Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => Aircraft and Vehicles => Topic started by: Seadog36 on August 13, 2011, 02:11:18 AM
-
http://www.warbirdsandairshows.com/aircraftvictorieswwii.htm
-
Something doesn't look quite right with those. I don't have access to the number that many here will but my gut tells me there is something off. Flame on!
-
What strikes you as off?
-
Take the spitfire for example. It seems to me that it should have had more than 375 kills for the entire war for all variants. And only 1 kill for the Mossie? Maybe, but it just seems off. Like I said before, I have no hard data to dispute it, just a gut feeling.
-
Take the spitfire for example. It seems to me that it should have had more than 375 kills for the entire war for all variants. And only 1 kill for the Mossie? Maybe, but it just seems off. Like I said before, I have no hard data to dispute it, just a gut feeling.
Read the title. US pilots. Not RAF.
-
Pretty easy data to refute if it wasn't just US aerial victories~ I'm surprised we have 1 Mossie victory...I was under the impression that we only flew them for unarmed recon missions. SBD was even more effective than the P-61 statistically :lol
-
Read the title. US pilots. Not RAF.
:rolleyes: My gut was correct... my eyes were wrong. Makes a bit more sense now.
-
I think it is neat to see that a P-26 scored two victories. Philippines? I did some basic digging, but it looks like they may have been in China. Would that count as a WWII victory (1937)? Anyway, cool stuff :aok
-
The 4th got 13 Credits with the Spitfire - and the 31st got two before they went to MTO. I found a ref to 1/2 for 27th FS with a Spit - making 15.5 total so the Spit number is very close. I can't get to the Mustang total because I don't have all the Photo Recon, but 8th and 9th AF FG totaled just over 4,000.. i'm wondering if RAF Mustang totals didn't slither into those tables?
-
(http://i110.photobucket.com/albums/n83/Urbanflotsom1/p-26.jpg) Fearsome! 1935 popular mechanics~ meanwhile hurri's and 109s had made the scene.
-
How the hell does the P-47 score "696.67" kills in the PTO :headscratch:?
-
How the hell does the P-47 score "696.67" kills in the PTO :headscratch:?
Shared credit.
The person who does the most damage didn't get the kill.
Actually, rounded up, three people got 1/3 of a kill.
wrongway
-
Pretty easy data to refute if it wasn't just US aerial victories~ I'm surprised we have 1 Mossie victory...I was under the impression that we only flew them for unarmed recon missions. SBD was even more effective than the P-61 statistically :lol
416th NFS in the MTO. Apparently they detatched some of their aircraft to fly with the Black Widows of the 425th NFS when the latter were stationed in France.
-
Apparently no US pilots flew one of these?
(http://www.aircraft-list.com/keywords/Northrop_P-61_Black_Widow/Northrop_P-61_Black_Widow_16.jpg)
-
Apparently no US pilots flew one of these?
(http://www.aircraft-list.com/keywords/Northrop_P-61_Black_Widow/Northrop_P-61_Black_Widow_16.jpg)
:headscratch:
The chart gave the P-61 127.5 kills.
EDIT:
I am unfamiliar with the Mosquito kill. American pilots did get kills in the Mossie, but those were in the RAF or RCAF. We did want the Mosquito as a nightfighter, but we never obtained them as far as I know. I wonder if we got one of them to use for service trials and got a kill on it?
Scherf might know.
-
How the hell does the P-47 score "696.67" kills in the PTO :headscratch:?
Maybe a P-26 got the other .33 of a kill :airplane: Bummer for the jug pilot who had 4.67 kills and that pesky pea shooter finishes him off, robbing him of an Ace. Happens to me in FSO all the time...
I wonder what percentage of those 127.5 P-61 kills were in the dark?
-
EDIT:
I am unfamiliar with the Mosquito kill. American pilots did get kills in the Mossie, but those were in the RAF or RCAF. We did want the Mosquito as a nightfighter, but we never obtained them as far as I know. I wonder if we got one of them to use for service trials and got a kill on it?
Scherf might know.
According to the USAF Museum web site~
"Although best known for their service with the Royal Air Force, Mosquitoes were also flew in several U.S. Army Air Force units as photographic and weather reconnaissance aircraft and as a night fighter. During the war, the USAAF acquired 40 Canadian Mossies and flew them under the American F-8 (photo reconnaissance) designation. In addition, the British turned over more than 100 Mosquitoes to the USAAF under Reverse Lend-Lease."
Maybe there was a US Mossie nightfighter victory?
-
:headscratch:
The chart gave the P-61 127.5 kills.
EDIT:
I am unfamiliar with the Mosquito kill. American pilots did get kills in the Mossie, but those were in the RAF or RCAF. We did want the Mosquito as a nightfighter, but we never obtained them as far as I know. I wonder if we got one of them to use for service trials and got a kill on it?
Scherf might know.
Sorry, must have missed it the first time :D
-
The USAAF flew just two groups of Spits in the MED; the 31st and 52nd Fighter Groups. They flew Spitfires from August 1943 to April 1944. Only 8 months on combat ops before converting to domestic US types.
-
Maybe there was a US Mossie nightfighter victory?
Lou Luma was an American with 5 or more victories in a night-fighter Mosquito. But it might be that most or all of them occurred while he was still in the RCAF.
-
Lou Luma's victories were all with the intruders of 418 Squadron, RCAF. He was serving in the USAAF at the time, wore their uniform and all. He was later obliged to join a USAAF unit on Mossies. IIRC he was grumpy about it, but orders is orders. Think he ended up in the weather recce birds of the 25th BG.
The US Mosquito kill was with the 416th NFS in the MTO. From memory it was in February of 1945, something of a Pyrrhic (sp?) victory as the crew were unable to find their way through fog to their base so baled out instead.
Have full details of the Mossie and its crew, and IIRC also of their victim. Will post later.
-
28/29 February 1945 (so my info anyway, not sure offhand if it was leap year or not...)
416th Night Fighter Squadron, Mosquito NF.30 MM476, Captain Lawrence E. Englert and 2nd Lieutenant Earl R. Dickey.
"Every night at around nine o’clock for several weeks during the winter 1945, a German Ju-188 reconnaissance aircraft would fly over the American air base of Pontedera, Italy. Because of the regularity of these overflights, the intruder was nicknamed “Recon Charley”. On the night of the February 28, however, a de Havilland Mosquito was readied with USAAF Capt. Larry Englert al the controls and Lt. Earl Dichney working the radar. When the Ju-188 reappeared on the scene like a clockwork, the Mosquito took off in pursuit. The night fighter located Recon Charley but because of the Mosquito’s rapid closure rate it was in dangerous proximity to the target at the time the pilot opened the fire. The Ju-188, caught unaware of the Mosquito’s presence, began to disintegrate. Some of the debris struck the Mosquito, harming the engines and causing hydraulic damage. Upon return to Pontedera, the limping aircraft was greetedby a fog blanketing the base. Able to spot the glow of the runway lights, Captain Englert manoeuvred the Mosquito over the faint landmarks, and than, with Lieutenant Dickey bailed out. These two members of the 416th Night Fighter Squadron not only survived, but became the only Americans to achieve a confirmed victory flying a British built Mosquito during World War II.
