Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => The O' Club => Topic started by: Tupac on December 08, 2011, 08:45:30 PM
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This is an absolutely chilling read.
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/aviation/crashes/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877-2
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So they didn't realize they were descending? Did Airbus forget to equip the plane with a VSI and an Altimeter? :huh
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So they didn't realize they were descending? Did Airbus forget to equip the plane with a VSI and an Altimeter? :huh
I don't think they were believing their instruments.
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I'm with Krup.
it is descending at a rate of 10,000 feet per minute, at an angle of 41.5 degrees.
They didn't know they were descending? Even if they level it out, they might be alive right now.
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I'm pretty sure the attitude indicator wouldnt show anything at 40 degrees (most in small airplanes have marks up to 20 degrees, I know nothing of big planes though so maybe Golfer could confirm.), a VSI would be pegged going down, and they didnt have any reference to the horizon. (They were in the clouds) It's quite easy to become disoriented in the clouds, it happened to me pretty bad my first couple of times in IMC. I felt like I was in a 45 degree turn to the left but in reality I was straight and level.
http://www.europeanpilotacademy.com/portals/43/TheLeans.pdf
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I think if my ASI was showing essentially 0, my stall warning wasnt going off, and my VSI was pegged (but the plane seemed relatively controllable) I would assume I was stable. Flying into a thunderstorm could (in theory) wreak havoc with your instruments, going from a standard pressure of 29.92 (used for operations above 18k) into what could possibly have been 27.XX pressures. That would indicate a rapid descent and indicate a much lower altitude.
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well, 2k feet lower wouldnt a a huge deal if your at 37k, but it would definitely wooly with you VSI.
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Pitch and power, control and performance. :(
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My friend and I were having a discussion on why we still need pilots. He said our computers are far and away good enough to take care of anything on their own...
I'll be showing him this link.
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So they didn't realize they were descending? Did Airbus forget to equip the plane with a VSI and an Altimeter? :huh
The VSI was working perfectly, it was pegged at it max, and the guy assumed it had failed.
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The VSI was working perfectly, it was pegged at it max, and the guy assumed it had failed.
What about the altimeter, did he assume that failed too? :headscratch:
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What about the altimeter, did he assume that failed too? :headscratch:
If you assumed your VSI and ASI were screwed, it would be safe to assume that you think your entire pitot-static system is wonky. I bet he didnt trust his altimeter, either.
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I'm pretty sure the attitude indicator wouldnt show anything at 40 degrees (most in small airplanes have marks up to 20 degrees, I know nothing of big planes though so maybe Golfer could confirm.), a VSI would be pegged going down, and they didnt have any reference to the horizon. (They were in the clouds) It's quite easy to become disoriented in the clouds, it happened to me pretty bad my first couple of times in IMC. I felt like I was in a 45 degree turn to the left but in reality I was straight and level.
They were descending at a 41 degree glide path, not pitch angle. The nose was pitched up throughout. It seemed they certainly were aware they were descending, they just couldn't figure out the why/how to fix part.
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They were descending at a 41 degree glide path, not pitch angle. The nose was pitched up throughout. It seemed they certainly were aware they were descending, they just couldn't figure out the why/how to fix part.
Oh ok.
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The plane was falling. He did the only thing his panicking human brain told him to do. Pull the damn stick. It's night, you're bored and something like that happen. They both went brain dead. Cost many lives. I never flew on a night flight. I'll try to stay the hell away from them...scary thing. If he had seen outside he may have realized what was going on before it was too late. Edit : or maybe not. Who knows......
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At the onset of the problem they had unreliable speed indications. As the event continued they never let go of the stick much less pushed forward to break the stall condition and simply fly out of it. Contributing to the confusion is from the pilot seats you can't see what inputs the other is making. From the jumpseat you have a better view but that doesn't help you keep in the loop with what the flying pilot is doing as you would with a yoke.
There are bigger training and culture issues at play which contributed to this accident and took hundreds of people to their deaths with what should have been capable pilots in the least risky phase of flight. It should be noted that as the captain got plugged into the situation the aircraft could well have been recovered with a little extra maneuvering room.
The attitude indicators never had any issues. Excessive pitch wouldn't have been an issue as with electronic displays as you exceed 30-40 degrees of pitch you'll get big arrows/chevrons pointing back to the horizon. I'm a Honeywell baby having only flown Primus 1000 and Epic systems. I can't speak for Collins or Airbii systems but I can't imagine they'd be hugely different with such a basic display function.
