the sinking of the Berkeley, had practically no success.
At 1030 an attack was made by 24 Fortresses, escorted by Spitfires, on the fighter airfield at Abbeville-Drucat, which rendered it unserviceable for two hours and probably severely hampered the enemy fighters at the crucial moment of the withdrawal. During the withdrawal Bostons made bombing attacks on the two headlands, and a thick smoke curtain was laid from the air. From 1200, heavy battles between formations of fighters went on over the ships and beaches, the enemy losing heavily. During the voyage home, fighter cover was maintained over the convoy and all attempts of enemy aircraft to attack the ships were foiled.1 In the air we lost eight bombers and smoke-layers, 10 Army Co-operation and reconnaissance aircraft, and 88 fighters, while our casualties in killed and missing were 113, with 40 wounded. It is estimated that the enemy made 125 sorties with bombers and 600 with fighters. Our total sorties were stated to have been about 3,000.
At the time it was thought that the enemy's air losses were considerably greater than ours and that over a quarter of the German Air Force in Western Europe had been put out of action. German records show, however, that in fact we only destroyed 23 fighters and 25 bombers, while 8 fighters and 16 bombers were damaged.
These bare figures, however, do not tell the whole story. According to reliable German documents, there were in the Luftflotte 3 area (France, Belgium and Holland) 299 fighters and 175 bombers, but of these only 206 fighters and 107 bombers were fully serviceable at the time. Thus about 15 per cent of the serviceable fighters and over 38 per cent of the serviceable bombers were either destroyed or substantially damaged. Since the Spring of 1941, when the bulk of the German Air Force was moved to the eastern front, the small force remaining in the west had operated under severe pressure. The bomber units in particular were showing signs of extreme fatigue, resulting in a serious decline in efficiency of both aircraft and crews. Coming just after substantial losses suffered in the raids on Birmingham at the end of July, the casualties at Dieppe were a heavy blow, particularly as nearly all of the crews were lost,including two Squadron Commanders.
These losses should be viewed, too, in the light of the contemporary position of the German Air Force as a whole. Both in the Mediterranean and on the eastern front it was extremely hard pressed and the bomber force especially was stretched to the limit of its capabilities. In these circumstances it can fairly be claimed that Dieppe was an important contribution to the run-down of the forces in the west, which in turn led to a severe restriction of offensive operations against the United Kingdom and British shipping.
1 B.R., p.164. " The cover and support afforded by No.11 Group, R.A.F. were magnificent." M., para.4.
2 The Germans claim to have brought down 112 of our aircraft. German Report.
3 B.R., pp. 33, 164.
4 Information from Air Ministry Historical Branch."
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