E/A Ju 188D-2 of 4(F)./122,Shot down NW of Cremona at about 2300 hour by a Mosquito night fighter while returning from a night photo recce over Naples, 100%, 4 KIA (including pilot Ltn. Fritz Wollert) and 1 WIA (Fw. Heinz Schlenaider). Il ricognitore era uno Ju-188D-2 W.Nr.230412 del 4° Staffeln. Questi bimotori avevano a bordo due macchine fotografiche per la ripresa notturna NRb (Nachtreihenbildkamera) 40/25 opppure NRb 50/25. "
Sources: Serial number from Norman Malayney. Details from http://www.analisidifesa.it/numero13/eng/stoeng-uniquen.htm. E/A details from http://www.wekusta.co.uk/html/february_1945.html . Italian-language details from http://www.analisidifesa.it/numero13/storia-unabbat-notturnounico.htm Information on Schlenaider from http://www.luftwaffedata.co.uk/wiki/index.php?title=Aufkl._Gr._122_Feb_1945
-
Rather wonderful pic of a 416th NFS Mossie here:
http://www.57thfightergroup.org/pictures/james_hare/pisa2.html
Click on it and it expands to quite a large size. Large enough, in fact, that a Mossie parked in the background appears to have US Stars and Bars on the port wing, RAF roundel on the starboard. Also note the RAF fin flash still on the Mossie in foreground, despite US markings on the fuselage.
Early-styly NF.30 exhausts, which gave trouble. Later ones had louvered openings in the flame damper below each exhaust stub.
Generally wonderful site all-round, really.
-
Rather wonderful pic of a 416th NFS Mossie here:
http://www.57thfightergroup.org/pictures/james_hare/pisa2.html
Click on it and it expands to quite a large size. Large enough, in fact, that a Mossie parked in the background appears to have US Stars and Bars on the port wing, RAF roundel on the starboard. Also note the RAF fin flash still on the Mossie in foreground, despite US markings on the fuselage.
Early-styly NF.30 exhausts, which gave trouble. Later ones had louvered openings in the flame damper below each exhaust stub.
It is a great site~ especially for jugheads. I remember seeing another mossie w US markings in England. I cant remember where if it was a still or video. I'll try to find it for you~ thanks for sharing that
Generally wonderful site all-round, really.
-
Yeah, thought the Jugoons might like it. There's some wonderful shots of aircraft markings in the Corsica section especially.
-
Here is another set of Mossie marking for you:
(http://i110.photobucket.com/albums/n83/Urbanflotsom1/mosqitot.jpg)
Still a force post war...
-
American air base of Pontedera, Italy.
:O That's where I was born and live!!!!
I never knew the Piaggio airfield was used by USAAF after liberation... any more details on that, Scherf?
-
Hi Gianlupo,
Sorry, I really don:t know much about it. I believe all of the 416th Night Fighter Squadron, 415th NFS and 414th NFS were all based there at one point, from late '44 onwards.
There is a brief wikipedia page here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pontedera_Airfield
also here:
http://www.ronaldv.nl/abandoned/airfields/IT/toscana/pisa.html
Great avatar, by the way :x
-
The USAAF flew just two groups of Spits in the MED; the 31st and 52nd Fighter Groups. They flew Spitfires from August 1943 to April 1944. Only 8 months on combat ops before converting to domestic US types.
The 31st was in the 8th AF in 1942 before transferring to Africa and of course the 4th flew Spits until ~ April 4,1943 when they transitioned to P-47C's for all combat ops - That is where the 15 ETO kills came from.. still scratching my head on the .5 assigned to 27FS... implication is Spit, maybe on detached duty to 31st?
-
Here is another set of Mossie marking for you:
(http://i110.photobucket.com/albums/n83/Urbanflotsom1/mosqitot.jpg)
Still a force post war...
Yes indeed. The IAF struggled with them during training, however the Mossies did well during the Suez crisis. The IAF also used nightfighter and recce Mosquitos as well.
I believe the very last Mossies to see action were with the IAF.
-
Yes indeed. The IAF struggled with them during training, however the Mossies did well during the Suez crisis. The IAF also used nightfighter and recce Mosquitos as well.
I believe the very last Mossies to see action were with the IAF.
I was going to say, did it not count these? I know Dogfights isn't the greatest example for a historical source :uhoh, but part of the episode "Supersonic" details a couple fights of Lou Luma (an American in the RCAF) in the Mossie. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJUDCRRR7yE
-
Yes indeed. The IAF struggled with them during training, however the Mossies did well during the Suez crisis. The IAF also used nightfighter and recce Mosquitos as well.
I believe the very last Mossies to see action were with the IAF.
The mossies were the first proper, single type squadron that the IAF had (and second overall). The previous one had an AH like setup: 109s (technically Avia S199), P-51s and Spits of various bastardized models. The fact that they were fighting C-205, Spits, Tempests and Furies made it even more AH like :)
The IAF had problems maintaining them - the heat and direct sun was not very healthy to the wood and there were not many available experts in such woodwork, as opposed to welders and guys who know how to deal with a metal construction. The types of wood required are not available locally, while metal parts were scavenged from the streets of Tel Aviv. The IAF even learned to dogfight in them and pilots claimed that while it was not equal to the spit, it could hold its own. By the time of the Suez crisis in 1956, in the age of Mig15s and Dassault Mysteres, they were considered unfit for aerial combat, but still performed dangerous long range photo-recce missions.
-
Thanks to Dtango who saved me some legwork I have a pretty precise picture based on USAF 85 Victory Credits, mapping back to squadron level and pilots to ensure a breakout from sa P-47 to P-51 for 4th FG, or P-51 to P-47 to P-51 for 354th FG.
The numbers for ETO/USAAF ONLY 1942-May, 1945 - 8th and 9th AF
Spitfire 15.0
P38 452.0
P-47 2,658.4
P-51 4,179.2
P-61 128.0
The 'crossover' point for the transisition from P-47 to P-51 as dominant ETO fighter occurred from Big Week to Big B, February 20, 1944 through March 8, 1944.
Between Feb 20 and Feb 29 the Jug (all 8th and 9th AF P-47s combined) outscored the Mustang 140 to 64.5. From March 1 through March 8 the Mustangs (4 FG's, one with two days experience (355th), two with one and three weeks experience (357/4th) and one with three months (354FG) - outscored all 11 P-47 Groups (56, 78, 352, 353, 355(six days), 356, 358, 359, 361, 362, 365) - 108 to 86.
By the end of March the tally for P-51s during March was 254 to 176 for the Jugs. April was 322 to 85 Mustang over P-47.
This does not include aircraft destroyed on the Ground by the P-51 in that period. From January through May the P-51 destroyed. count was 529 to 164.5 for the Jug
All in - 8th and 9th AF combined Jan 1 through May 31 leading up to control of the air over Normandy beaches
P-47 Destroyed 764.5 air and 164.5 ground. The P-51 destroyed 1142.3 air and 529 ground
It was the end of May, 1944 when the Mustang passed the P-47 in total cumulative air victory credits in the ETO from the time the P-47 entered combat ops in ETO in March/April 1943 through May 1944.. with P-47s flying nearly 3.5x the sorties.