This accident is fascinating because it never ever ever ever should have happened the way it did.
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It sounds like the captain was correcting the problem, but the FO didnt realize what the captain was doing and kept the yoke held back and exacerbated it.
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The plane was falling. He did the only thing his panicking human brain told him to do. Pull the damn stick. It's night, you're bored and something like that happen. They both went brain dead. Cost many lives. I never flew on a night flight. I'll try to stay the hell away from them...scary thing. If he had seen outside he may have realized what was going on before it was too late.
While that might be more accurate than I'd care to admit, Air France and their training culture did not prepare these pilots for this situation. While it can be argued they probably shouldn't have to the Swiss cheese really lined up in what was thought an "impossible" way. This has everything to do with how these pilots "recovered" from stalls in training and lack of exposure to the edges of the flight envelope when in anything other than normal law.
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There are a lot of hints of inexperience amongst other things in there.
The junior FO didn't know what St Elmo's fire was, the senior FO came in and found that the radar is incorrectly set, the result of which led them into the tradgedy, and the fact that the senior let the junior continue to fly, just makes it worse.
A very bad, and chilling story, hopefully the community will learn from it.
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there were myriad warnings and faults sent back via satalite that indicate that the pito tube,all of them, had fouled due to super cooled water coming into contact with them.
the conclusion seems to be that they ignored their training... Very sad.
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There are a lot of hints of inexperience amongst other things in there.
The junior FO didn't know what St Elmo's fire was, the senior FO came in and found that the radar is incorrectly set, the result of which led them into the tradgedy, and the fact that the senior let the junior continue to fly, just makes it worse.
A very bad, and chilling story, hopefully the community will learn from it.
One could write a thesis on this accident and then write another one without repeating themselves.
To paraphrase; it's a disservice to ones self to experience one hour a thousand times versus having a thousand hours of experience. Or something like that.
Fatigue. Goodnight.
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the conclusion seems to be that they ignored their training... Very sad.
I disagree with this part. It seems to me that he reacted just the same way he did in every other stall situation. Yank back on the stick and let the airplane sort it out. Doesn't work in alternate law.
Training and culture failed the pilots and ultimately the passengers.
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I disagree with this part. It seems to me that he reacted just the same way he did in every other stall situation. Yank back on the stick and let the airplane sort it out. Doesn't work in alternate law.
Training and culture failed the pilots and ultimately the passengers.
So they are taught to yank back on the yoke in a stall? Do they not have a little button or something somewhere that said they were in alternate law?
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So they are taught to yank back on the yoke in a stall? Do they not have a little button or something somewhere that said they were in alternate law?
Sort of. In normal law (99.9999% of the time) you can apply full back pressure and the aircraft will not allow you to enter a full aerodynamic stall. In alternate law, that AoA protection no longer exists. Task saturation and information overload plays hell with your ability to sort things out as it's very confusing especially with the external stimuli bombarding your senses as you're trying to figure out what to believe.
The stall recovery (in actuality stall avoidance) training performed in simulators lacks. Not because it isn't important but because how the initial and recurrent training/checking events are constructed based on the requirements for each to be accomplished with a finite amount of training time. There are so many boxes to check you just can't cover everything. Stalls in cruise flight when in alternate law with instrumentation faults doesn't make the list.
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So they are taught to yank back on the yoke in a stall? Do they not have a little button or something somewhere that said they were in alternate law?
No button, just a little message on the Primary Flight Display where you can see it, but in the stress of the moment see through it. And the message does not say "alternate law" it says "use man pitch" and its amber for Alternate, red for Direct.
It all comes down to training, time available, items to be covered. $$$
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It sounds like the captain was correcting the problem, but the FO didnt realize what the captain was doing and kept the yoke held back and exacerbated it.
A friend of mine is FO on Airbus 320s. He told me the Captains stick will override the FO stick. He related an incident where he was the pilot flying, they got a TCAS (I think it was) warning advising a climb. Don said he pulled the stick back and nothing happened. WTF!?!? He's looking around trying to figure things out and realizes the Captain has overridden his input. (The captain had visual on the traffic and deemed it was no factor).
I wonder which seat these guys were in, was the junior guy in the left seat?
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robert had to tell bonin to give him the controls. It says when bonin yields control they finally get the nose down, and that before the plane was giving a response to both pilots pushing and pulling opposite direction, the half control was not enough to get the nose down.
bonin again began pulling back on the stick again without telling anybody
So that bonin guy was never handing over control and stalled the plane to the ground.
