Hi Kweassa,
>In that sense, I think Hohun's right - they would spew all sorts of fantasies to the public, or even send up 'optimistic' reports to their superiors - but the people directly in charge of departments concerning intelligence, R&D, and aircraft construction probably all knew the truth, and made adequate decisions and developments according to it.
I think it was an important part of Stalin's system that he guarded himself against fake information from subordinates. Hitler on the other hand tended to fire anyone who told him what he didn't want to hear, even if it was the truth he'd have needed to make adequate decisions.
How dangerous it was to talk about inconvenient truths under Stalin probably depended on the context, and on other factors which in their entirety could be called "luck" ;-)
When a number of Soviet fighter aces was decorated in December 1941, their division commander gave them a (propaganda) speech about the great performance of the Soviet fighter types.
Then, the fighter pilots were asked to talk about their combat experience. Pokryshkin was among the decorated pilots, and comparing the MiG-3 to the Me 109, he stated that the MiG was overly heavy, unmanoeuvrable at low altitudes and underarmed. He concluded by stating he was confident that the Soviet designer would quickly come up with new, improved machines - which of course was a diplomatic way of demanding just that.
It became immediately evident that his comments were considered unpatriotic, and apparently, his frankness earned him an entry in his file marking him as a troublemaker. No direct action was taken against him, but it wasn't forgotten either. Later, he got a commander he couldn't get along with at all, and this commander got him expelled from the Communist Party by a court martial decision based on incident where Pokryshkin got into a brawl with drunken officers. I'm sure the earlier black spot in his files counted against him!
The expulsion later was revoked, but it seems Pokryshkin's file still was blemished. After becoming a recognized and highly decoreated ace, he visited Yakovlev, and Yakovlev (who was 100% Stalin's man) listened to Pokryshkin's tactical ideas - which included the notion that fighters should have heavier armament than the Yak-3 - but wouldn't even answer. That's why Pokryshkin's regiment flew Lavochkins in late war - in distinct contrast to Jakovlev, Lavochkin had been delighted to discuss tactics with Pokryshkin, and accepted his ideas for the improvement of fighter aircraft.
What's the conclusion from this? I don't really know - maybe it just shows us that reality was highly complex :-)
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