Thanks Dave - wading through the USAF 85 and fixing it to the on-line records at USAF HRC was real fun - but I wouldn't have started absent your real hard work!
Apologise for boring you guys with the stats
Regards,
Bill
-
No a20 or b26 kills?
-
No a20 or b26 kills?
There are none that I can find in USAF 85 for A-20/P-70 in nightfighter version and USAF 85 did Not bother with bomber claims. The published doc was a complete scrub of all USAAF Fighter Victory Credits, and what was not published (on line) was the purpose of the study.
The USAF in the 50's and 60's asked the question - what characteristics seprated the shooter/killers from the ones along for the ride..there were a lot of factors they tried to correllate such as older/younger brother, sport achievement, rural/city upbringing, education, etc.
-
Didnt the USA fly Beau's in the Pacific too?
-
...
The 'crossover' point for the transisition from P-47 to P-51 as dominant ETO fighter occurred from Big Week to Big B, February 20, 1944 through March 8, 1944.
...
It was the end of May, 1944 when the Mustang passed the P-47 in total cumulative air victory credits in the ETO from the time the P-47 entered combat ops in ETO in March/April 1943 through May 1944.. with P-47s flying nearly 3.5x the sorties.
...
Thanks, very interesting statistics. I believe one major reason was that the LW tended not to engage the bombers till outside the escorts combat radius. In 1944 the Jug still could not reach Berlin and were flying back and forth part way, without engaging anything. The P51s escorted all the way and got to the fights. Just goes to show that the "best" fighter is not necessarily the better performing - its the one that shows up to the fight. See also F6F vs. F4U kills.
-
Thanks, very interesting statistics. I believe one major reason was that the LW tended not to engage the bombers till outside the escorts combat radius. In 1944 the Jug still could not reach Berlin and were flying back and forth part way, without engaging anything. The P51s escorted all the way and got to the fights. Just goes to show that the "best" fighter is not necessarily the better performing - its the one that shows up to the fight. See also F6F vs. F4U kills.
IMO - The best ETO fighter was still the P-51 in 1944, and it was able to demonstrate its attributes over Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia while flying out of England. I absolutely agree the difference maker between the Jug and the Mustang was range, but until the P-47M was introduced the 51B/D still had an overall performance edge from the deck to 24K.
I have studied this a lot - for a very long time and will devote some space on this subject in my new book. I often wonder if the 56th FG, with its leadership and cadre of pilots would have reached 1000 with the 51. They could have been the 1st P-47 group to change over the 355th and 4th and could have had them in late February. Consider that the 357th scored 595.5 air credits in that same timeframe with very little combat experience when they started cmbat ops in mid February?
The Luftwaffe formed the strategy of engaging the central German defense forces primarily along the line Dummer Lake to Geissen to Frankfurt/Stuttgart so that the three ZG groups could their firepower into the battles. JG26 and JG2 from LuftFlotte 3 were basically the first line of defense with a few units picking up the north Sea from western Germany and Holland out of Mitte and then Reich.
When the 8th basically was stalled in October 1943 and started flying missions mostly within escort range of the 47s, the Jugs picked up the pace of scoring because some of those Me 110/210/410/Ju88 forces engaged, along with JG1, JG3 JG11, JG27. When the 8th had two P-38 Groups (20th/55) gaining experience and the 354th Mustangs on loan, with the 357th ready and 352nd and 355th and 4th teed up for long range escort with 51s - they started and planned Big Week, then followed with Berlin with the idea of 1.) attacking the LW by virtue of going deep after the manufacturing, and 2.) going directly after the LW air to air to ensure control over Normandy in June.
The LW responded to the 8th by first a trickle of reinforcements from Ost and Sud fronts into LuftFlotte Reich(first Mitte), then a flood in February/March, drawing a balance of skilled leaders and experience into the fray, reaching a peak in April/May when guys like Rall were transferred.
It is that period in my opinion that the back of the Luftwaffe was broken - mostly by the Mustang as shown by the statistics - deep over central and eastern and southern Germany and Poland and Czechoslovakia. There was no place the LW could retreat to from a 'sanctuary' airbase standpoint. The stuff I talked about didn't dwell on the effect of airfield strafing or catching the LW during take off/assembly - or RTB when the battle was 'over'.
Just opinion and we know what that is worth.
Regards,
Bill
-
Zemke and some other P-47 pilots felt that the P-47 was what broke the back of the Luftwaffe based on the idea that the P-51 was introduced in numbers only after the allies had significant numerical superiority over the LW and that the P-47 was the majority fighter during the time when the numbers were even. I haven't looked up any numbers one way or the other -- just repeating what I have read and heard from some P-47 pilots.
-
Zemke and some other P-47 pilots felt that the P-47 was what broke the back of the Luftwaffe based on the idea that the P-51 was introduced in numbers only after the allies had significant numerical superiority over the LW and that the P-47 was the majority fighter during the time when the numbers were even. I haven't looked up any numbers one way or the other -- just repeating what I have read and heard from some P-47 pilots.
The problem with the observation is that P-47s weren't engaging with the bulk of Luftwaffe pilots and crews over central and eastern Germany/Poland/Czechoslovakia... they were turning back at Munster, Frankfurt, etc and the LW from LuftFlotte Reich was having their way with the 8th AF BC.
Zemke was a fantastic leader but the Luftwaffe almost shut down 8th AF strategic daylight ops in October 1943, and the Jug could do zero to change that. As to numerical 'superiority' of the Mustang when 'it' broke the back of the LW - the numbers I showed above from Big Week through May, 1944 were achieved by Mustangs when only a few groups were equipped by P-51s in contrast to the P-47s. During that timeframe when the Jug was relegated to flying to and from England to Frankfurt and Dummer Lake, the big battles were being fought over Munich, Berlin, Posnan, Merseburg, Misburg, Magdeburg, Brunswick, Brux, Kassel, Halberstadt, etc.
To restate the case. Big Week starting on Feb 20, 1944 was the 8th AF push to destroy the LW and gain control of the air over Normandy for the Invasion. At this time the 354th FG had been operating 80 days and had achieved their first 100 victory credits, faster than the 56th FG, in their first 80 days. At this time the 357th FG had been operational for a week. At this time some Mustangs were dribbling into the 355th for transition training. So, 11 P-47 Groups, Two Lightning Groups and two new Mustang groups begin the campaign to prove that daylight strategic bombing could work.
Two weeks after Big Week started, the 4th and 355th FG were operational in Mustangs. On March 8th the combined four groups of Mustangs had destroyed more German aircraft than all the P-47s in the 8th and 9th AF on that day, and from that point forward the combined P-47 and P-38 Groups in 8th and 9th AF never again scored more air victories than the Mustang Groups. So, the statement that the Mustang 'only achieved by overwhelming numbers' is flat wrong.