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I disagree with this part. It seems to me that he reacted just the same way he did in every other stall situation. Yank back on the stick and let the airplane sort it out. Doesn't work in alternate law.
Training and culture failed the pilots and ultimately the passengers.
It's my understand that in a situation where you have no speed indicators that the pilots are taught to apply a predetermined pitch and power (or some such). They aren't taught to "yank back" as you say.
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A friend of mine is FO on Airbus 320s. He told me the Captains stick will override the FO stick. He related an incident where he was the pilot flying, they got a TCAS (I think it was) warning advising a climb. Don said he pulled the stick back and nothing happened. WTF!?!? He's looking around trying to figure things out and realizes the Captain has overridden his input. (The captain had visual on the traffic and deemed it was no factor).
I wonder which seat these guys were in, was the junior guy in the left seat?
In the airbus regardless of what model it is, 320,330 etc, if both pilots put pressure on the sidestick, a loud voice, and I mean loud, shouts "dual input" if you need to override the other guy, you push a button on your stick and it locks the other guy out of the system.
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http://www.zshare.net/videoplayer/player.php?SID=dl028&FID=76720262&FN=Lost%20-%20The%20Mystery%20of%20Flight%20447%20_30%20May%202010__PDTV_XviD__.avi.flv&iframewidth=648&iframeheight=415&width=640&height=370&H=767202621d6953ef (http://www.zshare.net/videoplayer/player.php?SID=dl028&FID=76720262&FN=Lost%20-%20The%20Mystery%20of%20Flight%20447%20_30%20May%202010__PDTV_XviD__.avi.flv&iframewidth=648&iframeheight=415&width=640&height=370&H=767202621d6953ef)
This was a good film, made before the black-boxes were found. So far most of what they hypothesized has been proven true. Keep in mind they did this all before they had cockpit data. They were going almost solely on what the plane was reporting back to Air France via satellite.
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Had Dubois done so, he almost certainly would have understood, as a pilot with many hours flying light airplanes, the insanity of pulling back on the controls while stalled.
This is telling, I didn't actually realise until now that the Captain wasn't actually at the controls. This issue has been debated on several pilot forums. It's been suggested that a lack of basic flying skills is becoming more evident in younger pilots.
Remember in Europe generally pilots go to flight school and finish up with about 300 hours sitting in the right seat of something like an A320 or B737. They will have covered stalls during training but that's it. Now they're flying an electric jet that 'doesn't stall'. So holding full back stick with TOGA will fly you out of trouble. Except that in this case alternate law and the laws of physics apply. Which is what happened. The biggest failing though was crew coordination.
I met the Father of one of the passengers recently. Ironically he's a very experienced private pilot and knows all too well what happened to his daughter. He has difficulty understanding how the pilots reacted as they did. Sad, very sad.
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It's my understand that in a situation where you have no speed indicators that the pilots are taught to apply a predetermined pitch and power (or some such). They aren't taught to "yank back" as you say.
It's true and one thing that a lot of people have gone to.
I'm not sure how they couldn't have known the plane was in alternate law. Knowing when it is or isn't and the differences in the controls would be a huge part of emergency training, I'd think.
It is a massive failure and I personally have no idea what these guys were looking at. The length of time that this happened over is the worst part to read about.
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As a low-time PPL, I'm not qualified to judge on how the pilots reacted, but for the sake of the discussion, here is what I learned from the interim reports (3rd here (http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e3.en/pdf/f-cp090601e3.en.pdf)) and various discussions on pilot forums (mostly pprune.org):
Facts:
- The events happened during a sleep phase of the pilots circadian rythm
- When the Captain (Dubois) leaves the flight deck to take his rest, there is no briefing about the responsibilities of each FO (Robert PNF and Bonin PF at that time)
- When auto-pilot disconnects and the facts that speeds are unreliable is acknowledged, pitch & power procedure is not mentioned
- Robert (PNF) did acknowledge the degradation to Alternate Law at 02h 10' 22" (CVR transcript, page 90 of 3rd interim report)
- as mentioned in the article, lack of CRM
- When Dubois returns, there is no report of what happened (unreliable speeds, subsequent climb, alternate law)
- CRM doesn't improve after captain's return
Speculations:
- It is possible at 1st that Robert and Bonin were thinking that the initial climb and the beginning of the descent were caused by up- and downdrafts, as the plane was flying in a turbulent area
- When CAS falls below 60 kt, the stall warning is inhibited (3rd interim report page 20). The logic behind is the following: at such low speeds, the AoA vanes are unreliable. This may have contributed to the crew's confusion: while deeply stalled, no warning when the pilots are pulling on the sticks, but if they begin to push the nose down, the speed increases and AoA readings become valid again, triggering the stall warning
- While the AoA readings are sent to the flight computers, there is no AoA dial or tape for the pilots. Maybe they would have realized that they were in a deep stall if an AoA indication had been available for them
- While it didn't contribute to the crash as no stall recovery was attempted, the THS (Tail Horizontal Stabiliser) auto-trimmed itself up to the stops although speeds and, a little later, AoA readings were unreliable. As the auto-trim is actuated by relatively slow electric motors, it could have delayed for too long a recovery started with enough altitude
- Like someone said, training and culture seemed to fail the crew
Blue skies to the crew and their passengers.
