Much dreaded type of fighting was largely avoided by the Coalition who fought a smart war.
Initially, the Iraqi propaganda machine was superior to the Coalition one, but the dear Information Minister soon tripped on his own lies.
At any rate, I see several things the Iraqi regime did wrong. Of course since I suffer from insomnia and am a relatively dumb person who just wrote a lenghty pseudo-insulting post because it seemed like the right thing to do at the time, I'll most likely miss the important things, so feel free to contend things or add stuff.
- Conventional forces allowed to be in the open. We've all seen the pictures of destroyed Iraqi tanks on the outskirts of towns and cities, along with APCs. It seems idiotic to me to place them there after having been subjugated to an air war that was devastating 12 years earlier. They should have learned
- Using entrenched, static positions in the open for older tanks. Allows easy Panzer Plonking from the air, especially as metal cool down significantly slower than sand, allowing IR cameras a clear view of potential targets. The sand piled up in front of an old T-55 won't do much to the trajectory or power of a SABOT round; they'd need reinforced concrete and scrap iron to make the hull down positions viable.
- Failure to not lure, but force, Coalition forces to do battle mainly inside cities where inferior Iraqi tanks can be placed in intelligent ways so that their old tanks can get a shot at the rear of US armoured vehicles. No large scale organized use of anti-tank teams in urban settings.
- Not a sufficient continency plan in case of C&C disruptions. It seems their static defense plans weren't adequately planned.
- Insufficient use of weather. Sure they redeployed some armour but it was quickly rediscovered by Coalition forces, then pounded.
- Underrating American armour. The Iraqi tank crews seemed to believe that their T-72s were a close match to Challenger II's and M1 Abrams. This is clearly not the case. Their BMPs were also proven to be inferior to the Bradleys
- Late recruitment of Jihad suicide fighters. A large number early in the war could have given the Iraqis a propaganda victory
- Inability to command the soldiers to fight as hard as possible. A minority did make it tough on the US by digging in hard; had more done so, there'd be more civilian casualties and damages to infrastructure, which again would be a propaganda coup.
- Failure to destroy key bridges. They should have known they never would cross those bridges again.
- Failure to kill enough of their own people. Perhaps they did plant a bomb at that marketplace, much like the Russian bombed their own apartment blocks as a justification for going into Chechnya. Again, a propaganda coup. They might lose the war, but at least the rest of the Arab world would foster many more Bin Ladens that way.
- Poor use of potential propaganda victories. Destroying a APCs or Bradleys and showing the burning hulk/bodies instead of attempting to first deal with M1s was unwise from a propaganda POW. The Iraqi regime didn't so much need to destroy the Coalition war machine as they needed to inflict lots of casualties. Had the dead quickly turned into thousands, the Coaliton would be under severe pressure
- Failure to destroy oil wells. They knew that the war, once over, was gonna be financed by those wells. And they were going out one way or another, so might as well deny the Americans some cash for a while.
- Failure to capitalize on opportunities, especially on the long supply lines the Coalition had to protect. General inflexibility and lack of initiative by commanders on the field.
- Failure to create humanitarian disasters that could be blamed on the Coalition. This would have scored big with the anti-war crowd.
They did manage to opress the Iraqi population for a good while, but that came to an end eventually.
These are just from the top of my head. Some are obviously over simplifications, others might just be me being wrong. Anyone else have any additions? Would also be nice to discuss Coalition failures/shortcomings, although there are fewer of those.