Further, the combined Mustang/P-38 long range escorts didn't grow to a point where TWO fighter groups could be assigned as target escort from say Dummer Lake to Posnan Poland and back for any One bomb division of 250-350 heavy bombers over a 30 mile string (on a good day). Do you suppose they 'heaviliy outnumbered the Luftwaffe' in these examples through May?
Emphasis - By the end of May,1944 (pre D-Day), the Mustang had by then destroyed more LW aircraft in the air than ALL of the 8th and 9th AF P-47s had from the beginning of the P-47 operations in March-April 1943. Three months of operations.
The Jug was relegated to providing set up services inbound to west Germany and outbound from West Germany until the arrival of the P-47D-25 with wet wing, starting in July when the major conversions from P-47 (and P-38) to Mustang was in full stride.
The historical context of the Battle for Germany must be set with the context of battles over France, Holland and western fringe of Germany (P-47 vs JG26 and JG2 primarily in LuftFlotte 3) versus battles over all the rest of Germany and Poland and Czechoslovakia (LuftFlotte Reich) where the P-47 couldn't go.
-
Zemke and some other P-47 pilots felt that the P-47 was what broke the back of the Luftwaffe based on the idea that the P-51 was introduced in numbers only after the allies had significant numerical superiority over the LW and that the P-47 was the majority fighter during the time when the numbers were even. I haven't looked up any numbers one way or the other -- just repeating what I have read and heard from some P-47 pilots.
Brooke - the one simple point that I wanted to make is that the Mustang achievements were made when they were GREATLY outnumbered by both P-47s and the LW in the first half of 1944. The P-47 FG's assigned to provide escort during that time included not just the 8th AF Jugs but also the 9th AF P-47s.
During March the heavy lifting of long range escort duty included the four Mustang Groups plus the 3 Lightning groups, but the 38 unfortunately didn't contribute up to its potential and at that time wasn't going past Berlin or as far as Munich - During April the 352nd converted mid month (so the 352nd was contributing to P-47 scores through that time), then in May the 339th, 359th and 361st added to Mustang strength.
If you do the math you will see that your reference to Jug pilot memories may have been a little hazy regarding the 'numbers' and the timing of Mustang impact to the LW.
-
If you do the math you will see that your reference to Jug pilot memories may have been a little hazy regarding the 'numbers' and the timing of Mustang impact to the LW.
I don't have the figures with me, will try to check later. Fuzzy memory suggests that the bulk of P-51 kills began in late April of 1944 (and they clearly were romping in May). The question is whether the Battle of Germany had essentially been won before then. One way to judge this is by the quantity of aerial opposition to 8th AF missions, which I believe fell way off after the early March Berlin raids. Through that time the P-47s' kills were far greater than the P51s' (not necessarily pound-for-pound, but total kills).
That's if memory correctly serves.
I fall in with Brooke's recollection, which might be summarized as "the 47s killed most of the tough guys, then the 51s cleaned up on the kids."
- oldman
-
I don't have the figures with me, will try to check later. Fuzzy memory suggests that the bulk of P-51 kills began in late April of 1944 (and they clearly were romping in May). The question is whether the Battle of Germany had essentially been won before then. One way to judge this is by the quantity of aerial opposition to 8th AF missions, which I believe fell way off after the early March Berlin raids. Through that time the P-47s' kills were far greater than the P51s' (not necessarily pound-for-pound, but total kills).
That's if memory correctly serves.
I fall in with Brooke's recollection, which might be summarized as "the 47s killed most of the tough guys, then the 51s cleaned up on the kids."
- oldman
The impressions would be incorrect for multiple reasons:
The Jugs (8th and 9th combined including 358th and 362nd) destroyed 244.5 to 71 from January 1 through Feb 19 (all 354FG-9th AF).
The Jugs were credited with 316 from Feb 20 (Big Week) through 3/31, Mustangs in four groups, (three very short term operationally) destroyed 318.5. These P-51 scores included the 4th, 355th and 357th with the 4th and 355th contributing only after March 3.
In April, the Jugs were credited with 85 and the 51s were credited with 322.7. It was in April that the Mustang CUMULATIVELY destroyed more ETO a/c in the air than all the P-47 FG's in the 8th and 9th AF during 1944. It was at the end of May when the Mustangs destroyed more than All the P-47s credits for 1943 through May 1944 Cumulatively.
Next, The P-47s weren't killing the 'tough guys' that were killing the B-17 and B-24 crews out of range of the Jug (MOST of the Tough Guys) eastward from the Munster/Hannover line. Having said this, the guys the Jugs were chewing up had defended very well against the RAF and USAAF over Holland, North Sea, France and Belgium as well as western Germany - but the guys in Central Germany where the bombers had to go were crushing the 8th AF BC deep penetrations.
The Jugs were hurting JG26 and JG2 (mostly) during Penetration and Withdrawal Support, but the Mustang was killing the LuftFlotte Reich guys chartered with defending Brunswick, Berlin, Kassel, Freidrichshafen, Augsburg, Schweinfurt, etc and all the reinforcements flooding in from the East and MTO.
Last - while not affecting pilot strength, the Mustangs were chewing up the LW on the ground as well as rail, road and canal traffic on the way home - compounding logistics to and from airfields to bring LW Gruppe's up to strength.
We can agree to disagree which is what these debates are all about and I do respect your opinion - I once heldd a similar view until I started diving into the separation of Lowlands battles from Germany battles to get control prior to D-Day
-
Oldman and Brooke -
It bears repeating that the source of the above statistics include 8th AF Victory Credits Board - Sept 1945, the USAF Combat Victory Credits - 1985 and all the microfilm squadron histories cross referenced to Freeman's Mighty Eighth to get the transition dates for P-47/38 to Mustangs in 1944. For whatever it is worth, USAF 85 is a scrub of 8th AF VCB to remove double entries. Having said that, there were a significant number of credits claimed but never decided in April/May 1945 that didn't get processed by the 8th and 9th AF when the war ended suddenly and the VCB was a little lax in processing them.
In all my data base has over 6800 line items for 7432.55 victory credits for just the ETO - does not include bomber gunner claims.
In other words I didn't just make this stuff up.
The numbers I just threw out for the forum is a compilation derived from every Victory Credit for every approved ETO Claim for every fighter pilot in every squadron from Sept 1942 through May 8, 1945 as the standard accepted by the USAF HRC..
It is an important result (in time devoted) of over 30 years of deep dive into ETO Fighter Ops including 9th AF and various MTO units that received an ETO credit during the invasion of Southern France and afterwards.
-
You raw statistics are great. The problem is that raw statistics do not show the real story.
What happened did not happen because of the change in aircraft. It happened because of a change in leadership and the attending change in tactics. And no, the change in aircraft is not what allowed the change in tactics.
The 8th AF could have been providing long range escort of deep penetration bombing raids from the beginning. They specifically chose not to. The 8th AF was good at compiling statistics. They turned thousands of young men into statistics, needlessly, between September of 1942 and February of 1944.
First, they sent their long range fighter to North Africa, and the Mediterranean. They kept the short legged P-47 in Europe, and moved the P-38. They were convinced that heavy bombers did not require escorts. Second, they remained convinced until late 1943. The 8th AF leadership was incompetent at best, myopic and negligent is probably a far more apt description.