On a side note, the 'bus aerodynamics proved a pretty solid stability because the plane didn't enter a spin while so deeply stalled (40+° AoA) in turbulent air and engines power going from TOGA to IDLE and back to TOGA.
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It's my understand that in a situation where you have no speed indicators that the pilots are taught to apply a predetermined pitch and power (or some such). They aren't taught to "yank back" as you say.
I never said they could would or should apply full back pressure due to a loss of or an unreliable airspeed indication. That's exactly the wrong thing to do in that situation however it is a technique an Airbus will let you get away with when you're in a maximum performance situation. Examples of which can be described as a stall recovery, windshear recovery or ground prox recovery (not hitting the mountain in front of you) because the airplane will let you. The idea being command every bit of performance you can get and let the airplanes computers not actually go to 11. It works when everything is working.
Now having said that applying full back pressure is the very much wrong thing to do in an unreliable speed condition, here we are with a pilot who did exactly that and would have done so all the way to the ground. The million dollar question is "why?"
Its a technique I was taught in a FBW airplane for windshear and EGPWS warnings. Not for stall recoveries however I'll credit the company that wrote the manuals, training culture, FAA special emphasis items and the very seasoned instructors of that particular program for that more than the airplane.
Regarding dual inputs, like FTJR said there is an override button and associated audible warnings to go along with it. Even so you'd be amazed at what you DON'T hear when you tunnel in on something with all that fixation. I've seen it happen with simple things such as warning chimes and audible warnings that can be muted. They drive me nuts but if you're focused and saturated your won't process any more inputs until you snap out of it so to speak.
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Stalling an aircraft through more than 30K with a reasonably good nose up attitude and all the means to detect exactly that, while having all control surfaces and engines in good order is something that encourages me to....being seaborne.
Just saying.
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Seems as though there was some Spatial Disorientation thrown in there too.
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All I can say is WOW! What a tremendous cluster%^&$ that must have been.
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Those glass cockpit and fancy autopilots mush the brains of pilots, the more glass time you have the less you react to basic airmanship. The worst F/Os we have on the Metros are the 2000h CFIs & 5000h+ jet/glass pilots :bolt:
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I think I recall hearing about this on seconds from disaster, or something similar (http://www.cod1.co.uk/forum/images/smilies/s6/ScratchHead.gif)
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Makes me sick, honestly. The day I found out AB's fly-by-wire dual controlls were unsynchronised I knew this was only a matter of time before one idiot would get the other driver and the rest of their passengers killed. :(
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Makes me sick, honestly. The day I found out AB's fly-by-wire dual controlls were unsynchronised I knew this was only a matter of time before one idiot would get the other driver and the rest of their passengers killed. :(
Oh please...
The airplane didn't kill anyone.
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Oh please...
The airplane didn't kill anyone.
think george carlin said once: the day the make airplanes of the same stuff they make black boxes, nobody would die in airplane accidents.
semp
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think george carlin said once: the day the make airplanes of the same stuff they make black boxes, nobody would die in airplane accidents.
semp
That'd be a pretty frikkin heavy airplane.
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That'd be a pretty frikkin heavy airplane.
With enough thrust a refrigerator will fly. Not well nor far, but it will fly.
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Is there no stall buffet in an Airbus? No stick shaker?
I was in the last KC-135 instructor pilot class to practice stall recognition. The plane was slowed to just above stall speed. Airflow separation on wings would be felt on the elevator, starting with a tickle and progressing to 'elephants.'