No real effort was made to equip the P-47 with enough fuel capacity to provide long range escort until it was almost too late. Further, the 8th AF did not request a significant number of P-38's, either.
As an aside, if the 8th AF leadership had been competent enough, and influential enough, they probably could have made enough demand for long range fighters that the P-38 would have been properly second sourced. Instead, they only managed to use up B-17's fast enough that Lockheed was using 50% of the Burbank plant to produce B-17's for the 8th AF to get trashed due to their grossly mismanaged efforts. Double the number of long range escorts would have cut the bomber losses enough that the B-17's coming from Burbank would not have been needed.
How completely shortsighted was the 8th AF? Well, you mentioned the 20th and 55th Fighter Groups. Those two groups went operational in the weeks after "Black Thursday". Despite their inexperience, both in the air and on the ground, which resulted in 20% of their strength never leaving the ground, and then as much as 40% of those that did being early returns, they cut bomber losses to fighters dramatically. Often with as few as a dozen P-38's making the whole trip. Those two groups went operational in 1/3 the time normally allotted, in October and November of 1943. There should have been, and could have, been a dozen such fighter groups operational as early as the first quarter of 1943, considering that the P-47 could have been fitted with drop tanks, if anyone had been so intelligent as to request it with any authority.
What happened in late 1943 and early 1944 is that the leadership changed, and the tactics, even the reason for the very existence of the 8th AF changed. The 8th AF went from an air force trying to bomb German assets on the ground, to an air force dedicated 100% to taking control of the sky over Europe. The bombers were merely bait, a reason for fighters to be all over the skies. Sure, they dropped a lot of bombs, about 1/2 of which, or more, missed their targets. But they drew enemy fighters, which, forced to engage the bombers, became vulnerable to fighters.
It wasn't the P-51 itself, which by the way suffered massive teething issues (stick reversal at low speed, fouled plugs, cracked cylinder heads, etc) that were covered by the existence of other fighters in decent numbers. It was the fact that guys like Doolittle decided they were going to cleanse the sky of German aircraft. You could have hung drop tanks on any competent fighter aircraft in decent numbers with decent pilots in the cockpit in place of the "famous" P-51 and done exactly the same thing.
The P-51 was given every advantage. They did only segmented escort, they weren't, for the most part, tasked with escorting bombers for an entire mission. They were sent directly to a rally point, where they were handed bombers to loosely escort for certain legs of a mission. The P-51 did not handle the entire missions, nor were they tied to close escort on most of their missions. The replacement P-51 pilots were sent to "clobber college", the forerunner of the "Top Gun" type schools.
It is always amusing to see the P-51 attributed such magical powers as "the first long range escort fighter" and "the fighter that beat the Luftwaffe". It was a complete change of leadership, and the attending change in tactics, that made it possible to completely defeat Germany in the air. Had the P-51 been introduced, and then tied to the same doctrine and tactics that the P-47 and P-38 had been tied to, "Operation Big Week", and more importantly, "Operation Overlord" would never have been possible. The war in Europe might have dragged on another year or more.
-
Its important to note that by '43, the number of hours luftwaffe pilots had before entering their first combat mission was down significantly, and well below the number of flight hours the allied pilots had. This number only got worse to the point where luft pilots only got their '109/190 hours in combat and had almost time in them before combat (<4 hours).
The discrepancy in skill alone would account for figures steep climb in 44 and 45.
I believe it was pointed out in a previous conversation that allied fighter pilots had as much as 100 hours before their first combat mission.
Put that in perspective, how many hours has midway logged? remember how he flew before he was putting in 3000 hours a mo?
-
You raw statistics are great. The problem is that raw statistics do not show the real story.
What happened did not happen because of the change in aircraft. It happened because of a change in leadership and the attending change in tactics.
I agree
And no, the change in aircraft is not what allowed the change in tactics.I disagree
The 8th AF could have been providing long range escort of deep penetration bombing raids from the beginning. They specifically chose not to. But they didn't, leading to the crisis in faith August-October 1943
First, they sent their long range fighter to North Africa, and the Mediterranean. They kept the short legged P-47 in Europe, and moved the P-38. They were convinced that heavy bombers did not require escorts. Second, they remained convinced until late 1943. The 8th AF leadership was incompetent at best, myopic and negligent is probably a far more apt description.
Interesing condemnation - Ira Eaker was the 'they' and he did NOT 'send' the P-38s - they were taken from him.
No real effort was made to equip the P-47 with enough fuel capacity to provide long range escort until it was almost too late. Further, the 8th AF did not request a significant number of P-38's, either.
As an aside, if the 8th AF leadership had been competent enough, and influential enough, they probably could have made enough demand for long range fighters that the P-38 would have been properly second sourced. Instead, they only managed to use up B-17's fast enough that Lockheed was using 50% of the Burbank plant to produce B-17's for the 8th AF to get trashed due to their grossly mismanaged efforts. Double the number of long range escorts would have cut the bomber losses enough that the B-17's coming from Burbank would not have been needed.
That is a lot of assertions - that I could believe coming from Arnold or Marshall - do you have a source?
How completely shortsighted was the 8th AF? Well, you mentioned the 20th and 55th Fighter Groups. Those two groups went operational in the weeks after "Black Thursday". Despite their inexperience, both in the air and on the ground, which resulted in 20% of their strength never leaving the ground, and then as much as 40% of those that did being early returns, they cut bomber losses to fighters dramatically. Often with as few as a dozen P-38's making the whole trip. Those two groups went operational in 1/3 the time normally allotted, in October and November of 1943. There should have been, and could have, been a dozen such fighter groups operational as early as the first quarter of 1943, considering that the P-47 could have been fitted with drop tanks, if anyone had been so intelligent as to request it with any authority.
Not so Senor, there was PTO to consider for TRULY long range twin engine requirements, the MTO as well - wrt P-38. As for P-47, 'fitting' drop tanks on wing hardpoints was a complete redesign of wing - no time, no time, no time based on procurement and design and introduction into mfr requirements - ditto Merlin change into P-38
What happened in late 1943 and early 1944 is that the leadership changed, and the tactics, even the reason for the very existence of the 8th AF changed. The 8th AF went from an air force trying to bomb German assets on the ground, to an air force dedicated 100% to taking control of the sky over Europe.
Much too much of a gross simplification - The bombers were merely bait, a reason for fighters to be all over the skies. Sure, they dropped a lot of bombs, about 1/2 of which, or more, missed their targets. But they drew enemy fighters, which, forced to engage the bombers, became vulnerable to fighters.They also destroye dthe German Petro-Chemical industry which is a curious omission on your part regarding the relevance of Strategic bombing. That single fact alone was the most important justification for all the losses.
It wasn't the P-51 itself, which by the way suffered massive teething issues (stick reversal at low speed, fouled plugs, cracked cylinder heads, etc) that were covered by the existence of other fighters in decent numbers. It was the fact that guys like Doolittle decided they were going to cleanse the sky of German aircraft. You could have hung drop tanks on any competent fighter aircraft in decent numbers with decent pilots in the cockpit in place of the "famous" P-51 and done exactly the same thing.
But that simple solution didn't exist in December 1943. P-38s weren't cutting it in late 1943 through spring of 44, 47 didn't have the legs, B-17s had to go - or go night bombing because of political pressures - what's a fella to do?
The P-51 was given every advantage. They did only segmented escort, they weren't, for the most part, tasked with escorting bombers for an entire mission. They were sent directly to a rally point, where they were handed bombers to loosely escort for certain legs of a mission. The P-51 did not handle the entire missions, nor were they tied to close escort on most of their missions. The replacement P-51 pilots were sent to "clobber college", the forerunner of the "Top Gun" type schools.
What is your point? Evolving tactics to meet the needs and attributes? using P-47s where P-47s could operate and leave the heavy lifting inbound and outbound to the target - you have a problem with that? As far as 'not handling the entire mission? my father flew 8 hours and nearly 2100 miles on the first leg of the last Shuttle Mission from Steeple Morden to Warsaw to Poltava. You consider that a 'partial mission'?? Last he knew, the P-47s turned back at Dummer lake some 1750 miles behind him and the 355th
It is always amusing to see the P-51 attributed such magical powers as "the first long range escort fighter" and "the fighter that beat the Luftwaffe". It was a complete change of leadership, and the attending change in tactics, that made it possible to completely defeat Germany in the air. Had the P-51 been introduced, and then tied to the same doctrine and tactics that the P-47 and P-38 had been tied to, "Operation Big Week", and more importantly, "Operation Overlord" would never have been possible. The war in Europe might have dragged on another year or more.
But those operations WERE possible, and the results WERE achieved, and the P-47 at that time and place could NOT have achieved those results. Changing tactics to accomodate long range perfromance attributes seems clever to me - as contasted to letting P-47 pilots all fly one way-one time and lose your entire force? No?
-
as contasted to letting P-47 pilots all fly one way-one time and lose your entire force? No?
So well argued until this point~ The fact is there were not enough P-38s available to supply needs in the PTO, MTO and ETO at the same time that P-47 was coming into full swing. Many pacific squadrons reluctantly converted to P-47s as well as P-38 production was outstripped by demand, where they adapted with ever increased ranges admirably.
Another factor was that P-51s "Spam Cans" were significantly cheaper to produce that than the sturdy well designed and built P-47 and P-38, making it more attractive as a cheap easy to mass produce alternative. P-51s undeniably are and have been giving far to much credit for "winning the air war" eclipsing the contributions of the P-47 entirely which unbelievably often not even mentioned in documentaries and accounts of ETO or PTO fighters.
-
So well argued until this point~ The fact is there were not enough P-38s available to supply needs in the PTO, MTO and ETO at the same time that P-47 was coming into full swing. Many pacific squadrons reluctantly converted to P-47s as well as P-38 production was outstripped by demand, where they adapted with ever increased ranges admirably.
My comment was unfogivably sarcastic. But here is the point. Republic knew full well that the 47 had to be modified to dramatically extend the range. Both the P-47D-25 with a wet wing and wing hardpoints were designed and tooled in December 43 - but deliveries of the wet wing D couldn't happen until Summer 44 and the M was nearing design completion. The N was just about completed in preliminary design IIRC (and I'm too lazy to check)
The P-38 manuever flap design as a modification was complete, on ready for shipment - but lost in transit - so the H and early J's soldiered on. The P-51 arrived in-theatre as an integral part of 9th AF deployment for the invasion. It didn't have the fuselage tank but already had the same range as the P-38. Spaatz and Doolittle decided the primary objective for USAAF ETO was control of the air over Normandy - So the options were a.) request/demand control of P-51 assets while the 364th and 479th (38s) were still in training and not ready for combat ops until March and May respectively, b.) delay Big Week until they were available, c.) go with what they had and take the big losses around Scweinfurt, Regensburg, Hablerstadt (all BTW out of range of even the P-38 at that time except as a 'fly to IP, escort around the Rally Point and head straight for home.). We know the choice they made and from that point through March the 51 was more or less the only game in town despite the reliability issues, compounded by nagging structural failures in manuevering dives
Another factor was that P-51s "Spam Cans" were significantly cheaper to produce that than the sturdy well designed and built P-47 and P-38, making it more attractive as a cheap easy to mass produce alternative. P-51s undeniably are and have been giving far to much credit for "winning the air war" eclipsing the contributions of the P-47 entirely which unbelievably often not even mentioned in documentaries and accounts of ETO or PTO fighters.
As a 'former' airframe designer/airframe structures guy I would comment to you that contrasting the 51 as a cheap, easy to mass produce Spam Can is taking severe liberty with truth. All three were 8g Limit Load at original design gross weight. All three had their limit loads reduced as a function of Gross weight growth. All three suffered structural failures, the P-38 was limited all its career to .7M or less (placard stipulated .62M?) for dives while the 51 and 47 survived .82-.85M dives in recorded tests. So back to basics"
1.) the P-51B wasa.) not only 'cheap' (great manufacturing engineers co-ordinating with airframe design), but b.) exceptional with respect to aerodynamics, and was highly manueverable - Over Berlin, c.) operated at its peak at the altitudes of its prime mission in the ETO.
Note I did not say it was the 'best fighter' in the world - but it was the Best ALLIED Fighter over Germany where 8th BC roamed to go after Petro Chemical Industry - simply because Spits were loitering over France and Holland, Jugs were languishing over Dummer Lake and Stuttgart, Lightnings were penetrating to Berlin but weren't going to Munich and Scweinfurt - and besides were far too easy to spot, giving the LW opportunities to fight or flee with more time to decide.
2.) the Jug was legendary for being able to take punishment - a great attribute for CAS and strafing airfields. But it wasn't strafing airfields near Berlin, Munich, Salzwedel, Augsburg, Brunswick, Leipzig, etc where LuftFlotte Reich lived. I have heard from some pretty famous LW aces that the 51 was relatively easy to destroy when he had the shot - but also noted that it was tougher to get the shot (and hit on the smaller airframe) than it was on a P-47 or P-38. A fuel tank with fuel sitting behind the cockpit had a lot to do with that - ditto Me 109 and FW 190 - neither of which was immune to puny 50 cal.
Curiously, while we are dabbling in statistics, the P-47 groups lost more Jugs strafing airfields per LW fighter aircraft destroyed than the P-51 - by a large margin. The P-38 was even worse. This is tricky because while I carefully parsed the MACR's it is impossible to precisely pinpoint an actual flak loss when the narrative reads 'last seen strafing ABC airfield'. My statistics chalk that up as an 'unknown-probably flak' (for P-47, P-51 and P-38) and I throw it in that bucket. My 'guess' is that P-51s racked up a lot of ground scores in March through June, with proportionate fewer losses (although high) before the LW flooded airfields with 20mm/37mm flak and when the Jug got the range they encountered equally tough flak right away. I am just now breaking down month by month strafing credits/losses and re-tying back to MACR's - looooooong job.