The practice was stopped due to an unrelated incident. For the maneuver, the forward and aft body tanks had to be empty. While I was in training, a KC crew left an aft body pump on after the tank was dry. As they descended, the air got dense enough to provide the oxygen to the fuel fumes and overheated pump for an explosion that took the tail off. After that, forward and aft tanks were no longer allowed to be emptied, so stall recognition training was ceased.
Back to the Airbus, can't simulators simulate the stall vibrations? Certainly, loss of airspeed indications can and is practiced in simulators.
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you guys missed the part where the pilots thought that airplane's safety system would not allow a stall. except something about when it gets disconnected which the pilots failed to realize till it was too late. also they never realized one was pulling the stick up and the other pushing it down.
as sad as it is, out of every single airplane accident lessons are learned and safety improves a little more but in mho with every single new airplane safety lessons starts all over.
semp
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Here is a link showing the Airbus flight control laws. (http://www.airbusdriver.net/airbus_fltlaws.htm)
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Is there no stall buffet in an Airbus? No stick shaker?
- When CAS falls below 60 kt, the stall warning is inhibited (3rd interim report page 20). This may have contributed to the crew's confusion: while deeply stalled, no warning when the pilots are pulling on the sticks, but if they begin to push the nose down, the speed increases and AoA readings become valid again, triggering the stall warning
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I always feel uncomfortable in AB planes. Prefer to avoid them for this very reason. Too many lives have been lost due to this fly by wire automated control regime. Its totally unnecessary, no good.
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A force feedback stick certainly is no problem in AH.....
And they should have known how to detect the nose up attitude. As well as they knew that autopilot was disengaged.
Wouldnt want pilots with this slow-motion in a rough canyon-ride...
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Thing is they're still safer than the non-fly by wire airliners. Last time I checked the Airbus' had the best safety record of all airliners. No one had ever died in an A330 or 340 before Air France 447.
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Those glass cockpit and fancy autopilots mush the brains of pilots, the more glass time you have the less you react to basic airmanship. The worst F/Os we have on the Metros are the 2000h CFIs & 5000h+ jet/glass pilots :bolt:
I think by Worst you really mean, least experienced.
Back in the day when I got into airlines I was the most junior in terms of hours 3000 mostly pistion, and considered fortunate to be there, even then it was into a turbo prop. These days a lot of airlines the people in the right seat dont have any GA time expect for the basic licence. The only time you'll see experience is when there is a down turn and people lose their jobs.
Again, its training, not the plane.
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http://www.gamefront.com/files/20025877/Nova_-_Air_France_447_(by_apapele182).avi
http://www.megaupload.com/?d=3ZP5J0LN <- a very good BBC program that came out long before the NOVA version
Full episodes of the most likely cause.
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- When CAS falls below 60 kt, the stall warning is inhibited (3rd interim report page 20). This may have contributed to the crew's confusion: while deeply stalled, no warning when the pilots are pulling on the sticks, but if they begin to push the nose down, the speed increases and AoA readings become valid again, triggering the stall warning
How about physically? There is no stall buffet?
Every plane (Cessna 152, Cessna 172, T-37, T-38, KC-135) in which I have approached stall, there was obvious shaking that got more intense as the air separation increased. I've heard of some planes with no or little buffet having artificial shakers on the controls. I'm not talking about a horn. I'm talking about physics.
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They were in a thunderstorm...
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They were in a thunderstorm...
No one flies into a thunderstorm. Was their radar out?
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No one flies into a thunderstorm. Was their radar out?
Did you read the link in the first post? They flew INTO the storm. That was the first of many mistakes made by the crew.
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In the Commanche 250 there isnt much of a buffet.
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Did you read the link in the first post? They flew INTO the storm. That was the first of many mistakes made by the crew.
One expert speculated that there was a smaller cell that obscured the larger storm behind it. The pilots, not seeing the larger cell, made the ir choices based on the much smaller cell.
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dumb question, why aren't the flight instruments augmented by GPS instrumentation? It might not be as accurate but it'd be an easy backup system.
Last flight I was on I was watching our progress on google maps (yes Wifi/3G was off, the maps were cached) on my Android tablet - I got alt, heading, airspeed, all very accurate. And my garmin GPS I use while hunting can get coverage under dense push, in gullies, in heavily overcast weather.