The P-47 was a great all around fighter and deserves all the credit it hasn't received - but it doesn't deserve as much credit for the destruction of the LW over Germany in ETO as the P-51, or the Japanese Army Air Force by the P-38 in the PTO. The MTO was more P-38 and then P-51 over the P-47 - but once again the Mustang's contribution was long range escort and in the MTO the P-38 did the heavy lifting until ~ May 1944.
-
Its important to note that by '43, the number of hours luftwaffe pilots had before entering their first combat mission was down significantly, and well below the number of flight hours the allied pilots had. This number only got worse to the point where luft pilots only got their '109/190 hours in combat and had almost time in them before combat (<4 hours).
The discrepancy in skill alone would account for figures steep climb in 44 and 45.
I believe it was pointed out in a previous conversation that allied fighter pilots had as much as 100 hours before their first combat mission.
A couple of points.
Between August 1943 and April 1944, when the Luftwaffe re-organized Mitte into LuftFlotte Reich, over 30 squadrons from Russia, Italy, Greece, etc were transferred With their pilots, aircraft and ground crews into Germany. These weren't students although all the front line units were getting new pilots with relatively low time in contrast to RAF/USAAF counterparts.
Second, the training hours started taking its toll in 1943 and took a steep dive during and after the Oil Campaign beginning May 12, 1944.
The debate we are having is about a.)which fighter was most responsible for the rapid destruction of the LW defending Germany (mostly based out of range of the P-47), 2.) the constituency of the LW cadres within the LuftFlotte control, and, c.) whether the P47's - which destroyed 402 German a/c in 1943 in the ETO - got all the "old Guys".
I do not know the statistics yet for the distribution of LW losses between LuftFlotte 3 (JG26 and JG2) defending the airspace over North Sea/Holland/France) and Luft Mitte/Flotte defending Germany as they engaged also on the German Border/North Sea. Nor do I know what the proportion was between 'new guys'/'old guys' KIA in 1943 vs bailed out successfully and returned to combat. Nor do I know what the actual MIA/KIA loss list looks like per LW records versus our VCB awards for enemy a/c destoyed. AFAIK - nobody does to a great precision but Prien probably is close on the LW side, and by extension Caldwell.
So, my narrative is based on two facts. One the VCM records of the USAF. Two, the timing and the distribution of re-inforcements to the Battle of Germany, based in central and east/south Germany as well as western Poland and Czecoslovakia to protect refineries.
From the facts I draw the conclusions that a.) a LOT of 'old guys' transferred into Germany, and b.) the Jugs by and large hurt the LW assets in constant engagement over the North Sea, Western Germany and Holland/France - a force 1/3 the size of LuftFlotte Reich, and c.) the 51's and the 38's were hurting the German assets opposing deep penetrations outside the P-47 ranges.
Hence my arguments regarding the importance of the P-51 above the P-47 (and P-38) in the destruction of LW over Germany.
-
P-38 $97,147
P-47 $85,578
P-51 $51,572
That is a pretty significant price difference ~ 40% less.
The D-15, the first factory hard point/wet wing P-47 was was produced and saw service late '43 early '44, long before the D-25 which incidentally never had a wet wing. No D's ever had wet wings, only modest increases in internal fuel. The N was the only variant with a wing root extension and a wet wing. The M with 130 built was never a serious factor, merely a hot rod version specifically for the famed 56th FG.
By summer 1944 we obviously had mainland airfields making P-47 range a moot point~ They were taken out of the air to air roll, which they were still supremely capable of (and doing at less risk to their pilots) for the far more hazardous air to ground roll. This virtually eliminated the opportunities to hit, the by then, diminishing talent pool of LW fighters, who were hampered by ever reduced critical fuel supplies for combat and more importantly training of new pilots. Enter the sleek P-51D in overwhelming numbers, to steal the show.
-
P-38 $97,147
P-47 $85,578
P-51 $51,572
That is a pretty significant price difference ~ 40% less.
It was actually even worse when the Jug was ~ 104K -aug 1943 and the 51 was 58K at same time.
The D-15, the first factory hard point/wet wing P-47 was was produced and saw service late '43 early '44, long before the D-25 which incidentally never had a wet wing. No D's ever had wet wings, only modest increases in internal fuel. The N was the only variant with a wing root extension and a wet wing. The M with 130 built was never a serious factor, merely a hot rod version specifically for the famed 56th FG.
When you are right, you are right on - which will teach me to deal with memory. Having said this, while the wing racks were installed on -15 and subsequent models for Dec deliveries and all existing C's and D's started a mod/kit program in January, 1944, none of the P-47D's prior to the -25 could go past Hannover area.
BTW to increase in Internal Fuel for the -25 from 305 gallons to 370 gallons was HUGE even if only 21% on internal fuel, simply because escort range was predicated on how far the Jug could go, then return if forced to drop tanks, relying entirely on internal fuel. The SOP combat operating range near D-Day was now up to ~ 350mile radius.
By summer 1944 we obviously had mainland airfields making P-47 range a moot point~ They were taken out of the air to air roll, which they were still supremely capable of (and doing at less risk to their pilots) for the far more hazardous air to ground roll. This virtually eliminated the opportunities to hit, the by then, diminishing talent pool of LW fighters, who were hampered by ever reduced critical fuel supplies for combat and more importantly training of new pilots. Enter the sleek P-51D in overwhelming numbers, to steal the show.
Well it didn't really make it a moot point as far as escort role because a.) the 9th AF Jugs were pulled back from detached service to 8th during Dec 1943 through May 1944 and devoted to CAS - and the 78th, 353rd, 356th and 56th were still based in East Anglia, and b.) they were still prevented from doing battle over Berlin, Merseburg, Magdeburg, Leipzig, Brux, Posnan which the LW was still desparately trying to protect because of the Refinery complexes in those areas. Misburg was in range, but the Jugs hardly went there, due to habit I guess.
As to those 'sleek ol P-51D's', they did show up to continue the grinding but it was the P51B and C which did ALL of the carving as long range escorts through May 1944. The very first P-51Ds arrived at 4th and 354th FG in last couple of days in May and had no role in the big battles until really June 20 to Stettin/Magdeburg/Merseburg and thence to Berburg/Leipzig/Merseburg July 7 and then grew increasingly through the summer 1944.
It was the P-51B/C which finally ran the air to air total (cumulative) past all the ETO scores of the P-47C/D (cumulative) for the ETO. I often wonder what the score would have been for the 56th had Zemke not been stubborn about the Jug. He sure as hell adapted well to the 51 when he commanded the 479th.
I respect your opinion - it has been good to chat
-
I often wonder what the score would have been for the 56th had Zemke not been stubborn about the Jug. He sure as hell adapted well to the 51 when he commanded the 479th.
Heh. Well, you see where that got him.
You raise some good points drgondog and you've plainly done lots of research.
- oldman
-
A cot in the Stalig with Gabby :D Great contributions drgondog. :salute
-
A cot in the Stalig with Gabby :D Great contributions drgondog. :salute
Yeah - the Mustang didn't outmuscle a T-Storm..
Interesting quotes for you from Zemke on pg 188 Zemke's Wolfpack after a record setting September 29 1944 mission while leading the 479th.
"My enthisiasm for this fighter increased. While not having the firepower of the P-38, or P-47, it was superior on nearly every other count'. The P-51 wouldn't outclimb the Me 109 or perhaps the FW 190 but it could outdive and outrun them at any altitude and could usually out turn them... Best of all with that large built in tankage and moderate thirst, we didn't have to sweat over fuel gauges like the P-47, and to a degree the P-38 also. "
And thus Zemke shed the light and took on the mantle of the Dark Side. Robin Olds 'adored' Zemke if that is the right time, or 'phrasiology' to describe one very hot fighter pilot's admiration for another.
-
Heh. Well, you see where that got him.
You raise some good points drgondog and you've plainly done lots of research.
- oldman
Thank you - I really have devoted a lot of time and work diving into 8th AF ops.
Along time ago I was discussing with Jeff Ethell either a 65th FW or 8th AF FC project in diary format similar to Escort to Berlin or my own Angels, Bulldogd and Dragons. Jeff, a longtime friend dating back to our toddler days when my old man was CO of 35FBW in 1948 and Earl Ethell was a squadron CO, had the bad grace to expire when his P-38 stalled out on final.
-
p-39 with 2.5 kills was it that out classed in the ETO by both German and Italian planes? Would have thought it would be used by the US as atleast a bomber killer.
Edit: Did a search for total us p-39 losses using various terms and really couldnt find and stats on how many were lost in the ETO so I'm guessing not many were there anyway.
-
"My enthisiasm for this fighter increased. While not having the firepower of the P-38, or P-47, it was superior on nearly every other count'. The P-51 wouldn't outclimb the Me 109 or perhaps the FW 190 but it could outdive and outrun them at any altitude and could usually out turn them... Best of all with that large built in tankage and moderate thirst, we didn't have to sweat over fuel gauges like the P-47, and to a degree the P-38 also. "
I've heard that before, but never understood how... maybe at high speed? the 109g6 (what most of the 109 kills were), easily out turns the p51 and p47. It has a lower wing loading too (for the g6 vs p51).
-
I've heard that before, but never understood how... maybe at high speed? the 109g6 (what most of the 109 kills were), easily out turns the p51 and p47. It has a lower wing loading too (for the g6 vs p51).
Difference between the game and the Real World. Put it down to pilot training, situation, whatever, neither US nor German pilots rated the 109G highly in 1944-45. The one staffel of JG26 that retained them in 1944 got really depressed. By contrast, the A8 units were fairly successful and were respected by Allied pilots. You figure it out.
I've posted it before, but this is a pretty good illustration, both of the similarity and the difference between AH and WWII:
From JG 26 - Top Guns of the Luftwaffe, by Donald L. Caldwell (Ivy Books, New York 1991), ISBN 0-8041-1050-6 (First Ballentine Edition, June 1993), at page 276:
[The following occurred on the afternoon of September 17, 1944 - the first day of Operation Market-Garden]:
The Third Gruppe [of JG26] also fought a battle with Mustangs, with ruinous consequences for itself. In mid-afternoon, Major Mietusch assembled about fifteen Bf 109s of his scattered command and headed for the landing zones, climbing all the way. The weather had taken a turn for the worse, and there was a continuous layer of thin cloud at 15,000 feet. The Germans climbed through it, and then, while above the Dutch-German border, Mietusch spotted a squadron of P-51s below them. He radioed, “Otter Mietusch, I am attacking!” and dove through the cloud. His first burst of fire destroyed the Number 4 plane of the trailing cover flight. Oblt. Schild hit the Number 2 Mustang’s drop tank, and it dove away trailing a solid sheet of flame. The events of the next few minutes are best stated in the words of the leader of that P-51 flight, Lt. William Beyer of the 361st Fighter Group’s 376th Squadron:
* * *
I was the flight leader at the tail end of the squadron. We had flown back and forth between checkpoints for a couple of hours. My wingmen apparently got tired of looking around for enemy aircraft. Only by the grace of God did I happen to look behind us at that particular moment, because in no more than a couple of seconds the enemy would have shot the whole flight down.
I saw about fifteen German fighters closing fast with all their guns firing. I immediately broke 180 degrees and called out the enemy attack. My Number 4 man went down in flames, and my wingman got hit and spun out. I headed straight back into the German fighters and went through the whole group, just about in the center of them. We were separated by only a few feet...
I immediately made another 180-degree turn, picked out one of them, and started to chase it. The rest of the fighters zoomed back up into the clouds and disappeared. We made many violent high-G maneuvers with wide open throttle. When I started to close and fire, I noticed that his plane seemed to have stopped in the air. I had to decide whether to shoot and run, or to try to stop my plane. I cut throttle, lowered flaps, and dropped my wheels - I still kept closing. I had to fishtail and do flat weaves to stay behind him. This maneuver was repeated three times, and on one occasion I almost cut his tail off, we were so close...
Then we started into steep dives. The last one was at around 1,000 feet with flaps down. This last maneuver was deadly and nerve-racking. He went straight down toward the ground, hoping I couldn’t pull out. If I pulled out early, he could have come in behind me, so I stayed with him. If we had had our wheels down when we pulled out, we would have been on the ground.
It was after this pullout that I finally was able to get my sights lined up and fire at him. I must have hit him with the first burst, because he kept turning and went into the ground and broke up. Knowing the caliber of this German pilot, I am sure that if I had taken the time to get off some shots when he was slowing down he could have possibly shot me down or made a getaway. My other combat victories were not nearly as spectacular as this one, and it is with this in mind that I can recall it so vividly.
* * *
Lt Beyer’s victim was Klaus Mietusch. Mietusch was one of the most fascinating individuals in the Geschwader’s history. He was a career officer, had joined the Geschwader in 1938, and was its senior pilot in length of service when he died at age twenty-five. His early combat career was marked by a seemingly endless series of failures and frustrations. A member of the successful 7th Staffel under Muencheberg, he did not come into his own until he succeeded to the command and led it on detached assignment in Russia in 1943. He was the opposite of the typical extroverted, self-confident fighter pilot. He compensated for what he believed to be his lack of ability by an act of will. According to Priller, Mietusch’s combat motto was, “Bore in, until the enemy is as large as a barn door in your sights.” Again quoting Priller, duty as Mietusch’s wingman was an “unforgettable experience.” Mietusch was shot down ten times and was wounded at least four times. He was said never to have turned down a mission, and he had logged an incredible 452 combat sorties at the time of his death. His seventy-two victories brought the award of the Oak Leaves to his Knights’s Cross, two months after his death.
-
I've heard that before, but never understood how... maybe at high speed? the 109g6 (what most of the 109 kills were), easily out turns the p51 and p47. It has a lower wing loading too (for the g6 vs p51).
The 109G-6/G-10 in the hands of a very good pilot will out turn the 51 at speeds below 300mph TAS. The SOP for all USAAF fighters was keep your speed up above 300 in general. A 109 was really in its element with respect to climb and turn at speeds in the 200-250 mph range. Most 51 and 47 pilots that claimed the 109 was easy to out turn were not flying against a pro.