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It would seem like the pilots failed to perform standard speed and pitch procedure as they battled to stay wings level. Too much chaos in the cocpit probably made them overlook the engine thrust indicator level as they focused too much on their artificial horizon and solving other problems..
Dual stick inputs did not actually help, one pilot might have tried to gain airspeed and the other focused on keeping the nose high.. While none of them increased thrust.. Lack of proper training, and ontop of that lack of communication in the final minute of flight I think..
Pretty idiotic placed thrust indicators on that plane I might add, if it were placed up in view they might have noticed the problem and been able to solve it.. :noid
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Whatever happened to using DME to find your groundspeed?
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Whatever happened to using DME to find your groundspeed?
Which DME signals would they be picking up in the middle of the ocean?
GPS and IRS.
The solution for what happened is fly a "that's about right" pitch attitude with a "that's about right" power setting and accept deviations from planned speed and altitude until such time you regain reliable instrument indication.
Throw in a thunderstorm, bells and chimes, warning messages, autoflight kicking off, a stall recovery technique inappropriate for the conditions of the airplanes control software and light shined intona big black hole overlooked by the training/experience of the crewmembers sitting there web this all happened and you have an accident.
They didn't do really anything right. The French (and Brazilian) way if doing things says point fingers and lay blame. Well that's on Air France and this crew.
The bigger question is "why?". And bigger yet "how do we prevent it?"
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My point is that there are many devices that will read out plane speed.
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My point is that there are many devices that will read out plane speed.
Yeah. These guys had groundspeed information, GPS derived, right in front of them.
All the ADCs could have taken a dump at the same time and it shouldn't effect the outcome of the flight. All of these elements came together (weather, fatigue, disorientation, unreliable indications and an unfamiliar flight control mode) to kill what you would call an experienced crew during the least hazardous phase of flight.
This wasn't a single point failure by any stretch of the imagination and data they already had didn't seem to help them.
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Oh please...
The airplane didn't kill anyone.
And how did you conclude that from my responce?
But I do agree - the airplane itself didn't kill anyone - some idiotic, inexperieinced, half-hashed company with an equaly talented engineering, design and R&D departments - riding in on their horse and some unporven but sternly touted belief that the way they do things is the only and best way in the world to do them.... yeah, they did it, and I hope they don't do it again, but they probabley will unless they decide to change the way they do things for the way it should be and the way it's been getting done for generations already.
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That's a nonsensical statement.
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How about physically? There is no stall buffet?
Every plane (Cessna 152, Cessna 172, T-37, T-38, KC-135) in which I have approached stall, there was obvious shaking that got more intense as the air separation increased. I've heard of some planes with no or little buffet having artificial shakers on the controls. I'm not talking about a horn. I'm talking about physics.
plane has no stall buffet it has a stall alarm. it clearly says that. reasoning is because airplane was designed to not stall in normal law once the autopilot disconnected they were in alternate law in which the airplane could stall, but because of training they probably didnt know it.
but basically the airplane crashed because one of the copilots had pulled on the stick when the autopilot disengaged trying to climb while thinking that the plane was not able to stall due to it being in normal law. both pilots failed to realize that in alternate law you can stall the airplane, anyway towards the end one was pushiing down on the stick while the other was pulling up basically cancelling each other, not untill the end one took control by then it was too late as it tried to get speed to keep from crashing.
basically two co pilots not talking to each other and believing wrongly that their airplane could not stall. it all comes back to training.
semp
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And how did you conclude that from my responce?
But I do agree - the airplane itself didn't kill anyone - some idiotic, inexperieinced, half-hashed company with an equaly talented engineering, design and R&D departments - riding in on their horse and some unporven but sternly touted belief that the way they do things is the only and best way in the world to do them.... yeah, they did it, and I hope they don't do it again, but they probabley will unless they decide to change the way they do things for the way it should be and the way it's been getting done for generations already.
When it comes to experience there is little to choose between Airbus and Boeing. The only difference is that Boeing has had the same name the last century. When you fly in a new "Boeing" you're flying a BoeingMcDonnelDuglasGrummanNo rthAmericanPiaseckiStearmanAu toneticsDeHavillandAustralia. When you're flying in an "Airbus" you're actually in a DassaultBritishAeroSpaceSuper marineVickersArmstrongsMesser schmittBölkovBloomDornierFockeWulfHeinkelJunkersConstruccionesAeronáuticasAérospatialeMatra.
The Airbus' are actually distant relatives of the Spitfire, Bf109 and Fw190 :aok